Comrade consumer: Economic and technological images of the West in the definition of the Soviet future 1957-1969 by Nettleton, Nordica Thea
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
https://theses.gla.ac.uk/ 
 
 
 
 
Theses Digitisation: 
https://www.gla.ac.uk/myglasgow/research/enlighten/theses/digitisation/ 
This is a digitised version of the original print thesis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Copyright and moral rights for this work are retained by the author 
 
A copy can be downloaded for personal non-commercial research or study, 
without prior permission or charge 
 
This work cannot be reproduced or quoted extensively from without first 
obtaining permission in writing from the author 
 
The content must not be changed in any way or sold commercially in any 
format or medium without the formal permission of the author 
 
When referring to this work, full bibliographic details including the author, 
title, awarding institution and date of the thesis must be given 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Enlighten: Theses 
https://theses.gla.ac.uk/ 
research-enlighten@glasgow.ac.uk 
Comrade Consumer:
Economic and Technological Images of the West in the Definition of
the Soviet Future 1957-1969
By
Nordica Thea Nettleton 
MA, University of Alberta, 1999 
BA Honours, University of Alberta, 1996
THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF 
THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
In the Department 
Of
Central and East European Studies
University of Glasgow 
August 2006
All rights reserved. This work may not be reproduced in whole or in part, by 
photocopy or other means, without permission of the author
ProQuest Number: 10390647
All rights reserved
INFORMATION TO ALL USERS 
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a com p le te  manuscript 
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed,
a note will indicate the deletion.
uest
ProQuest 10390647
Published by ProQuest LLO (2017). Copyright of the Dissertation is held by the Author.
All rights reserved.
This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States C ode
Microform Edition © ProQuest LLO.
ProQuest LLO.
789 East Eisenhower Parkway 
P.Q. Box 1346 
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106- 1346
G la sg o w  Y 
ONIVERSITV vLlBftARY;
ABSTRACT
The goal of the Soviet government in the 1950s and 1960s was not to 
emulate the political or economic system of the Western capitalist democracies; it 
was to overtake them in terms of the provision of wealth; a wealth that was to be 
equitably distributed and to which social programmes were implicitly understood to 
belong. Positive statements about the economic and technological successes of the 
West, particularly as they pertained to the Soviet future, were means by which 
individuals and the state could share a language and established a common ground 
for discussion while pursuing interests that met and diverged. Criticism of the 
current material reality within the USSR fell within the realm of permitted dissent. 
Thus, consumption served as both a prime motivational factor and a safety valve for 
releasing the pressure of discontent.
Soviet failure to maintain the belief that the communist system was capable 
of providing a socially acceptable level of consumerism while the government still 
purported Marxist ideology, resulted in the social acceptance of modernisation and 
consumerism, both intiinsically linked with the West, as the most favourable 
objective but devoid of the belief that the Soviet system was best able to achieve 
this. The positive information about the West which was intended to motivate 
Soviet citizens, instead served to provide them with an alternative means of 
achieving their future objectives.
The de-stabilising effect of Party permitted information affected Soviet 
society on multiple levels and was introduced through numerous means. This study 
is an examination of the introduction of the economic and technological ideas as 
they entered Soviet discourse through official statements in the form of speeches, 
newspaper articles, books etc.; through cultural diplomacy in the form of 
exhibitions; and through science and technology, specifically the SCST and the turn 
key factory AVTOVAZ. Taken together, these image conduits resulted in the 
creation of a mythical other; that is to say externally and internally constructed 
image of the West that was to challenge the economic legitimacy of the Paity’s 
leadership and to call into question the goals of the communist system.
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Introduction: The Provision Of All Life’s Comforts
Paradise is a place where people want to end up, not a place they run from.
(Nikita Khrushchev)!
The Thaw was not about freedom but about ‘a period o f striving to legitimate 
the socialist project, while recoiling from the horrific excesses o f Stalinism. ’2
(Victor Buchli)
Introduction
From its inception, Soviet Russia strove to achieve technological and 
economic parity with the West. The Soviet future was the West minus social 
injustices and plus a Russian soul. While Soviet economic ‘superiority’ could be 
bolstered by social, moral and cultural successes, it remained dominated by 
production and consumption. Early on in Soviet history, the objective of instilling 
the masses with socialist ideals and morality was dominated by industrialisation. 
Through industrialisation a Soviet society was to be built; and the Soviet Union was 
to establish parity with and eventually superiority over the West. This focus on 
production was to place enormous stress on the Soviet system.3
The economic momentum begun under Khrushchev’s leadership was to fade 
into the early years of the Brezhnev leadership and the comparative sense of 
aspirational deprivation that resulted can be attributed to two sources: a failure to 
achieve a fictitious future fast enough and a failure to compete with external 
comparators.4 In 1959, the US government analyst Hans Haymann Jr. observed that 
‘since about the middle of last year, and particularly coincident with the launching 
of the new 7-Year Plan, which was in itself an aberration from the usual 5 Year Plan, 
the prestige-laden objective of ‘catching up with America’ has been rapidly 
transformed by Khrushchev from a mere propaganda slogan into something
1 Nikita Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers: The Glasnost Tapes (Boston: Brown and 
Little, 1990) 203.
2 Victor Buchli, An Archaeology of Socialism (Oxford: Berg, 1999) 138.
3 This need to surpass w as distinctive of Soviet socialism. While socialism in the W est has 
always been in competition with capitalism, it has not focused on the need to out-produce 
the capitalists. Indeed, many Western socialists simply replaced the optimal production 
value with other values, for example more humane or environmentally sound principles, 
thus effectively removing Western socialism from the industrial rat race.
4 The term aspirational derivation can be attributed to Katherine Verdery. S ee  Katherine 
Verdery, What W as Socialism and What C om es Next? (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1992)
approaching a national obsession.’5 Although it was clear that a race was to be won,
the benchmarks of success were fluid, fluctuating from per capita output, to total
output, etc., and the finish line was a Soviet future that bore a striking resemblance
to a cultured and just American dream. As late as 1981, the writer Alexander
Zinoviev, bemoaned it:
On top of everything else, there’s abroad. Oh, if only it didn’t exist! Then 
we’d be through in two ticks. But over there they keep on inventing things, 
and we’re obliged to keep up with the competition, to prove our superiority. 
We hardly have time to steal one machine from them before we have to start 
thinking about the next. By the time we’ve introduced something, it is out of 
date already. 6
This focus on comparability resulted in a culture that required technological and 
economic comparison to define itself.
This study examines the information sources upon which images and 
perceptions were based: the forms in which information was communicated; the 
pervasiveness of its dissemination; and the blurring of the line official line of Cold 
War hostilities in order to create serviceable economic and technological images of 
the West that were to help define the Soviet future. Christopher William Smart has 
proposed that it is ‘through the more passive medium of the ill formed public 
opinions that images are at their most influential’ in the Soviet Union.? hnages do 
not occur in an information void. There must be sufficient information (or 
misinformation) upon which to formulate them. The intensity of interest in things 
Western and Westerners in the post-WWII Soviet Union is indicative of sufficient 
information to create an image but insufficient to sate curiosity.s The level of public 
discourse is indicative of a relatively high level of state tolerance, as a public image 
must make the transition from a private thought to one that is shaied.9
As mass consumption, consumer goods, and industrialisation are prominent 
features of post WWII America, and as Russia (Soviet or otherwise) has historically 
defined itself at least in part in relation to the West, it is not surprising that the
5 Philip Hanson, The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Economy (Harlow: Longman, 2003) 72.
6 Alexander Zinoviev. The Yawning Heights (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1981) 513-514.
7 Christopher William Smart, The Imagery of Soviet Foreign Policy in W est Europe (Ann 
Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1992) 1.
8 S ee  any of a number of Shlapentokh’s sociological surveys, som e of the first permitted in 
the Soviet Union.
9 Kenneth E Boulding, The image: Knowledge in Life and Society (New York: Ann Arbor, 
1956), 14.
absorption of a defined economic image of the West would be a significant aspect of 
the Soviet decision making process. Soviet leaders could represent Western 
modernisation as positive while not running counter to Marxism-Leninism. This is 
not to say that the positive economic image was not potentially destabilising. The 
confines of economic determinism and the legitimisation of the Communist Party 
rule rested on its ability to provide an equitable and superior standard of living, 
thereby magnifying the intensity or scale of the economic mirror image. Those 
individuals who were supposed to be the staunchest defenders of communism were 
often those who were exposed to the most positive aspects of the alternative system 
of capitalism, lo
The present study examines the function of the Communist Party of the Soviet 
Union (CPSU) in the creation of a technological and economic image of the West 
from 1957 to 1969 that was to help define the Soviet future. The main research 
question is: What was the mythical other and how did it and its creation impact 
Soviet society? This main question is composed of several subsidiary questions. 
What were the economic and technological images of the West? How was the 
Soviet Union defining itself in economic and technological terms post WWII and 
what was the impact of the mythical other on Soviet society’s view of itself and its 
future? Who participated in the building of the mythical other and why? How was
10 Mass production Is dependent on m ass consumers. Be the consumer governments, 
other industries, or individuals, they must subscribe to the belief that allows m ass  
production to perpetuate itself: that change is beneficial. This Is a learnt social norm and a 
high tolerance for change distinguishes the late 20'*^  century from other eras. While the 
term ‘new’ implies a concrete state. It has a conceptual meaning implying a state of 
perpetual acquisition of goods and services. The life span of employment, technology, 
objects and trends has been drastically reduced over the centuries and now the em phasis is 
as much on the concept of new as it is on the object or event itself. This half-life of goods is 
not tied simply to their utility, but relativises the modernity and function of a good with that of 
su ccessor models or technologies. This allows a shift whereby consumptive behaviour is 
limited largely by wealth and only to a lesser degree by desire or necessity. The acquisition 
of the ‘new’ acts as a temporal seg u es to the future. This perpetual acquisition must be 
accepted as beneficial, and as necessary, as fundamental to a better standard of living and 
the status of the individual as modern. The general social change from industrialisation 
(machines and technology are durable) to modernisation (both the durability and the 
desirability of long term durability are diminished) is often indicative of a nation having co­
adopted the social ethos of m ass consumption. This transformation is most apparent in 
large consumer durables such as automobiles and refrigerators. O penness to accept new  
economic and technical developm ents, to be In a perpetual state of consumption has been  
greatest in the W est. For a further discussion of the concept of what is new and its 
relationship to present reality and the future s e e  Jan Ola-Ostman ‘Pragmatic makers of 
Persuasion,’ Propaganda. Persuasion, and Polemics ed. Jeremy Hawthorn, (London: 
Edward Arnold, 1987) chapter 6, 138.
this image built and who adopted it? What effect did the mythical other have on the 
comrade consumer? A premise of this thesis is that there is something profound in 
saying to a citizen of a country where the rapid development of the means of 
production and production techniques with the objective of fully satisfying the 
demands of all members of society is a prime objective, that superior technology 
and better standards of living exist in another socio-economic system. Under the 
early Bolsheviks and Stalin large-scale industrialisation took precedence over 
modernisation! 1. However, the Post-War era necessitated that the Soviet Union both 
industrialise and modernise. The crux came in the late 1950s, when the residual 
effects of the Great Patriotic War had lessened, and a pervading sense of uneasy 
stability in the international situation arose.
An enduring myth of the Cold War is that the Soviet government did not 
permit access to information about the West, an information iron curtain, and that 
the information that was provided was derogatory and negative. While a great deal 
of research has been conducted on the concurrent negative image of the West and on 
non-official images, for example the West in samizdat literature, there is a 
comparative dearth of reseaich into positive, primarily economic and technological, 
official images and public reception of this image. This is due, in part, to the 
commendations having co-existed with the more salacious vilification of the West, 
in pait due to Cold War politics in which positive images failed to fit into the 
polarisation of the two world systems, and in part due to the need for the passing of 
time and eras before historical research can begin. The purpose of this study is to 
contribute to a growing body of research on western influences in the Soviet Union 
during the Cold War. Specifically, the rise of the comrade consumer and the effect 
of economic and technological images of the West as part of the Soviet future will 
be examined. This is not a study of those who were stepping outside of the official 
confines of the system, for this is a period in which a concerted attempt was made to 
create a comrade consumer. The question that remained to be answered was how to 
meld the consumer, as the embodiment of materialism, choice, modernity, mass 
consumption and recipient of rapid technological change, with the comrade. The
11 For an in-depth study of the relationship between workers, factory and state during 
the 1920s and 1930s s e e  Sergei Zhuravlev, Malen’kie liudi i bol’shaia istoriia (Moskva: 
ROSSPEN, 2000). Five of the eight chapters focus on the foreign workers.
focus is on technological and economic images as these were of prime importance 
both in Communist ideology and internationally in the post WW II era. National 
prestige and success were equated with mass production and cutting edge 
technology. J. D. Parks has argued that Khrushchev’s faith in the ability of the 
socialist system to compete with the capitalist system formed the basis for greater 
exchange with Western countries. 12 While Khrushchev was neither the first nor the 
last Soviet leader to espouse catching up with the West, he was arguably the most 
vocal.
The Khrushchev era was a period during which government and party officials 
were often resented for their elite status, which included their contact with 
foreigners, and their general consumption of things Western. They were also the 
people empowered to govern a socialist state. During the Brezhnev regime, the 
society’s moral expectations of the nomenklatura and apparatchiki was to 
degenerate to a level at which they were virtually absolved of ‘fulfilling the most 
important moral prescriptions, those of discipline and initiative.’ 13 This decrease in 
moral prescriptions was matched by an increase in economic expectations. In 
essence there was an inverse relationship between moral expectations placed on 
apparatchiki and the demand for higher personal standards of living. The decreased 
focus on moral objectives left the Party with primarily an economic mandate. 
Factored into the economic mandate was the belief that elsewhere economic 
aspirations were, at least for some, being better fulfilled. The predominance of the 
économie mandate and the belief in the existenee of a wealthy other led to 
aspirational deprivation; 14 a state in which demand was greater than supply. This 
was contrary to the regime’s motivational aspirations and self-image.
Today, the aspirations of modernity, the utilisation of ordinary means for the 
creation of the extraordinaij for the benefit of all, are generally regarded as 
nostalgic longing. Whether the Soviet leadership believed in its ability to fuse 
socialism and consumption, saw no alternative to attempting it, or had set aside 
communist ideology warrants discussion but is not a prime focus of this study for all
12 J. D. Parks, Culture. Conflict and Co-existence: American Soviet Cultural Relations. 
1917-1958 (London: McFarland, 1983) 3-4.
13 Vladimir Shlapentokh, Soviet Public Opinion: Ideology. Mvthoioav. and Pragmatism in 
Interaction (New York: Praeger, 1986) 67.
14 David Lane and Felicity O’Dell, The Soviet Industrial Worker: Social C lass. Education, 
and Control (Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1978) 137.
three alternatives result in the propagation of a positive image. 15 This image was to 
function as a ‘mythical other’. The mythical other was an economic and 
technological West that was constructed on several levels by divergent groups 
furthering often-contradictory interests. The combined images of Soviet tolerated 
Western images as well as official Soviet images of the West provided Soviet 
citizens with a body of information sufficient for the formulation of a concept of the 
West that was unique to the Soviet Union. While the West and the Soviet Union 
were proclaiming ‘irreconcilable ideological differences’ 16, they were co-operating, 
consciously or otherwise, in myth formation.
Were Soviet citizens more interested in consumer goods and material 
standards of living than in social, political and/or cultural comparisons? This study 
does not suppose that there was a lack of interest in political or cultural issues. 
However, interest both political and cultural issues lies outside the scope of this 
study as they often lay outside the bounds of permitted dialogue. While there were 
members of Soviet society, from Central Committee members to collective farm 
workers to dissidents who had an interest in the political systems of the West, there 
was no effective and accepted conduit for this information. However, an interest in, 
praise for, and aspirations of acquiring Western technology and economic norms did 
not lie outside the limits of permitted dissent,n as the state was both passively and 
actively involved in the cultivation and articulation of this image. The positive 
economic image was contextualised within another image, one that vilified the 
Western political system and scorned the Western cultural system. The inequities, 
injustices and inequalities of the West accompanied its phenomenal economic and 
technological achievements. The resulting paradoxical image of the West as unjust 
and war mongering while at the same time providing a cornucopia of consumer 
goods and luxurious living is one that has survived the Soviet Union. While the 
wealth and scientific/technological advancement of the West minus the evils of 
bourgeois democracy were once held up as an important aspect of the Soviet future.
15 A study addressing this issue is Stephen A. Resnick and Richard D, Wolff, Class Theory 
and History: Capitalism and Communism In the USSR (New York: Routledge, 2002).
I6T0  use a phrase from Slava Gerovitch, ‘Mathematical Machines of the Cold War: Soviet 
Computing, American Cybernetics and Ideological Disputes in the Early 1950s,’ Social 
Studies of Science 31/2 (April 2001) 253-287, 256.
17 This term is used by Dina Spechler in her work Permitted Dissent in the USSR Novvi m ir 
and the Soviet Regime (New York: Praeger, 1982) 4-5.
18 As quoted in Amanda Wood Aucoin, ‘Deconstructing the American Way of life: Soviet 
R esponses to Cultural Exchange and American Activity During the Khrushchev Years/ 
diss., University of Arkansas: 2001, 9. This researcher would use soul as opposed to spirit 
In the translation.
19 Shlapentokh, ‘The Changeable Soviet Image of America,’ American Political Science  
Review no. 5 (1988): 157-171, 157.
it was the fused image ‘Chicago 1930s’ that survived and served as the dominant 
image of the immediate Post-1989 Russian future.
The contradictory image of the West pictures a West that was successfully 
realising the consumerism of modernisation (and of globalisation) and was 
completely devoid of any soul. The retired Russian professor Mikhail Usatenko, an 
avid fan of Frank Sinatra and Western films, stated: ‘We always knew that you 
Americans had it better than we did in material things, but we thought that you had 
no spirit [soul].’ is Vladimir Shlapentokli has written along similar lines noting that 
the image of America as a bastion of consumerism and vanity escalated concurrent 
with a general increase in interests in material comfort in the Soviet Union: the 
‘image of Americans became a part of the mythological balancing within the Soviet 
mentality, with the claim to cultural superiority over Americans being used to 
rationalize the growing economic and technological gap between the two 
countries.’ i9 The changes in both political and economic policy with regaids to the 
West were to have a profound impact on the everyday life of Soviet citizens. It is 
not possible to separate Khrushchev’s calls to improve the daily life of average 
citizens from his activities in the international arena. The socio-cultural history of 
the Soviet Union cannot be understood without studying the impact of the economic 
opening towards the West. Similarly, the resonance of economic policy cannot be 
assessed without examining the impact that the policies were to have on Soviet 
society.
The goal of the Soviet government was not to emulate the political system of 
the Western capitalist democracies; it was to overtake them in terms of the provision 
of wealth; a wealth that was to be equitably distributed and to which social 
programmes were implicitly understood to belong. Difficulties in achieving these 
goals were to contribute to the backlash against the West and materialism that was 
so rampant in the 1970s and 1980s, notably amongst the intelligentsia. Thus, the 
Soviet leadership had set the terms for the debate. Calling for multi-paity elections 
was treason - calling for fashion alternatives, access to passenger cars, etc. was not.
The adoption of consumption as a social goal was a means by which members of the 
society could simultaneously follow the letter if not the spirit of government policy 
and pursue individual objectives that would contribute to the growth of the private 
sphere. As ‘a reward for prior austerity measures and an attempt to attain some 
semblance of normalcy, popular preoccupation with the private was imbued with a 
sense of citizenship’ .20
The political ramifications of the image include: alternative paths to 
socialism; the knowledge of another system succeeding where the Soviet system 
was failing; the growth of social discontent with economic progress despite 
economic growth; and the rise of the private sphere. The early Cold War period, 
that of the Khrushchev and early Brezhnev leaderships is of prime importance for 
the study of this phenomenon as this was the period when changes in technology 
permitted a rapid acceleration in the mass dissemination of information and 
increased contact with the West.21 It is the period when the Soviet population began 
to demand a level of parity with economically leading nations. Perhaps most 
importantly, it is the era in which both a finite objective, the creation of communism 
by 1980, is set for the Party and the state, and in which a comrade consumer and a 
mythical other are created.
Timeframe
This research encompasses a period between two highly symbolic events; the 
launching of Sputnik (04.10.1957) and the landing of the first man on the moon 
(20.07.1969). The launching of Sputnik into orbit has been taken as a beginning 
point for several reasons. Sputnik was the ultimate representation of technological 
progress in an era in which technological progress and modernisation were lauded. 
The Soviet Union, so long trailing Western states and so devastated by war, had
20 Christine G. Varga-Harris, ‘Green is the Colour of Hope?: The crumbling façade of 
Postwar b y f through the public eyes of Vecherniaia M oskva.'Canadian  Journal of History 
Vol. 34 (August 1999) 193.
21 Hitler, Roosevelt, and Churchill all used technology, for example the radio during the 
1930s and 1940s for the m ass dissemination of information/propaganda. Technology in the 
form of railways had also increased contact. However, the post WWII technological 
developments marked a rapid acceleration in the speed, accessibility, and breath of 
information dissemination.
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succeeded in leading the world to the heavens.22 As Khrushchev was to announce in 
his concluding remarks at the 22^ ^^  Party Congress: 'Sovetskii Soiuz seichas 
bukval’no i figurai’no shturmuet nebo’ (today, the Soviet Union is literally and 
figuratively storming the heavens). 2J The Soviet system appealed to be rocketing 
ahead of capitalist contemporaries. Soviet dominance in economics, technology, 
and in the provision of all life’s comforts, was plausible. The launching of Sputnik 
represented the zenith of Soviet optimism in an unlimited future. This research 
period ends not with a Soviet achievement but with an American one, the landing of 
Neil Armstrong on the moon. Falling outside of the standard delineation of the 
Thaw period, being post-Khrushchev, post-Hungarian revolution, post-Prague 
Spring and after the period of political liberalisation, it represents the end of the era 
of optimism. While it would be an overstatement to list the American success as 
representing a Soviet failure, the first moon landing highlighted the failures of the 
Soviet system to deliver, embodying not only the failure to perpetuate the 
momentum and successes of the space programme but also its failure to harness the 
optimism of 1957. Over time, Klirushchev’s promises of catching up with and 
overtaking the West, of burying the as yet unborn grandchildren of the United 
States, went from arrogant but not inconceivable to ludicrous. What was possible in 
1957 was laughable in 1969. If the Khrushchev era was the thaw after the frigidity 
of the Stalinist era, then this study marks the transition from a turbid yet potentially 
fertile period to the drought of stagnation.
As the period from 1957 to 1969 overlaps the Thaw era a few words on the 
nature of the Thaw are warranted. The commencement and termination of social 
phenomena and of natural phenomena are gradual events. The establishment of an 
economic image of the West is connected with, but not confined to, the Thaw era. 
The Thaw era, like the image of spring that it evokes, is difficult to temporally 
define. Should it be placed in the late Stalinist period as the groundwork for reform 
appears to have been laid by a reform enlightened bureaucracy that was willing but 
unable to implement limited reforms? Elena Zubkova’s work supports this line of
22 For a contemporary Soviet analysis of the role that Sputnik was to play in East-West 
relations se e  L. Ilyichov, T h e Sputniks and international relations,' International Affairs 3 
(1958) 7-18.
23 Nikita S. Khrushchev, Otchet tsentral'noqo komiteta kommunistlcheskoi partii Sovetskoqo  
Soiuza XXII S ”ezdu Partii (Moskva: Gospolitizdat, 1961) 185-186.
reasoning and she has written that ‘Stalin’s death alone introduced substantial 
adjustments in the relationship of people and government. As the chief link between 
them had disappeared, so did the harmony of their interests, and thus there was a 
progressive alienation of the two’ .24 The beginning of the Thaw can also be 
associated with First Secretary N. S. Klirushchev’s rise to power. By the time the 
Secret Speech was made at the 20'*^  Party Congress things were flowing. Part of the 
difficulty surrounding the temporal defining of this era is that the term Thaw 
encompasses several social, political and cultural changes, which, each taken 
separately, ebbed and flowed and taken together overlapped and separated. The 
years 1953, 1956, 1959, and 1962 act as milestones for the period. The end of the 
Thaw is as imprecise as its beginning. The Thaw period provided Soviet citizens 
with an inconsistent world full of change, anxiety and uncertainty that vied with 
optimism as the dominant cultural mood. Having introduced the subject and having 
presented the research questions, this chapter will now turn towards a historiography 
of the comrade consumer and the mythical other, the methodology used for this 
work and description of the following chapters,
A Historiography of the Comrade Consumer and the Mythical Other
The historiographical research for this work consists of several branches of 
research that combine to provide a not insignificant collection of sources. As is 
indicated in the title of this section, the works tend to fall into two separate 
categories, consumption in the USSR and the technological and economic image of 
the West. As there was interest in things Soviet during the Cold War era, there is a 
rather consistent source of solid secondary sources concerning Soviet economic and 
technological capabilities and Soviet politics. However, research pertaining to the 
mythical other and to the comrade consumer intensified during two distinct periods. 
The first period is during the 1950s and 1960s, when laymen and academics wrote 
on their personal and professional opinions of the USSR, its standard of living, 
economic developments and potential, East-West relationships and perceptions of 
each other. These sources aie interesting from a methodological viewpoint as there 
is a connection between primary and secondary sources. For example, when the
24 Elena Zubkova, Russia After the War: Hopes, illusions, and Disappointments. 1945-1957  
(New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1998) 153.
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historian Frederick Barghoorn wrote on Soviet images of the United States he was 
writing as both a historian and as US embassy staff in Moscow. The well-known 
British professor Mervyn Matthews has published both memoirs of his time in the 
Soviet Union (which include meeting his Russian born wife) and numerous 
academic works on the era in question.25 William Turpin, former US Foreign 
Service Officer and professor, was using the term ‘Soviet consumer’ in his works in 
the 1960s .26 One of the significant advantages of many of these ‘dual’ works is the 
ability to use them as a form of checks and controls against temporal perception 
changes. The charge that opinions and recollections are modified over time is 
legitimate and these sources provide the opportunity to compai’e 1950s and 1960s 
perceptions and academic assessments with research conducted in the 1990s and on. 
Two significant bodies of information from the 1950s and 1960s on Soviet public 
opinions were the Harvard Interview Study and Komsomol’skaia Pravda’s institute 
for public opinion.
The military stalemate of the Cold War meant that the government could 
expect to enter into long-term negotiations with the Post-War generation.
Significant insight into the nature of the Post-War generation was provided by the 
Harvard Interview Study (1953), one of the most influential Western undertakings to 
gather the opinions of Soviet citizens under the direction of Alex Inkeles and 
Raymond Bauer, in which recent emigrants from the USSR were interviewed and 
the numerous surveys conducted by the Institute for Public Opinion in Moscow.
The Harvard study was funded under the US Air Force contract No. 33(038)-12909 
and involved 2,700 questionnaires of former Soviet citizens in Europe and the USA, 
327 life history interviews, and a sub sample questionnaire of 700 individuals who 
had completed either or both the original questionnaire and an interview. Despite 
the inherent flaw that émigrés may not hold opinions that are representative of the 
masses who stayed, there appears to be little discrepancy when cross referenced 
with other interview projects and foreign commentaries based on conversations with 
Soviet citizens in the USSR. The main conclusions of the social processes 
examined can be summarised as:
25 Mervyn Matthews, Mila and Mervusva: a Russian Wedding {Bridgend: Seren, 1999).
26 William N. Turpin. T he Outlook for the Soviet Consumer,’ Problems of Communism no.6 
(1960) 30-37.
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1. Stalinism resulted in a hostile relationship between the public and the 
state, which had the potential to undermine the legitimacy of the 
Communist regime.
2. After the terror of Stalinism the next greatest source of discontent was
the low standard of living. This low standard of living was often 
attributed to the poor management of industrialisation and 
collectivisation.
3. Russia and Russian society had been changed from a predominately 
religious society to an industrialised urban society on the cusp of 
modernisation and the accompanying value shift from continuity and 
tradition to success and security had taken root.
4. The majority of the respondents were pleased with large sections of 
Soviet life, in particular the equity of some services, the development 
and accessibility of high culture, and the idea of social mobility.
5. Grievances were specific. The main grievances were the Terror, slow 
economic pace of development, and the current standai'd of living. Fault 
lay not in the concept of socialism but in its execution.
6. In te rv ie w e es  fe lt  th a t th e  le ad e rsh ip  h a d  ac ce p te d  th a t th e  S o v ie t p e o p le  
w an te d  an d  h a d  a  r ig h t to  an  ea s ie r  lifestyie.27
In the Har vard Project two of the top three grievances of individuals leaving the 
Soviet Union were economic in nature. A section of the survey involved standard of 
living and these findings illustrate the pre-existing discontent with the Soviet 
provision of amenities and commodities. Without terror to pacify the hostile 
population and with economic issues being of paramount importance, the 
communist government had little alternative but to attempt to rectify the economic 
situation. This is particularly relevant when the increased sense of self-worth and 
entitlement on the part of the average citizen is taken into consideration. The fourth 
conclusion of the study indicates that social negotiations were possible as most 
respondents were pleased with large sections of Soviet life.
From January to Maich 1961, Komsomol’skaia Pravda’s institute for public 
opinion conducted a survey titled ‘A Self-Portrait of the Young Generation’, in 
which 17, 446 Soviet citizens under the age of thirty paiticipated. Published in 
Komsomol’skaia Pravda, as well as in Western newspapers such as the Observer, 
Daily Telegraph, New York Herald Tribune, New York Times, Stuttgarter 
Nachrichten, Unita, Stampa, and L ’Humanité, the results of this study support the 
fourth conclusion of the Harvard Project. In response to the question what are the
27 Alex Inkeles and Raymond Bauer, The Soviet Citizen: Daily Life in a Totalitarian Society 
(New York: Atheneum, 1968) 380-382, 396.
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strongest features/characteristics of the Soviet youth the dominant responses were 
patriotism and a love for the rodina (32%), high moral standards (31%) and fidelity 
to the Party and the ideas of communism (22.1 %).2s A later study by Susan Reid 
supports the theory of the belief in the reformability of the Soviet state.29 The 
perception that the general standard of living was not improving is inconsistent with 
the general economic trend as seen in both the Soviet and American statistical 
information, which shows significant increases that were then to taper off. The CIA 
estimated that there was a 26.5 percent increase in per capita consumption between 
1953 and 1958 and 44.6 percent for 1953 to 1964.30 For as much as the Soviet 
Union’s economic advances constituted a comparative failure, in absolute terms 
there was a great deal of progress.3i Thus, the historiographical research shows a 
marked degree of consistency in findings over several decades of research.
For Bauer and Inkeles the fundamental question was ‘in what degree are the 
distinctive features of Soviet totalitaiianism compatible with the rest of the social 
structure we associate with large-scale industrial society?’32 Reflecting back on the 
1960s and projecting into the future David Lane wrote that the key challenge was 
how the political and economic system was to satisfy pragmatic economic 
considerations.33 If unable to meet this challenge, could the presence of an image of 
a system able to meet this challenge prove to be destabilising to the Soviet system? 
Ultimately unable to meet this challenge, was the Soviet Union destabilised by the 
presence within itself of an image of another system that was meeting the challenge?
After promising beginnings in the 1950s and 1960s there is a lull in research 
into public opinion and consumption until the 1990s, when primarily in the 
disciplines of sociology and social anthropology a concentration of studies into 
Soviet perceptions of the West and a focus on the theory of communism and 
consumption occurs. This is not to argue that researchers during the 1950s and the 
1960s did not address concepts of consumption in the Soviet Union, but it is in the 
1990s that a concentration of detailed theoretically grounded sociological and
28 B. A. Grushin, Chetvre zhizni Rossll: v zerkale oprosov obshchestvennogo mneniia 
(Moskva: Progress-Traditsiia, 2001) 179.
29 Susan Emily Reid, ‘Photography in the Thaw’, Art Journal Summer (1994) 33-40, 33.
30 Hanson, The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Economy 54, 65.
31 For more on the relative su c c e sse s  of the Soviet economy se e  Hanson, The Rise and 
Fail of the Soviet Economy 49.
32 Inkeles.The Soviet Citizen 384.
33 Lane, The Soviet Industrlai Worker 51.
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anthropological work appears. The lapse in time is due in large part to past 
limitations resulting in a scanty corpus of available source material; with the 
collapse of the Soviet Union the research situation was to change. The 
groundbreaking work of such academics as Victor Buchli (common artifacts in 
socialism), Penelope Harvey (the idea of nations communicating modernity through 
the presentation of goods, primarily exhibitions), the anthropologist Daniel Miller (a 
‘grandfather’ of the study of material culture, specifically automobiles), and 
Katherine Verdery (defining socialism and its successor) serves as a rich basis for 
further researchers in the field of the consumption and socialism.
According to Anthony Giddens, one of the promises of modernity is that it is 
without end and without limit. It has an inherently restless and mobile nature and a 
disposition to expand, change and discard the old that derives from the investment -  
profit -  investment cycle.34 Modernity requires that the consumer never be satisfied, 
that there always be something new on the purchasing horizon. Modernity is the 
antithesis of provincialism and the stability and continuity that is inherent in 
provincialism. The defining motifs of the early Post-War era, such as space travel 
that opened up the unlimited scope of the heavens for human exploration reinforced 
the concept of modernity. The need for unlimited consumption, ever changing, 
growing needs, and the focus on the individual were all integral concepts of the 
modem capitalist system.35 The competition and freedom associated with choice 
were embodied in consumption and personal freedom was expressed through 
consumption. Modernity and mass consumption are not synonymous, but the 
connection between the introduction of new goods and technology and the idea of 
being modern can be found throughout history.36 The anthropologist Daniel Miller 
has stated that ‘consumption is the key means of creating culture in the urbanised 
and industrialised societies of the modern world.’ 37 It seems improbable that 
Soviet modernity could have existed without attaching some significant importance 
to consumption.
34 Anthony Giddens, The C onsequences of Modernltv (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990) 11,
35 For more information on the logic of industrialism se e  Clark Kerr, John T. Dunlop et.al,. 
Industrialism and Industrial Man: The Problems of Labour and Management In Economic 
Growth (London: Heinemann, 1962).
36 Daniel Miller, Modernity: An Ethnographic Approach (Oxford: Berg, 1994) 203.
37 S ee  Daniel Miller, Material Culture and Mass Consumption (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 
1987).
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Several researchers from Resnick to Verdery have noted that the unlimited 
nature of modernity was an anathema to the Soviet state. Khrushchev’s statements 
about consumption are indicative that he believed not in the concept of 
modernisation (unlimited consumption) but in industrialisation and the concept of 
limited consumption.38 For example, in 1959 he stated that ‘[a] person cannot, for 
instance, consume more bread and other foods than his organism needs. There are 
also definite limits to the amounts of clothing and housing that can be used.’39 
Soviet modernity was to be distinguished by the notion of controlled consumption. 
Also known as ‘goulash socialism’, or ‘a different kind of consumer society’ the 
Communist Party attempted to redefine and to limit social expectations.40 One of 
the key aspects of this contract was the provision of ‘all life’s comforts’, a then 
ubiquitous term that is contradictory in principle to controlled consumption. During 
the 1990s sociologists and historians such as Susan Strasser and Matthias Judt 
embarked upon research into Post War consumer history comparing Europe, 
America and the former Soviet Union and addressing such issues as the relationship 
between consumerism and politics, the role of the state in consumption, the role of 
consumption in Cold War Politics, and the language of consumption in various 
social, political and cultural groups.41 In Art Historian Susan Reid’s recent works 
consumer durables and goods are used to illuminate the solidification of the idea of 
the consumer and consumption through her argument that the ‘main economic task’ 
was to demonstrate the superiority of the socialist system over the capitalist 
system. ’42 Perhaps the most important contribution that Verdery has made to date 
in terms of this research is the notion that as there is no constraint due to 
exploitation, the very process of socialist economic development fosters aspirational 
deprivation and a fixation on consumption. Verdery has argued that:
the regimes themselves paradoxically abetted the emphasis on consumption.
38 S ee  Verdery, What W as Socialism and What Com es Next?; or Resnick, Class Theory 
and History: Capitalism and Communism in the U SSR .
39 Nikita. S. Khrushchey, Pravda (02.10.1959) 2-3.
40 Both terms were widely used.
41 S ee  for example, Susan Strasser, Charles McGoyern and Matthias Judt eds. Getting and 
Spending: European and American Consumer Societies In the Twentieth Century 
(Cambridge: Cambridge Uniyersity Press, 1998).
42 Dayid Crowley and Susan E. Reid, ‘Style and Socialism: Modernity and Material Culture 
in Post-War Eastern Europe,’ in Style and Socialism: Modernity and Material Culture in 
Post-War Eastern Europe Eds., David Crowley and Susan E. Reid (Oxford: Berg, 2000) 1- 
24: 9.
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First, organised shortage made procuring something -  anything -  a major 
triumph. Second, even as the regimes prevented people from consuming by not 
making goods available, they insisted that under socialism the standard of living 
would constantly improve... Socialism...aroused desire without focusing it, and 
kept it alive by deprivation. That is, in socialism desire floated free in endless 
search of goods people saw as their right... The arousal and frustration of 
consumer desire and East Europeans’ consequent resistance to their regimes led 
them to build their social identities specifically through consuming.43
One of the basic tenets that will be forwarded in this research is that within the 
USSR, the idea of consumption was consumed more readily than the ever-scarce 
goods. One sociologist whose work is not confined to the post 1990s is Vladimir 
Shlapentokh. Trained as a sociologist in the Soviet Union, and one of a small group 
of sociologists who conducted surveys in the Soviet Union under Khrushchev, 
Shlapentokh’s work spans from the Khrushchev era to the present and provides 
numerous studies on Soviet society.44
In conjunction with the developments in the research of consumption in the 
USSR was an increased interest into the uses of culture during the Cold War. J. D. 
Parks, Walter Hixson, Frances Stonor Saunders, Stephen Whitfield and in a less 
direct manner Richard Stites, have all published works dealing with the politics of 
cultural contact.45 These works share the central theme that cultural and to the 
extent tliat economic contact could be cultural, economic contact served as the 
Trojan horses of the Cold War. Each of these works challenged the idea of a 
cultural iron curtain and put forward the concept of culture as a medium that is 
interconnected with other mediums such as economics or technology. Of the above- 
mentioned historians, only Parks published his groundbreaking work in the 1980s. 
Without exception, the above-mentioned historians acknowledged that these 
connections were recognised and often deliberately manipulated during the 1950s 
and 1960s. The argument that western failure to recognise the importance of 
Western economic standards in the construction of the mass perception of the Soviet
43 Verdery, What W as Socialism and What C om es Next? 25-26.
44 For example s e e  Vladimir Shlapentokh, T h e Changeable Soviet Image of America’; 
Soviet Intellectuals and Political Power: the Post-Stalin Era (London: I. B. Taurls and Co., 
1990) and Soviet Public Opinion.
45 S ee  for example Walter Hixson, Parting the Curtain: Propaganda. Culture and the Cold 
War: 1945-1961 (Houndmills: Macmillan press, 1998); Frances Stonor Saunders, Who Paid 
the Piper? The CIA and the Cultural Cold War (London: Cranta Books, 2000); Stephen 
Whitfield. The Culture of the Cold War (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991); 
and Richard Stites,. Russian popular culture: Entertainment and society since 1900 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).
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future resulted in the West failing to appropriately target a critical aspect of the Cold 
War has been forwarded by historians such as Walter Hixson. Hixson has written 
that the Americans in particular, far more concerned with militaiy preparations and 
closed-door politics, failed to respond accordingly and as such squandered energy 
and resources on a conventional war programme for a Cold War that was at its 
essence a struggle for the loyalty, the hearts and minds, of individuals.#
The aforementioned Vladimir Shlapentokh has written that the contradiction of 
images of the West translated into a contrary perception: ‘it is remarkable that even 
the most committed haters of the West and especially of America among 
Russophiles are convinced of the absolute scientific and technological superiority of 
the United States. ’47 A Khrushchev contemporary E. S. Varga displayed this 
contradictory nature in his published speech ‘Capitalism of Our Day’ in which he 
lamented the increases in capitalist output (five times since the turn of the century), 
and declared that the capitalist world had all the technology needed to free the world 
from ‘hunger, poverty and fear of the future’ if it was inclined to do so.4s This is in 
contrast to declarations of the maximisation of Soviet capacity that was resulting in 
the century being a ‘century of Marxist Leninist victories’ .49 Dina Khapaeva 
has written that the belief in a higher foreign standard of living was to remain a 
consistent aspect of Soviet social perceptions, arguing that Western influence 
increased dramatically in the 1950s, reaching its zenith between 1989-1993. 
Furthering her argument on the impact of images of the West, Khapaeva has ar gued 
that the ideal image of the West continues to coincide with the desired future.so 
Historian Martin Malia has defined two periods in Russian history where 
international forces were at their most significant in Russia. The first was from the 
accession of Peter the Great until 1815, and the second was from the battle of 
Stalingrad in 1943 until the 1980s. During both periods, the state attempted to 
counterbalance the relative poverty of Russia by importing high levels of external
46 Hixson, Parting the Curtain 232-233.
47 Shlapentokh, T h e Changeable Soviet Image of America,’ 163.
48 E. S. Varga, 'An Analysis of the Evolution and Trends of Capitalism,’ Current Digest of 
the Soviet Press vol.12 no.4 (1960) 3-9, 5.
49 Nikita S. Khrushchev, Za novve pobedv mirovoao kommunistlcheskoao dvizhenlla 
(Moskva: Gospolltlzdat, 1961) 6.
50 Dina Khapaeva, ‘L’Occldent Sera Demain,’ Annales HSS November-December no.6 
(1995) 1259-1270, 1268.
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technological and scientific knowledge.si
In her study of 1930s Vechemiaia Moskva, Sheila Fitzpatrick coined the 
phrase ‘life as it was becoming’ to refer to the phenomena of illuminating the 
utopian and bountiful future.52 Images of this future were often based on the reality 
of other countries. In Christine Varga-Harris’ examination of World War II and 
Post-War articles in Vechemiaia Moskva, she noted that a prominent theme was 
‘living in peace and contentment’ and that Muscovites were to interpret the right to 
peace and contentment as the right to ‘decent housing, high quality inexpensive 
consumer goods, and adequate and respectful service... demands were made in the 
language used by the state and Pai ty, and justified in the very terms used by the 
authorities. ’53 Soviet failure to meet these demands and its failure to maintain the 
belief that the communist system was capable of providing a socially acceptable 
level of consumerism resulted in a situation where the society accepted 
modernisation and consumerism as the most favourable objective but was devoid of 
the belief that the Soviet system was best able to achieve this. Instead of motivating 
citizens, the positive information about the West provided them with an alternative 
means of achieving their economic objectives.
Consumption is the act of an individual, and its social prominence increases in 
relation to the empowerment of the individual. Two works on the historical impact 
of consumption in Europe in which the ideas of national identity and 
Americanisation/globalisation during the 1950s and 1960s are present and that speak 
to the international aspect of the phenomena of adopting a mythical other are the 
works of Reinhold Wagnleitner in his work on American consumer culture in Post 
Wai* Austria and Erica Gaiter’s study of the role that West German women played 
by internalising consumption and melding it into an essential aspect of the new West 
German identity.54 Both these studies attest to the creation of an image of the 
industrial, modern, and technologically advanced abroad that was to play a role in
51 Martin Malia, Russia Under Western Eves: From the Bronze Horseman to the Lenin 
Mausoleum (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1990) 415.
52 Sheila Fitzpatrick, The Cultural Front: Power and Culture in Revolutionary Russia (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1992), 223-224.
53 Christine Varga-Harris, ‘Green Is the Colour of Hope?: The crumbling façade of Postwar 
byt through the public eyes of Vechernlala Moskva,’ Canadian Journal of History. Vol. 34 
(August 1999) 193-219, 217.
54 S ee  Erica Carter, How German Is She? (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1997); 
Relnhold Wagnleitner, Cocacolonization and the Cold War (Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press, 1994).
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the national understanding of self. Along the same lines, Elena Zubkova has argued 
that through the struggles of the Great Patriotic War there was the creation and an 
intensification of civic spirit, responsibility and self worth that was to contribute to 
the creation of the Soviet consumer.55 Elena Zubkova was not the only researcher to 
argue that WWII lent itself to the alteration of the self perception of Soviet society, 
Ludmilla Alexeyeva and Paul Goldberg have argued that as from the masses a 
collection of citizens arose; a “ collective’ of faceless people could not have won the 
wai'.. .they acted as citizens.’56
Shifting from West Germany and Austria to East Germany and placing 
economic and technological systems and artefacts within a social, cultural and 
political context are the works of, for example, Raymond G. Stokes, André Steiner, 
and Ina Merkel. In Constructing Socialism, Stokes examines the communist 
inability in East Germany to join the high-powered post wai' German technology 
with Soviet ‘dedication’ to technological development to produce internationally 
credible and competitive results.57 In his edited work Überholen ohne einzuholen: 
Die DDR- Wirtschaft als Fufinote der deutschen Geschichte? Steiner gives attention 
to a main challenge of the Socialist system: how to realise the smallest of changes in 
such a manner as to neither call into question the credibility and viability of the 
whole or to act as the impetus for uncontrollable change.58 Highly complex and 
theoretical discussions of ‘the social construction of technological systems’ can be 
found in the similarly named compilation of historical and sociological works. The 
main themes of this compilation include: the relationship between science and 
technology; the role of science and technology in broadening existing culture; the 
role of the artefact in culture and with various social groups (this idea is present in 
much of the sociological writing on consumption); the concept of the technological 
system as an evolutionary system that has adapted over time to most efficiently 
provide for a society and thus the inherent difficulty in consuming new technology 
and technological systems without modification; and technology as a social product
55 Zubkova, Russia after the War 11-19.
56 Ludmilla Alexeyeva and Paul Goldberg, The Thaw Generation: Coming of Age In the 
Post Stalin Era (Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1990), 28.
57 Raymond G. Stokes, Constructing Socialism: Technology and Change In East Germany. 
1945-1990 (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000).
58 André Steiner, Überholen ohne einzuholen: Die DDR-Wirtschaft als FuBnote der 
deutschen Geschlcte? (Berlin: Ch. Links Verlag, 2006).
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that cannot be isolated from the economic, political and social milieu in which it is 
developing.59 The idea that the Cold War shaped and was shaped by science and 
technology is particulaiiy well articulated in these works. There is a striking pattern 
of confrontation and manipulation of consumption and images based around 
technology and economics common to the works on Austria, West and East 
Germany that speak to the Soviet myth building process being both unique to the 
Soviet Union and part of a larger international movement. A comparative study 
between Soviet bloc countries (East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary) in 
which calls to catch up with and overtake or, to overtake without catching up as was 
the slogan in East Germany, and Soviet Russia would provide for an interesting 
comparison in terms of what images were introduced, why they were introduced, 
and what role they performed in the shaping of a national vision of the future. One 
of the aspects that makes the compai'ison interesting was the Moscow habit of 
projecting some nations, such as Czechoslovakia, simultaneously as an obtainable 
periphery of the mythical other and a key part of the Soviet bloc, while the nations 
themselves were purporting to a similar duality for entirely different purposes falls 
outside the delineations of this study.
Required reading for historians studying the relationship between technology 
and Soviet authority are the numerous works by Paul R. Josephson, Alexander 
Vucinich, David Holloway and Loren Graham in which the discussion of science 
and technology as objective truth about nature (scientific realism) and science as a 
product of socio-economic and political forces (social constructivism) is 
examined.6o Graham has argued that despite science serving as a protective enclave
59 Wiebe E. Bijker, Thomas P. Hughes, and Trevor Pinch eds, The Social Construction of 
Technological Systems: New Directions in the Socioloqv and History of Technology 
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 1989).
60 S ee  for example Paul R. Josephson, Totalitarian Science and Technology. (New York: 
Humanity Books, 2005); New Atlantis Revisited: Akademqorodok. the Siberian City of 
Science. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997); Paul R. Josephson, ‘Projects of the 
Century, Soviet History: Large Scale Technologies from Lenin to Gorbachev.’ Technology 
and Culture Vol.36. No.3 (July 1995), 519-59; Alexander Vucinich, Empire of Knowledge: 
The Academy of Sciences of the USSR (1917-1970). (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1984); David Holloway, ‘Physics, the State, and Civil Society in the Soviet Union,’ 
Historical Studies In the Physical and Biological Sciences. Vol.30, I (1999), 173-92; and 
Loren R. Graham, What Have W e Learned About Science and Technology from the 
Russian Experience?. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998). In the ca se  of 
Totalitarian Science and Technology, the first edition is of more use to the student of Soviet 
history than the second as in the second the totalitarian system s Is expanded from the 
original Soviet and Nazi study to include North Korean and Cuban studies.
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against the politics of the Soviet Union, the dependence of scientific and 
technological development on the Soviet government resulted in the procuring of 
funding to be more important than autonomy. Vucinich has looked at the campaigns 
and public discourse in which intellectuals were attacked for ideas of idealism, 
formalism, cosmopolitanism, and kowtowing before the West, and concluded that 
intellectual freedom in the field of science and technology was subjugated to 
ideology.61 The argument that science and technology were relatively independent 
of politics was also posited by David Holloway who sees a range of intellectual 
independence with the ultimate being conferred upon the closed defence 
laboratories. Two historians who have argued that a symbiotic relationship existed 
include Mark Adams with his argument of a flexible, continuous form of negotiation 
between Party and scientists, and Nikolai Ki'ementsov with his theory of ‘cultural 
unification’ in the shared public rituals, didactics, and institutional structures.62 
Josephson steps outside of the aigument about the essentially democratic and 
confrontational nature of science and technology and calls for the objective 
examination of governmental impacts on science and scientific policy as science and 
to this end also technology, was a tool with which to transform not only nature but 
society, politics, and culture. ‘Authoritarian regimes use film, radio, and print 
media to shape and direct citizens’ beliefs no less than housing, public 
transportation systems, and monuments.’63 Another important theme for Josephson 
is how authoritarian regimes seek to implement rapid
industrialisation/modernisation in economies in which resource allocation is top 
down and not bottom up. In Technology and Communist Culture: The Socio- 
Cultural Impact o f Technology under Socialism edited by Frederic Fleron, 
technology is examined in its role of ensuring the Soviet regime’s ability to deliver, 
and the conclusion is drawn that any failure to provide would contribute to a
61 Vucinich, Empire of Knowledge: The Academy of Sciences of the USSR (1917-1970) 
chapter four.
62 S e e  Mark B. Adams, ‘Science, Ideology and Structure; The Kol’stov Institute, 1900-1970,’ 
in Linda L. Lubrano and Susan Gross Solomon eds., The Social Context of Soviet Science  
(Boulder, Westvlew Press, 1980) 173-204 and Nikolai Krementsov, Stalinist Science 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997), 6.
63 Josephson, Totalitarian Science and Technology 15.
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reduction in the regime’s legitimacy.64 This interplay between government and 
scientists and industry is also seen in the aforementioned works of Stokes and 
Steiner.
To be Western meant having a high standard of living, as represented by the 
newest consumer products. It meant mass-produced jeans, computers, radios, frozen 
and instant food products, polyester clothing, the biggest and fastest cars, and rock 
and roll. The crux of the matter for the Soviet Union became, could culture be 
separated from technology? Could technological development be separated from 
what is so quintessentially Western, the drive for consumer goods, and the faith in 
the system that provides for these developments?65 Is the culture that has arisen in 
the West one which is formed by technology or does culture form technology? If 
technology and culture are inseparable, then the importation of Western technology 
into the Soviet Union had the potential to introduce non-socialist societal and 
cultural change. Technology and industrialisation were integral aspects of Soviet 
ideology. Technology is also an integral aspect of democratic capitalism. Did this 
common denominator provide a basis for comparison? Culture and technology are 
the objects that display economic and political power. Penelope Harvey has argued 
that the inclusion of technology extends further back into Western society than the 
consumerism of American society that became so dominant in the 1950s. She notes 
that Western liberal tradition is founded on the idea of a ‘modernity that was built 
upon the idea of progress through the scientific establishment’ and the creation of 
the ‘domains of cultural homogeneity and continuity’ which one can trace back to 
19th Century Britain and Europe.’66 Frederic Fleron has explained the link between 
technology and culture stating that ‘[a]s an artefact of human experience, technology 
must be viewed as an element of culture. The process of technical transfer, can be 
viewed as an aspect of the more general process of cultural diffusion.’67 During the 
1990s, Hilary Pilkington defined the Soviet concept of culture as ‘not simply the
64 Frederick Fleron, ‘Introduction,’ Frederick Fleron ed.. Technology and Communist 
Culture: The Soclo-Cultural Impact of Technology under Socialism (New York: Praeger 
Publishers, 1977).
65 S ee  Carter, How German Is S h e? . Wagnleitner, Cocacolonization and the Cold War: 
Mary Louise Roberts, ‘Gender, Consumption, and Commodity Culture,’ The American 
Historical Review vol. 103 Issue 3 (1998), 817-844.
66 Penelope Harvey, Hybrids of Modernity: Anthropology, the Nation State, and the 
Universal exhibition (London: Routledge, 1996), 99.67 Fleron, ‘Introduction,’ 11.
22
p r o d u c t  o f  t h e  i n t e r a c t io n  b e t w e e n  p e o p l e  a n d  n a tu r e  [ th e  a r t e f a c t s  o f  e v e r y d a y  l i f e ]  
n o r  t h e  t r e a s u r e  t r o v e  o f  t h a t  w h i c h  i s  v a lu e d  b y  s o c i e ty  o f  t h e  d a y ,  i t  w a s  r a t h e r  th e  
s p h e r e  o f  t h e  l i v i n g  in t e r a c t io n  o f  s o c i e t y  a n d  i t s  s u b j e c t s . ’68 A s  a  p h e n o m e n o n  o f  
m a n ’ s e x i s te n c e ,  t e c h n o l o g y  i s  a  p a r t  o f  S o v i e t  c u l t u r e  a n d  s o c ie ty .  P a r k s ’ s tu d y  o f  
c u l t u r a l  r e l a t i o n s  h a s  r e v e a l e d  t h a t  i t  w a s  o n l y  i n  r a r e  c i r c u m s t a n c e s  o f  e x t r e m e  
p o l i t i c a l  c o n f l i c t  t h a t  C o l d  W a r  c u l t u r a l  c o n n e c t i o n s  w e r e  s u s p e n d e d  en mass&,69 
E v e n  i n  n a t i o n s  t h a t  h a v e  r e j e c t e d  l i b e r a l  d e m o c r a t i c  f o r m s  o f  g o v e r n m e n t ,  
i n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n  a n d  m o d e r n i s a t i o n  h a v e  o c c u r r e d  th r o u g h  th e  i n c o r p o r a t i o n  o f  
c a p i t a l i s t  p r a c t i c e s  a n d  h a v e  r e s u l t e d  in  n o t a b l e  l e v e l s  o f  W e s te r n i s a t i o n .  W r i t i n g  
a b o u t  t h e  i n h e r e n t  c o n t r a d i c t i o n s  i n  t h e  S o v i e t  l e a d e r s h i p ’s a t t e m p t s  t o  i n te g r a t e  
c a p i t a l i s m  in to  th e  S o c i a l i s t  s y s te m ,  A l e x  N o v e  q u e s t io n e d :  ‘ [ c j a n  o n e  h a v e  s t a te  
c a p i t a l i s m  a n d  n o  c a p i t a l i s t s ? ’70 D a n i e l  M i l l e r  c o n te n d s  t h a t  p o p u l a r  c u l tu r e ,  m o r e  
a c c u r a t e ly  t e r m e d  t h e  c u l t u r e  o f  c o n s u m p t i o n ,  i s  t h e  l o g ic a l  a n d  m o s t  d o m in a n t  
c u l t u r a l  f o r m  f o r  c o n te m p o r a r y  i n d u s t r i a l  c u l tu r e .?  1 T h e  m a s s  c o n s u m e r i s m  o f  
W e s t e r n  s o c i e ty  is  d e p e n d e n t  o n  th e  m a s s  p r o d u c t i o n  o f  g o o d s ,  w h i c h  u l t i m a t e ly  
o n l y  o c c u r s  w i t h  th e  n e c e s s a r y  t e c h n o l o g ic a l  a d v a n c e s .  D e s p i t e  w h a t  t h e  o b j e c t iv e s  
o f  t h e  S o v i e t  g o v e r n m e n t  m a y  h a v e  b e e n ,  t h e  r e a l i t y  w a s  t h a t  t h e  p o l i c i e s  i t  
i n s t i t u t e d  r e s u l t e d  in  a  s o c i e ty  th a t ,  w h i l e  s o c i a l i s t  in  n a m e ,  b e h a v e d  s i m i l a r ly  to  a  
c u l t u r e  o f  c o n s u m p t i o n .  T h e  s o c i a l  i m p l i c a t i o n s  o f  th is  w e r e  m a g n i f i e d  b y  th e  
s t a t e ’ s i n a b i l i t y  to  s a t i s f y  t h e  p o p u l a t i o n .  B u i ld i n g  o n  th e  e s t a b l i s h e d  r e s e a r c h  t h a t  
c o n c e p t s  o f  c o n s u m p t i o n  w e r e  p a r t  o f  S o v i e t  c u l t u r e  a n d  t h a t  a n  i m a g e  o f  t h e  o t h e r  
e x i s te d ,  h i s t o r i a n s  n o w  h a v e  th e  o p p o r t u n i t y  t o  f u r t h e r  th e  d i s c u s s i o n  th r o u g h  
c o n c r e t e  e x a m p l e s .  T h i s  h a s  b e e n  f a c i l i t a t e d  b y  t h e  o p e n in g  u p  o f  a r c h i v e s  a n d  
R u s s i a n  s o c ie ty .  S i g n i f i c a n t  c o n t r i b u t o r s  to  t h is  b o d y  o f  r e s e a r c h  o n  m a t e r i a l  c u l t u r e  
i n  t h e  f o r m e r  U S S R  a r e  D a v i d  C r o w le y ,  S u s a n  R e id ,  L a r i s s a  Z a h k a r o v a ,  E l e o n o r y  
G i lb i i r d ,  H e i n o  N y y s s o n e n ,  a n d  A n n e  K r o p o t k i n e  w h o s e  w o r k s  o n  c o n s u m p t i o n  
p r e s e n t  t a n g i b l e  a r g u m e n t s  w i t h  a  d e g r e e  o f  n o r m a l c y .72
68 Hilary Pilkington, Russia’s  Youth and Its Culture: a Nation’s  Constructors and 
Constructed (London, Routledge, 1994) 51.
69 Parks, Conflict and C o-existence. 1.
70 Alec Nove, Political Economy and Soviet Socialism (London: George, Allen and Unwin, 
1979) 207.
71 Miller, Mass Culture and Mass Consumption. 11,
72 While all of the above have numerous publications the latter four com e together in a 
special edition ‘Repenser le Dégel; versions du socialisme, influences Internationales et 
société soviétique’ Cahiers du MONDE RUSSE January to June 2006. 47/1-2.
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The historiography of this work is similar in composition to the work itself. 
Both draw on divergent sources that overlap and resonate to form a whole, hr order 
to address the topic of this thesis, the research draws on the above fields of research 
(historical discussions written during the 1950s and 1960s, sociological, 
anthropological and historiographical research into consumption, technology, 
society and the state) to highlight how economic and technological images of the 
West acted as links between concepts of consumption, the mythical other and 
communism in the Post-War era. Having reviewed the main fields of research that 
provide the bases of secondary research and the theoretical underpinnings for this 
study, the focus will now turn to a discussion of methodology.
Methodology
Due to the diverse primary sources used in this work, a discussion of the 
methodology is warranted. The four main pillars of primary source work are: 
published Soviet literature (for example newspapers, magazines, collections of 
official speeches), published non-Soviet literature (for example travel memoirs), 
unpublished official information (primarily archival documents) and unpublished 
unofficial experiences and opinions (questionnaires and interviews). Of the four 
pillars, only the later was created largely post factum. This is due to the then limited 
research possibilities to gather information on ‘average’ Soviet opinions during the 
Khrushchev era. This is not to say that there were no attempts, the Komsomol’skaia 
Pravda’s institute for public opinion conducted numerous surveys and sociologists 
began active field research during this period, but it is not until the collapse of the 
Soviet system that opinions could be voiced without fear of official reprisal. Taken 
together, the four pillars serve to provide a combination of official and non-official 
sources as well as Soviet and Western perceptions with each checking the other 
against historical revisionism. Each of the four main pillars was selected in order to 
address a particular aspect of the main reseaich question. Published Soviet literature 
provides an insight into mass produced information that Soviet citizens could 
access, the banal everyday news sources about the West. The published non-Soviet 
literature provides a foreigner’s opinion, thus an opinion that had the advantage of 
being outside the system and that could be expressed during the era. It also provides 
a foil between then contemporaiy Western and Soviet society through the topics
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upon which Westerners chose to comment. The archives provide information on the 
phenomenon of the social dissemination of the image of the West and examines if 
the idea of the West as part of the Soviet future was entrenched in the opinions of 
those individuals who were to be leading the nation down the path to communism. 
The final pillar consists of unpublished, unofficial information and allows for the 
circuit of the government, government propagated and tolerated information about 
the West, and individuals to be completed. For it was citizens that were to consume 
the images and build the Soviet future. In the case of the AVTOVAZ project, this 
group of individuals was chosen as they worked both in a field that incorporated 
foreign technology and they produced a product that spoke to the consumerism of 
the times (the passenger car). Each of the four pillars will now be dealt with 
separately and with particular attention being given to the fourth pillar.
The first pillar, consisting of published works in the Soviet Union, includes 
newspapers, women’s magazines, trade journals, foreign journals published in the 
Soviet Union (for example the British publication Ang/nn), and government 
statements. These documents were analysed with respect to positive references 
about the West with a focus on science and technology and consumption. A specific 
filter was the incorporation of English words. A sub-category of analysis was the 
examination of images that accompanied articles and speeches. The term image is 
used as articles were often accompanied by graphs, diagrams, cartoons, or photos 
that contained clear and direct messages. The particular cross section of printed 
materials was chosen in order to provide a range of styles, interests and readership. 
The main printed materials examined aie: Angliia, Vechemiaia Moskva, 
Moskovskaia pravda, Rabotnitsa, Volzhskii avtostroiteV and Vneshniaia torgovlia. 
Thus, providing coverage from a women’s magazine, to one of the capital’s 
newspapers, to a provincial paper, to two elite orientated journals. The uniformity 
of the image that was presented in these various sources speaks to the relatively 
stable, uniform and widespread image of the mythical other. It also addresses the 
ubiquitous nature of the concept of consumption in the Communist system. These 
sources are supplemented by official speeches, thereby including the Soviet 
leadership in the ubiquitous images of consumption and the mythical other.
In addition to the information found in mass published literature in the 
Soviet Union, materials published outside of the Soviet Union predominantly but
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not exclusively by Westerners were studied. The dominant form of this material 
was the travel memoir written by Western students, academics, reporters and 
businessmen. These sources provide a check on contemporary Soviet sources, as 
they were without the filter of Soviet censorship. They gauge personal reactions of 
Soviets to Westerners and Western goods as seen through Western eyes. They serve 
as an independent source of evidence of Western penetration and chart the 
introduction of ideas and images. The existence of these works in themselves, is a 
testimony to the issue of contact and openness. Finally, the works provide not only 
first hand accounts of the Soviet Union during the 1950s and 1960s but conclusions 
on developments. The conclusions drawn by contemporaries of Klirushchev must 
be accepted as opinions and should not be used as a basis upon which to form new 
conclusions. However, the first hand reports contained within the works were 
examined as primary sources upon which interpretations could be founded. The 
focus of these works on consumption, consumerism and perceptions of the West, 
affirms that current interest in the field of consumer communists and the mythical 
builds upon an aspect of Soviet history that previously could not be thoroughly 
addressed.
Perhaps the most straightforward of the four pillars from a methodological 
standpoint is the third pillar, archival information. The documents came primarily 
but not exclusively from the Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi arkhiv ekonomiki (RGAE) 
and Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi arkhiv noveishei istorii (RGANI). While much of the 
information found in RGAE can be found in RGANI and other archives, RGAE was 
preferred due to the comparatively high level of access. This can be attributed to the 
information at RGAE being classified as economic and not political. Indeed, 
numerous files that were listed as classified in RGANI were unclassified in RGAE. 
Archival information was used to determine the penetration of the myth of the 
technological and economic superiority of the West into the Soviet elite and the 
extent of industrial contact. The former was assessed in essence to help determine if 
the stewards of communism were still faithful. Documents were analysed with 
specific attention to the structure of reports, both general scientific and technology 
reports as well as exhibition reports tended to begin with an assessment of Western 
developments and then a compaiison of Western developments with the Soviet 
Union, and to the depth and breadth of industrial contact. Documents specifically
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on exhibitions were examined with particular' attention being paid to the nature of 
par ticipation and the evaluation section regarding Western participation and Soviet 
official and nonofficial reactions. The ‘cultural’ aspects of the exhibitions (for 
example art exhibitions) were not analysed. The final pillar, unpublished Soviet 
opinions will now be discussed.
Qualitative research is often legitimised by stating that only through this 
form of research can certain individuals, groups and sensitive issues be included in 
historical knowledge and as such is often conducted when working with a group or 
perspective that has been excluded previously from academic history. Thompson 
has stated that “[hjistory, in short, is not just about events or structures, or patterns 
of behaviour, but also about how these are experienced and remembered in the 
imagination,” 73 Life histories are used to forward an argument, and not to state a 
fact. Two areas of strength for oral history are in events that were of such a 
magnitude as to be impressed upon the individual memory and on repetitive habitual 
actions.74 Contact with the West can fall into either of the two categories, thus 
making surveys and interviews suitable research methods. Due to the nature of the 
Cold War and the Soviet political system, the open discussion of the lives and 
perceptions of Soviet citizens has traditionally been excluded from Western and 
Soviet historiography. In this thesis, the works of a life history reseaich project 
conducted in St. Petersburg and a questionnaire/interview project of initial workers 
at AVTOVAZ have been included.75 The overriding research questions driving the 
surveys and interviews were: what were the perceptions of standard of living, was 
there contact with the West, what was the nature of this contact, and how was this 
contact seen? Like all forms of research, life stories, interviews and questionnaires 
contain inherent strengths and weaknesses and the objective must be to accept the 
limits and to recognise that the inverse of the limitations is often the attributes. 
While the complexity of human nature and memory pose specific challenges to the 
writing of history they must, with all of their idiosyncrasies, be preserved. Paul 
Thompson has referred to these idiosyncrasies as the ‘original multiplicity of
73 Paul Thompson, The Voice of the Past: Oral History {Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2000), 3'" Ed. 162.
74 Anthony Sheldon and Joanna, Pappworth, By Word of Mouth: Elite Oral History 
(London: Methuen, 1983) 17.
75 S ee  Appendix A for a translation of the questions found In the questionnaire.
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standpoints” that enrich history and maintain its humanness.76 As Sheldon has 
written, in “talking to those who participated in events, the historian is less likely to 
make simplistic judgements and understanding is broadened to accommodate the 
underlying factors that caused individuals to behave in a certain way.” 77 According 
to recent research into the nature of memory, the retelling of life history tends to 
become more reliable after a prolonged period over which the mind becomes more 
detached and better able to reconstruct events. Memories become “clearer and also 
franker. Deliberate misinformation about the past is very rare.”?8 One reason for 
this is that compliance with political and social constraints decrease with age. While 
the later of the two studies is more important for this study, both will be discussed, 
as they are methodologically similar.
In terms of format both surveys were two pages long and consisted only of 
open-ended questions about personal experiences and opinions, for example during 
the creation of AVTOVAZ, contact with foreigners and opinions about the 
production of Ladas (see Appendix A for a list of the questions). An initial 
description of who the researcher was and the academic purpose of the research was 
given along with the option that respondents did not need to provide their names in 
the personal section that included (name, date of birth, place of birth, profession, 
and Paity status). At the end of the questionnaire were contact details for those who 
were willing to consent to an interview, hi the 1997 St. Petersburg project, most of 
the interviewees completed surveys, while in the VAZ project there was little 
overlap, with potential respondents asking if they could participate in an interview 
instead of filling in a survey. All respondents were assured anonymity, and with the 
exception of only a few respondents, names were provided. An issue with 
anonymity arose as academics and higher-ranking Paity members requested that 
their proper names be used. In search of a compromise, all questionnaires have been 
made anonymous and in those interviews in which the individual felt interviewed in 
their professional capacity actual names have been used.
hiitial contact was conducted through a three-pronged approach, students 
who contacted family members, interviews with (former) officials, and through
76 Thompson, The Voice of the Past: Oral History 6.
72. Sheldon Bv Word of Mouth: Elite Oral History 51-52. 
78 Thompson, The Voice of the Past 131.
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personal connections. In all three instances further referrals were made. There was 
some triangulating of interviewees, which permitted a limited amount of cross- 
referencing. The issue of représentât!vity is tertiary as the research addresses the 
issue of cultural penetration but does not attempt to measure the degree of 
penetration. The question is, was there an image, what did it look like, and what 
effect did it have. To use the words of Hilary Pilkington, respondents were not 
chosen “in order to obtain a ‘representative’ assortment of socio-democratic 
characteristics but these were examined post factumPi9 The criteria for the St 
Petersburg life history project was that the individuals were born before or during 
the Russian Revolution and for the VAZ survey that the individuals were present 
from either the beginning of the construction of the city/factory, or from the 
beginning of production, hi the VAZ project, of the 40 respondents 25 were male 
and 15 female. In total, 7 were members of the Communist Party. Those who 
responded to the questionnaires represent a broad section of workers at the factory 
from individuals who worked (work) on the assembly line, as well as in design, 
translation, engineering, and other sectors run by the factory but not part of 
production, for example doctors in the AVTOVAZ polyclinic. In addition to the 
questionnaires, interviews were conducted either as a supplement to, or instead of, 
the written questionnaires. Interviews were conducted as life stories with specific 
questions elaborating on the 1950s -1960s.
Long answer questionnaires and life histories are highly personal forms of 
history.80 Each individual will have different views, different emphases, and 
different recollections. The life of one individual cannot be held as an absolute or 
definitive interpretation of an era. It is however the micro level of history in which
79 Hilary Pilkington, Migration. Displacement and Identity In Post-Soviet Russia (London: 
Routledge, 1998) 110.
80 The role of the researcher is pertinent to any analysis of the methodology of life 
stories/interviews. As with any role, the researcher had multiple characteristics that labelled 
her as simultaneously being both an insider (gender, education, religion) and an outsider 
(age, nationality). The insider relationship is potentially restrictive a s it tends towards the 
danger of social conformity while offering a broad base for commonality and understanding. 
Being an outsider often facilitated the prompting for further explanations and prevented the 
respondent from being able to simply state that it was understood or, ‘you know’. Taking 
the role of insider/outsider into consideration, it is a mistake in the current era of 
increasingly recognised social and cultural distinctiveness and with the rise in local culture, 
to overlook the overarching umbrella of humanity. This is not a romantic thesis of universal 
brotherhood or solidarity. Most people, regardless of gender, race, or nationality enjoy the 
attention afforded to them when talking about them selves.
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the human element is best maintained. As much as history is the mass sum of 
individual lives in various eras, movements, and events, at its most human level, it is 
the lives of individuals. The four research pillar s used in this thesis are an attempt 
to provide a history that addresses the challenges put forth to the historian.
Chapter Breakdown
This research has been divided into five chapters. The purpose of each chapter 
is to both forward the overall study of the technological and economic image of the 
West in the Soviet future, as well as to provide a detailed study of an aspect of this 
image formation and reception. Each chapter can stand alone as a representation of 
a time in Soviet history when the state either permitted or propagated a positive 
economic image of the West. Although such sources as newspapers, speeches, and 
interviews are used throughout this work, each chapter has a main medium and 
thematic focus. For example, the first two chapters focus heavily on published 
memoirs and speeches while the third and fourth focus on official archival 
documents and media reports. The variety of sources and subjects (for example 
exhibitions or the AVTOVAZ factory) when taken together, show the pervasiveness 
and the normalcy of positive economic and technological images of the West. The 
term West is taken to include Western Europe and North America (excluding 
Mexico). The major Western powers represented in the study are France, Great 
Britain, Italy, and the United States of America, with mention made of other nations. 
Three countries notable by their relative absence in this study are West Germany, 
Finland, and Japan, all of which were significant trading partners, and fall outside of 
the parameters of this study due to their Post-War political status. In addition, the 
image of West Germany was often filtered through East Germany. Japan was 
shuffled between Western and Eastern status by Soviet officials and the Soviet 
public. For example, the culture was eastern but the imported Japanese machine 
lines were western. All three merit further study, but the study scope is sufficiently 
different as to fall outside the scope of this work.
While the governments of the Khr ushchev and early Brezhnev era did not seek 
to foster the political or economic system of Western Europe and North America, 
they were intent on imitating and overtaking them in the provision of the highest 
standard of social programmes together with of an equitable distribution of wealth.
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This focus on the provision of material comfort was communicated through 
numerous mediums, for example, press releases, speeches by the leadership, 
exhibitions, film and literature, and scientific and industrial contact, turnkey 
factories, and expertise imports. In this introductory chapter ‘The Provision of All 
Life’s Comforts,’ the implications of the participation by the Soviet leadership in the 
idea of consumption, albeit controlled, and the effect this was to have on the 
relationship between that leadership and general population is discussed. This 
discussion serves as the basis for the subsequent chapters. From this introduction, 
the study proceeds to the next five chapters in which various information entry 
points and sources as well as Soviet reactions are used to further discussion of the 
aforementioned research questions.
In ‘Society and Catching Up With the West’ the relationship between 
government declarations and changes in the Post-War Soviet society in respect to 
rising expectations is examined. This chapter addresses the subsidiary questions: 
How was the Soviet Union defining itself in economic and technological terms post 
WWII ? and Who participated in the building of the mythical other and why? An 
important aspect of the relationship of rising expectations and the creation of the 
comrade consumer is the increased emphasis on external contemporary comparison 
as opposed to internal historical comparison. Also addressed is the fact that positive 
information was not exclusively Western propaganda tolerated by Soviet officials, 
but Soviet generated propaganda. This chapter is followed by ‘Conceptualising 
Communist Consumption’ in which specific examples, drawn from the automotive, 
clothing and housing sectors, are used to further the case made in ‘Society and 
Catching Up With the West.’ The third chapter ‘Exhibiting Alternatives,’ moves 
away from the official Soviet construction of future material comfort and focuses on 
the images of wealth that the Western nations were permitted to display through 
exhibitions and trade fairs. This chapter taken with ‘Image Conduits’ and ‘Driving 
Towards Communist Consumerism: AVTOVAZ’ address both the question of: 
What were the economic and technical images of the West? and How was this 
image built and who adopted it?. It is in the chapter on exhibitions that the myth of 
an iron curtain shrouding the Soviet Union is most significantly challenged.
Foreign exhibitions and trade fairs were massive breaches in ideological control and 
fraught with potential problems. Trade fairs and exhibitions had both cultural and
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industrial components. The industrial aspect is focused upon in this study and one 
notable characteristic of the primary sources is a relative dear th of angst expressed 
over economic, technological and scientific contact in comparison with cultural 
aspects of Western contact.81 Building upon the technical and scientific contact, in 
‘Image Conduits’ the exposure and sensitivity of Soviet elites (political, industrial 
and scientific) to the positive images are discussed. These elite groups were charged 
with reforming the Soviet economy and overtaking the West. The support of these 
groups was vital to Communist leaders. These were also the groups most exposed 
to images of the West. Their failure to maintain the pretence of Soviet superiority 
arnorrgst themselves made the effectiveness of the Post-War social contract between 
the Soviet rulers and the masses dubious. This research combined with that of the 
first chapter (‘Society and Catching Up With the West’) and with the final chapter 
(Driving Towards Communist Consumerism: AVTOVAZ) puts forward the 
argument that the positive economic image of the West was pervasive: sources 
varied but the image itself was relatively constant. ‘Driving Towards Communist 
Consumption: AVTOVAZ’, is a study of highly publicised co-operation between 
Fiat and the Soviet Union and its roll of spearheading Soviet light passenger car 
industry. Tens of thousands of workers and specialists were involved directly, and 
few industries remained untouched by the ‘project of the decade’. The AVTOVAZ 
factory is an example of officially sanctioned contact with Western ideas, 
individuals, and products. Together the chapters provide an opportunity to assess 
the historical significance of the economic image of the West, its reception, and the 
role it was to play in negotiating a social contract between the Communist rulers and 
the common citizen. Questions also arise as to the extent to which this image forms 
the foundation of the modern Russian image of the West and the extent to which the 
image contributed to the implosion of the Soviet Union.
81 For an example of the discussions concerning cultural Imports s e e  E. S. Afanas’eva ed. 
Ideoloqicheskie komissii TsK KPSS 1958-1964: Dokumentv (Moskva: Rosspen, 2000).
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Conclusion
The future and the past are a nation’s two reference points for myth building. 
The Soviet future was of paramount importance for the country. In a nation that had 
had a violent and bloody break with the Tsarist past, that was faced with the 
challenge of rewriting history, and that was enduring the hardships of mass social 
changes, it was often more advantageous to forget the cumbersome past and to focus 
on the utopian future of coramunism.82 After the death of Stalin in 1953, and the 
concerted efforts of the new Party leadership to denounce Stalinism and the cult of 
personality, the recent past was also problematic, thus further strengthening the need 
to focus on the future. 83 Defining the future is an ephemeral process that combines 
aspects of reality and fantasy and can be as simple as taking the technology of a 
massive computer and imagining that someday computers would be small and 
affordable enough to be present in every household. The Soviet Union maintained 
the Russian tradition of looking towards the West to define its objectives and 
perceptions of the future that it was building.
What was Soviet Russia’s image of its future? Isaiah Berlin has written that: 
'one of the most arresting characteristics of modern Russian culture is its acute self- 
consciousness. There has surely never been a society more deeply and exclusively 
preoccupied with itself, its own nature and destiny.’84 Soviet Russia was not the 
first nation to struggle with the creation of a national identity. However, it was one 
of the few nations, certainly in terms of great powers, which consistently struggled 
to define itself. It failed to produce a common vision or ideal, similar to the 
American dream, the glory of the British Empire, or the aspirations of the French 
Republic.85 Soviet Russia’s image of itself was constructed primarily through 
external comparison. Its perceived place within the dominant political, cultural and 
social community was based on similarities with other dominant societies, namely
82 For an analysis of this issue through poster art s e e  Klaus Waschik and Nina Baburina in 
Werben fur die Utopie (Stuttgart; Edition Tertium, 2003).
83 Betfram Silverman and Murray Yanowitch have argued that the need to minimise and 
even ‘destroy’ the past is a commonality between communism and free market liberalism. 
Bertram Silverman and Murray Yanowitch, New Rich. New Poor. New Russia: Winners and 
Losers on the Rusian Road to Capitalism (London: M. E. Sharpe, 1999) 6.
84 Isaiah Berlin, The Soviet Mind: Russian Culture Under Communism (Washington: 
Brookings Institution Press, 2004) 760. A similar idea is found in Isaiah Berlin ‘The Silence 
in Russian Culture,’ Foreign Affairs Vol.36 (1957) 1-24.
85 Gerhard Simon, ‘Zukunft aus der Vergangenheit: Elemente der Politischen Kultur in 
Russland,’ Qsteuropa 05 (1995): 455-482.
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with the West. This comparative image allowed past and present Russia to assume a 
legitimised place in Western history and society. Frederick Barghoorn, who worked 
in the American embassy in Moscow, has attributed the Soviet ‘inferiority complex’ 
and sense of moral superiority to foreign capitalism to the ‘developmental gap’ 
between the USSR and the Westse Commenting on the image of the West, and in 
particular the USA, he wrote: ‘during the war, this leading democracy [USA] had to 
be presented as an ally without arousing too much sympathy. Since the war, it has 
had to be presented as a rival without arousing too much fear.’87 During the Thaw, 
it had to be presented as a competitor without arousing too much envy.
The Soviet Union was a superpower that defined itself in opposition to and in 
comparison with its ideological enemy. Both before and after the introduction of the 
concept of peaceful co-existence by Nikita Khrushchev, the tenets of communism 
involved the notion of political, social and economic supremacy through 
industrialisation, good government, and equality.ss There were areas in which the 
Soviet society could integrate into the Western mores, and others, like ideology 
where they were diametiically opposed. The Soviet Union of the 1950s 
encompassed one sixth of the world’s landmass, had an arable land territory equal to 
that of the United States and Canada combined, and had an abundance of natural 
resources. It was the first country to put a satellite into space in 1957, and the first 
to put a man into space in 1961. Khrushchev’s prediction that the USSR would 
‘bury’ the USA was widely reported. Indeed, as eaidy as 1959, statements such as 
the oft repeated and quoted phrase ‘in the next ten to fifteen years the USSR will 
draw ahead of the USA economically and become the country with the world’s most 
powerful economy’ were uttered with plausibility.89
Soviet leaders were not in a position to create an antithetical self-image to the 
West, as there were sectors of the West that they sought to emulate. The result was 
an unconvincing combination of vilification and praise that permitted the rejection 
and condemnation of Western practices such as discrimination, poverty and wai-
86 Frederick C. Barghoorn, Détente and the Democratic Movement in the USSR {New York: 
Macmillan, 1976) 39. s e e  also his work: The Cultural Offensive.
87 Frederick C. Barghoorn, The Soviet Image of the United States, a Study in Distortion 
(New York; Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1950) xviii.
88 Khrushchev w as not the first Soviet leader to use the term ‘peaceful co-existence’. There 
are exam ples of both Lenin and Stalin having used the term.
89 Varga, ‘An Analysis of the Evolution and Trends of Capitalism,’ 50.
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mongering; while accepting innovation, technology, and economic prowess. ‘Soviet 
citizens were told that they were at the forefront in every sphere, they led the world, 
and yet disorienting glimpses on TV, and above all foreigners themselves, seemed 
like evidence that this might not be so.’90 Present developments in Russian society 
do not constitute a reawakening of the issue of West versus East in the Russian 
identity. It is simply that the combination of the loss of superpower status, the loss 
of communism and the appeal for many of the economic image/reality of the West 
has resulted in a deluge. The pillars making being different from the West more 
palatable have crumbled, and Russia is experiencing the full effect of 
Westernisation/Americanisation.
The two defining aspects of the Thaw era were the changes in the Gulag 
system and the presence of the West in all strata of Soviet society. Western 
influences in the Soviet Union were ubiquitous and nebulous. If ‘they’ had access 
to Western music, fashion images, literature, films, and cars, who were the ‘they’? 
How does one trace the dissemination of an image into Soviet society? This process 
can be described by the metaphor of a rock being dropped into a pond of water. The 
entry point, an exhibition, a turnkey factory, international travel, a film festival, 
literature, newspaper articles etc, can be documented. In many instances the initial 
impact is measurable, for example the number of individuals attending an exhibition 
or the number of factory workers involved. It is the subsequent ripples that become 
unclear; who then read or heard about events? What is clear is that these impacts 
were socially significant as a general concept of the West entered into Soviet 
culture. The widely held beliefs and perceptions about the West that survived the 
Soviet Union act as the tangible ripples in the sand on the shore. To further 
complicate the clarity of events, it was not a case of a rock being dropped in, the 
reverberations settling and then another one being added. These were scattered and 
prolific events. By analysing the entry points, the diffusion of information as far as 
can be measured, and the evident final social impact, the role of the image can be 
studied.
If culture was to be used as a substitute for ideology, and technology was a
90 Caroline Humphrey, ‘Creating a Culture of Disillusionment: Consumption in Moscow, a 
Chronicle of Changing Times’ Daniel Miller ed., Worlds Apart: Modernity Through the Prism 
of the Local {London: Routledge, 1995) 55.
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fundamental component of culture, then ideology was linked to technology. This 
was not a good prospect for the Soviet Union, a superpower, founded on ideology 
and lagging in technology: especially in an era when a nation’s potential and its 
place in the international hierarchy was based largely on technological progress and 
possibilities.9i Failure or perceived failure, in the areas of technology, science and 
standard of living was destabilizing and de-legitimising both domestically and 
internationally. What was of prime importance to the nomenklatura within the 
Soviet Union was whether it was possible to have technical transfer without the 
cultural diffusion. If this was not possible, what were the ramifications? The 
greatest cost was that the cultural diffusion would be residual in nature and that the 
compound effect on society of technological importations would eventually be 
greater than the compound effect of the teachings of socialism. To this end, the 
Party needed to distinguish between universal technology, which involved the 
importation of homogenous world culture, and that which was ‘contingent on 
Western culture and the specific requirements of the capitalist system.’ 92
The derisive image of the West and Westerners as intellectually shallow, 
materialistically driven and morally corrupt was not coupled initially with a 
dismissal of the inherent desirability of modernisation or consumerism. Under 
Khrushchev there was some faith that a comrade consumer could be created. 
However, consumption could not be allowed to replace ideology nor could it be 
effectively used as a replacement for terror.93 By the end of the Brezhnev era it was 
generally accepted that the Soviet Union was unable to close the technological and 
scientific gap with the mythical other of the West. This loss of faith can be cited as 
a major contributing factor to the rise of anti-Americanism. If the launching of 
Sputnik represented the zenith of Soviet optimism in the future, and a correlating 
positive image of the US, then the landing of the first man on the moon by the 
Americans in 1969 marked the beginning of the descent. The economic image of 
the West defined the gravitational centre that served as the abstract definition of one
91 Harvey, Hybrids of Modernitv 126.
92 Andrew Feenberg, Transition or Convergence: Communism and the Paradox of 
Development’, in Frederic Fleron ed., Technology and Communist Culture 73.
93 Les Fluctuations Économiques en URSS 1941-1985 {Paris: Éditions de l’École des 
Hautes Études en Science Sociales, 1989).
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of the most highly valued paits of the Soviet future. The central challenge for the 
regime was how to Thaw without melting away.
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1: The Party, Society and Catching up and Overtaking
Introduction
This reseaich proposes that during the post-Stalin era a type of consumer 
society with ties to images of the West was formed. The purpose of this chapter is 
to examine the social and political background that contributed to the creation of the 
comrade consumer. To do this, changes within Soviet society in respect to 
empowerment, rising expectations, and government declarations sign posting the 
path of expectations have been examined. These changes in Soviet society occur 
within the context of a society with a generation maturing without terror, wai', or 
famine. The Soviet people were no longer the people of a struggling nation but of a 
superpower. Socialism in one country had not resulted in complete isolation, but 
political, economic and cultural contact had been kept to a minimum on the 
governmental level and severely restricted on the personal level. After decades of 
an official policy of looking inwards the emphasis turned outwards. Internal 
historical comparisons would have had the advantage of being more controllable, as 
history can always be rewritten to be more sympathetic to current and future 
successes and goals, but Khrushchev needed the West to form his socialism.
In this chapter and the following one ‘Commenting on Communist 
Consumption’ the ideas of the glorious Soviet future and of comparison with the 
West are traced. The ideas of catching up, of comparison, and of the contradictions 
of Soviet life in many of those very areas of consumerism that the Soviet Union 
declared to be priorities are focused upon. Under the Soviet government, norms 
were set for what was reasonable in terms of food consumption, square metres of 
living space, footwear etc and the government then pledged to meet these norms. 
Khrushchev himself was to publicly declare that if capitalism proved better at 
providing an equitable non-excessive free standard of living, he would convert. In 
response to Senator William Fulbright’s direct question as to ‘what Khrushchev 
would do if it was proven that the capitalist system was able to prove better for more 
people?’ Khrushchev answered that ‘ ‘if history were to confirm that the capitalist 
system really offers the best opportunities of developing the productive forces of 
society and of providing a better life for man -  and we don’t believe that a kopek’s
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worth - 1 would be the first to vote against communism.’94 In private, Klirushchev 
was to write that if ‘capitalism satisfies these requirements [consumer/standard of 
living] better than socialism it will be increasingly difficult for us to propagate our 
point of view and consolidate our way of life.’95 This concept of failure was part of 
a larger phenomenon: the introduction of the idea of institutional and personal 
fallibility.
The impact of the demographic and social changes, with a focus on how this 
affected the concept of consumption are examined in this chapter, which is divided 
into three main sections of where society was, where it wanted to go and where the 
state was guiding society. The main research objective is addressed in this chapter 
by looking at how Soviet society saw itself and its future as well as by looking at 
how the Soviet regime was defining the economic and technological future vis-à-vis 
the West. The primaiy source materials for this chapter include memoirs, speeches, 
newspaper articles, popular anecdotes and the St. Petersburg questionnaires.
Where Soviet society was coming from
Under Stalin, there was a sense of the infallibility of the leader. Stalin was a 
man-god who understood all, knew all, and acted accordingly. Communism was the 
only alternative, and there was only one path. Khrushchev’s economic policy 
involved chaiges of backwardness, mistakes and inefficiencies; his social policy 
involved the return of Gulag prisoners, enemies of the state tiansformed into 
pardoned citizens; and his political policy involved denouncing the cult of 
personality and exposing Stalin’s excesses. Having debunked the Cult of 
Personality, Khrushchev effectively destroyed the Party’s ability to convey itself as 
the all-knowing purveyors of truth. Robert Rozhdestvensky’s poem Rodina printed 
in Pravda (16.12.1962) openly alluded to this loss:
We do not want to say anymore:
Somebody thinks fo r us
We know how that ends.
Soviet individuals began to trust their own judgements and a diffusion of critical 
public commentary occurred. ‘Everywhere -  in the stadiums, in the buses, in the
94 Zhit’ V mire i druzhbe (Moskva: Gosudarstvennoe izdatel’stvo, 1959) 83.
95 Nikita Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament (London: Little, 
Brown, and Co., 1974) 146.
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subways -  people talked freely, judged men and events, leaders and political acts. 
Everywhere people expressed their opinions, detailed criticisms and recounted 
anecdotes. The highest political figures had no immunity from public opinion’.96 
Indeed, as this process matured, even the communist nature of the leadership was 
scrutinised. The multi-pronged and prolonged onslaught against the concept of the 
infallible leader solidified the widespread dissemination of the concept of fallibility. 
A popular bit of satire is symbolic here is representative at how far the process went: 
‘Brezhnev’s mother visits her son in the Kremlin soon after his coming to power. 
When she hears about his fine apartment, his luxurious dacha, his expensive cars, 
and other material comforts, she says, ‘Leonid, my son. I’m so proud of you, but one 
thing worries me: what will you do when the communists take over? ” 97 It also 
reinforced the need for economic success. If, Khrushchev and the Communist Party 
could no longer count on the automatic acquiescence of the society, then legitimacy 
must be established. The ultimate form of legitimisation would be to provide a 
system in which people preferred to live. Thus, consumption was a prime political 
goal, and over the course of the 1950s and 1960s, the Communist regime’s 
legitimacy became increasingly dependant on the provision of material wealth.
Robert Tucker has written that the iron curtain represented the external walls 
of a ‘Potemkin Russia... fabricated not out of wooden facades but out of words and 
pictures and mass spectacles in Red Square.’98 Only through absolute control was 
Stalin able to maintain the image of a Russia that was or would soon be providing 
for all man’s needs and dreams. Stalin had an intense aversion to travelling and 
avoided foreign contacts. This aided the creation of the Potemkin Russia and 
contributed a sense of isolationism to the image of the Soviet Man. Controlling the 
image of the past, present and future constitutes one of the defining features of 
totalitarianism. By contrast, Klirushchev actively pursued travel opportunities. Not 
for nothing did his colleagues complain about him constantly ‘knocking about’ 
abroad and in the pre-corn period gave him the nickname of Intourist, 9 9  Fedor
96 Giuseppe Boffa, Inside the Khrushchev Era {New York: Marzaniano, 1959) 87-88.
97 As found in Robert Strayer, Why Did the Soviet Union Collapse: Understanding 
Historical Change (London: M. E. Sharpe, 1998) 53.
98 Robert C. Tucker, T h e Psychology of Soviet Foreign Policy,’ Problems of Communism 
V0 I.6 no.3 (1957): 1-8, 6.
99 Fedor Burlatsky, Khrushchev and the First Russian Soring (London: Weidenfeld and 
Nlcolson, 1991) 153.
40
Buiiatsky has noted that claims that Khrushchev’s wanderlust constituted ‘the first 
step towards opening up our society’ were not unfounded, loo In 1955, Khrushchev 
went to the Geneva Summit, in 1956 along with Prime Minister N. A. Bulganin, he 
travelled to Great Britain, and in 1959 to the United States. Travel abroad peaked in 
I960, The prestige associated with these high level visits contributed to the prestige 
assigned to many things foreign and an acceptance that foreign contact was 
valuable. Richard Nixon’s assessment was that Khrushchev ‘is an intensely 
pragmatic and curious man who likes to see for himself, and he believes what he 
sees far more than what he hears.’ loi Khrushchev’s curiosity was to legitimise the 
curiosity of a nation.
In trying to define the Thaw to Giuseppe Boffa, the writer Galina Nikolaieva 
explained it as: ‘ ‘we all notice how our life is awakening... this atmosphere is made 
by us, the product of the will of men, the product of the work of the Party, the 
product of far from easy labour which developed and is developing everywhere, 
from the factories to international relations.” 102 Boffa’s recollections of this time 
include impressions of Soviet technology and culture renewing ties with the West; 
Inostrannaia literatura publishing the works of modern Western writers ‘from 
Daldwell to Mariac, from Hemingway to Moravia’ ; Soviet film makers making 
documentaries in major foreign cities; and film festivals etc. In his assessment it 
was from the renewing of the international commitment that an awareness of Soviet 
problems could be put into context and demands could emerge. They did. 103
An important feature of the Thaw period was the ending of the Soviet Union’s 
isolation from capitalist countries. Tatyana Zaslavskaya recalled that from her first 
trip abroad, to Sweden in 1957, she gathered impressions of another way of life and 
the idea that the working class in the West suffered miserably was shattered: ‘we 
saw that, in fact, the countries of the West had in many instances overtaken us and 
we had lively discussions about ways of overcoming our weaknesses. . . ’ 104 
However, Soviet citizens did not need to go abroad in order to glean information
100 Burlatsky, Khrushchev and the First Russian Spring 154.
101 Richard Nixon, The Challenges W e Face: Edited and Compiled from the S p eech es and 
Papers of Richard Nixon (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company Inc, 1960) 42.
102 Boffa Inside the Khrushchev Era 19.
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104 Tatyana Zaslavskaya, The Second Socialist Revolution (Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press, 1990) 34.
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about the West. Dissident and professor Yuri Glazov recalled how when workers 
‘are shown movies about strikes in capitalist countries they see that the striking 
workers come to meetings in their own cars, and that, however poor they may be, 
the unemployed also have cars, which they drive to their private homes after 
collecting an insurance cheque.’ 105 The acceptance of Khrushchev in the 
international arena and the subsequent prestige this brought the USSR was 
acknowledged by the Soviet people and was to contribute to the feelings of betrayal 
and loss caused by incidents such as the U-2 flyovers. Alexander Werth recalled a 
conversation with a young (late twenties early thirties) Soviet diplomat after the U-2 
incident in which the diplomat assessed Khrushchev’s mood and that of the Soviet 
public as being upset and angry, noting that Khrushchev had been arguing that 
despite the presence of warmongers in the USA, Eisenhower could be trusted. 
Khrushchev’s trust in Eisenhower was seen by many, according to the diplomat, as 
un-Marxist and concluded by saying that the ‘real point is that by behaving the way 
he did, Eisenhower destroyed, temporarily I hope, that system of peaceful 
coexistence and international negotiations which is the very basis of Klirushchev’s 
policy. ’ 106
In 1935, Stalin announced that life was becoming ‘better, more cheerful’ and 
in the Third Five Year Plan of 1938, it was announced that the Soviet Union was to 
catch up and surpass the West. Despite the better and more cheerful life, many 
Soviet citizens took refuge in the idea of the West as an escape from the Soviet 
present. While studying in Moscow in 1952, the Russian writer Vasilii Aksenov 
attended a party of the privileged youth who owned a radiola and numerous records 
of Bing Crosby, Nat Cole, Peggy Lee, Louis Armstrong, and Woody Herman, lo? He 
watched astonished as the young guests did the jitterbug, smoked Camels and Pall 
Malls, addressed each other as darling and baby, and identified themselves as 
shtatniki.ios The university educated daughter of a successful Moscow actress 
studied French and English ‘as a form of escapism,.. she would go to anything, just
105 Yuri Giazov, The Russian Mind Since Staiin’s  Death (Dordrecht: D. Reidei Publishing 
Company, 1985), 29.
106 Alexander Werth, The Khrushchev Phase: The Soviet Union Enters the Decisive Sixties 
(London: Robert Hale Limited, 1961) 9-10.
107 Vasilii Aksenov. Zvvozdnvi bilet (1961V A Starry Ticket (London: Putnam, 1962).
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to hear French and to get away from the Soviet Union.’ i09 Tanya Matthews, a 
Russian secretai'y who worked regularly with foreigners and married an 
Englishman, was to ponder the attraction of the ‘weak chested, physically 
unattractive male of the mysterious West’ especially when Siberian camps were a 
real possibility. She answered her question herself when she wrote that her dream 
was the end of pretending that it was nothing when during a midnight visit a 
neighbour or family member was taken away, and that if ‘there was a hero who 
could take one away from all that and give one chewing gum, silk stockings, lipstick 
and soap, together with his devotion, one could not help loving him.’ no Thus, as 
early as the Stalin period, interest in the West was a combination of genuine 
curiosity and a response to Soviet reality.
The West was also used as a metre stick by the Soviet government. In July 
1955, Bulganin gave a report to the Central Committee in which the problems in 
industry and agriculture were acknowledged. Bulganin’s conclusions were frank - 
although Soviet industry was producing more than three times the pre-war level, it 
was being held back by technical backwardness, poor organisation and cumbersome 
bureaucracy. He then gave supporting facts. Bulganin unfavourably compared 
machines from the USSR with those made in the USA, Germany and 
Czechoslovakia. Khrushchev then decried the under-valuation of foreign progress 
as an additional detriment to Soviet industry. The phrase ‘catch up with and surpass 
the most advanced capitalist countries’ was reintioduced. Catching up with the 
West was to become the new rallying cry, a cry that was ‘superficially 
comprehensible to the simplest mind.’iii In the late 1960s a Soviet economics 
professor, ‘Professor X ’, said in conversation with Alexander Werth that as ‘things 
are at present, America still has certain serious advantages over us... Socially, we 
are progressive, but our economic mechanism is still conservative and 
inefficient.’ 112 Professor X believed that fault lay in the implementation of the 
economic system. He also believed that only when the current backward kind of 
socialism was reformed, would socialism take off and dominate internationally. In
109 interview with scholar of Soviet literature Martin Dewhirst, Glasgow April 2001.
110 Tanya Matthews, Russian Wife G oes W est (London: Victor Gollancz Ltd, 1955), 15.
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acknowledging economic failures, Khrushchev and the leadership tore down the 
illusion of success that Stalin had so carefully cultivated in order to control the 
chaos that the Bolshevik revolution and industrialisation had unleashed. As the 
means of production belonged to the workers, the population could also take the 
criticism personally. Khrushchev then tried to rebuild the illusion based on 
optimistic, bordering on incredulous, statements of future successes. Concurrent 
with Khrushchev’s open attacks on the Soviet economy, which had been a wonder 
of progress just months before, and negative comparisons between it and the West, 
political certainty was cast aside. The Soviet Union was left with neither an 
omnipotent leader nor a glorious past. Even the present revolutionary industry was 
marred with backwardness: at a steel workers meeting in April 1958 Khrushchev 
said: ‘and do not take it amiss comrades if I tell you that looking at your plant -  it 
fails fai' to meet the requirements of modern socialist production’.ii3 In attempting 
to overcome the devastations of WWII and Stalinism, a strong Soviet society 
without the shroud of socialist realism was drawn to ideas of consumption and the 
future.
A party agitator, addressing a factory meeting of workers, holds forth on the 
country’s glorious achievements. For an hour he piles up statistics on growth 
in steel, petroleum, coal, new housing units, railroads. Then he wipes his brow 
and invites questions from the audience. ‘Don’t be shy, comrades,’ he urges, 
‘what would you like to know?’
Finally a shabby little man in the back row stands up. ‘I have only one 
question, comrade,’ he says meekly. ‘If everything is so good, why is 
everything so bad? ’ 114
Where society was going: impact of demographical changes
Klirushchev was to call upon the young generation to become the foundation 
for the creation of the homo sovieticus, a person with a relentless focus on the future 
and the ability to withstand the allures of bourgeois consumerism. Mihajlo 
Mihajlov has written that homo sovieticus was a man whose world had begun 
yesterday. This lack of a past was to reinforce the naïve belief placed in science and 
technology that through them mankind would achieve happiness and solve all its
113 Nikita S. Khrushchev, For Victory in Peaceful Competition with Capitalism {London: 
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114 Eugene Lyons, Workers’ Paradise Lost: Fifty Years of Soviet Communism: A Balance 
Sheet (New York: Funk and Wagnails, 1967) 211.
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problems. 115 However, a lack of interest in the past resulted in far less latitude for 
the interpretation of the present as it changed the fields of comparison from 
historical to international. Although the new Soviet man was to be immune to the 
allure of bourgeois influences, there was a disturbing fascination with the West in all 
classes of Soviet society, and particularly the youth. Soviet literature was unable to 
compete with even the most censored Western works. ii6 Western fashion was 
mimicked, and foreign words were incorporated into slang. There was also a 
significant demand for travel, especially notable among Party officials and the 
intelligentsia. 11? This desire to travel may have been for personal reasons but it was 
couched within the language of official policies with claims of the need to gather 
information and build professional contacts with Westerners, us In the Statement of 
Policy by the National Security Council on East West Exchanges (NSC 5607 June 
29 1956) the third point under general considerations of the American basic strategy 
is to build upon the greater demands for freedoms and goods as expressed by the 
young now educated population, noting that the ‘demands referred to must be 
considerable because the Soviet rulers judge it necessary to take drastic and 
hazardous measures to meet them.Tig
‘Drastic and hazardous measures’ included academic exchanges which 
brought the future Soviet educated class into contact with Westerners and Western 
ideas. In September 1956, four Cambridge students spent the month of September 
at the Moscow State University. While there, the students participated in 
extracurricular activities. Their assessment was that these Komsomol and Trade 
Union activities were well attended. Either foreign films or documentary films 
about abroad were common; the Cambridge students saw films on Milan and 
Indonesia, and several Italian films. Evenings to introduce foreign and Soviet 
students to each other were held, on average, once a week. During the Cambridge 
students’ stay, one such evening was advertised as ‘a meeting with English, Danish,
115 Mihajlo Mihajlov, Moscow Summer (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1965) 153.
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and Italian students.’ 120 Vechers usually staited with a concert, then speeches by the
Western student delegations, then a dance with live music. Rex Brown had this to
say about his vecher experience:
three girls trap me to practise their English on me. Then I keep on being taken 
aside to meet students of philosophy and journalism. Soon I have my back to 
a pillar, and am surrounded by a dense press of Arts students, all asking 
questions. I move aside to drop a cigarette in an ashtray, and find myself in a 
new crowd, natural scientists this time. From then on until one in the morning 
I can scarcely move for people, who stand around firing questions at me.121
Due to the active nature of control and surveillance that surrounded visitors, Brown 
was uncertain if the subsequent parties to which he was invited were spontaneously 
organised by fellow students or if they were orchestrated by the Komsomol. 
Regardless, his recollections of the parties included jazz records on the gramophone, 
dancing to the Voice of America or any other station playing dance music. 122 Sally 
Belfrage recalled being invited to an end of year* party in 1957 by several Muscovite 
students. Her first impressions were of ‘pig tails and frizz’ peasant like girls in 
G.U.M. like fashions or girls ‘dressed to kill in foreign looking ensembles’ that 
ranged from ‘winter suits to summer evening dresses. ’ 123 The boys were wearing 
tr ousers and silk ties. In terms of fashion, a lot of the Youth Festival had been left 
behind. Mervyn Matthews, who was in Moscow during the Youth Festival, recalled 
that students at MGU were all short of money but that they consistently got parcels 
from their parents and that they ‘all seemed to end up having these Western 
clothes’. 124 Despite being danced from friend to friend and not being permitted to 
speak to other students, Sally’s identity as an American who had been at the Festival 
(images of her were in the Soviet film about the festival that many who had not 
attended the Festival had seen) was known.
Yuri Glazov believed that the average young Russian was quite 
knowledgeable about other countries, generally disinterested in Africa or South 
America and occasionally thought about Europe and America. He has commented 
that when thinking about the West, the average citizen believed that the majority of
120 Rex V. Brown. ‘Recreation and Social Life at Moscow University,’ Alex Inkeles and Kent 
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families had their own houses, that a monthly salary was sufficient to purchase a 
pair of shoes, a coat, and a quiet evening in a restaurant. 125 According to Glazov, 
there was a paiticulai' fascination with America that on the one hand was ‘like a 
fairy-tale land: shops filled up with produce and meat, shopping centres where you 
can always buy a raincoat or solid boots. But at the same time crimes [were] 
committed there every minute. T26 Co-authors Peter Vail and Aleksandr Genis 
wrote of the image of the United States in the immediate post-Stalin era as a place 
that was ‘not known but believed in. An enormous, not yet open country’ that was 
to spring into Soviet consciousness. 127 Their list of important events contributing to 
impressions of the United States included:
1955 -  beginning of the distribution of Amerika and staging of Porgy and Bess
1957 -  ‘Live Americans played at the Moscow Festival’ (International World
Youth Festival)
1958 -  Nixon visits
1959 -  Khrushchev goes to Washington in a TU-114 (translation lessons for
the gymnasium were based on radio broadcasts on this trip and 
American news reports)
American exhibition at Sokol’niki ( ‘dlinnye, kak minonostsy, mashiny 
tsveta ‘bryzgi burgundskogo ’ ’)
1962 -  ‘Velikolepnaia Senierka' (Magnificent Seven) on Soviet screens
1963 -  Murder of Kennedy in a taxi (sic). 12s
One result of the aforementioned destruction of faith and infallibility was that 
the Soviet leadership needed to produce results quickly. The significance of the 
generational gap can be felt here. Although the concept of the USSR as socialist 
superpower was universal, there were generational differences in levels of patience 
and compromise. In comparison with the often-idealistic youth, many of the older 
generation were prone to high levels of disillusionment and yet more willing to 
accept compromise. Alice Rossi studied generational differences among the 
respondents of the Harvard project, and concluded that members of the younger 
generations had a higher positive rating of the institutional organisation of the USSR 
and were at the same time more inclined to favour violence and overthrowing the
125 Giazov, The Russian Mind Since Stalin’s  Death 19.
126 Glazov, The Russian Mind Since Stalin’s  Death 20.
127 Petr Vail’ and Aleksandr Genis, 60E: Mir sovetskogo cheloveka (Moskva: Novoe 
llteraturnoe obozrenie, 2001) 63.
128 Vail’, 60E: Mir Sovetskogo Cheloveka 64.
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regime in light of failures. 129 hi essence, the youth were more willing to believe but 
support was highly conditional, while the older generation was more sceptical but 
willing to compromise for the sake of stability. One area in which the generations 
converged was in the general apathy towards politics, with perhaps the exception of 
public anger in regard to Klir ushchev’s brinkmanship over Cuba. On the apparent 
indifference to politics, a friend of American journalist Eddy Gilmore made the 
distinction between weariness and indifference. The Soviet friend grew up hearing 
that fascism was evil, then was told that the country had made a pact with good 
Hitler, then was told that Hitler was indeed the enemy; that WWII was an 
imperialist war until it became a fight for the Soviet fatherland before changing to a 
fight for the Russian motherland; and that Americans and the allies were friends 
who sent aid, food, transport, factories etc, and then the enemy. However, the 
greatest confusion came from the denunciation of Stalin, who was omnipotent and 
infallible until he died and people began saying that life was better without him and 
culminated with his denunciation as a ‘monster.’no In response to the questioning 
of his total lack of interest in propaganda and politics and the solving of political 
issues: ‘that’s their [the Party’s] job, I suppose. As for me. I’ve got other things to 
worry about... Such as that new apartment I’ve been promised and who’s going to 
win the football championship next summer.’ ni
In the testimony of defectors a decline in the ideological élan of youth, as 
compared with the idealism of the civil war days or the great outpouring of energy 
and dedication that accompanied the first phase of the Five Year Plans is 
emphasised. 132 Political apathy or weariness often leads to new interests and 
increased susceptibility to consumption as a political alternative. In the late 1950s 
articles such as ‘Soviet youth have lost their heroes’ in which it was written that ‘a 
day does not pass, that in this or that Moscow newspaper that there is not an article
129 One section of the Harvard study looked at alienation and asked from what are the 
citizens alienated (the leadership, the Communist Party, the system  etc). The results found 
alienation varying by class. The intelligentsia was twice as likely to call for private 
ownership of light industry as peasants or ordinary workers. Raymond A. Bauer, ‘ Political 
Alienation Among Former Soviet Citizens,’ ed. Alex Inkeles and Kent Geiger, Soviet 
Societv: a Book of Readings 228-241, 237.
130 Eddy Gilmore, The C ossacks Burned Down the YMCA: Russia Revisited (London: The 
Bodley Head, 1964) 165.
131 Gilmore, The C ossacks Burned Down the YMCA 165.
132 Merle Fainsod, T he Komsomol: Youth Under Dictatorship,’ American Political Science 
Review Vol.45 (1951) 18-40, 36.
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or a letter ... [commenting] that in my time there was a different enthusiasm’ were 
common. 133 Acknowledging the need to restore faith through results, Khrushchev 
set dates for a respectable level of parity with the West and for the attainment of full 
communism and overtaking the USA. In Khrushchev’s words ‘America occupied a 
special place in our minds and our imaginations. It couldn’t have been 
otherwise.’134
In a study of eighty-five fifth year students in the late 1950s at the University 
of Moscow, the respondents were interviewed as to their expectations for the future. 
The results showed high expectations that often exceeded the promises made by the 
Party. For example, eighty of the eighty-five respondents said that they expected to 
own a car within six years, despite the fact that Khrushchev had made it clear that 
the focus of the Soviet automotive industry would be on the creation of rental pools 
and not private passenger cais.135 Another official study was carried out in 1966 
and involved 2,204 youth between seventeen and thirty in Leningrad. More than 
half were factory workers, the rest were engineers, students and technicians. No 
names were required but twenty percent of respondents voluntarily gave them. The 
results of the study were published in 1969 in booklet form under the title Young 
People: About themselves and their contemporaries. In one section of the survey, 
respondents were asked to rank their primary and secondary goals. The desire for 
good housing and for material prosperity ranked third and fourth within the category 
of primary goals. First and second place were taken by an interesting job and higher 
education.
In an attempt to moderate demands, the standard propaganda means were 
instituted. For example, in a letter from a young woman to KomsomoVskaia Pravda 
one reads that: ‘Igor’s room is crammed with expensive things: beautiful furniture, 
rugs, a tape recorder, two record players, two radios, cameras, a photo-enlarger, and 
a movie camera, and there is even a typewriter. In short, his room has all the 
equipment needed to enable a modern, stylish young man to shine among his
133 NEF No.8 (1957) 82-94. A Various documents in which the issue of youth apathy Is 
discussed can be found in the archival documents of RGANI fond 5 opis 33 delo 31.
134 Sergei Khrushchev, Nikita Khrushchev and the Creation of a  Superpower trans. Shiriey 
Benson (Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University, 2000) 320.
135 John Bushnell, ‘The Soviet Man Turns Pessim ist,’ Alexander Dallin ed. The Khrushchev 
and Brezhnev Years (New York: Garland Publishing Inc, 1992) 137-157, 141.
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friends.’ i36 The girl is from modest circumstances and feels that she and her 
beloved Igor should begin their married life together modestly within their means. 
Igor has become accustomed to the wealth provided by his father and expects this 
standard to be maintained regardless of his marital status. The rising expectations of 
the youth and parents who catered to them were regularly scorned in the press, hi 
Pravda (19.06.1969), a mother wrote in about her daughter’s school graduation. 
Having set out in search of ‘a bright and youthful’ dress for her daughter, the mother 
ended up purchasing a wedding dress as nothing else was good enough. However, 
even a wedding dress failed to impress the other girls whose attire was ‘resplendent 
with gold filament, beads and sequins and their heads were crowned by towers, 
decorative braids, fantasies and other hairdos. These weren’t girls, they were New 
Year’s trees.’ 137 The mother then ponders the psychology of a teenager who can 
demand: “ either a white lace dress over nylon, or I won’t go to the party!’ i3s and 
concludes that these excessive expectations are tied to the increasing family income, 
considerations of prestige, and laws of fashion. 139 In A. Kuznetsov’s Continuation 
o f a Legend the hero Toly a leaves his family, friend Victor and girlfriend, to travel 
along the Trans-Siberian rail to Irkutsk where Toly a soon begins working. On the 
first day his muscles ache and he has bloody hands. Exhausted, lonely and mentally 
fatigued he regularly contemplates going home but is repulsed by ‘Victor’s cynical 
letters, full of talk of imported clothes and rock and roll.’ i40
In 1966, Valeri Agranovskii conducted a self-designed ‘social experiment’.
He fictionally gave twenty-five Gorky university students 10,000 roubles and told 
them to spend it all. The results of the experiment were published in Yunost no. 2 
1967. Of all of the students, only two managed to spend all the money and this was 
because they purchased Volgas. Many of the students said that they would travel, 
but most restricted themselves to the Soviet Far East and North. The student 
Lebedev wanted to take a girlfriend to France, however, it was decided that this 
would cost twenty to thirty thousand and was disqualified. In response to student
136 ‘I don’t want to be dependant,’ Komsomol’skaia Pravda (28.01.1969) as found in Colette 
Shulman ed.. We the Russians: ’Voices from Russia (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1971) 
74.
137 As in Shulman ed., W e the Russians 81.
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avowals that they did not need material possessions the author was to argue that the 
necessity was there, what was in question was if the funds were also there. T 
[Agranovskii] met a first year girl who spent her stipend on a pair of high fashion 
shoes for twenty-seven roubles and then for the next four days, until her parents 
responded to an urgent request for replenishment, subsisted on thirty kopeks a day: 
salad, tea, and the indispensable pastry. ’ 141 In a sardonic travel memoir, Marc 
Polonsky and Russell Taylor wrote that the Russian fashion industry was countering 
the reputation of poorly and drably dressed Russians by producing ‘paisleys and 
polka-dots in shades of garish orange and purple which would have appeared outré 
at the Woodstock Festival’ 142
The changes in Soviet Russia imbedded in the consciousness of Soviet citizens 
were to appear more pronounced to foreigners. This is evident in the travel memoirs 
of the time. Eddy Gilmore, an American journalist, who after 1955 lived in England 
was married to a Russian woman and had lived and worked as the Chief of the 
Moscow Bureau for the Associated Press from 1941 to 1953. Unable to leave until 
1953, it was with some trepidation that he and his wife returned in 1963 for a visit. 
His impressions of changes are particularly acute due to having left almost 
immediately after Stalin’s death and returning near the end of Khrushchev’s reign. 
The title of his travel memoir is The Cossacks Bm-ned Down the YMCA and refers to 
the system of using English words to codify Soviet institutions. In this instance:
The Cential Committee of the Communist Party had burned down (taken control of) 
the NKVD. A ‘big difference’ (phrase commonly used at the time) between the 
Stalinist and Khrushchev eras was in the restaurant in the National Hotel, reputed to 
be the best in Moscow at the time, with its second floor location overlooking Red 
Square, the Church of St Basil and the Kremlin. The clientele were no longer rich 
factory managers, Soviet officials, or Red Army, Navy or Air Force officers but 
young Russians in their twenties and thirties. While their clothes could not be 
described as elegant, it was the best-dressed group of young people that Gilmore had 
ever seen in the Soviet Union. The music was no longer traditional and staid but a 
six-piece band playing Western numbers, including Kurt Weill’s ‘Mac the Knife’. 143
141 As in Shulman ed., We the Russians 87.
142 Marc Polonsky and Russell Taylor, USSR: From an Original Idea bv Karl Marx (London: 
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This new generation was a generation that could see the effects that Stalinism and 
the war had had on the older generation but was removed from them. Take for 
example the young reporter for Vecherniaia Moskva, Sasha, born in Moscow in 
1949.
We lived in a pretty dingy old house in the Zamoskvorechi till the end of 1961, 
and then we got a beautiful modern three room flat not far from the present 
university. By this time I was already twelve. After the twentieth Congress of 
1956, which terribly upset my father, who had been a Party member since 
1952, he did not take Stalin’s portrait down. Only when we moved into the 
new flat did he not put it up again. But then that was after the 22”^  Congress, 
after which Stalin’s body was thrown out of the Lenin Mausoleum. I think my 
father was still very upset about it, but he said nothing. Instead of the portrait 
we now have an enlarged photograph of Uncle Petya. Uncle Petya died 
fighting in Kaliningrad. i44
In response to the question if Sasha had ever suffered he answered ‘no, not 
much. The dark basement where I lived until I was twelve was pretty awful, all the 
same; however, as I said, we got a nice new flat in 1961. Actually, I did suffer last 
year. I was in love. But she went and married someone else.’ 145 On Klirushchev, 
Sasha was to comment that Khrushchev had been amusing but that the routine soon 
grew old. More was expected from the head of the CPSU. ‘Of course, we had good 
moments under Khrushchev. I remember the first Sputnik; I was only eight or ten, 
but the excitement at our school was terrific.’ i46 Werth’s assessment of Sasha was 
that ‘he was not wildly interested in ideology, but was very proud of living 
relatively prosperously in a well run country that took such good care of all its 
citizens.’147
Condemnation of the trend towards excessive materialism came not just from
official Soviet organs but also from hipper members of society. For example, in the
1960s the song ‘Tonyechka’ by the Russian poet and songwriter Alexander Galich
was popular. 148 In this song, the fallen ‘hero’ has left the girl of his heart for another
under the accusations of seeking money, material goods and privileges.
She gathered up her things and said in a small voice:
‘As for your falling in love with Tonka, well, she has nothing to do with it!’
I t’s not Tonka’s moist lips that seduced you.
144 Werth, Russia: Hopes and Fears 121-124, 162.
145 Werth, Russia: Hopes and Fears 121-124, 162.
146 Werth, Russia: Hopes and Fears 162.
147 Werth, Russia: Hopes and Fears 163.
148 This translation can be found In Shulman ed., We the Russians 76-77.
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But the fact that her Papa has a bodyguard assigned to him.
that her Papa has a dacha in Pavshino,
that Papa is surrounded by toadies with secretaries,
that Papa has access to the Central Committee privilege shops!
And that on holidays there are movies starring Tselikovskaya!
Your Tonka is too ugly for words-
But don’t listen to me, I belong to the past!
And now you ’re going to sleep with a washboard, 
for the sake o f her private car...
That’s what you wanted, and you know it yourself.
You know it but you’re embarrassed
Over and again you talk about love, about trust
about lofty things!
But in your mind’s eye you see -  the dacha in Pavshino, 
the bodyguard and the toadies with secretaries, 
and how you will watch movies at home with the family 
and happiness with be a caramel on your tongue 
(Boy responds)
I  now live in a house where nothing is lacking.
Even my trousers have zippers,
the wine flows in our home as from a well,
and we have an indoor toilet -  eight by ten
Papasha himself gets home by midnight,
the bodyguards and the toadies all stand at attention!
And tell him a joke about the Jews!
But when I go to bed with this idiot, this Tonka,
I  remember that other sweet voice.
What a temper that girl has -downright violent,
I telephone her and she hangs up.
Drive me to Ostankino, chief.
To Ostankino, where the Titan movie theatre is.
She works there as a ticket taker, 
stands in the entryway, all frozen, 
freezing and shivering, 
but she has overcome her love 
chilled to the bone and grown cold, 
but uncompromising and unforgiving.
The hero acknowledges the materially wealthy reality of his new situation, as well 
as the emotional void. This juxtaposition of materially wealthy with spiritually 
empty was commonly applied to the West and those that emulated it.
Apparently mistrustful of the younger generation, the leadership revoked the 
relaxed requirements for party membership as instituted under Klirushchev and 
raised the joining age from twenty-one to twenty-four at the 23'^ '^  Party Congress. It 
has been argued that the Brezhnev-Kosygin team implicitly promised to insure the
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economic position of the newly entrenched privileged class thus, sidestepping the 
demands and desires of the masses, and failing to deliver on the promises made 
under Khrushchev. i49
Where Soviet society was going: Perceptions of standard of living
As the improvement of living standards was a prime political goal, Soviet
citizens could espouse the idea of consumption with minimal fear of charges of
political deviation. Eventually, this was to translate into a blurred line on such
phenomena as the shtatniki and the stilyagi. These trends are but two of many that
serve as indicators of the Soviet government’s inability to provide an acceptable
alternative to the consumption of Western popular culture. This failure was not
unique to the Soviet government as the general process of globalisation involves a
substantial amount of homogenisation of culture. What was unique was the
fundamental nature of the threat this posed to the Communist system. The Soviet
system failed not only to provide an alternative to Western popular culture but also
to provide an acceptable alternative to Western style consumption. It was a system
that was not dependant on mass participation (unlike Western economies that
needed mass consumption of goods and culture to perpetuate growth and foster
expansion) but which invited/permitted images of culture and consumption for
which mass participation and consumption were fundamental, without having the
institutional ability to respond appropriately to the new delineations of the social
contract. In 1960, Alec Nove wrote:
Of course, people’s attitudes and expectations are relevant to the efficacy of 
incentives as well as to political stability. The more the Soviet Union boasts of 
its great technical progress, of its Sputniks and moon rockets, of its equality 
with or superiority over the United States in weapons, the more impatient its 
citizens become with their backward living conditions, and the less reasonable 
it seems to them that nothing drastic is done to improve them... The increasing 
range of contacts between Soviet citizens and foreigners plays a dual role in 
this process. Many more Soviet citizens are now learning at first or second 
hand how the other side lives, and this affects their own expectations. Then, 
too, with the increasing flow of foreign visitors to Russia, it must certainly 
appear politically advantageous to the leadership to impress them with higher 
standards of living. This is much more than a matter of impressing 
unsophisticated tourists from the West, who can if necessary, be fobbed off
149 Giuseppe Boffa, Ot SSSR  K Rossll: Istorlia neokonchennoao krizisa 1964-1994  
(Moskva: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, 1996) 21. A similar theory can be found in Lyons, 
Workers’ Paradise Lost 186.
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with Potemkin villages... Klirushchev is well aware that relative living 
standards will play an important role in the world impact of the two opposed 
systems. 150
Despite a general dearth of sociological studies during this period, journalistic
bodies (for example KomsomoVskaia Pravda) had public opinion institutes and
conducted quasi-sociological surveys. These surveys were published along with
official commentaries from respective Soviet ministers, combined with the letters to
the editors were to provide KomsomoVskaia Pravda with literally hundreds of
thousands of opinions. In 1960, the average number of letters to editor was 16-
17,000 per month.i5i From August to September (results published in October)
i960, KomsomoVskaia Pravda interviewed citizens about their perceptions of their
standard of living. The survey began with the following preamble:
In our times, the efforts of our government, the Communist Party of the Soviet 
Union, is towards the quick resolution of problems concerning future increases 
in the material wealth of the people. Not long ago at the 5* Session of the All- 
Union, a new mandate was taken to lower taxes, to shorten the working day, 
and to raise standards of living. 152
The four long answer questions asked were: How do you compare your current 
standard of living with your past standaid of living?. How is this expressed/With 
what is this primarily associated?, What issues are of prime concern for you?. Of 
the 1,625 surveys distributed, 1,399 were returned. In an attempt to gather a 
representative survey the survey was distributed to passengers on sixty-five trains, 
from those to Leningrad to those heading for Kazaklistan. Of the respondents 
59.3% (830) were male and 40.7% (569) were female with the dominant age group 
(53.6%) being 30-55 years of age followed by under 30 (41.7%) and over 56 (4.7%). 
The following chaif and graph are breakdowns of the profession and place of 
residence of the respondents. 153
150 Alec Nove, Toward a Communist Welfare State? Social Welfare in the USSR ,’ 
Problems of Communism Vol. 9 no.1 (1960): 1-9, 9.
151 Grushin. Chetvre zhizni Rossll: v zerkale oprosov obshchestvennogo mneniia 47.
152 Grushin, Chetvre zhizni Rossll: v zerkale oprosov obshchestvennogo mneniia 113.
153 Figures as found in Grushin, Chetvre zhizni Rossll: v zerkale oprosov 
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Table 1: Profession
Profession Percentage of respondents
Worker 34%
Office Worker 33.4%
Engineer/Technician 13.2%
Military 7.5%
Housewife 3.3%
Student 3.2%
Pensioner 3J9&
Kolkhoz 2.3%
I Chart 1 Place of Residence
30,0%
25,0%
20 ,0%
15,0%
10,0%
vtT
<<J
if '
V
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Of the respondents seventy three percent said that their standard of living had 
improved in recent years and seven percent reported a ‘deterioration.’i54 In 
response to the second question about concrete representations of improvements in 
standards of living the answers included receiving new flats, increased pay, the 
shortening of the work day, more books, more foodstuffs and products in general, 
and raised cultural standards. Suggestions for improving areas of concern included 
better organisation (the refrigerator was delivered to the flat before the building was 
finished), faster implementation of automation, cheaper or free public transportation, 
strengthening the military, the new stores should be accompanied by goods, and a 
shorter working week (one suggestion was for a four hour day). 155 Only one of the 
1,399 respondents called for a different political system and the majority of the 
responses involved a strong belief in the paternal responsibility of the state to 
provide for the masses, ise
In a conversation between two twenty something Ukrainian university students 
in 1960 and a youthful Martin Dewhirst (who in addition to numerous travels and 
work in the USSR went on to lecture Russian language and literature at the 
University of Glasgow) the discussion turned to the probability of the Soviet Union 
catching up with the USA by 1980: T [Dewhirst] thought, in my naivete and 
ignorance that the Soviet Union would go on making great economic advances and 
that life would become easier and better for most people and I said so on this 
occasion and the two young Ukrainians burst out laughing and they said in 
Russian... that the Soviet Union would never catch up on the West.Ts? Ronald 
Hingley’s interpretation of the Russian image of the West: ‘some Russians have 
exaggeratedly glossy ideas of Western prosperity so that I have even found myself 
defending their Seven Year Plan and rising living standards. Some of them
154 The newspaper began large-scale survey projects in May 1960 with a survey of Soviet 
citizens about the Cold War and the U-2 affair, with the organisation (department) 
responsible for the sociological studies being called the Institut obshchestvennogo mneniia 
(lOM). The formation of lOM was given wide press coverage in the West, for example by 
the Daily Telegraph (09.01,1961), and the New York Herald Tribune (28-29.01.1961). For 
more Information on the surveys of the lOM se e  Grushin, Chetvre zhizni Rossll: v zerkale 
oprosov obshchestvennogo mneniia 41-68, For an analysis of the October published 1960 
survey se e  Bushnell, T h e Soviet Man Turns Pessim ist,’ 140; or Grushin, Chetvre zhizni 
Rossii: V zerkale oprosov obshchestvennogo mneniia 112-132.
155 Grushin, Chetvre zhizni Rossii: v zerkale oprosov obshchestvennogo mneniia 118-124.
156 Grushin, Chetvre zhizni Rossii: v zerkale oprosov obshchestvennogo mneniia 155.
157 Interview with Martin Dewhirst, Glasgow April 2001.
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wouldn’t have this. ‘Things here will never change’.’ iss Both Hingley and 
Dewhirst found themselves defending the credibility of the improvements in the 
Soviet economic system in the face of unfounded praise for Western standards and 
harsh condemnation for the Soviet system by Soviet students. This is not to argue 
that there were not individuals who believed initially in the Soviet Union’s ability to 
catch up. Sally Belfrage recalled a conversation with a man named Kolya who 
believed that the material standard of living would soon be more favourable than in 
the West and that when this happened Soviet citizens would be permitted to travel 
and discover that life in the Soviet Union was better than that abroad: ‘you have 
seen, there are many people here who think in terms of flats and clothes and material 
luxuries, just as they would anywhere... They’re bitter and they complain, and think 
that capitalism is better because people have more things. When there are more 
things, these petty people will be satisfied.’ 159 Dissatisfaction, despair and 
resignation were not restricted to the general population. Sergei Khrushchev 
recalled how in 1953, his father was given an American inflatable rubber dingy that 
was designed to be attached to the floats of a plane, Nikita Khrushchev was so 
impressed with the inflatable boats that he tried to have them produced in Ukraine. 
This proved unfeasible.leo Dissatisfaction was not restricted to material shortfalls. 
Ludmilla Alexeyeva and Paul Goldberg were young adults under Klnushchev and 
they recall feeling great indignation at his ‘idiotic kitchen debate’ with Vice 
President Richard Nixon, his shoe incident at the United Nations, his laughable 
attempts to ‘catch up with and overtake America in per capita production of milk 
and meat,’ his illiterate pronouncements on art, his attacks on writers whose work 
was ‘inaccessible to the people,’ and his shameful mistreatment of Boris 
Pasternak.’ lei Respect for Khrushchev and a sense of appreciation for what he had 
done came after 1964 according to Alexeyeva and Goldberg. 162
158 Ronald Hingley, Under Soviet Skins: an Untourist’s Report (London: Hamish Hamilton, 
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In the cartoon Tn the ‘free world” a couple are discussing their financial 
situation in the comfort of their home and the man saying to his wife: ‘If you had 
not blown all our money on food and the flat, we could buy a new car’. 163
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Fig. I Tn the ‘free w orld” Novoe vremia no. 30 (1959)
The political message of this Canadian cartoon was that so much money is 
consumed by food and shelter that there is no disposable cash left over. However, 
this cartoon was published in the Soviet Union in 1959, a time when food was still 
scarce, when there was a massive shortage of housing, and a private car was 
dreamed of. The concept of the availability of goods in the West would have been 
reinforced by the plethora of ‘things’ drawn in the cartoon and the contrast to the 
Soviet Union where the shortage in the Soviet Union was goods, not money, would 
have been pronounced.
Due to their privileged positions. Communist bosses had access to inordinate 
quantities of Soviet and foreign goods. This put them in a powerful position vis-à- 
vis their fellow citizens. The result was that it was often these citizens who engaged 
in black market earnings, and who (along with their children) wore the Western 
fashions, had the Western goods and spoke the Western infused slang. This was met 
with resentment from the general population. In his memoirs, N. Dubovin noted the
163 F. Raita, cartoon ‘In the ‘free world”, Novoe vremia no. 30 (1959): 21
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constant presence of the black market as being very capitalistic. For example, in 
1953-54 the secretary of the company Komsomol where he worked would take 
batteries and sell them on the black market but ‘in the meetings he always called for 
honesty and economy in handling state property,’ or the third secretary who was in 
charge of supplying officers’ quarters with fuel and who would sell truck loads of 
firewood on the side.]64 The P/'avt/a journalist referred to as Kolya by Werth 
declared that it was impossible to ‘get away from the fact that there is a technical 
and intellectual elite in this country. And it’ll take far more than twenty or thirty or 
fifty years to create any semblance of real equality.’i65 The use of Western status 
symbols and activities by the elite blurred the distinction between communism and 
capitalism further.
The reports of foreigners from the same period are consistent with the above 
findings. Thomas Whitney wrote in 1961 that every week brought letters with news 
of former friends enjoying ‘these years of abundance and peace.’ i66 Maria 
Ivanovna, the family’s former cook, wrote how prosperous, healthy and happy the 
family was. The lyric-writer and journalist David wrote that he had a ‘spacious new 
flat’ and a car.]67 Giusseppe Boffa also made mention of the improvements: ‘from 
year to year people ate better, dressed better, had more fun.’ 16S John Gunther noted 
that Soviet production of consumer durables during the late 1950s was ‘quite 
respectable... In 1960, the USSR produced 453,800 vacuum cleaners, 2,783,000 
bicycles, 26,038,000 clocks and watches, and 1,764,000 cameras.’]69 Despite the 
general increase in living standaids, figures such as Gunther’s were not indicative of 
customer satisfaction. In a published interview with the American Victor Perlo, 
then First Deputy Premier Anastas I. Mikoyan answered questions on the Soviet 
economy and used the example of the failures in the bicycle industry despite 
satisfactory outputs, to illustrate the need for the Soviet economy to be more 
flexible. ‘An example is bicycles. We decided to make three and a half million
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bicycles per year. Previously there were long waiting lines for bicycles. Soon there 
was an oversupply. We lowered the price, with some success, but still there were 
too many. So we cut production to two million bicycles per year, improved quality, 
and advertised.’ no Both the American Meyer Bernstein and the Yugoslav Mihajlo 
Mihajlov were less impressed than John Gunther with the supply of customer goods 
and durables. While gathering information that might be of interest to union 
members, Meyer Bernstein, the head of the United Steelworkers of America’s 
International Affairs Department, frequented various department stores (G.U.M. and 
Z.U.M. in Moscow) and both converted the prices to USD and compared them to 
the average income of Soviet workers during his tour of Soviet steel mills at the end 
of 1966. His conclusion was that although there was an acceptable range of goods, 
items were expensive: ‘a suit of clothes, $191.40; women’s shoes, $44; a small 
stereo radio, $247.50; a small tape recorder, $198. The same items, if and when in 
stock, can be bought at more reasonable figures, of course, in less swanky shops. 
When matched against the average income of $26 a week, however, it helps point 
out the plight of the ordinaiy consumer.’ i7i
Mihajlo Mihajlov, who was imprisoned by Tito for his publication about his 
summer spent in Moscow in 1964, wrote that in general ‘electric appliances and 
cameras are extremely cheap, while textiles, shoes and vodka are incredibly 
expensive.’ 172 He also noted that living standards in the USSR were about forty 
percent lower than those in Yugoslavia. Richard Edmonds, touring Russia in 1958 
with a British town planning delegation, reported on shopping in Stalingrad that 
while it was clear that the government was bent on eliminating shortages, they still 
existed. ‘The shoe shortage is probably not as obvious as once it was, but the 
foreign visitor is still likely to be accosted outside his hotel and offered a generous 
price for his shoes. ’ 173 Ronald Hingley recalled that he was often interviewed by 
Soviet radio or press reporters and asked to speak about life in England. He felt that 
the main interest was in ascertaining the nature of the general standard of living. To 
this end, Hingley was regularly ‘interrogated about my income, house, cai' and
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family. When they got down to detail it was hard to satisfy their curiosity. For 
instance, I could not tell them how much we pay for a kilogram of bread.’ 174 This 
absorption with detailed prices speaks of the social significance prices had for many 
Soviet citizens. Learning that many necessity goods were cheaper in the USSR than 
the West reinforced the fairness and socialism of the Soviet system. The challenge 
that was to arise was the blurring of the definition of ‘necessity’ versus ‘luxury’ 
items, as items such as refrigerators, radios, televisions, etc. became necessities.
The transfer from luxury to necessity was based on expectations formed by internal 
and external comparisons. That the Soviet Union was unable to provide luxury 
items in the quantity, quality and affordability of the West was tolerated; that it was 
to provide the necessities more cheaply and with an all consuming distribution was 
one of its prime responsibilities to Soviet citizens. Two former Soviet citizens of the 
Thaw generation were to comment that the 1960s were a time of ‘already not living 
in the past and not yet troubled by the future.’ 175 To use Khrushchev’s words the 
Thaw era, was one of ‘it is possible’ (vosmozhno).
Differences between proclamations, reality and the viability of future 
achievement during the late 1950s and 1960s presented often painfully comical 
contradictions. It is during this period that anecdotes soar in number. As a 
questionnaire respondent wrote in reflection on the Khrushchev era: ‘it was evident 
to the whole country that there were issues, but only a few protested. The people 
told anecdotes instead.’ i76 The rise of anecdotes is indicative of a knowledgeable, if 
dis-empowered, population. Vitaly Komar, an art student at the Stroganoff Institute 
in Moscow recalled the period as being ‘peculiar’, with everything in a state of great 
fluctuation. Teachers were always changing, thus allowing the students to ‘willy- 
nilly learn pluralism’ and the curriculum was in fluctuation with one day drawing 
one way and another day another way, even occasionally like the Americans.
Access to significantly increased numbers of Western journals also contributed to 
the pluralism. 177 Pluralism contributed to the ability to criticise Khrushchev and to
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envisage an alternative leader. From the idea of an alternative leader, an alternative 
system did not constitute an insurmountable leap.
In a 1997 survey in St. Petersburg of persons born before or around the time of 
the Russian Revolution, and who remained in the Soviet Union and witnessed its 
collapse, respondents were asked to list their dominant impression of all Soviet 
leaders and on the best era. Although these surveys have the filter of history, they 
represent an opportunity to glean some understanding of the opinions of individuals 
who remained within the Soviet Union and who were perhaps unable or unwilling to 
express their opinions under the Communist regime, ns The general consensus was 
that Klirushchev was a good but ignorant and silly man of the people 179 who tried 
but failed to reform the system but who succeed in reigning over a period of relative 
prosperity, although not, as one respondent wrote a time of stability: ‘Klirushchev 
exposed the cult of the personality and he tried to reform the country’s economy. 
Unfortunately, he did not have the time necessary to do this... Brezhnev, despite 
representing a stagnation brought stability’.iso Respondents often simultaneously 
mentioned Klirushchev’s denunciation of Stalin and his botched economic reforms. 
On Khrushchev’s mixed successes: ‘he wanted to do a lot, but he couldn’t do 
anything’ isi or ‘he wanted to improve [things] but made [them] worse.’ is2 Irina 
Loukina noted that Khrushchev struck her ‘as amusing and poorly cultured. He 
wanted to provide freedom, a thaw, a spring, I remember that it was during 
Khrushchev’s era that the first rehabilitations of the terror occurred.’ 183 Another 
individual wrote that Khrushchev: ‘was closer to the people. We began to live 
wealthily, many became free.’184 She was to continue that the ‘best years, in all 
probability, were the 1960s: we were not hungry; we were becoming wealthy: we 
built a dacha, in the summer we went with my husband and son to the Black sea.’ 1S5
178 This research was conducted by the researcher in St. Petersburg in 1997. It involved 
respondants answering both written long answer form questions and oral interviews. The 
critiera for the respondants was that they were born before or during the Russian 
Revolution. Contact with respondants was made through the branch method. Names have 
been changed to protect the annoymlty of the respondants who chose to give their names.
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Another respondent was to write that Klirushchev was ‘happy and khotevshii -  [he] 
did the best he could. We started to acquire wealth. In my opinion he wasn’t overly 
cultured.’ 186 This jumping back and forth between the personal and the political was 
typical for the comments on Klirushchev. This is in contrast to the comments on 
Stalin for example, which focused almost exclusively on his sly intelligence, 
brilliant leadership during the war and forceful nature of a ‘real’ leader. One of the 
few male respondents (born in 1918) was the only respondent to talk about 
Khrushchev’s reforms to the military and how no officer that he (the respondent) 
knew was pleased with them.is? The same respondent conceded that Khrushchev 
‘did a lot for the revision of communal apartments (but then dismissed him). Often 
his words and actions were stupidity, for example: corn, the achieving of 
communism in the ‘near future’ and so forth.’ iss
Looking for shimmers of light on the horizon, one respondent noted that while 
‘there have never been good periods in Russia, the somewhat improved periods 
were 1924-25 [NEP] and the late 1960s.’iS9 Other respondents expressed similar 
sentiments. 190 Iosif Emanuilovich Dyuk was born in 1918 and described his Post- 
War life as such: I got married in 1946; by 1956 we had four children, tliree girls 
and a boy. Life was hard during those post war years. I worked as a painter and 
decorator, doing a full day’s work and then a lot of moonlighting on the side. Even 
then it was difficult to make ends meet, though by the mid -1950s things were 
looking up a bit.’ i9i Anna Glazov said that the best time was in the ‘1960s. Yuri 
Gagarin flew into space, our country rejoiced in it, we were proud of it. And in 
power was Nikita Sergeivich Khrushchev.’ 192 Valentina Titova noted that 
Khrushchev’s greatest achievements were exposing the cult of Stalin, and opening 
up space and Siberia. 193 While most respondents listed the birth of their children 
and the victory in WWII as the best moments in their lives, some listed the obtaining 
of personal goods. Thus, the following: the ‘greatest joy was when I, with my 
husband and children, received a flat. Up until then we lived in a communal flat:
186 Questionnaire 9 (St. Petersburg: 1997).
187 Questionnaire 14 (St. Petersburg: 1997).
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189 Questionnaire 18 (St. Petersburg: 1997).
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five tables in the kitchen. The waiting list was many years, and then we received a 
two room apartment, there was so much happiness.T 94 In an interview that was 
conducted in conjunction with the St. Petersburg surveys, interviewee David 
Makarovich recalled the changes in the housing situation: ‘we married in 1951. At 
the beginning there wasn’t anything, we only had a room. Then we received a 
khivara [flat]... It was sixteen metres for five people. Put succinctly, we lived like 
that from 1951 to 1961, But then Nikita Sergeivich decided, it was from his good 
will one could say, he decided for mass construction.’ 195 David was to recall that he 
lost his faith in the possibility of a better future coming first during the Brezhnev 
regime as he realised that the USSR was not living up to its promises. Gershon 
Solomonovich Shapiro born in 1899 in Rovno, once a confirmed communist, also 
lost his faith post-Stalin in the 1950s. He concluded that the ‘very foundations, 
economic and political, of Soviet type socialism are rotten.’ i96 This stemmed from 
the fact that ‘scarcity and inadequacy of goods and services leads to their inequitable 
distribution; to a massive degree of bureaucratic abuse of office, embezzlement and 
plain theft; to endemic popular discontent that is then suppressed by force or the 
threat of force.’ 197 Commenting on the general generational difference in terms of 
opinions of Khrushchev, Evgeni Arsenyevich Boltin theorised that ‘those who 
suffered in the purges will never forget that Klirushchev, though not he alone -  
another Western myth, threw open the camps; and they are grateful to him. But to 
younger people the purges and the camps are ancient history now; what they do 
remember, though, is his brinkmanship over Cuba, and for that they will never 
forgive him.’198
One aspect of the Liberman report was an analysis of Soviet and foreign 
consumption. This report was published abroad and in the Soviet Union despite the 
contention that it was written for the West. Liberman’s report noted the impressive 
pace of Soviet growth in compaiison to the USA but then mentioned that the USSR 
was behind the more developed capitalist nations in consumption and that as living
194 Questionnaire 20 (St. Petersburg: 1997).
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standard was essential to international economic competition, it must be given 
priority. 199 In Andrei Amalrik’s essay ‘Will The Soviet Union Survive Until 1984’, 
he likened the state of Soviet society to one man holding a gun on another, noting 
that over time both men will weary of their strained positions and relax slowly. One 
could witness this relaxing in the Soviet Union as there is ‘a growing yearning for a 
quiet life and for comfort -  even a kind of ‘comfort cult’ -  on all levels of our 
society, particularly at the top and in the middle. ’200 The ‘comfort cult’ was driven 
from the top down as the leadership sought to prove Soviet parity with the West and 
it was driven from the bottom up as average citizens sought comforts befitting 
citizens of a modern Soviet state.
Where state was taking society: government fuelled expectations
In struggling for peace, our Party well remembers Lenin’s dictum that 
victorious socialism exerts its main influence on the fate o f mankind by its economic 
successes. These successes can only be multiplied under peaceful conditions. In the 
peaceful economic competition with capitalism, Socialism undoubtedly will gain a 
decisive economic victofy and will insure for the people their right to a higher 
standard o f living than they now have. This will demonstrate to an even greater 
extent than now the superiority o f our social system and will serve as a mighty, 
inspiring example to all people o f the world in their struggle against capitalism and 
for socialism. Frol Kozlovioi
Expectations were created by the government (it allowed people to aspire) and 
were fuelled by private desire. Achievements such as Sputnik I and II, the atomic 
icebreaker Lenin, and Yuri Gagarin’s flight into space, dramatically eased the task 
of proving the modern nature of the USSR.202 This pride in technological advances 
is clearly conveyed in the 1960 Soviet film Russian Souvenir in which a plane full 
of foreign tourists (mostly American) crashes in Siberia. The foreigners are 
equipped with only a pre-revolutionai’y guidebook and prejudices. As the foreigners 
wander their way back towards civilisation, they encounter high-rise complexes 
where they expected to find wood huts and hydroelectric dams where they
199 The English translation of this report was first published under the title T h e Soviet 
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anticipated untouched nature. At one point in the film, the foreigners are woken 
early and escorted to a hilltop. There they find a peasant looking through a 
telescope. One of the Americans asks the peasant if he can read and write. There is 
an unintelligible response and the American is motioned to peer through the 
telescope himself. At this point there is an explosion of colour as a rocket soars into 
space. The peasant then approaches the group and introduces himself as 
Academician Bobrov: ‘so you see I do sometimes have occasion to read and write, 
and even to do the odd spot of calculating.’ The visitors continue to be stunned and 
amazed but the zenith remained the Sputnik. The message of the film was that 
despite foreign misconceptions and continued underestimation, the USSR was 
advancing at rocket speeds and was no longer a peasant nation. Naturally, the film 
also portrayed evil spies within the foreign group, and the sexual promiscuity of the 
Americans. Ronald Hingley, who viewed the film in 1960, noted that the cinema 
was full (he bought his ticket from a speculator) and that the only real sign of 
animation from the audience was when the Scottish Presbyterian Minister among 
the foreign group went to a Kremlin reception in a kilt.203 For the Soviet leadership. 
Sputnik was used as the irrefutable proof, even for the most obdurate opponents, 
that the Soviet Union possessed a potent combination of gifted scientists, innovative 
engineers, advanced laboratories and workers and a highly developed industry. 
Despite Sputnik and other impressive technological achievements the perception of 
being behind was not eradicated. In his memoirs Khrushchev recalled: ‘I remember 
how our engineers would travel to Japan and bring back models of various products. 
They would pass them around and our experts’ mouths would gape in wonder.
There is apparently some great defect in our system, for we have no fewer 
engineers, scientists, or mathematicians than West Germany or Japan.’ 204 Although, 
the successful launch of Sputnik eased ‘the task of demonstrating that the USSR was 
a modern advanced country ...a thousand fold, ’ 205 it did nothing to ease consumer 
expectations. Indeed, it fuelled them.
This section involves a chronological analysis of the development of the ideas 
of catching irp and surpassing the West as presented in public statements. As
203 Hingley, Under Soviet Skins 186.
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mentioned previously, the term catching up with and surpassing the West was 
reintroduced in 1955. This plirase was then employed for domestic and 
international consumption. During a speech made at a meeting of electors of the 
Kalinin constituency in Moscow (14.03.1958 covered in Pravda the following day) 
Khrushchev explained the need of the communist system for economic and 
industrial improvements stating that they are ‘vivid evidence of the viability and 
invincibility of the new social system -  socialism. ’206 In the same speech, he spoke 
of Great Britain, France and the United States as having garnered the respect of the 
Soviet regime and deserving due praise for their ‘great contributions’ to the 
development of world science, technology and culture.207 In an interview with 
Figaro correspondent Daniel Groussard that ran in Figaro and Pravda (27.03.1958) 
Khrushchev was to respond to Groussard’s statement that he understood the main 
task of the USSR to be an economic one, with ‘Yes, to surpass the West,’20s With 
Khrushchev making such bald statements, it is not surprising to find these 
sentiments reiterated by other individuals. It was also in 1958 that the Minister of 
Culture told film workers that they must produce films that show new management 
methods ‘and the struggle of farm workers to outstrip the United States in per capita 
production of meat, milk and butter. ’209 These films were to show American crops 
and equipment, outline their comparative advantages and then detail how the state 
collective farm would prove itself more efficient. In an attempt to gather 
agricultural information, Klirushchev was to visit numerous foreign, primarily 
American, farms, slaughterhouses and food processing factories. Upon returning to 
the USSR from fact gathering visits he would not only supply information for 
documentary films, but also include this information in various speeches. Along a 
similar vein to that of the Kalinin constituency speech was the speech at the Baltic 
Works in Leningrad in honour of a visiting Polish delegation (03.10.1958) in which 
Khrushchev was to explain the importance of proving economic superiority as ‘after 
we raise our economy, culture and the standard of living to still higher levels, the 
ordinary people all over the world will see for themselves that communism is a
206 Khrushchev, For Victory in Peaceful Competition with Capitalism 157.
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social system embodying all mankind’s finest dreams for a happy life. ’210
While perhaps unaware of what exactly the construction of a social system that 
embodied all of mankind’s finest dreams for a happy life entailed, there is little 
doubt that the Soviet leadership had sufficient information about the West to 
formulate an accurate understanding of their respective positions along the path to 
that life. Prior to Khrushchev’s visit to the United States, the First Deputy Premier 
Anastas I. Mikoyan (in an unofficial capacity at the insistence of Klirushchev) 
visited the USA as a guest of Ambassador Mikhail A. Menshikov (04.01- 
20.01.1959). American Ambassador Llewellyn Thompson interpreted accurately 
the purpose of the trip to be the discussion of increased trade and Berlin. Mikoyan 
travelled to Cleveland, Detroit, Chicago, San Francisco, Los Angeles, New York 
and Washington DC, spreading diplomacy and gathering impressions along the way. 
In talks between Mikoyan and Vice President Richard Nixon in Washington
(06.01.1959) the State Department’s assessment of Mikoyan’s message was that the 
new Soviet leaders were well-read, open to foreigners and based decisions on a full 
understanding of the facts. The leadership was cognisant of the prior suffering of 
the Soviet people and felt that Soviet citizens had a right to a better life. Thus, the 
new slogan of catching up with America. The State Department’s assessment was 
that the new slogan did not constitute a ‘menace’ but ‘admitted that America was 
ahead of the Soviet Union and it raised America’s prestige. If the Soviet people 
lived better, what kind of threat was that to America? The Soviets did not want to 
flood the United States with goods. They wanted them for their own people.’ 211 In 
the same conversation Mikoyan was to remark that peaceful co-existence and the 
ensuing deterrence of war was of prime importance. ‘This was not because they 
were weak or were cowards. They wanted peace in order to develop their country 
and have it become rich like the United States. ’212 hi a discussion with US 
Ambassador Lacy Thompson and Secretary Strauss held at the Department of 
Commerce, the first topic that Mikoyan brought up was praise for the organisation
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and multiplicity of motorways and roads. He also voiced his reservations at Russia 
developing such a road system quickly.2is While visiting the USSR in 1955, the 
American millionaire farmer Roswell Garst had advised the construction of more 
and better roads to facilitate grain delivery.214
Shortly after Mikoyan’s return from the USA, the Congress of the 
Communist Party met in Moscow (27.01.1959-05.02.1959).2i5 Khi'ushchev opened 
the Congress with a speech in which he emphasised catching up with and surpassing 
the West in per capita output by the end of the Five Year Plan and prophesised that 
by 1970, the USSR would assume first place internationally in per capita output.2 i6 
In his address, Mikoyan reported that Manukovsky and Gitalov had stayed on 
Garst’s farm in order to leain how one person could manage one hundred hectar es of 
land, and then increase this to one hundred and fifty. This information was to be 
communicated to specialists and to the general population through the news media 
and documentary films displaying Garst’s other American farm methods.217 That 
many of the American methods and crops were not suitable for the proposed 
incorporation into Soviet agriculture was known. For example, Garst was well 
aware that there were large sections of the USSR that were not suitable for growing 
corn. In 1955, he had distributed a generous number of Russian language pamphlets 
in which he detailed where corn could be grown in the USSR and the preconditions 
for its success: hybrid seeds, fertilisers, insecticides, herbicides, irrigation etc. Many 
of these things were missing in the USSR. A reported incident in the Krasnodai* 
Territory involved Garst yelling at farmers for sowing the corn without using the 
readily available fertiliser. The brigade leader told Garst to ‘bug off’, Garst 
threatened to tell Klirushchev (which one has to assume he did as the incident
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appears in the family memoirs) and the fertiliser was spread.2i8 Both publicly and 
with specialists, Khrushchev would hold up Garst and his methods as exemplary 
producers. 219
In Klirushchev’s address to the 21®' Party Congress (28.01.1959 Pravda) the 
major accomplishments since the 20'*' Party Congress three years earlier were listed 
as: a) the path to communism was farther walked along, b) the strength of the nation 
had increased, c) international prestige had increased, d) industry, agriculture and 
science had improved and e) living standards had risen.220 The topic of consumer 
goods, and standard of living was directly addressed and an attempt was made to 
define needs and thereby curb expectations. It was declared that the time was not 
far off when man’s ‘essential requirements within necessary and reasonable limits... 
[of] all the Soviet people’s requirements of food, housing and clothing’ would be 
satisfied. 221 There were limits to man’s requirements, for example people could not 
wear unlimited quantities of clothing, or use unlimited housing space. A distinction 
was made between the provision of ‘wholesome’ requirements for the cultured 
person and the potentially whimsical claims for luxuries for the bourgeois. The 
Soviet regime recognised the need to confine expectations: ‘essential requirements’, 
‘full satisfaction within necessary and reasonable limits’, the concept of limited 
material needs, and the refusal to cater to ‘whims’ or to ‘luxuries’ are all indications 
of this awaieness. In the address it was acknowledged that the Soviet Union was 
currently failing to provide ‘the full abundance of material goods and cultural 
benefits necessary to satisfy the growing requirements of our people, necessary for 
their development’ and that without this ‘communism is impossible’. 222 The issue 
was further claiified by stating that communism could be achieved only if the Soviet 
Union surpassed the production levels and labour productivity level of the West.
The creation of the material and technical base of communism presupposed a 
‘highly developed, modern industry, complete electrification of the country.
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scientific and technical progress in all branches of industry and agriculture, complex 
mechanization and automation of all production processes, maximum utilization of 
new power sources and of our wealth of natural resources, new synthetics and other 
materials, and a higher cultural and technical level of all the working people.’ 223 
Overtaking the United States was not sufficient for the completion of communism, 
as the defects within the American system had to be avoided; ‘if America’s 
production level is taken as a yaidstick for the growth of our economy, it is only in 
order to compare this economy with the most developed capitalist economy.’ 224 
Overtaking the USA was the first stage of communist construction, ‘only a way 
station from which we shall be able to overtake the most highly developed capitalist 
country, leave it behind, and push ahead.’225 This was to remain the main objective 
throughout Khrushchev’s leadership. Once official proclamations had been made, 
Soviet society was in a position to take aspects of such proclamations that appealed 
(high standards of living) and overlook those that were less appetising (no provision 
for whims or luxuries). This selective process was to reinforce the backlash against 
Khrushchev, his claims, and eventually the Soviet system, that arose as it became 
irrefutably clear that the Soviet Union was not providing the basics let alone whims 
and luxuries. It was not for naught that a common anecdote of the time asked ‘what 
is a Soviet woman’s favourite gift? An onion wrapped up in toilet paper’ in 
response to the persistent shortage of the latter.
The Russian publication ‘Concerning the abolition of taxes on factory and 
office workers and other measures to advance the well being of the Soviet people’ 
published in English under ‘Raising the Soviet Standard of Living’ was a collection 
of documents based on Khrushchev’s published address to the Supreme Soviet
(05.05.1960) together with an explanation of resulting laws. In the main address it 
was announced that the Soviet people were in the process of catching up with the 
most highly developed capitalist countries, and that the feasibility of this task was 
incontrovertible. The more dedicated workers were to fulfilling the Seven Year 
Plan, the more vigilantly shortcomings would be conquered and the ‘more vigour
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we display in cleaning our Soviet house of everything stagnant and outmoded the 
faster we shall accomplish this. ’226 The focus of the report then turns to the role of 
technology in achieving Soviet supremacy. Within this technological section the 
leading role of the USA is reiterated. The concluding argument held that the 
superior Soviet pace of growth was such that the gap would be closed in the neai’ 
future.227 Then Soviet statistics were given (The inclusion of Soviet statistics into 
this study is not an acceptance of their accuracy rather it represents information, 
accurate or otherwise, that was made available to the masses). This particular 
document claims the 1960 plan provided for the production of 7.9 billion metres of 
fabric; more than France, Britain and West Germany together. It claimed also that 
the Soviet Union was manufacturing more wool and linen textiles than any 
individual capitalist country, and that Soviet fabric consumption per person was 
equal with France and was set to overtake West Germany and Britain. From the 
main address: ‘We shall have to do a big job, take measures to reduce the time 
required for building textile and shoe factories, enterprises for the manufacture of 
chemical fibres, synthetic leather and top quality dyes. We must expand more 
rapidly the building of machines for the light, textile and chemical industries. ’228 
The greatest challenge was in meat production that was to remain lagging behind the 
USA throughout the Seven Year Plan.229 Ideally, the end of the Seven Year Plan 
was to witness a Soviet Union that was the most advanced country in consumption 
of ‘many important consumer goods.’ The clothing and footwear requirements of 
the population were to be plentifully met, housing was to be adequate, more meat 
was to be available etc. In Khrushchev’s concluding remarks there is a denunciation 
of doubters, a reiteration of well placed faith in the Soviet worker, a promise to 
match and overtake American production levels, and a reiteration of the idea that 
abundance refers only to necessities: I wish to stress once again that as regards all 
consumer goods which are really needed by the people, we shall soon reach the 
level of production and consumption of the United States of America. ’230
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At the 5 '*' Congress of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany, Khrushchev 
spoke about the challenge facing the Soviet Union: ‘not for one moment must we 
forget that in all branches of industry and agriculture we are still lagging behind 
capitalist countries and are not as yet meeting in full the constantly growing 
requirements of the population of our countries.’231 Also in 1960, ‘For Victory in 
Peaceful Competition with Capitalism’, a series of Klirushchev’s speeches and 
responses to questions from foreign journalists, was published. This is a particularly 
optimistic collection of interviews in which it was declared that the Soviet Union 
was to overtake the US in food and consumer goods within the ‘next few years,’ in 
terms of housing in the next ten to twelve years,’232 and in which it is noted that 
standard of living should not be based on quantity of goods produced but on 
consumption. The idea that recognition was representative of respect was 
communicated in such documents as the interview with I McDonald, the foreign 
editor of the Times, published in February in Pravda and in International Affairs 
no.4 (1960). In this particular interview Khrushchev reiterated the standard 
hortatory sovietese that the Soviet Union was soon to outstrip advanced capitalist 
nations in per capita output and that ‘when this has been achieved the indisputable 
superiority of the socialist system will be even more obvious to everyone.’233 It is 
also this interview that contains a phrase summing up the inevitable failure of the 
Soviet economic system. ‘A minister had to be greater than God because he had to 
know everything that was being done,’234
Frol Romanovich Kozlov became first Deputy Premier in March 1958 and in 
1960 he joined the Party Secretariat. In 1959, he served as Klirushchev’s interpreter 
at the American exhibition. His propensity to dress nattily, he had a ‘liking for good 
jewellery and shirts with button down collais,’ drew comments from the foreign 
press and was not overlooked by the Soviet press.235 In November 1960, Kozlov 
gave a published speech in celebration of the 43“^  anniversary of the Bolshevik 
Revolution in which he reiterated many of Khrushchev’s ideas about the state of the 
Soviet economy vis-à-vis Western ones and substantiated this with figures. The
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Soviet Union was a rich and flourishing country with exceptional prospects, and 
everything necessary to satisfactorily provide for its citizens.236 The Soviet Union 
is already ahead of the United States in the output of iron ore and coal, coke, 
passenger cars for trunk railways, grain harvester combines, lumber, woollen 
fabrics, butter and sugar. We realise, of course, that the United States is still leading 
in a number of industrial fields.’237 What is not mentioned were such details as the 
US had moved away from woollen fabrics to synthetics and that the lack of 
destruction to the American rail system during the wai‘ combined with its previous 
expansion and the advanced state of automotive transportation resulted in the US not 
needing to expand at a rate similar to the USSR. Kozlov continued by declaring that 
‘only the victory of socialism and communism will insure the complete and fullest 
satisfaction of the material and spiritual needs of the working people.... Life in the 
Soviet Union is becoming more and more joyous and happy. ’238 As proof of the 
Party’s commitment to improving living standards Kozlov draws upon the success 
of the housing industry in which from ‘1957 to 1960 houses with a total area of 
almost 300 million square metres were built in towns and workers’ settlements. ’239 
In 1958, a highly influential and prestigious drafting committee was brought 
together under the auspices of the Central Committee’s International Department 
chief Boris Ponomarev. The committee was charged with gathering scientific, 
technological and economic information on the state of the Soviet economy and on 
international developments. Two leading economic theorists Evgenii Varga and 
Stanislav Strumilin participated. Particular attention was to be paid to ten-yeai’ 
comparisons between the USSR and USA. Fydor Burlatsky joined the group in 
1960 and recalled that the working group’s comparisons were ‘complete 
fabrications’ but that the figures had come to the committee in a separate folder with 
Khrushchev’s instructions that they be included.240 After the presidium had 
received the draft with minor changes, it was published (30.08.1961) and presented 
by Klirushchev at the 22"'* Party Congress. The role of the committee was to make 
the fictitious figures seem functional.
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In Khrushchev’s ‘Report on the Programme of the Communist Party of the 
Soviet Union: October 17'*' at the 22'"* Congress’, Soviet citizens heard that 
previously Russia was seen as a land of the ‘pick and wheelbarrow, the wooden 
plough and the spinning wheel. It had one tenth of the machinery that the United 
States had, and one fifth of what Germany had.’ 24i By contrast, the Soviet Union 
was a country of advanced technology, of high-powered machine tools and precision 
instruments, of assembly lines, electronic computers and spaceships. It was a 
country of steel and aluminium, of cement and plastics. Its steel production figures 
were on a par with Britain’s, West Germany’s and France’s combined.242 The 
Soviet public heard that the United States offered incentives for agricultural 
dumping in an attempt to maintain high prices and that the US was the ‘richest and 
mightiest power in the capitalist world’ and that it was past its prime.243
In addition to official reports and speeches from within the Soviet Union based 
on the Soviet economy, Khrushchev was to have his speeches, transcripts of press 
conferences etc from abroad published in the Soviet Union. One such example was 
the press coverage surrounding his trip to the United States in 1959. This trip and 
the subsequent press coverage had a significant impact on Soviet perceptions of 
Khrushchev and of capitalist consumption.
Where the state was taking society; An American example
One example of coverage linking consumption, technological and economic 
images of the West and the Soviet future was Khrushchev’s extensively publicised 
visit to the USA in 1959. Klirushchev’s visit was reported on before, during and 
after the trip in all Soviet newspapers under such titles as ‘Thirteen days that stirred 
the world’ and ‘A triumphant journey’ .244 Alexander Werth ai’rived in Moscow just 
after Sputnik was launched and was there as Khrushchev arrived back from his USA 
trip. His dominant impression of press coverage at this time was ‘columns and
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columns of Khrushchev in every paper. ’245 Press coverage was prolific and the 
subject matter, the nation’s leader combined with the United States, guaianteed an 
audience.
The pace of the American trip was gruelling, packed with political, industrial, 
and press meetings. The focus was on establishing trade ties, increasing the Soviet 
leader’s prestige at home, and included the potentially fruitful Camp David talks. 
Upon arriving back in the USSR, Khrushchev undertook a tour of Russia (primarily 
of Siberia) in which he often referred to the United States. In conjunction with the 
American trip and the daily coverage the work Z h if v mire i druzhbe, an edited 
volume of Khrushchev’s American speeches, question and answer sessions and 
comments thereon was published. Both the foreign language editions and the 
Russian editions ran the same photos, albeit not in the same order. The images 
portrayed Khrushchev and his entourage interacting with Americans. The pictures 
contained images of American automobiles, fashion, and architecture.
Before leaving for the United States, Khrushchev had insisted that he be 
treated as head of state and head of government, despite this being an affectation (he 
was the head of government). However, being recognised as both would allow for 
the full ceremonial welcome. In Geneva in 1955, Klirushchev felt that he had been 
humiliated and shunned during the greeting ceremony claiming that a Swiss 
guardsman man had deliberately stood directly in front of him just as Bulganin 
stepped forward to review the Swiss guard of honour. Klirushchev ascribed great 
importance to being properly respected by the West in general and the Americans in 
particular: that he received a full ceremonial welcome and send off was considered 
official recognition of his success. In Klirushchev’s opening address, he began with 
what many Americans were to assess as a warmongering boast and many Soviet 
citizens as evidence of poor taste: ‘upon the eve of our meeting with you, Mr. 
President, Soviet scientists, engineers, technicians and workers gladdened us by 
launching a rocket to the moon.’246 Sputnik was often mentioned during the trip; 
Eisenhower was even given a model of the satellite. A partial explanation for the 
chortling over Sputnik was Khrushchev’s sense of inferiority:
245 Werth, The Khrushchev Phase 15.
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For one thing, we still have a lot to leain from the capitalists. There are many 
things we still don’t do as well as they do. Its been more than fifty years since 
the working class of the Soviet Union carried out its revolution under the 
leadership of the Great Lenin, yet, to my disappointment and irritation, we still 
haven’t been able to catch up with the capitalists. Sometimes we jokingly say 
that capitalism is rotten to the core. Yet those rotten capitalists keep coming 
up with things, which make our jaws di’op in suiprise. I would deaiiy love to 
surprise them with our achievements as often. Particularly in the field of 
technology and organisation, rotten capitalism has borne some fruits which we 
would do well to transplant into our own socialist soil.247
Shelest’s account o f Khrushchev’s assessment of his final public speech in 
which he lambasted Soviet arts and sciences reinforces this idea. Shelest recalls 
Khrushchev saying: ‘’Yes, I recognise that I allowed myself to behave less than 
tactfully toward people in the arts and sciences... But after all, it’s no secret that our 
science lags behind foreign science and technology in many areas.’24s In his 
memoirs, Klirushchev writes of having repeatedly shared his displeasure with Soviet 
workers and engineers. For example, during his 1960 trip to France, Klirushchev 
was terribly impressed by the quality of the runway and how well equipped D ’Orly 
was. ‘Much as I’ve tried over the years and much as I’ve criticised our construction 
engineers, our runways still look worn-out and potholed a year after they’re built. I 
don’t think that there is any secret about why everything is always so neat in the 
West: it’s a matter of good production, discipline, strict standards, and well- 
designed processes. It’s just a higher level of culture in the W est.’ 249 He was to 
continue that this ‘isn’t the first time I’ve mentioned the problem. I used to speak of 
it whenever I came home from a trip aboard; unfortunately, the comparisons I made 
were rarely in our favour. ’250 Klirushchev was not the only Soviet citizen to 
comment on Soviet inadequacies. Carl Rowan, the former head o f USIA, recalled a 
conversation with a Russian citizen waiting for a defective lift in which the Russian 
noted that the leadership ‘can get to the moon but they can’t get me to the fifth 
floor. ’251 A Muscovite voiced a similar antipathy to Sputnik when she remarked 
that it was fine to have Sputniks but all she wanted was to buy a new teapot.252
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In the USA, Khrushchev’s speeches emphasised, catching up and surpassing 
the United States. During his opening speech at the White House (15.09.1959), the 
world was to learn that the Soviet leaders and citizens wanted nothing from the USA 
and that the Soviet people were well aware of the fact that the United States was 
richer than the Soviet Union. The world was then informed that a prime Soviet 
objective was to be ‘as rich tomorrow’ as the United States was then.253 This idea 
could not have been news to either the American administration or the American 
public. Richard Nixon, who visited the USSR in the capacity of Vice President 
earlier on in 1959, recalled Klirushchev telling him as they perused the American 
Exhibition: “ Mr. Vice President, you’re ahead of us now economically, but we’re 
moving faster than you are, our system is better than yours, and we’re going to pass 
you by pretty soon, and we’re going to wave to you as we go by and then we’re 
going to say ‘come on, follow us and do as we do so that you don’t fall behind any 
faither’.’254 During the joint televised addresses to mark the official opening of the 
American exhibition, Nixon stated that ‘the world’s largest capitalist country has, 
from the standpoint of the distribution of wealth, come closest to the ideal prosperity 
for all in a classless society.’255 Khrushchev was to audibly interject that the USSR 
was catching up. Nixon believed that Khrushchev was attracted to the West’s 
economic successes as he was striving to provide economic progress for ‘his poverty 
stricken Soviet people. He also knew that without this progress his goal of world 
domination would be a pipe dream . ’256 A Soviet journalist put it less charitably 
when he commented that Kirushchev ‘liked the supermai'kets and all that. ’257 
In an interview with leaders of the US congress and members of the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee, Khrushchev recalled that the ‘Soviet people always 
think highly of the achievements of the American people, rejoice in these 
achievements, are a little envious at times, and want first to bring our economy level 
with yours, then gather strength and outstrip you.’258 In addition to acknowledging 
the current state of competition between the two nations, Klir ushchev often called
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on examples of historical co-operation to justify increased trade co-operation and
exchanges of scientific and technical information.
You may rest assured that the Soviet Union will hold its own in this economic
competition: it will overtake you and leave you behind.... Incidentally,
competition as we Soviet people understand and practise it by no means
excludes cooperation and mutual assistance.. .haven’t we cooperated with you
in the past? Some thirty years ago, when our country started building a large-
scale industry, good economic contacts were established with leading US
firms. Ford helped us build the motor works in Gorky. Your engineers helped 4
us build the tractor works in Stalingrad and Kharkov. Americans, along with
the British, were consultants during the construction of the Moscow subway.
We were grateful to your specialists for their cooperation and many of them 
returned home with Soviet decorations and letters of thanks, to say nothing of 
remuneration in cash.259
Khrushchev was to taunt the Americans with information about trade with Western 
Europe noting that trade relations with Britain were ‘shaping up quite well’, were 
expanding with West Germany largely due to the West German government’s 
‘correct understanding of the interests of its country in this matter,’ were ‘shaping 
up’ with Italy, and were ‘not bad’ with France.260 Two chemical plants that an 
American company had purchased from Krupp of Germany had also been purchased 
by the USSR; an automobile tyre factory for the Dnepropetrovsk Economic Region 
was to be provided by a British company; Italy was active in the field of Soviet 
synthetic fibre and chemical equipment and thus equipment that the Soviet Union 
would be willing to purchase from Du Font was being purchased in Western 
Europe.261 Due to the extensive nature of the Soviet press coverage, Soviet citizens 
at home were able to gather information not only about the United States but also 
about their nation’s trade relations. An added benefit for those learning English was 
the use of the American broadcasts for translation lessons in schools, colleges and 
universities.
The various comments by Henry Cabot Lodge provided figures on the 
American economy and standaid of living. At the dinner given by the economic 
club of New York (17.09.1959), Lodge was to declare that there were 14 million 
Americans who owned shares; that two thirds of the American GDP went towards 
consumer items such as food, entertainment, refrigerators, automobiles, etc; that
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seventy-five percent o f American families owned their own automobiles; that 
services had overtaken production despite production quantities being the highest in 
the world; and that the proportion of families making over $10,000 a year had 
tripled in the last ten years. He declared that the term ‘economic humanism’ was the 
most accurate term to describe the American system as the system existed for ‘the 
benefit of the everyday rank and file of citizens. ’262 Five days later, Lodge was to 
give a similarly detailed speech regarding labour, farm machinery, and consumer 
durable consumption amongst farmers. According to Lodge, between 1940 and 
1958, the average amount of farm machinery per worker had increased nine hundred 
percent (with over five million tiactors); availability o f farm electricity went from 
thirty-one percent of faiins to ninety-four percent; fifty-two percent o f farms had 
telephones; seventy four percent had cars; ninety percent had refrigerators; fifty 
three percent had televisions; and thirty-nine percent had home freezers. In a very 
sovietesque manner, he then reported that the average American consumed 8.4 
pounds of butter, thirteen pounds o f cheese, 151 pounds of meat and 180 litres of 
milk a year.263
Khrushchev’s answer to Lodge was to acknowledge the high levels of 
mechanisation and output of American farms and to express an interest in applying 
American methods to kolkhozes.264 ‘We must learn from your experience. We pay 
due tribute to the knowledge, industry and experience of American farmers, 
scientists and farm specialists. Your achievements are worthy o f praise and your 
experience is worthy of study and imitation.’20s Khrushchev also commented on the 
density of the crops: he had seen such crops in films but that it was good to see it in 
real life .266 Despite lower yields and poor mechanisation the kolkhoz remained 
superior as it worked for the people and not for profit. Klirushchev was not so 
against the American profit system that he felt that all individuals involved either on 
a governmental or private level were inept. He was to publicly mention a 
conversation with Harriman in which he stated that after Harriman had been 
replaced by the US government, he could have the post o f ‘Economic Adviser to
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the Chairman of the Council of the Ministers of the USSR, with a good salary and a 
good country house.’267
Khrushchev believed that good trade relations were indicative of good 
relations between governments and repeatedly called on examples of past co­
operation as grounds for future negotiations.268 He liked to highlight the 
industiialist Aimand Hammer, whose family had owned a pencil factory during the 
Tsarist times, who had a son in the Soviet Union, and who was an economic 
emissary for the US government under the Kennedy administration. Hammer’s 
friendly activities received wide Soviet media coverage, notably after he donated 
two letters written by Lenin to the Soviet state. In 1961, he visited the old pencil 
factory that was now within Moscow city limits, walking in on the night shift (with 
the exception of a few new machines, all of the machines that he had purchased in 
Germany under Lenin were still being used). Press coverage of this visit reinforced 
Hammer’s connection to Lenin. For example, this report ran in Pravda:
‘Hammer went to V, I. Lenin and said that he had decided to apply for a 
concession for the manufacture of pencils. V. I. Lenin looked at him with 
surprise and said, ‘Why do you want to take a concession for the manufacture 
of pencils?’ ‘Mr. Lenin,’ said Hammer, ‘you have set a goal that everybody 
should learn to read and write and you haven’t any pencils! Therefore, I will 
manufacture pencils!’ [Noisy applause in the hall] Some of the old employees 
were still there to greet Hammer. ‘See how pleased our old boss is with our 
progress,’ they said [Laughter and applause]. So, you see, V. I. Lenin went 
even further than we by granting concessions to foreigners.’269
During the 1960s, Hammer sought to negotiate a massive agreement for an 
American technology based factory system for the production of fertilizer but 
Khrushchev was removed from power before it was ratified. In 1978, under 
Brezhnev, the scheme was resurrected. The proposal was for a complex of ten 
plants, eight ammonia plants and two urea plants, with a total annual capacity of 
approximately four million metric tons of liquid ammonia and one million metric 
tons of urea. 270 Great Britain was to provide the credit.
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Western moguls, such as Eaton, Hammer or Rockefeller were often given 
positive press coverage in the Soviet Union. Cyrus Eaton was showcased regularly 
as an industrialist who understood economics and did not let politics influence what 
should be economic decisions. Typically, Eaton’s visits to the Soviet Union 
received first page coverage. This image of the good industrialist was in direct 
contrast with the stereotype of the businessman. Individual men contemplating 
conducting business with the USSR were depicted as objective, scientific, wealthy, 
and intelligent in contrast to fat swine with blood dripping down their jowls, over 
the riches stuffed in their pockets and ruining their tuxedos. Under Klirushchev the 
stereotypical evilness of the capitalist was de-personified and transferred to large 
corporations, as seen in a Krokodil caricature of the American firms Boeing,
General Dynamics, Hughes Aircraft, Lockheed, and Douglas all depicted as wild 
swine eating out of a trough labelled ‘pentagon’.271 Charles Levinson travelled in 
the USSR with a group of prominent American businessmen and recalled that all the 
men, but Rockefeller in particular, were treated like celebrities. His assessment as 
to why the capitalists received red carpet treatment was that ‘American capitalists in 
the USSR have a special status, based on a strange reversal of principle, just as in 
our own democratic society crowds turn out to cheer royalty.’272
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Fig. 2 ‘Kormushka’ Krokodil (1967)
Throughout the American trip, Khrushchev was to urge American 
businessmen to be less illogical and allow business to be business. During an 
exchange with US businessmen (25.09.1959), Eric Ridder, publisher of the Journal 
o f Commerce and host of the gathering, opened up discussion by asking whether 
trade would improve because of Khrushchev’s visit and inviting comments from the 
panel. The panel consisted of several prominent American moguls and Khrushchev. 
The comment from J. Strauss, the President of R. H. Macy and Co., was that 
Americans did not like to purchase goods from behind the Iron Curtain. This was 
refuted by A. Moore, the President of Moore-McCormack shipping lines, whose 
company regularly carried shipments of Polish ham, Czech goods and Russian 
caviar to the USA. Khrushchev’s response was full of irritation at the American
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businessmen’ s propensity to combine political and economic considerations 
declaring that the Americans were ‘making a hash of everything’ and that regardless 
of the evident American dislike of the Great October Socialist Revolution there was 
a fondness for Russian caviar.273 In his memoirs, Khrushchev was to complain 
about Poland’s high grain requisitions despite Poland having the best agricultural 
yields in the Comecon and hypothesised that in Poland pigs were being fed wheat 
and the ham was being sent to the USA. He charged Poland with being motivated 
by dollais and the USA with having a policy of divide and conquer.274
In response to the question ‘Why, in spite of all this [American fear of 
communism, illogical trade restrictions etc] do you adopt a lot of what there is in the 
capitalist countries?’ Khrushchev was to answer: ‘Because we are not fools!’275 
During the course of the American trip, it was made clear that the Soviet interest in 
purchasing consumer goods did not lay in sausages, shoes or machine equipment. 
Interest lay in exactly those industrial fields that were the subject of recent trade 
deals with Western Europe: tyre production, automotives, synthetic materials, 
petrochemicals, chemicals etc. However, Klirushchev was to overlook one of the 
great technological innovations of the time in favour of his stomach. During the 
American exhibition, IBM had exhibited a functioning RAMAC computer.276 
During the planning stages of Khrushchev’s visit to the USA, he was offered the 
opportunity to tour IBM. (Soviet press coverage attributed the invitation to the State 
Depaitment.) In a speech at a civic authorities’ reception in San Francisco
(21.09.1959) after his visit to IBM Khrushchev was to speak fondly of Mr. Watson, 
the President of IBM Corp, with whom he had had contact in the Soviet Union and 
USA. Then he declared that the tour was ‘evidently’ interesting but that as a non­
specialist his evaluation ‘meant nothing’ and that only time would tell which 
country was producing better machines.277 This was followed by praise for the self- 
service cafeteria system that was instituted as a highly efficient and novel system. 
Upon returning to the USSR, Klirushchev sought to have the cafeteria system
273 Zhif V mire i druzhbe 311-312.
274 Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament 213.
275 Zhif V mire I druzhbe 317.
276 a discussion on the merits of the RAMAC computer and the questions that it posed  
during the American exhibition can be found in A. Eprin, ‘Vopros robot,’ Qqonek no.35
(23.08.1959) 27.
277 Zhif V mire i druzhbe 257-258.
85
implemented, the result of which failed to impress at least one Soviet professor,
Evgenii Arsenyevich Boltin, who referred to them as ‘completely useless.’278 In his
final address on American soil, Khrushchev brought the essence of the visit around
from politics and economics to the people: ‘we liked your beautiful cities and fine
roads, but most of all your fine amiable, kind hearted people. ’279
Khrushchev spoke of his American trip and his ceremonious departure during
his subsequent tour of the USSR. At a rally in Vladivostok (06.10.1959), he
conveyed his pride in the ceremony given to the Soviet delegation and the sense of
validation of Soviet achievements that this gave:
as I stood in the aerodrome near Washington before departing from America, 
the salute of nations was given in honour of our motherland, just as during the 
welcoming ceremony. I was delighted to hear our national anthem and the 
twenty-one cannon salvos. After the first volley I though, ‘that’s in honour of 
Karl Marx, the second -  Friedrich Engels, the third -  Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, 
the fourth His Majesty the working class, the toiling people!... And so on, one 
volley after another in honour of our motherland and her people. Not bad, 
comrades, not badh?,o
A  Moscow journalist put it succinctly when he said: ‘on the whole, there is
something very nice about Americans, and, my God, it’s an impressive country; and
it’s no use denying that Nikita was really impressed by their standard of living. ’281
Q: Is it true that Comrade Klirushchev’s health is declining?
A: Yes. He is suffering from a hernia caused by lifting the level of agricultural 
production, hyperventilation caused by trying to catch up with America, and 
verbal diarrhoea caused by God knows what.282
Conclusion: Why Khrushchev needed external comparison
Praise for the United States was common and accepted enough during this 
time that even Soviet militaiy backed publications like Krasnaya zvezda were to 
carry positive statements such as there is no ‘doubt the American people are 
industrious and talented. They have made a great contribution to world civilization 
and culture in subjugating nature,’283 I. R. Borisov of Inostrannaia literatura was in 
New York in 1959. In his coverage of America he wrote that he had come to accept
278 Werth, Russia: Hopes and Fears 165-166.
279 Zhit' V mire I druzhbe 343.
280 As quoted In Burlatsky, Khrushchev and the First Russian Spring (160.
281 Werth, The Khrushchev Phase 169.
282 Alexeyeva, The Thaw Generation 104.
283 CDSP (17.07.1957)
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that ‘in science and technology, the USA represented the epicentre, ’ and that in 
terms of the provision of all life’s comforts the American economy had provided 
‘not a few results.’ 284 In describing the general perception of the West, specifically 
America in the 1950s and early 1960s in Russia, R. K. White wrote that within 
Soviet society there was the notion that life ‘in America is a kind of magic crystal in 
which they hope to catch glimpses of their own future and their children’s future.*285 
In conversation with two Siberians who were in Moscow on business in the early 
1960s, Eddy Gilmore was surprised by both the level of information and praise that 
he found:
‘Siberia’s like the great West in America,’ said Konstantin. ‘We’ve got 
everything out there, just as your west has everything. We’ve got cattle, oil, 
coal, gold, diamonds-waving fields of grain and the Mexicans’
‘You don’t have Texas millionaires,’ I interrupted.
‘We have collective farms that are millionaires.’
‘Not the same as a Texas millionaire,’ I said.
‘I don’t suppose so. But we’ll have them one of these days.’
‘Under Communism?’
‘Who knows? He roared with laughter. ‘Here’s a toast. To Siberian 
millionaires.’
‘How do you know about the West?’ I asked.
‘I’ve been there, tovarich. I’ve been to Texas, to Oklahoma, the whole thing -  
Arizona and New Mexico too. Now, Texas, that’s a state for you. I loved it. 
It’s so much like Siberia’286
Gilmore’s conversation with the Siberian businessmen highlights a number of the 
then contemporary issues. A willingness to put faith in the successes of the 
Communist system (the wealthy collective farms, the future of millionaires in 
Siberia); praise for the wealth of the West; and an increasingly large group of 
privileged citizens who could tiavel abroad.
The West was a foil for the Soviet Union in many of the anecdotes that were to 
gain such populaiity during this era. As Peter Vail and Aleksandr Genis have noted, 
without the West in general and the United States in particular, many of the most 
enduring pointed anecdotes of the period would not have existed. For example.
284 R. Borisov, ‘Reklama I zhizn’,’ Inostrannaia literatura no.9 (1959) 213-218, 213, 214.
285 He also noted that part of this image w as formed or reinforced by the American 
publication Amerika and the extraordinary demand thereof. Ralph K. White, Fearful 
Warriors (USA: Macmillan, 1984) 257.
286 Gilmore, The C ossacks Burned Down the YMCA 160-161.
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‘How do you undermine a capitalist country? Send Soviet planners’287; ‘A vagrant 
lies in the gutter, dressed in filthy rags, starving, and almost comatose. Comment of 
the observer: ‘somebody has reached socialism; ’288 or, ‘What is the difference 
between democracy and communism? Abundance.’289 Even Khrushchev’s pet 
project of agriculture was subjected to this ridicule: ‘Khrushchev appealed to 
Kennedy with a request to sell grain. Kennedy replied: Fine, We will sell you grain. 
But, you want to spread communism tlnoughout the world. Where will you buy 
grain from then?’290 Or the fictitious taunting by Soviet and American children:
American and Soviet children playing with/ taunting each other.
- You don’t have flour, and you don’t have grouts.
- Your president was murdered.
- And you won’t have flour and you won’t have grouts.291
Official comparison with the West was not restricted to the Khr ushchev era. 
However, by the late 1960s and the Brezhnev regime, the proclamations of catching 
up and surpassing had been quieted. Neither the population nor the leadership 
believed in the viability or the benefits of the claims. In Brezhnev’s 1967 closing 
speech to the CPSU he excused the fact that the Soviet Union was lagging behind 
through historical justification, noting that when the bourgeoisie came to power it 
received ‘a well designed and tested vehicle, a well prepared road and previously 
tested appliances’ while the proletariat had received ‘no vehicle, no road, absolutely 
nothing that had been tested beforehand.’292 Under Brezhnev the attempt was made 
to return comparison to the historical and internal from its foray into the 
contemporary and external. However, the goal of providing an improved standaid 
of living remained part of official rhetoric and the need for some Western 
technology remained. In 1976, Kosygin declared the need to improve ‘the quality of 
products, especially consumer goods.’293 At the 25'*' Party Congress in February 
1976, Brezhnev declared that the Soviet government was like any other government
287 Dora Shturman and Sergei Tictin. The Soviet Union Through the Prism of the Political 
Anecdote (London: O verseas Publications Interchange Ltd, 1985) 34.
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in that it sought to make use of the ‘advantages provided by external economic links 
for the purposes of mobilising additional opportunities for the successful resolution 
of economic tasks and the gaining of time, for raising the effectiveness of 
production and accelerating the progress of science and technology. ’ 294 At the 26'*' 
Party Congress in February 1981, he instigated an investigation into why ‘we 
sometimes lose our lead [in technology], spend large sums of money on purchasing 
abroad equipment and technology that we are fully able to make for ourselves often 
indeed at a higher level of quality. ’295 By late 1970s and early 1980s there were 
public statements expressing concerns with the high level of Soviet importation of 
Western equipment and technology and the false application of technology 
purchased. For example, the press reported that in ‘a number of cases the imported 
equipment was left outdoors exposed to Russian weather and component cannibals. 
In a number of instances, it was not used at all’. 296 Another cautionary note came 
from Andrei Amalrik when Sidney Monas questioned how increased exposure to the 
United States could possibly fail to bring improvements, Amalrik responded with 
doubts that ‘foreign tourists, jazz records and mini-skirts will help to create a 
‘humane society’ . ’297
As a newly formed country that had inherited a backward economic system, 
the state of the Soviet economy looked more impressive when compared with the 
Tsarist period, than with the economies of the West. However, external emphasis 
was essential to Khrushchev’s programme. Indeed, it is arguable that without the 
West, Khrushchev would not have been able to build his type of communism: if 
Lenin’s communism was Soviet power plus electrification of the whole country than 
Khrushchev’s was Soviet power plus Western prosperity. Khrushchev visualised 
two equally ranked entities (either the two superpowers or the East and the West 
match this description), marching towards a similar future of world dominance of 
their respective ideology and the highest international standard of living for their 
citizens. However, historical differences had resulted in the West being farther 
along economically than the USSR. After tremendous gains from industrialisation
294 As quoted in Abraham S. Becker, Economic Relations with the USSR (Massachusetts: 
Lexington Books, 1983) 36.
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at break-neck speed, despite the tremendous costs involved, and the punishing losses 
of WWII, the Soviet Union was, notwithstanding persistent shortages and industrial 
shortcomings, catching up with the West in general and was to overtake capitalist 
nations, which had neither ‘steam power nor hauling power’298 in some fields by 
1970 and completely by 1980. This idea of catching up was reiterated both at home 
and abroad. In New Delhi in 1959, Klirushchev stated that the competition between 
the communist and capitalist world was like a horse race and that the ‘horse you are 
riding in the United States is an old horse. It was a fine horse at one time, but now 
it’s old and worn out and beginning to go lame. But the horse we’re riding, our 
Communist horse, is young and vigorous and spirited, and we’re going to pass you 
and win this race.’299 The imagery of a horse race is less common than the more 
industrial image of the steam engine that was to be used throughout the American 
visit in 1959 with comments to the effect that the Soviet ‘whistle calling’ was 
ringing increasingly clearer and louder in the ears of the West.300 Failure to catch up 
with and surpass the West would constitute de facto a failure to achieve communism 
and severely de-legitimised the rule of the Communist Party. It was one of the great 
contradictions of Soviet life that Soviet citizens lived in a modern industrial state but 
endured the living conditions of an economically backward state.301 In the 
subsequent chapter, the focus is on several areas of consumption that were of 
pai'ticular importance to the public and the state: housing, clothing, passenger cars 
and food. In these areas, Khrushchev created a ground for common dialogue, or in 
his words ‘I think that the mood of the average housewife is a better indicator than 
the bureau of statistics about the health of our economy, ’302 and opened up the 
possibility for an increased sense of personal empowerment and involvement.
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2; Commenting on Communist Consumption
Introduction
Marxism, like any ideology, faces the charge of being abstract, theoretical, 
non-accessible and elitist. The theoreticians within the Communist Party were often 
dismissed as being intellectual but not practical and unable to connect with the 
workers. Khrushchev’s programme of peaceful coexistence was straightforward and 
while the meaning of such slogans as ‘full abundance’ was questionable, the 
building of the material basis of communism was concrete and affected the daily 
lives of citizens. The result of combining consumption and communism was that 
Khrushchev established a common ground for dialogue. The state opened up the 
channels for discussion about housing, clothes, passenger car s, food etc and the 
public entered into these dialogues. The crux of the problem was that the success in 
establishing a dialogue left the regime fighting a rear- guard action in an attempt to 
control the unleashed expectations. As Boffa has written of the era (his words 
echoing the novel Not By Bread Alone)', ‘after all, there was bread, and even a type 
of butter. ’303 Khrushchev was seeking a broad base of support and the bringing 
together of the people and the government while citizens wanted not merely cars, 
motor scooters, casseroles, and umbrellas, but affordable and attractive Soviet ones. 
Khrushchev himself acknowledged the general preference for foreign goods 
amongst Soviet consumers who had a particular penchant for ‘hard to find imported 
goods, which satisfy their aesthetic demands much better than domestically 
manufactured products.’304 His attempts to control consumption ‘if you want to get 
more than is possible you may even lose what you already have’ were ineffectual.305 
In this chapter four areas of importance for both Soviet society and the Soviet 
leadership (housing, clothing, automobiles and culture) will be discussed within the 
context of what was provided, what was expected and how expectations were tied to 
technological and economic images of the West. Housing has been chosen for as 
the post Soviet era faced severe housing shortages; there was a political commitment 
made to changing the housing situation; there was a technological and thus 
economic change in housing construction that symbolised modernity and a new
303 Boffa, Qt SSSR  k Rossii 21.
304 Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament 146.
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efficiency; and architectural and construction ideas were being introduced from the 
West. The housing drive in the 1960s is also indicative of the state abandoning the 
idea of a socialist living quarter (communal flats) for a private domestic sphere. 
Clothing has been chosen as it represents a field of consumption that is highly 
subjective, malleable and omnipresent. Clothing trends within the Soviet Union 
were politicised and were clearly delineated on Western and Non-Western lines. 
Clothing was a field where Soviet citizens could transform Soviet exteriors into 
Western ones. It is also a field that speaks directly to the state’s attempt to come to 
a compromise with citizens, distinguishing between need and want. Both housing 
and clothing appear again in connection with how the West was presenting itself in 
the following chapter on exhibitions. Automobiles appear several times in this 
study, in this chapter, in AVTOVAZ and to a lesser degree in the chapter ‘Image 
Conduits’. The automobile is a symbol of national technological and economic 
prowess as well as private freedom and prosperity. The debate surrounding the 
private passenger car in the Soviet Union highlights issues of external comparison, 
social expectations, and technological pride. More about the significance of 
automobiles as cultural artefacts will be discussed in chapter five. The final section 
deals with culture. Of all the subjects looked at in this chapter, culture was subject 
to the greatest ideological scrutiny, as it was considered by the ruling elite to be the 
most potentially subversive aspect of contact. The field of cultural contact is 
extensive and the purpose of this study is to provide a brief insight into some aspects 
of cultural contact to highlight how images of the West could be formed through 
seemingly benign (benign in the sense that Soviet authorities judged them 
permissible) forms of a typically ideologically charged medium. Each of these 
examples addresses the idea of who participated in myth building and how images 
were created.
Housing
The immediate post-war housing situation in the Soviet Union was dire. Poor 
housing, and inadequate utilities plagued the countryside while massive 
overcrowding, poor housing and inadequate utilities plagued the cities. The Stalinist 
architecture (the so called Stalinist wedding cakes), provided visually impressive 
buildings, but was expensive, inefficient and difficult to build. Soviet architecture
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of the post-war period revealed its sins: it was arguably unattractive; it was costly, 
irrational, and based on antiquated construction methods, A campaign against waste 
and conservatism and for the adoption of modem industrial methods was needed. 
Under Stalin, a law was passed giving every individual a right to ten square metres 
and a family to a minimum of thirteen square metres of living space.306 The 
communal housing project (Kommunalka) was an example of communist ideas 
being superimposed on bourgeois space. Individuals or families had a room or a 
partitioned room and shared all other rooms including the red corner (the red corner 
was to metamorphosis from an icon corner under the Tsars to a corner for a picture 
or bust of Lenin, then Stalin, and under Khrushchev - the TV). The ideological 
justification for the communal flat was that as public life was personal fulfilment, 
and as public life was becoming ‘better and more cheerful’, then the need for a 
private sanctuary was null.307 The move away from the communal flat under 
Khrushchev represents both a significant political concession by the Party to 
individual citizens and the abandoning of an ideological theory.
One of the earliest primary goals of the post Stalin government was an 
impressive housing project. In 1957, a formal decision was made to liquidate the 
‘most acute problem’ of housing. Under this new decision, man’s living space 
requirement for large cities was nine square metres per person. The desire for more 
space was dismissed as abnormal and irrational. The irrational need of some for 
more than nine square metres of living space did not apply to Party officials’ dachas. 
In an interview with UPI correspondent Henry Shapiro {Pravda 19.10.1957) 
Khrushchev acknowledged that there was a housing problem and the government 
has chosen to address this by ‘satisfying the people’s housing needs within ten to 
twelve years. We wish to provide an apartment for every family, not a room but an 
apartment... we shall end the housing shortage and create normal human living 
conditions in urban and rural housing.’ 3os The 1965 article, ‘Moskva, 197... god’ 
contains detailed information about the near* future composition of Moscow
306 Actual per person square metres was 8.07 square metres in the cities, the average 
house build by collective farmers w as 36.9 square metres, the average private flat w as 35.8  
square metres and the average state built flat w as 29.6 square metres, S ee  Arcadius 
Kahan, Som e Problems of the Soviet Industrial Worker: Volume I (Oriental Research  
Partners: Newtonville, 1994) 283.
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including the quantity and nature of private dwellings (nine and sixteen-storey 
buildings) and the proliferation of restaurants, entertainment and services. The 
concluding sentence of the article is that ‘in a word, Moscow will grow, get 
younger, and improve from year to year.’ 309
During the plenary session of the CC CPSU (23.11.1962), Khrushchev gave 
the speech ‘On the Development of the USSR Economy and Reorganisation of Party 
Guidance of the National Economy’ in which he spoke of the Party’s continuing 
commitment to improving the well being of the working people. To this end, the 
output of consumer goods was reported as having increased and ‘large scale housing 
construction was proceeding on schedule with a total space of 325,000,000 square 
metres, or 8,800,000 new flats in cities and workers’ settlements during the first four 
years of the Seven Year Plan, and 2,400,000 rural homes having been built.’310 The 
housing project was to take into consideration the needs of the family (including 
newly weds) for a private flat complete with ‘central heating, piped water, sewerage 
systems, bathrooms, electric lighting and gas.’sii Promises such as the above were 
on line with promising the Soviet population the moon. The provision thereof was 
part of the responsibilities of a superpower and thus was promised based on 
comparison with the West, specifically the USA and not with past Soviet provisions. 
In the Seven Year Plan, Klirushchev officially announced the objective as the 
provision of a separate flat for each family. The dimensions of the flats were 
approximately forty-four squaie metres per apartment, small by Western standards, 
however, depending on the size of the family, the flats could potentially provide 
more than the official minimum allotted living space of nine square metres per 
person for persons dwelling in large cities. 312
The construction initiative was successful enough to regularly provide more 
flats than new families formed by marriage, but it did not provide sufficient leeway 
for families in communal flats looking to get out and families trying to get into 
cities, nor did it account for divorce.313 Using marriages as an indication of newly
309 ‘Moskva, 197... god,’ Rabotnitsa no.8 (1965) 8.
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formed families, the increase in housing can be contextualised for the period of 
1965-1970.
Table 2 Yearly Registered Marriages and Construction o f New Flats 1965- 
1970 in Thousands
Estimated Registered 
Marriages
Constructed
Apartments
1965 2,009 2,227
1966 2,067 2,291
1967 2,122 2,312
1968 2,111 2,233
1969 2,251 2,231
1970 2,365 2,266
TsentraTnoe statisticheskoe upravlenie pri Sovete Ministrov SSSRi>\a
Logistically, the construction programme was a monumental undertaking: flats 
needed to be built quickly, efficiently and cheaply. To this end, Klirushchev placed 
a great deal of emphasis on the adoption of modern Western consti’uction methods 
and designs and the Party instituted wide sweeping reforms for the industrialisation 
of construction work. New materials were to be adopted, assembly line production 
for prefabricated elements progressed and the allotted housing budget increased 
from fifty-eight billion roubles in 1950 to 172 billion roubles in 1959.315 Despite 
official proclamations to the contrary, prefabricated reinforced concrete did not 
prevail as the dominant construction material for many yeais. This was due to 
significant internal reluctance from Party officials to the use of foreign techniques 
and industrial limitations, in particular the failure of the concrete department to 
supply the quality and quantity of product needed. In the late 1950s in Moscow and 
St. Petersburg contain descriptions of a large percentage of buildings still being built 
using the traditional method of bricks and mortar. The rapid pace of construction, 
swelling demand and a general dearth of skilled workers and masters resulted in 
dubious quality. The government and citizens acknowledged these problems. 
Reports appeared regularly in the press, with the most common complaints being 
cracks in walls and ceilings, dysfunctional plumbing, and the need for festooned
314 Kahan, Som e Problems of the Soviet Industrial Worker Source: Tsentral’noe 
statisticheskoe upravlenie pri Sovete Ministrov S S S R . Narodnoe Khoziaistvo SSSR  v 1975 
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nets to catch falling debris from outer walls. The witticism ‘instant antiquity’ was 
applied to the new buildings. In a published response to complaints, Mikoyan 
acknowledged that the majority of Soviet workers were untrained in construction 
and in the new building methods. In an attempt to rectify poor standards of 
workmanship, the Soviet government enacted a directive that labourers were to have 
first priority on flats in the building on which they worked. John Scott of Time Life 
Magazine visited Leningrad in 1960 after a three-year absence and noted that while 
there were improvements, the legal sanitary minimum was not being met and that 
officials acknowledged this.3i6 As the provision of private living quarters was 
adopted as ‘normal’ for Western nations and ‘required’ for a superpower and as the 
methods and techniques were lauded as modern, better, more efficient and so on, the 
Soviet production of ‘instant antiquity’ called the credibility of the Soviet Union 
achieving in the present and the future what was being propagated as established 
reality in the West. In addition to the problematic juxtaposition of the Soviet reality 
and the Western image, there was the fantastic Soviet future.
These difficulties in achieving even legal minimums were in contrast to 
some of the images of the future Soviet city and dwellings. The Soviet city of the 
future was described by one Moscow architect as dominated by building facades 
with huge windows made of a synthetic material with gold and silver veins running 
through them. Main thoroughfares were to be filled with music, cars and people. At 
night time the skyline was to appear to be a mountain range and in autumn after 
sundown there was to be the image of golden leaves everywhere. The ‘most 
favourable living conditions’ were to be provided for everyone complete with easily 
accessible amenities. ‘Is the city we have just pictured really so remote? No, 
because such cities are already being planned and built in the Soviet Union.’317 
What Soviet citizens also knew was that Britain, USA and West Germany were 
leading in the production of synthetic materials (see reference to huge windows), 
that images of huge thoroughfares were associated with Britain’s motorways and the 
United States highway system; that Western music was temptation; and that the 
production of passenger cars was dominated by the West.
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An attempt was made to inspire confidence in the new building techniques 
through a series of international construction exhibitions and architectural displays 
in national exhibitions/trade fairs. During these exhibitions, foreign governments 
and companies built their own structures, often with the assistance of Soviet workers 
and supplied Western technical publications and documents. lurii Gerchuk was to 
recall the excitement surrounding the construction of foreign architecture in this 
instance during the American National Exhibition in 1959 when workers ‘wearing 
strange helmets of coloured plastic’ appeared and began work on an ‘openwork, 
tubular, spherical construction, which they filled with a six-sided honeycomb with 
metal panels’, this geodesic dome was to serve as the central pavilion for the 
exhibition. 3is Next to the geodesic dome was a series of plastic multi faceted, semi 
transparent fan-like structures that were to house various exhibits. Gerchuk recalled 
that the ‘demonstrative simplicity and strange, purely technological elegance, quite 
incompatible with any kind of applied ornament, was received as a visual lesson in 
genuinely contemporary architecture.’ 3i9 There was an intense interest (testified to 
by the long queues of visitors) in the prefabricated American home.320 The historian 
Stephen Bittner has argued that Khrushchev’s praise for foreign aichitecture and his 
association of Soviet progress with the West, for example in the autumn of 1960 
Klirushchev commented on the improvements in Moscow by saying that the city 
now compai’ed favourably with cities in the United States, resulted in successful 
measures in Soviet architecture being associated with the West, regardless of the 
veracity’ of such ideas.32i In the 1963, Soviet study ‘The World Of Values of 
Soviet Youth’ the 6,425 were asked to rank the most important architectural 
edifices. The top ten included the Kremlin (first place), MGU (second), UN 
headquarters in New York (fourth), the Empire States building (seventh) and 
modern western apartment buildings (fifth). Of the top ten, four were Western, and 
except for high-rise housing, all were public buildings.322
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Design was an integral aspect of modernity and universality. Along with 
modern amenities, a sleek, multifunctional efficient design broadened Soviet 
citizens to world citizens. This linkage was often, but not exclusively, restricted to 
the upper echelons of Soviet society. In his description of the average executive’s 
flat of the late 1950s, David Granick described a lucky executive as one who 
received a flat in a recently constructed complex as these had a ‘fairly airy and light 
architectural feeling rather than the heavy pomposity which characterised the 
construction of even five years ago. ’323 The flat would consist of two small to 
medium sized rooms, a kitchen, a toilet and a bathroom. A single wall closet in the 
flat would be a luxury. Appliances in the small kitchen would include a two-burner 
stove, a small sink with workspace, and overhead cupboards. There would be little 
room for any other appliance, but a small refrigerator could be added later. 324 The 
lack of space for a refrigerator is perhaps one reason why only ‘the smallest 
refrigerators seem to be produced. ’325 John Massey Stewart, press centre employee 
at the 1966 British Trade Fair was invited to the flat of a Soviet journalist living in 
Moscow. He wrote that two room flat was comfortable with an entrance hall, a 
room for two children, a living room cum bedioom for the parents, a bathroom, 
lavatory, and a kitchen with an American refrigerator containing American cake 
mixes that had been brought over recently by a friend.326 The flat owner Katya was 
to comment that some ‘foreigners think these new apartments are only for privileged 
people.. .They’re wrong. The only intellectuals here besides ourselves are an 
architect and his wife, she’s a movie director, a magazine editor, a woman chief 
engineer with her son and his family, and a head librarian’ .327 That the woman 
considered ‘intellectuals’ to be privileged people is an issue that will be addressed in 
Chapter Four. Ray Pierre Corsini was to visit a flat in a new housing project 
building that belonged to ‘Mrs S~’, the widow of a former Soviet official who had 
been stationed in New York. Corsini was to describe the four room flat housing five 
family members as ‘quite liveable, light, airy, and with larger rooms than those in
323 David Granick, The Red Executive: a Study of the Organisation of Man in Russian 
Industry (New York: Anchor Books, 1961) 93.
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our housing projects. ’328 The bathroom was small but with all the necessary 
amenities and the kitchen had a large window, enough space for a family dining 
table and a refrigerator. In a conversation with John Gunther, a Moscow-based 
French expatriate was to comment on the general sense of ‘yearning for bright 
colours and chromium furniture and trips to the seaside.’ and noted further that after 
‘forty years of privation, their sense of fun is coming out.’ 329 Gunther was to 
respond that his dominant impression from a recent trip to a housing project was the 
lack of closets to which the woman replied: ‘they [the Russians] just haven’t come 
to closets yet! ’330
With the acquiring of the flat came the need to furnish the flat, not least of all 
with storage space. It is in the design of furniture that one sees foreign influences 
even more strongly than in architecture. Furnishings were to be sleek, 
multifunctional, plentiful and in line with those seen from Scandinavia and Finland. 
In Moscow, there was a furniture shop called WOO Items for Your Home, named 
after the magazine 1000 Tips for Young Homemakers. The idea of a thousand items 
for the house was as revolutionary as the contents. However, furniture stores were 
often barren entities, one observer noted that her local furniture store was always 
empty of goods with the exception of one day when she saw two lorries delivering 
glass-fronted bookcases that filled the store to overflowing. Within days the store 
was again barren.331 Shortages in furniture were exasperated by the drive to convert 
Soviet taste from heavy and ornate to chrome, synthetic, multifunctional and 
contemporary (by contemporary read international). Women’s magazines and 
decorative magazines were to publish pictures of the modern style alongside images 
of old massive furniture being discarded, and the state was left providing not only 
for the newly created living spaces but new tastes as well.
In 1955 a campaign against ornamentalism was launched, in which 
ornamentalism was denounced as superfluous, pompous and petit bourgeois.i'ii 
Mass-produced, simple, elegant and multi functional items for domestic
328 Ray Pierre Corsini, Caviar For Breakfast (London: Harvill Press, 1967) 125.
329 Gunther, inside RussiaTodav 94.
330 Gunther, Inside RussiaTodav 94.
331 Belfrage, A Room i n Moscow 75.332 November 1955 directive of the Union of Architects was released shortly after the 1955 
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consumption was communist. The refining of the new Soviet Man’s tastes was to 
result in the rationalisation of consumption. First to be eliminated was kitsch, 
particularly subject to ridicule were the seven elephants that adorned windowsills, 
wardrobes and china cabinets. A piece of clothing or article of furniture was not 
worthy of a Soviet purchaser unless it was versatile. The coat for all seasons, the 
low bed without bed posts that could be made into a sofa, or the sofa without a back 
that could be made into a bed, the chair with a storage unit under the cushion, or the 
table that folded up into the wall. Multifunctionality meant that individuals required 
fewer objects; fewer objects meant that individuals were decreasing their 
dependence on the material and were advancing towards the realisation of 
communism. However, Soviet authorities were concerned with the possibility of 
specifically women exceeding the bounds of limited consumption and demanding 
excessive and unnecessary goods. Having witnessed the rowdy reopening of 
G.U.M. in the 1950s, Richard Edmonds noted that perhaps the authorities had cause 
for concern.333
Another aspect of furnishing the house was the provision of appliances. 
Gilmore was to recall one of his biggest surprises in Russia occurred when his 
mother-in-law turned to his wife Tamara and said “ Please deai*, will you go into the 
kitchen, look in the refrigerator and take out the caviar?’ Ten years ago this sweet 
and generous woman, in her wildest dreams, would not have dreamed of using an 
electric refrigerator, much less owning one. ’334 Officially, the CPSU was committed 
to lightening women’s burdens through the mass provision of modern, affordable, 
inexpensive domestic machines, appliances, and electrical devices.335 This 
lightening of the women’s burden bears a striking similarity to the Western refrain 
of technological development for the easing of the housewife’s burden.
Interestingly, the Western refrain of technology reducing the housewife’s burden 
was held up as representing the insidious subjugation of Western women to the 
mechanised health. One example of this message is a series of newspaper articles 
on the visit of a group of Soviet tourists to an average American home. The tourists 
reported that they were told that the family was saving money in order to purchase
333 Edmonds, Russian Vistas 111.
334 Gilmore, The C ossacks Burned Down the YMCA 55.
335 The Road to Communism: Documents of the 22"  ^Congress of the CPSU: 17- 
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several new appliances that were to ease the housewife’s chores. This surprised the 
Soviet visitors as the kitchen contained a ‘range with numerous buttons, a set of 
ovens, a dish washing machine, a closet refrigerator, a washing machine, etc.’ .336 
The tourists noted that the woman was as bound to the household as those women 
without the plethora of appliances, the only difference being the difficulty of the 
physical labour. The intended message was that within the West/America women 
were not as free as in the Soviet Union and that technology without socialism did 
not essentially change the role of women. The other message conveyed was that in 
the average American house there was a wealth of goods that eased the physical 
work of women, that an average American family had their own house, that the 
husband earned enough money for the wife to stay at home and that a kitchen that 
was not yet adequate in terms of appliances contained multiple ovens, a dishwasher, 
and a large refrigerator etc.
There can be no doubt that the ‘modernisation’ of dizain, (design) and 
architecture, was a politically co-opted phenomenon. Minimalism, 
multifunctionality, and simplicity were efficient means of providing the highest 
number of goods to the greatest number of individuals with the lowest output cost 
per item. Calls for redecorating and the launching of housing campaigns often 
coincided with important public holidays such as May Day or the anniversary of the 
October Revolution. The shift towards ornamentalism that had occurred under Stalin 
was labelled a social deviation and in discai'ding ornamentalism, the acquiring of 
new modern items resulted in civic duty involving consumption. However, the 
material and political need for modern consumer items exacerbated the need for and 
focus on technologically advanced forms of mass production.
Despite the best intentions, housing remained problematic: waiting lists were 
long, charges of unfair allocation were common, problems with new flats abounded 
and expectations grew faster than housing opportunities. Starting to deal with the 
issue of housing gave birth to a new series of issues from furniture and appliances to 
ever increasing utility usage. As in other areas of life, the cynicism and scepticism 
associated with perceived governmental promises was conveyed through anecdotes.
336 Sbvvaiutsia mechtv chelovecheskie: Man’s Dreams are coming true 277.
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A friend says to a friend, T have just written a book.’
- What about?
- Boy meets girl.
- Ah, a story!
- They fall in love.
- Ah, a romance!
- They get married and find a flat.
- Ah, a fable!337
Clothing
Clothing and fashion were to be particularly problematic aspects of the 
planned economy. Under Stalin, a pair of boots for one out of every three citizens 
was standard. An interview respondent from the St. Petersburg project was to recall 
her father’s joy during the 1930s, when as a reward for his stellar production norms, 
he received a coupon for a pair of red girl’s shoes (later in life she was to recall this 
with horror -  that a grown man could be so delighted that the state was going to 
grant him the possibility of obtaining a pair of necessary shoes for his daughter). 
Isaac Deutscher has declared ‘the barefooted and the owner of a pair of shoes are 
not equal; and not even a government consisting of communist angels could make 
them so.’338 Under Khrushchev, an attempt was made to eliminate this expression 
of anti-egalitarianism when he proposed that production increase to a level that 
would provide one pair of new shoes per person per year. One of the first post- 
Stalin, public acknowledgements that the clothing and textile industry needed 
reforming came from Kosygin in 1954 in the ‘Consumer Goods Programme. ’339 In 
this programme the need to provide ‘beautiful high quality and varied working 
clothes, home, holiday, evening and sports clothes, with due regard for the 
consumer’s age and tastes’ was acknowledged.340 It was also acknowledged that at 
present, consumers were complaining not only about quantity but quality. This 
public discontent is in contrast with the thankfulness of the Stalinist era as noted 
above. As production had increased and the issue was not only quantity but also 
quality and vaiiety, it stands to reason that Soviet production was sufficient to meet 
only the most basic of needs. While it is arguable that the desire for attractive
337 Gunther, Inside RussiaTodav 427.
338 Isaac Deutscher, Russia After Stalin {London: Hamish Hamilton, 1953) 99.
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clothing is part of human nature, Soviet fashion trends indicate that they were driven 
by both internal and external considerations.
The provision of adequate beautiful clothing in accordance to consumer 
preferences was an extremely problematic endeavour not only from a fashion point 
of view but also from the definition of adequate quantity. A passage from the work 
Sbyvaiutsia mechty chelovechestva is illustrative of the concept of limited 
abundance as it pertains to clothing. The passage opens with an acknowledgement 
that clothing and footwear, unlike foodstuffs, have no non-transcendable bounds. 
Clothing and footwear requirements were a combination of basic function, the need 
to protect the body against the elements, and socio-economic and cultural functions. 
The Soviet citizen was to be above the ‘philistine craving to show off’ and socialist 
fashion was to be better aligned with function and beauty representing the ultimate 
in their ‘quality, comfort and beauty.’ 341 Fashion provisions from the state were a 
means by which the state would provide clothing for work, home and leisure while 
simultaneously cultivating appropriate aesthetic tastes. The question as to whether 
the Soviet Man should have clothes for all occasions was rhetorical and followed by 
the more pertinent query: ‘Can society fully satisfy people’s rational requirements in 
high quality and beautiful clothes? Of course it can.’342 Both economic systems 
were to provide beautiful clothing and shoes, with both having well dressed citizens, 
but the Soviet system was to provide classic quality immune to the fickleness of 
fashion trends and an external ranking system. What constituted the highest 
standard of living or the fulfilling of all man’s needs was the ‘rational’ provision of 
consumer goods. These ideals are in contrast with such Soviet practices as 
producing bourgeois knock-offs of western designer labels.
Speaking during an election campaign in the Kalinin District of Moscow, 
Klirushchev acknowledged that attractive and good quality clothing and shoes were 
not a luxury but a right and were an integral part of the increased production of 
consumer goods. He also acknowledged the rising expectations: ‘our people not 
only want to have all the prime necessities of life, they also want to wear attractive 
and good quality clothes. Has our industry done everything to meet these demands?
341 Sbvvaiutsia mechtv chelovecheskie; Man’s Dreams are coming true 159-160,
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No, far from i t / 343 Khrushchev was getting ahead of himself, jumping over the 
provision of the basics that had not yet been fulfilled, while simultaneously 
questioning the ability of industry to meet demands. The provision of quality was 
problematic as Soviet industry was struggling to introduce new production methods, 
which by the very nature of new methods involved a period of experimentation and 
thus decreased production while still attempting to meet high production quotas.
According to Aleksei Adzhubei, Khrushchev considered the shortages of 
footwear and clothing to be of priority and that synthetic fabric was essential to 
ending shortages.344 Synthetic material would have been known initially through its 
usage in Nazi Germany military uniforms and subsequently through British, 
American and later French and Italian fashions. In the June plenum of 1960, 
synthetic fabric was attributed as being responsible for the output volume and style 
of modern French, English and West German fashion. In part, this focus on quantity 
was an attempt to convince a sceptical public of the merits of synthetics. Scepticism 
was often exhibited in face of new materials be it prefabricated concrete or velvet 
precisely because the Soviet results were substandard. The production of synthetic 
fabric ties in with the perceived necessity of the chemicalisation of all industries. 
Tlirough the chemicalisation of the fabric industry, citizens became walking 
testimonies to the industrial and technological prowess and wealth of their nation.
As many of the new fashions, particularly fabric patterns, could only be produced 
using modern technology and synthetic materials, there was no means for the Soviet 
Union to achieve the required results without implementing the technology. At 
Bratsk, Khrushchev discussed the relationship between science and clothing, 
claiming that during WWII Soviet officials used to laugh at the Germans for making 
their uniforms out of wood and yet now they accepted that this was the correct 
approach. To this end, the Soviet Union was to import cellulose fibres for clothing 
from the GDR.
As early as 1955 newspapers and magazines began running articles about the 
wonders of synthetic material that would keep the wearer dry through rain and 
snow, cool through scorching heat and warm through freezing temperatures.
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Research into gas, wood and oil was translated into the production of synthetic 
textiles and leathers. The potential for synthetic cloth was stressed in the Soviet 
press, ‘beautiful fabrics can now be made out of polymers... They cannot be strictly 
called fabrics because they are not woven, and do not contain a single thread, but 
still have all its properties... It sheds water like a duck’s back. It does not rot or 
bleach, moths will not eat it, and oils and dirt will not stick to it. Finally, it is very 
cheap.’345 In addition, modern fashion designs (referred to as the New Look) of 
France and the USA necessitated the use of synthetic fabric.346 Despite attempts to 
assure the public that the synthetic materials were superior (see image below), they 
were poorly received. This resulted in the demand for natural based products, 
particularly leather shoes and boots, being driven up and shortages exasperated 
despite increases in the production of clothing and footwear as synthetic based 
products were passed over for more expensive natural based products.
Fig. 3 Chemistry meets Footwear: Rabotnitsa no.8 (1964)
By the late 1950s, claims that the situation was visibly improving were being 
made. In the early days of the first Russian Sputniks there began an urban legend of 
an unusually naïve Western diplomat and a woman member of the ruling Soviet 
hierarchy. During the course of a diseussion the Western diplomat was forced to 
concede that yes, the Soviet Union had made Sputniks but added the rejoinder that it 
could not make nylon pants. The woman was to have thought about it for a moment 
and replied, ‘True, Mr. Ambassador, but I think it’s going to be a lot easier to go 
from Sputniks to nylon pants than it will be to go from nylon pants to Sputniks.’ A 
perusal of 1964 Soviet drawers in Moscow revealed that one could purchase ‘frilly 
drawers at prices ranging from 19 shillings to 5 pounds for a super pair with a
345 Sbvvaiutsia mechtv chelovecheskie: Man’s Dreams are coming true 72.
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matching slip. ’347 Maurice Hindus, was to note that ‘women were better shod than 
at any time since the coming of the Soviets: round toes, heavy soles, thick flat heels, 
were visibly out of favour with the younger generation; even spiked heels had come 
to Leningrad.’348 Boffa believed that the Soviet citizen ate better but dressed worse 
than the Italian, but that bundled up in winter dress the Soviet citizen portrayed an 
unusually negative image. He considered the English, Germans and Americans to 
be more lenient in their fashion critique, but then dismissed them as not having 
particularly good fashion sense either. His final assessment was that ‘it is true that 
his [the Russian’s] clothes look shabby; all clothes are scarce, of inferior quality, 
and very expensive’ .349 John Gunther conceded that clothes had improved but 
maintained that ‘they are still revolting. Their positive sloppy manginess, as well as 
cheap quality and lack of colour, is beyond description. ’350 In a speech at the 
plenar y meeting of the Central Committee (21.06.1963) Khrushchev quoted his 
good friend Roswell Garst as proof that the situation was improving. When ‘I 
[Garst] first came to the Soviet Union and walked through the streets of Moscow, 
my suit was better than the suits of others. This time, when I walked in your city, I 
saw that mine was perhaps the worst suit around. ’351 Given that Garst was a multi 
millionaire it seems unlikely that he made this statement, but Khrushchev’s use of 
the statement reinforces the idea of the use of the West as a benchmark.
The availability and price of clothing was problematic. One issue was sizing, 
as there was often an overproduction of unusual sizes and a shortage of ‘average’ 
sizes. Eddy Gilmore recalled being surprised to learn that a hotel floor waiter who 
had disappeared for several hours in the hopes of purchasing Czech made shoes (he 
returned empty handed as the sizes were all too big) had been willing to spend forty- 
six roubles for the shoes despite the fact that his monthly income without tips was 
forty-eight roubles.352 As Sally Belfrage compared consumer prices with her 
neighbours, she learnt that her neighbour’s shoes had cost three hundred roubles (or 
thirty Post-1961 roubles), or triple the price of her own shoes. When she questioned
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her neighbour about the high price the neighbour answered that she understood that 
it was high but that ‘the little too much that we pay we know is for the welfare of the 
country.’353 Also relating to production and costs, Belfrage was to note that the 
tasteless Soviet designed goods sat in stores while there were line-ups for the 
expensive but beautiful imported goods and that she had to airmail her winter jacket 
to Moscow as she could not afford to purchase a good quality jacket in Moscow. 
Illustrative of public awareness of the shortage is a cartoon of the time showing two 
toddlers sitting bundled up in their prams looking into a shop window. One of the 
toddlers says to the other: ‘Its time that we should be able to walk’ to which the 
other answers ‘Yes -  but in what?’354
T O  B A  Pt><
Fig. 4 Shoes? Krokodil no.2 (1958)
As in the case of most Soviet social issues, anecdotes arose around clothing. 
For example, ‘Go ahead, Nikita, catch up with America, if you can, but for heaven’s 
sake don’t run ahead. If you do, people will see your bare behind.’355 The quality
353 Belfrage, A Room in Moscow 31.
354 Elisabeth Helmrich and Ursula Neuman, 50 Jahre Sowiet Union im Spiegel Ihrer 
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of ready-made clothing was often dubious. Boffa noticed long queues outside of 
stores and individuals wearing ‘a striped shirt, badly cut, with a worn collar and 
strident colours. ’356 The clothing of the queued individuals was in sharp contrast 
with that displayed in windows. A 1963 study of twenty-six Soviet cities’ 
storefronts showed that the luxury items on display were either not produced at all, 
or were produced in severely limited quantities. The officials in charge of the 
investigation dismissed the practice as a confidence trick. ‘Beautifully embroidered 
children’s rompers and well-cut suits were so exclusive that they could not be 
bought. Kid leather shoes... were hand made, especially for the fashion shows. 
(Commenting on the limited nature of the items) Chief Engineer V. V. Goravneva in 
a Leningrad fur factory when interviewed by the magazine Krokodil, said ‘Do you 
think we want to lose the money incentives for the sake of those model coats and 
hats? ” 357 A charitable explanation of the discrepancy came from Maurice Hindus 
writing about the fashionable formal dresses on display in Nevskii Prospekt: ‘I could 
only assume that the state was making a promise that it was not yet in a position to 
fulfill.’ 358
The promise of synthetic clothing was furthered with the opening of the store 
Sintetika in Moscow in 1962 and in Leningrad in 1964. Alexei Feodorovich 
Kulichev, the Chief Designer of Dome Modele in the early 1960s was to comment 
that despite his own personal fondness for ‘American designs, colours and fabrics’, 
he was especially enamoured with the Galanos collections and the Fifth Avenue 
shop of Bergdorf Goodman, ‘‘high styles are not acceptable here. Models and 
actresses wear high styles. But working people prefer simple clothes. ” 359 Another 
means of conveying a sense of immediacy was through fashion shows. Fraternal 
fashion houses, particularly Lithuanian, Estonian and Polish were respected for their 
simple chic fashions, and the accompanying patterns that were often for sale after 
shows. For five roubles, one could be invited into the G.U.M. auditorium with its 
moulded ceiling, chandeliers and brown and yellow plush carpet to wait for a show 
complete with a five-piece band playing marches and waltzes. The fashions at
356 Boffa, Inside the Khrushchev Era 14.
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G.U.M. tended to involve more complicated styles often introducing Western 
fashions with high prices shortly after trade shows or exhibitions. .
In preparation for festivals and exhibitions the press ran articles cautioning 
Soviet citizens to not be too impressed by Western fashions. For example, prior to 
the World Youth Festival citizens were instructed ‘not to be too excited about 
‘women’s jewellery, cigarette cases and lighters, and cuff-links” and not to criticise 
foreigners for their ‘sharp colour combinations in dress. ’300 The Sixth International 
Youth Festival held in Moscow in the summer of 1957 was a massive international 
event; Soviet figures put attendance at thirty thousand youths from 131 countries.36i 
In the name of peace and friendship, it brought together young adults from around 
the world. Both Moscow and Muscovites were to be beautified for the event. As 
one journalist noted ‘Moscow had never been so young and beautiful’.362 Women 
were directed to wear no more than thr ee colours; that a bright pretty scarf and clean 
shoes greatly improved any outfit and that makeup should not be worn.363 A 
highlight of the festival, according to Rabotnitsa, was the outdoor ball. For those 
readers not aware of what a bal was, Rabotnitsa provided this definition: ‘Ball!
What a small word! Ball - it is simply dancing.’364 Soviet women were advised that 
should they attend, they would be able to ‘see new types of outfits, dresses, and 
receive consultation about what one is wearing in the upcoming season.’365 S. 
Vladimirova noted that for her, the most interesting aspect of the festival was being 
able to see the Italian models, fashions, and temperaments.366 Information about 
foreign styles could be found in newspapers, films, novels and local and foreign 
magazines. Maria Williams recalled how influential the styles of Laura Ashley as 
seen in advertisements in foreign magazines were for her and her mother, setting the 
standard for a fashionable young woman regardless of the woman’s political 
background.367 At times the coverage was direct, as in the article ‘Italian Fashion,’ 
but it was also indirect as in the articles about film festivals, for example, the
360 Max Frankel, New York Times (28.05.1957) in Gunther, Inside RussiaTodav 102.
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coverage of the Moscow Film Festival in 1961, which focused on Elizabeth Taylor 
and Gina Lollobrigida both of whom were honoured guests; or in articles about 
struggling women in the West, for example the plight of a Parisian worker.368
The American Sally Belfrage who was to attend the World Youth Festival and 
then return to live in Moscow for five months recalls her friend Sergei, whose 
mother had a ‘touch of chic’ about her, whose brother was a reporter in Paris, and 
who was ‘comparatively well-dressed’ in a Western cut sports jacket, and beige 
suede shoes. Sergei was distraught at having missed the World Youth Festival due 
to his need to redeem himself by working on a Komsomol farming team in Siberia. 
For Sergei’s friends, the festival had been an opportunity to meet interesting people 
and to buy foreign clothes. Sergei had bought his jacket and shoes fourth hand 
through "biznes' friends; the original owner was an Italian boy. According to Sergei 
the first non-Italian owner had been thrown out of the Komsomol after making it a 
habit to stand outside hotels and purchase foreigners’ clothes.369 During the Early 
1960s, Andrew Webb was approached on the street and offered nine hundred 
roubles (at the then official exchange rate almost one thousand USD) for his suit.37o 
Custom clothing was available but not overly common due to prohibitively 
high prices. In David Graniek’s judgement based on the ‘rather tasteless cuts of 
clothing seen on people in the expensive hotels and in the first rows of the theatre, I 
would judge that ready-made clothing is the rule. ’371 The other means of acquiring 
fashionable clothing was to have foreign or foreign like clothing. Upon seeing a 
young man with a derby/bowler hat, Eddy Gilmore asked from whence it came. The 
young man, who was accompanied by a stylishly dressed girl with a beehive hairdo, 
responded nonchalantly that he had ordered it from England.372 The conversation 
then turned to Cool Jazz and attracted other Russians who were more cautious than 
the dapper young man and his companion. When the other Russians left after their 
tentative foray, Gilmore asked if the others were scared of someone from the 
Komsomol chastising them for discussing jazz with a foreigner. The young man
368 N. Golikovoi, ‘Itai’ianskaia moda,’ Rabotnitsa no.8 (1963): 32; se e  also 'Silaiushchee 
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answered that they were ‘just cautious... I’m the Komsomol. ” 373 This episode is 
representative of a larger trend of the greater access to Western clothes by the 
privileged youth. A Soviet image that draws attention to the issue of the West and 
the privileged youth is 'I nashim i vashim' from 1963.
M 0 '
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Fig. 5 I nashim i vashim Krokodil no.1 (1963)
This image has the youthful card carrying Soviet man straddling communism, as 
represented by the Kremlin, the red star and a sheet of paper declaring that I am 
always with the Party’ and capitalism as represented by images and words of 
skyscrapers, Pepsi, Camel cigarettes, sex, Hollywood, striptease, night club, 
Cadillac, and a sheet of paper saying ‘but here appeals to me too!’ The fashion of
373 Gilmore, The C ossacks Burned Down the YMCA 133.
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each side changes as well. The Soviet side is a conservative suit with a tie and lace 
up dress shoes; the Western side is loafers, stripped socks, short-sleeved shirt, and 
short-cuffed trousers. The access of Soviet elite youth to Western goods reinforced 
their social status while eroding away at the ideological system. As Mervyn 
Matthews was to note of the elite Moscow University students, they were not 
‘interested in Party documents, they were interested in money, getting decent food, 
travelling and that sort of thing, not boring party documents. ’374
The word ‘style’ (stiF in Russian) was to form the root of the name for the 
most prominent youth counterculture, the stilyagi and be a defining theme for the 
era, one danced, dressed, and acted with and in style. As with the term modern’, 
stiV was infused with Western connotations and removed the user, if only by a small 
step, from everyday Soviet reality. The constant charge made against the stilyagi 
was that they were anti-social elements, seduced by a mirage of the West and its 
consumer goods’ .375 Boffa described the stilyagi as those who dressed with ‘style’ 
as quasi-Western in nature, children of individuals with money who were lacking in 
personality and sought to distinguish themselves through eccentricity.376 Olga 
Vainshtein has written of the radical fetishisation of Western clothing being a 
society wide phenomenon with the stilyagi being the most prominent example at the 
time. 377
The stilyagi male favoured narrow, straight-leg pants or ‘pipers’, pointed 
shoes, a Hawaiian shirt, sunglasses, and a bandana around his neck; he wore his hair 
short, was in love with jazz, and danced the ‘twist’ and the ‘shake’. The female 
version was the ingénue, characterized by a childlike hairstyle, a round turndown 
collar, a slight décolleté, a naïve gaze, light pastel hues in makeup, a miniskirt, 
clothes that outlined the figure, and the mannerisms of a capricious child. In many 
respects, quite obviously, this image corresponded to the tendencies dominating 
Western fashion of the time, exemplified by the British model Twiggy.378 By the 
1960s, the socially deviant stilyagi were being re-evaluated perhaps in response to
374 Mervyn Matthews, Interview 2002, London.
375 Crowley, ‘Style and Socialism: Modernity and Material Culture in Post-War Eastern 
Europe’ 17
376 Boffa, Inside the Khrushchev Era 214.
377 Ol’ga Vainshtein, ‘Female Fashion, Soviet Style: Bodies of Ideology,’ Helena Goscilo 
and Beth Holgren eds., Russia. Women. Culture {Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 
1996) 64-93, 73.
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the rise of more insidious elements such as the khippL In the ar ticle ‘Not by clothes
alone’ one reads o f how Z. Balakli erroneously judges an extremely well dressed
young women as being stilyagi, ‘most likely without intelligence, without a heart’.
As fate would have it, Balakh soon learnt that this fashionable young woman had a
heart. Not only did she help a lost child find his mother but she herself was an
orphan who did not remember her mother who had died on the day o f victory.379
The prestige afforded foreign fashions served both the ruling class and the
dissenters. To wear Western clothes was to officially thumb one’s nose at the
Communist party while having access to Western fashions often set the privileged
class (here read largely communist party member or their families) off from the
masses. The dissident for whom Martin Dewhirst bought jeans and who wanted
American Levi’s because ‘he wanted the best’ from a fashion point o f view, could
have been a Party official’s son. 38o
Officials were aware o f the contradictory nature o f the elite youth sporting
Western fashions. The stilyagi had a weak spot for the fox trot and jazz, and ‘were a
serious challenge to Soviet ideology, not because they were numerous or powerful,
but because they were the first manifestation of a new phenomenon for which the
country was ideologically unprepared.’381 Writing for the Soviet press in 1954,
Ivanov noted that the stilyagi risked becoming ‘an over refined intellectual with petit
bourgeois tastes and propensities.’382 The American Sally Belfrage described her
stilyagi friend’s background as representative:
Sergei had been brought up with all the money he wanted and nothing to buy 
with it. The family had had a big black Zim to drive around in and a chauffeur 
to drive it, two maids and a cook and his father’s assistant, a dacha in the 
country, and English, French and piano tutors for Sergei and his brother... He 
wasn’t very interested in his career, though he had confidence that he’d be a 
success because o f influential friends. Every evening was spent living it up in 
a restaurant or at a party dancing rock’n’roll. He never read anything, but used 
up a lot of time speculating over foreign things. Nothing was any good unless 
it was foreign, he thought. Often he or those like him gave me foreign pens, 
jewellery, cigarette cases or holders, lighters, sometimes even American 
cigarettes and chewing gum.383
379 Kononenko, 'Silaiushchee budushchee,’ 6.
380 interview with Martin Dewhirst, Glasgow April 2001.
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382 G. Ivanov, ‘Bad taste,’ CDSP vol 39 no.6 (1954): 10-11, 11.
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There were inventive applications of legitimate products in the quest to be Western
to be seen in the early 1950s when youth would pin American cigarette packs to
their clothing and chew paraffin wax as gum.
A condemning charge laid against the stilyagi by Soviet officials was that they
tried too hard to be like their foreign idols and were rewarded with the scorn of
foreigners who saw them as hopelessly outdated. One example of this was an
AGITPUNKT caricature that John Massey Stuart saw posted during his visit to
Russia in 1969 of a ‘caricatured American tourist, with a wad of ten rouble bills in
his hand, and a stilyagi, drooling over a pair of old trousers.’384 The stilyagi were
not the only group to imitate the West. In the 1950s there were the shtatniki and in
the 1960s there were the bitniki and khippi. Despite initial official condemnation of î
these groups members of these groups were not de facto  failed citizens. Soviet
papers and journals ran articles cautioning citizens against misjudging these youth.
For example, from K om som ol’skaia Pravda:
This one? He is dressed in a wide-shouldered jacket and extremely narrow :
short trousers from beneath which flash brightly coloured socks. He spends a 
large part of his time on his appearance. He wears his hair long and sprinkles 
his speech with such words as ‘colossal’ ‘charming’ ‘simply’ etc. If he is 
Boris, he calls himself Bob, and if he is Ivan, he calls himself John.. .He
‘adores’ everything foreign and is ready to give his right arm for a fashionable c
record...
However, despite such an introduction, the article then continues, declaring 
that the habits of aimlessness, selfishness etc were more harmful than a flair for 
fashion. Persecuting individuals for their fashion accoutrements constituted a lack 
of attention being paid to ‘real bourgeois elements’ and that Young Communist 
League members lost respect for leaders who engaged in such superficial pursuits.
The article continues: ‘you can have a moustache and a fashionable suit and still be 
a good YCL member. An elegant ring on the beautiful hand of a girl can make her 
hand still more beautiful. YCL honour does not suffer from this. The desire to 
dress well is natural. It is bourgeois only when it becomes almost the main concern 
of one’s life.’385
Official and public awareness of Western fashion was such that fashion 
trends in the USSR only lagged about two or three years behind those in the West,
384 Stewart, Across the Russias 135.
385 Ye. Rusakova, ‘Which of Them is the Stiliaga,’ in CDSP Vol.8 no.33 (1956): 8-9, 8.
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brand names were known, and certain countries garnered more respect than others. 
During various stays in the USSR (1959-1964) Martin Dewhirst was asked 
continually for Levis, despite Levis just coming into widespread use in Britain 
during this time. The semiotics o f dress, to ‘have something that looked as if it had 
been made in Italy, if only a tie, was very important for one’s self respect, at any 
rate in Moscow and St. Petersburg/Leningrad.’386 In an attempt to provide 
consumers with something foreign, Soviet factories began placing foreign labels on 
Soviet products.
Fig. 6 Pittsburgh Youth Welcome N. S. Khrushchev Z hit’ v mire i druzhbe
Soviet media often provided contradictory images o f Western fashion, often 
with the derisive intent. The images o f the West provided templates for fashion 
conscious Soviet citizens. For example, in January 1961, the magazine Krokodil ran 
images o f the British the staff gathered during an official trip to England. The 
sketch ‘W elcom e!’ (in English), showed various images o f Brits. The dominant 
central image is o f an impeccably dressed pencil thin businessman with umbrella, 
attaché, and a handkerchief in pocket. His trousers have a front pleat, his jacket is 
single breasted, and his tie is narrow. Other images form a rough circle around the 
businessman and include a woman with long straight hair wearing a fuzzy cardigan.
386 Interview with Martin Dewhirst, Glasgow April 2001.
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a mini skirt, and court shoes (with ornamental buckle) walking several dogs. Then a 
couple, he in a kilt - she in flared trousers, leather boots, and a floppy hat. Another 
pair is looking at modern art with their arms around each other. She has long hair 
and is wearing bell-bottoms and a stripped shirt, and he has on a baggy jumper, 
cargo trousers and boots. Two more stereotypical pictures neither large nor 
centrally placed include a British guard in full military regalia including beaver hat 
and a poor man in tattered clothing working as an advertising post.387
\>wa\o
Fig. 7 * Welcome!’ Krokodil (1967)
The stilyagi trend is representative o f a larger trend of increased interest in 
fashion. Fashion was no longer perceived ‘unconditionally [as] a bourgeois 
perversion but [as] a legitimate phenomenon of contemporary socialist life’.388 To 
be fashionable meant to be contemporary. The concepts of contemporary as well as 
the production realities (i.e. synthetic material) were intrinsically linked with 
modernity and the West. According to Rabotnitsa fashion was a highly visible 
aspect o f modernity, and of universality; ‘even’ the Italian women turned their heads 
at pretty dresses.389 In terms o f modernity, the ability to produce wrinkle free,
387 Boris Efimov, ‘W elcome!’ Krokodil (02.01.1967) 7.
388 Reid, ‘Cold War in the Kitchen’ 241.
389 Renata Bestegi, ‘V komnate’,’ Rabotnitsa no.7 (1957):3-4, 4.
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dynamically patterned and coloured synthetic textiles as well as synthetic leather 
into new fashion was possible only through a combination of innovative design and 
advanced manufacturing capabilities. Sophisticated machinery was needed to mass- 
produce clothing and footwear. In articles such as Tn exhibition and in the stores’ 
new Soviet clothing was praised for its innovation and lamented for its scarcity.390 
Along with the promise to get clothing into the shops there was a warning that part 
of the problem was the increasing demands and selectivity of Soviet shoppers. No 
longer were shoppers content with acquiring just any garment, they now had 
preferences in style, colour, fabric, quality, and size. In a conversation between a 
Rabotnitsa journalist and a shopper the journalist asked why the woman did not 
want to purchase a particular perfectly respectable jacket. The response was:
‘young lady, I want a jacket that is stylish and not too expensive’ .391 The reader is 
reminded to remember the dismal state of clothing production during the early 
1940s. No longer dealing solely with scarcity, the 1960s problem is that there are 
not enough nice dresses and too many unattractive ones: ‘[ajnd so, there are no 
dresses. And there are too many dresses. ’392
The two countries that epitomised fashion during this period were France 
and Italy. There were exhibitions, films, fashion shows, the purchasing of materials 
and production lines, and official statements describing and promoting the new 
fashions from these nations. After Khrushchev’s visit to Paris and the fashion show 
put on by Christian Dior in Moscow, he publicly stated that all Soviet citizens 
should have clothes made of a quality and fashion compar able to Christian Dior. 
Klirushchev’s international visits and the fashions involved were regularly reported 
on in Rabotnitsa. In an article on Italian fashion, the focus was on light, ultra thin 
synthetic fabrics, bright bold patterns and on how to take limited articles of clothing 
and create a comparably dynamic and versatile wardrobe. Articles that discussed 
what was trendy in the West typically contained the reassurance that these products 
or styles would be available to Soviet citizen. Having acknowledged that the world 
of fashion was dominated by the styles of France and Italy, and the synthetic fibres 
of the United States and United Kingdom, the Soviet Union’s contribution was not
390 L. Korniushin, ‘Na vystavkakh i na skladakh,’ Rabotnitsa no.8 (1959): 9; T. Aleksandrova 
and S. Lapteva, ‘Otchego nadmenny manekeny,’ Rabotnitsa no.7 (1964): 22-23.
391 E, A. Fedorova, ‘Samostoiatel’nost’ i otvetstvennost’,’ Rabotnitsa no.12 (1965) 6-7.
392 Lapteva, ‘Otchego nadmenny manekeny” 22-23.
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to be underestimated. The article ‘Boots from synthetic material’ claimed there was 
international recognition of Russian boots as ‘very stylish’ in form but failing to be 
the most stylish. It claimed that the most fashionable footwear was no longer made 
from leather but from synthetic materials, which allowed the Soviet Union to be a 
contender, if not a leader, in the international fashion world. One then reads that the 
production of synthetic boots in the Soviet Union is to begin in 1964 with the first 
million pairs being produced at the Kalininskii Factory.393 Articles on synthetic 
footwear ran before production thereof began in the Soviet Union and associating 
synthetic material with the West was an attempt to foster acceptance. Despite 
attempts to sway opinions, synthetic materials were largely distrusted by the public 
as not being durable, difficult to wash, hot in summer and cold in winter 
(particularly true of nylon), bleeding of colours (stockings or ‘stretch socks’ were 
the worst for bleeding often staining women’s legs), and were perceived as an 
attempt by the regime to produce a cheap inferior substitute.
In order to produce new materials in large quantities old factories needed to be 
revamped and new ones built.394 The article ‘Or ulitsy Batratskoi do ulitsy 
TereshkovoV ran an in-depth report on four modern textile factories, all with large 
windows and air conditioning. The textile patterns produced by factories were not 
developed by mere dissinatorov, but by aitists. The newest factory, the Kamyshina, 
produced knitwear, flannel for children’s clothing, satin, and specialised in velvet 
(the article switches regularly between the transliteration o f ‘velvet’ and barkhat).
A prime objective of the Kamyshina factory was to reproduce lightweight high 
elasticity velvet that matched their Italian and French samples.395 The article 
summed up the future of the factory by prophesising that should one come back in 
2018, one would find built here on the Volga River the largest and best textile 
factory in Europe, producing stylish patterns on luxurious fabrics. The factory 
Krasnoe znarnia was also a major source of synthetic fabrics. Situated in Leningrad, 
it was one of the first producers of synthetic material, in this instance kapron, and 
became a main supplier of synthetic furs. Khrushchev had a papakha out of
393 ‘Sinteticheskaia obuv’,’ Rabotnitsa no.8 (1964): 32. For a discussion on the merits of 
synthetic materials s e e  also T. Kostygova, ‘Kabiuk, moda i zdorov’e ,’ Rabotnitsa no.10 
(1965): 28-29.
394 S ee  for example T. Aleksandrova, Rabotnitsa no.10 (1965): 9-11 ; Ts. Golodnyn, ‘Net, 
nevidimaia,...’ Rabotnitsa no.11 (1962): 16-17.
395 For example, T. Aleksandrova, Rabotnitsa 10(1965): 9 -11 ,10 .
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s y n th e t i c  l a m b s k i n  p r o d u c e d  in  Krasnoe znamia a n d  w o u l d  q u i z  p e o p le  a s  to  i f  i t  
w a s  s y n t h e t i c  o r  n a tu ra i.3 9 6
Soviet fashion trends were a combination of Soviet ingenuity in the face of 
shortages and poor quality with enough attention being paid to the West that the 
Western influences and origins of many of the trends were recognisable. The 
chemicalisation of the clothing industry was to result in clothing and footwear 
serving as a conduit between the general population, the chemical industry and the 
government. Added to this was the dynamic of fashion as a symbol of progress and 
thus national pride. The adoption of Western fashion trends served to incorporate 
Soviet fashion culture into a greater world culture; accentuate both class distinctions 
(access to Western fashion greater for elite) and dissent; and provide an alternative 
to ‘soviet’, hr 1963, Khrushchev acknowledged that despite great progress having 
been made over the past decade, Soviet people were dressing better than previously, 
‘some clothes are still on the dismal side. We are producing an ever-growing 
quantity of all kinds of consumer goods; all the same, we must not force the pace 
unreasonably as regards the lowering of prices. ’397
Automobiles
Cars were visions of modernity, enshrouded in images of power and speed. As 
with modern fashion, it was impossible to separate the prestige of the private 
passenger car from the West. Foreign cars were rare in the Soviet Union and an 
image of the foreign car existed. In particular, the American automotive industry 
not only underpinned the American economy, but ubiquitously exported and 
imported the American dream.398 American cars were built and designed to 
accommodate the aesthetics of the middle-class. In his memoirs, one of the original 
management members and later general director of AVTOVAZ, Anatolii 
Anatol’evich Zhitkov wrote that: ‘the United States of America brought in the 20* 
Century with the automobile, [and] that the automobile appeared in the majority of 
various Western countries as an engine of progress, that thanks to it, there was a
396 Natal'ia Lebina ‘Plius khimizatsiia vsei odezhdy,’ 86.
397 Khrushchev, Marxism-Leninism is Our Banner 29.
398 David Nye, Consuming Power: A Social History of American Energies (Cambridge: MIT 
P ress,1998) 178.
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large collective technological, scientific and economic programme’ .399 Again, as 
with housing and clothing, automobiles linked national industrial prestige with 
personal consumption and images of the Soviet future fused with images of the 
mythical other. In chapter five, ‘Driving Towards Communist Consumerism:
VAZ,’ the formation of images through direct industrial contact is examined in 
detail. In this section of chapter two, ‘Commenting on Communist Consumption’ 
the public lore surrounding the passenger car with its links to the West and the role 
the passenger car was to play in Soviet society is briefly approached.
Soviet anecdotes about automobiles illustrate the broad social impact of the car 
and the linkage of cars to the concepts of wealth and foreign. The connection with 
wealth was a combination of the wealth of the individual that owned a vehicle and 
that of the society (Italy could produce the Fiat and Ferrari, the British the Land 
Rover and the United States, the chrome laden Cadillac) that had the resources to 
divert to the private car industry. The phenomenon of the car-wealth linkage is 
illustrated in the following well-known anecdotes. Both date from the 1960s.
An American tells a Russian:
-I have three cars. In one I go to work, in another I visit guests and when I go 
to Europe, I take the third car.
The Russian responds:
-Well, to work I go by tram, to guests in the metro.
The American asks:
- and to Europe?
The Russian answers:
- and to Europe I go by tank.4oo
An American was looking around Moscow and went with the Intourist guide 
to a factory where there stood three cars.
American: To whom does this factory belong?
Intourist: The workers 
American: and the three cars?
Intourist:One is the Director’s, the other, the Chairman of the Trade Union 
committee, the third, the Seeretary.
A Soviet official was looking around Detroit and sees at one of the factories a 
thousand cars. He asks his guide, an American communist: To whom does 
this factory belong?
American communist: to the Capitalist Ford.
Soviet official: and these cars?
American communist: the workers. 401
399 A. Zhitkov, Vershinoi zhizni stal VAZ (Tol’iatti, 1997), 24.
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The first anecdote combines the notion of relative American prosperity with
the idea that the Soviet Union has diverted, at least in part, some of its wealth into
the military and Eastern Europe. A third anecdote highlights the admiration in
which foreign technology and workmanship was held, and the limits of Soviet
society to express their knowledge of the West.
A large, handsome American automobile was parked on a street in Moscow.
A man walked by and stopped to admire it. He rubbed his fingers over the 
finish, he felt the tyres; he stared awestruck at the upholstery.
‘What a beautiful Russian car,’ he said to a second man who had also stopped 
to admire it. ‘What magnificent, magnificent work we do here.’
‘Fool,’ said the second man. ‘Don’t you know that this is an American car, 
not a Russian car?’
‘Yes,’ said the first man. ‘I know it’s an American car\ But I don’t know 
you.’-'”
Recalling the reaction of Soviet citizens to the American Exhibition in general
and the car display in particular ‘Friend D’ felt that the exhibition did not have the
impact it should have had, due to its department store nature full of items that could
be dismissed. There were ‘a lot of very nice goods, rather better than ours; but so
what? We’d catch up with them in a few years where that sort of thing was
concerned. They hadn’t had a war the way we had; so what the hell? All the same,
our young people went pretty crazy about their cars.’403 A popular joke that arose
surrounding the American exhibition and American cai*s that supports the opinion
that the cars were popular went as follows:
A young man got so rapturous about a Cadillac that he asked an American 
guide how he could possibly get such a car. ‘You’ve got to show that you 
Russians are really tougher than we Americans.’ ‘What do I have to do?’
‘First you’ve got to drink a whole bottle of scotch in one draught; then you’ve 
got to shake hands with a lion; then you have to have sexual intercourse with 
an old Eskimo woman.’ So he drinks off the bottle of whiskey without turning 
a hair; he gets into the lioness’s cage; after forty minutes he comes out, 
looking badly bruised, scratched and tattered and says: ‘Now, Where’s that 
Eskimo woman whose paw I’ve got to shake?
During Khrushchev’s Siberian lectures in 1959 he noted that the Americans 
had yet to send a rocket to the moon yet wanted praise for their passenger cars and 
that the Soviet Union did not intend to give this praise, as there was no intention of
402 A. Lit, Forbidden Laughter: Soviet Underground Jokes (Los Angeles: The Almanac 
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competing in this realm. The Soviet automobile industry was going to avoid the 
American pitfalls of ‘it’s a lousy car, but it’s mine’ and the frustration o f insufficient 
parking space. The Soviet solution was car pools and the improvement of public 
transportation. The car pool system was promoted as relieving individuals o f the 
onerous job o f upkeep and yet placing cars at their disposal.404 This policy decision 
did not prevent the Soviet people from being interested in passenger cars.
i
Fig. 8 Mrs. K looking at the British Triumph (courtesy o f J.M. Stewart)
In his memoirs, Khrushchev made clear his opinion on the shelving of the car 
pool system for mass production o f passenger cars, tying it to food and agriculture.
In 1961, in an attempt to increase poultry production, the USSR purchased a poultry 
plant from the Finely Moody Corporation o f Aurora Illinois. In the USA the plant 
yield one kilogram of meat for three kilograms of feed. In the USSR, the same plant 
needed five kilograms of feed for one kilogram of meat. ‘How could we compete 
with the US if there was such a vast discrepancy? I [Khrushchev] was simply 
ashamed to talk with the president o f the American firm, just as it fills me with 
shame to hear that w e’re importing chicken from relatively small countries like 
France, to say nothing o f Holland.’405 When Finely Moody was asked why the plant
404 Sbwaiutsia mechtv chelovecheskie 164.
405 Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament 141.
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was not producing as it should they could not provide an answer as their experts had 
not been permitted to view either the plant nor to oversee the installation. In 1964, 
despite the poultry factory never having reached the promised norms, Klirushchev 
entered into discussions for the purchase of a bacon plant from Finely Moody.
Talks were tabled with the removal of Khrushchev from power: T [Khrushchev] 
think it certainly would have been better from an economic standpoint to buy that 
license rather than one for a Fiat automobile plant. ’406 Modern food production was 
a combination of Soviet and Western technology and driven by the Soviet 
leadership’s belief in the need to improve provisions.
In Kommunist the argument against private car ownership was taken further by 
contending that American capitalists permitted workers to have cars as this resulted 
in workers, no longer fatigued from the subway, being more productive. Along the 
same vein, TV was developed in an attempt to curb excessive drinking and all night 
parties.407 In 1961, architect Ya. A. Kornfel’d spoke scornfully on automotive 
centred American cities saying that ‘there exists a peculiar understanding about 
travel by automobile, which is considered and advertised, like American Coca-Cola, 
as something that is impossible to do without. ’408
By the mid 1960s official Soviet policy on passenger cars had changed to 
support mass production of economy cars. This was to be achieved through 
improvements to existing factories, the designing of a small Soviet economy car, 
and most significantly, from Fiat a multi-million dollar turnkey factory in Tol’iatti. 
The agreement with Fiat did not constitute a fundamental change in the Soviet 
automotive industry from the aspect of cooperation as the Soviet automotive 
industry had developed in conjunction with foreign assistance. Prior to his removal, 
Khrushchev had publicly lauded Soviet-American automotive ties, typically noting 
that during the Revolution, engineers went to study in American colleges and 
universities and to work as ordinary workers at Ford and elsewhere. The head of the 
automobile industry Engineer Strokin, used to work for Ford, and ‘Ford thought 
highly of him; he suggested that Strokin stay and work for him . ’409 The Fiat factory 
was to provide the bulk of the small passenger cars. The magazine Krokodil
406 Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament 142.
407 As quoted in Gunther, Inside RussiaTodav 81.
408 Bittner, ‘Remembering the Avant-Garde’ 562.
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(01.1969 no. 1) was to announce the beginning o f production in Tol’iatti with a front 
cover cartoon. 4io
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Fig. 9 Fiat Krokodil no. 1 (1969)
410 ‘Fiat.’ Krokodil no.1 (1969)
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The belief in Western superiority in car production, and in consumer goods in 
general, was part of the secret that everyone knew. The anecdotes in this section are 
all dependent on certain basic cultural assumptions about the West. The West had 
to be technologically advanced, adept at mass production, and have consumers. If 
there was a plethora of vehicles in the West, were there then many other less 
expensive consumer goods available?
A common Soviet response to the idea of abundance and mass distribution of 
goods was the denunciation that this abundance was false and that goods were only 
available to the elite or that the goods seen were prototypes that were not in general 
production. This argument would have sounded logical to Soviet citizens who were 
able to view the economic and technological wonders of Socialism often only in 
exhibition halls or museums and who had direct experience with a system which did 
reserve such goods for the elite. However, anecdotes like the first one with the 
Soviet official in Detroit and articles like that from Kommunist are indicative of an 
image of wide spread material wealth. This belief existed at a time when core to 
Soviet discourse were the issues of: increases in the production of consumer goods, 
increased access to them, and concerns about the level of Soviet quality all of which 
were intrinsically connected with such goods as cars.
Culture
The linkage between state, technology, society and the West can also be seen 
in the field of culture in general but popular culture in particulai". By nature popular 
culture and the arts were designed for an audience and proved a particularly 
sensitive medium. This was not lost on the Soviet leadership and regardless of the 
era, culture was consistently viewed as more subversive and ideologically 
threatening than science and technology. During the post WWII era the ties 
between technology and culture strengthened both due to technological changes to 
the medium itself, for example the introduction of colour pictures, and 
dissemination, for example advances in music recording and reproduction. Under 
Khrushchev, cultural contact was advocated by the West and the Soviet regime 
consented to it in order to achieve other objectives. Between Western governments 
using the incentive of possible economic ties to gain cultural concessions and the 
Soviet government not being as cautious as it had been previously and would be in
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the future, cultural contact increased during the late 1950s and 1960s. Indeed, this 
was an era when most organisations had a foreign branch of some sort.4ii Cultural 
diplomacy was remarkably resilient to political tensions, indeed neither Boris 
Pasternak being forced to turn-down the Nobel Prize for Literature (October 1958) 
nor the U-2 surveillance plane incidence (May Day 1960) had long-term 
ramifications for cultural exchanges.4i2
In this section, examples from three forms o f both Soviet and Western popular 
culture (film, music and a popular magazine) have been chosen to show the origins 
of the image, the image o f the West being conveyed, and the linkage of the medium 
to technology. Generating interest not only due to their foreign nature, imported 
culture was a refreshing alternative to the stilted nature of socialist realism which 
had resulted in artists, cultural organisations and the public being thoroughly 
disinterested in much of the popular Soviet culture at the time. As one commentator 
of the period was to note that the ‘Soviet Union will collapse, if it ever does 
collapse, of boredom.’4i3
a. Films
Films are one example of how technology, society and the state interacted and 
constructed an aspect of the image of the mythical other. The technology behind 
film production was to develop quickly with the advancement to colour pictures 
coinciding with the race for space. Films were also a form of media designed for 
the modem mass audience. In addition, films could be viewed by the entire 
population and did not necessarily favour an urban elite. Indeed, film was a cultural 
medium paiticulaiiy well suited to the youth, as it was modern, affordable, universal 
and accessible. Thus, a film could convey a message of modernity on three levels: 
the technology with which it was produced; the mass nature and demographics of its 
audience; and the message contained within the film. Images of the West were to 
occur both in Western and Soviet films played in the USSR.
Initially under Klirushchev films were a popular medium for exchange. Western 
governments, in particular the American government, favoured information and
411 Richmond. US-Soviet Cultural Exchanges 63.
412 Frederick Starr, Red and Hot: The fate of jazz in the Soviet Union 1917-1980 (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1963) 262.
413 Gunther, Inside RussiaTodav 383.
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cultural exchanges partly because they were perceived as a breach in Soviet 
information control. For the West, films were a form of cultural diplomacy that 
required little investment or work. For the Soviet officials films were modern, 
mass-produced and had the potential to earn the Soviet state money. While Soviet 
officials always screened potential Western films, by the 1970s, the practice was 
largely set-aside in the West largely due to a general lack of public interest in Soviet 
films. After the initial interest in Soviet films such as ‘My Name is Ivan’, ‘Ballad of 
a Soldier’, and ‘The Cranes are Flying’, public interest dwindled exacerbating the 
process of establishing reciprocal agreements. By contrast, Western films were box 
office successes in the Soviet Union.
Western films during the Khrushchev era built upon the wartime popularity of 
foreign films and were to remain a significant aspect of Soviet film culture. Under 
Stalin, film production had dwindled to the point that cinema works from the 1930s 
such as Volga, Volga were resurrected and played regularly. When Soviet films 
were produced, in the early fifties five to ten per year, they did not depict the 
realities of contemporary life (a trend that had begun internationally). By the late 
1950s under Kluushchev, Soviet film production increased to over fifty per year and 
the regulation requiring that scripts be centrally approved was abolished. In 
conjunction with this abolishment of central control, there was a decrease in 
political content and an increase in representative stories and characters. Under 
Brezhnev, film scripts were brought back under scrutiny. Soviet films such as ‘The 
Cranes are Flying’ and ‘Ballad of a Soldier’ demonstrated an ability on the part of 
the Soviet film industry to produce films that audiences willingly viewed. However, 
even within the Soviet Union, Soviet films did not dominate the film industry during 
the 1950s.
The importance of Western films in Soviet culture was based on quantity, 
quality, and simply being western. In 1956, such masterpieces as ‘La Strada’ and 
‘Lady Hamilton’ were highlights that drew in Soviet audiences. ‘La Strada’ 
(director Federico Fellini) was first released in Italy in 1954 and in the USA and the 
USSR in 1956. It is the tragic story of the impish Gelsomina who is sold by her 
poor mother to the carnival man Zampano. Abused and living a life of servitude, 
Gelsomina meets II Matto (The Fool) who shows her the possibility of a life without 
subjugation and pain. In the end Zampano kills II Matto breaking Gelsomina and
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leaves her. ‘Lady Hamilton’ (also released under ‘That Hamilton Woman’), first 
released in 1941, was director Alexander Korda’s attempt to produce a war 
propaganda film in a United States that was not yet ready for such a film. The film 
was seen by contemporary critics as being bad history, the usage of Napoleonic wars 
to symbolise Hitler and the war in Europe, with the British safeguarding against 
ambitious dictators, but good propaganda for Britain. The latter of these two films 
was in keeping with the more traditional nature of Soviet films in that in technically 
dealing with a historic subject, there was little to be learnt about contemporai'y life. 
The former was modern and edgy but due to its storyline politically acceptable. 
However, in showing the poverty of Italian life through the fate of Gelsomina, it 
also showed through images the wealth of Italy. The presence of foreign film was 
also felt through its quantity.
In 1957 alone, seventy foreign films were shown. During Mihajlov’s summer in 
Russia he saw four Western films playing: ‘Divorce Italian Style’ (recorded as 
playing in twenty-nine theatres), ‘The Secrets of Paris’, ‘Fanfan the Tulip’, and the 
American Western ‘The Magnificent Seven’.414 Popular American films during the 
Khrushchev era included:
‘Marty’,
‘Roman Holiday’,
‘All about Eve’,
‘Twelve Angry Men’,
‘Inherit the Wind’,
‘Some Like It Hot’,
‘To Kill a Mockingbird’,
‘Zorba’,
‘My Fair Lady’,
‘Romeo and Juliet’,
‘Around the World in Eighty Days’,
‘Lust for Life’,
‘West Side Story’,
‘Deanna Durbin’ (US singer) films,
‘Stagecoach’ (released in USSR as ‘The Journey Will Be Dangerous’),
‘Mr. Deeds Goes to Town’ (renamed ‘The Dollar Rules’),
‘The Roaring Twenties’ (renamed ‘A Soldier’s Fate in America’), and 
‘Tarzan’s New York Adventure’.
414 Mihajlov, Moscow Summer 51.
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Again, as with the examples from 1956, popular American films were a combination 
of historical and contemporary films. Films such as ‘Roman Holiday’ (director 
William Wyler), and ‘West Side Story’, would have given Soviet audiences images 
of Western fashion, cities and homes. For example, in ‘Roman Holiday’ runaway 
Princess Ann (Audrey Hepburn), discovers Rome and the life of a commoner at the 
side of American reporter Joe Bradley (Gregory Peck). In this film elegant fashions 
from Ann’s world as a princess attending balls and gatherings throughout Europe 
are combined with daily fashions in Rome. Princess Ann laments having to wear 
silk nightgowns with roses and is bored with her lovely lingerie and longs to wear 
only the top half of pyjamas. One sees cafes and street life as well as an average flat 
in Rome. At the beginning of the story. Princess Ann escapes into an open supply 
truck, then Joe Bradley takes her to his flat in a taxi and they discover Rome on a 
scooter together. In ‘West Side Story’ (1961) set in late 1950s Upper West Side 
New York City, images of racial strife, gang wars between the newly arrived Puerto 
Rican immigrants (gang name Sharks) and second generation European immigrants 
(gang name Jets), juvenile delinquency, racism, and inner city problems vie with 
American fashion, slang, a rebellious youth subculture, kinetic dance scenes and a 
jazzy score. The opening scene is a bird’s eye view of Manhattan with its bridge 
traffic, skyscrapers and motorway ramps that reduces to a concrete playground and 
youth playing basketball. Passive information gathering about fashion, music, and 
American culture is reinforced by the immigrants’ assimilation into American 
culture. For example, the founder of the Jets, Tony, first sees his Maria in a bridal 
shop full of luxury fabric, wedding gowns, and evening dresses where she is getting 
a dress altered. The dress is to be perfect as she is to wear it to an upcoming dance 
that will mark the beginning of her life as a young lady in America. In a beautiful, 
sexy dress (Maria’s brother Bernardo objects to the low neckline) Maria is to 
become part of American culture. Modern Western films dealing with 
contemporai'y life derived a degree of credibility from addressing contemporary 
issues. The sheer quantity of films, allowed for a consistent representation of cities, 
homes and fashions. However, images of the well off Westerner were not solely 
found in Western films.
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Soviet officials themselves furthered the images of the wealthy West in their 
portrayals of life in the West. One example of this is the Soviet film ‘The Memory 
of the Heart’ written by Sergei Gerasimov and directed by Tatyana Lioznova. The 
film was first released in the Soviet Union in 1958 and in 1959 in Finland. The 
picture is about an English pilot who crashed in Soviet territory during the Second 
World War and was saved by two paitisans (a woman and young boy). Long after 
returning to London, he remembers the two partisans and resolves to return to 
Russia to find them. Set both in the Soviet Union and in England, the main English 
scenes involve the hero in his home in the London suburbs. In one scene, eleven 
members of his family have gathered at his home to comfortably listen to his tales.
In order to create a ‘realistic’ hero’s London suburb home for Soviet audiences, the 
home was filled with copies of Good Housekeeping and Looks; a hunting dog was 
brought in; reproductions of abstract art were hung; the table was decked out with a 
gold Lomoges coffee set, a large birthday cake and decanters of port; and 
fashionable clothing and footwear were custom-made for the ‘English’ actors and 
actresses. Images such as the above mentioned, of the West as full of modern 
fashion, busy cities, masses of passenger cars, modern homes and social problems 
could be found both in Western and Soviet film during the 1950s and 1960s.
b. Music
In her study Mythologies o f Everyday Life in Russia, Svetlana Boym has noted 
music is not just a ‘cultural or diversionary phenomenon. It is also a political 
phenomenon... Music brings people together and evokes for them collective 
emotional experience to which common meanings are assigned. It gives them 
common reference points, common idols, and often a common sense.’4i5 During the 
1950s and 1960s the music scene was relatively progressive and international. In 
late 1962 speaking at an Moscow art exhibition Khrushchev declared his support for 
music, and inadvertently his praise of foreign technology: ‘I like music a lot.. .and 
often listen to it on the radio. I even went so far as to carry a little Japanese radio 
around in my pocket.’ He proceeded to lambaste new music and dances as indecent
415 Sabrina Petra Ramet ed., Rocking the State: Music and Politics in Eastern Europe and 
Russia (Boulder: Westvlew Press, 1994) 1.
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and failing to ‘ennoble the individual and arouse him to action.’416 Richard Stites 
has noted in his study of popular culture that the drive for jazz during the 1950s was 
neither exclusively the work of the intelligentsia nor did it begin only after Stalin’s 
death.417 Jazz was to flourish in the late 1950s through to 1962. In 1959, the Yale 
Russian Choir included jazz in its repertoire and this was well received according to 
Soviet Music. When it was conceded that some jazz was permissible, this in 
contradiction to the Stalinist line that all jazz was decadent, Western, and bourgeois, 
the Composer Yuri Miliutin was called in to help navigate between the staunch anti 
and pro forces. His article as printed in Komsomol’skaia Pravda (22.09.1960) 
concluded that jazz should be permitted but that Soviet musicians must write the 
songs. Preceding this article, the first official jazz club formed in Leningrad in 1958 
under the leadership of Yuri Vikliarev. The first two jazz cafes in Moscow (the 
'Molodezhnoe’ and the ‘Aelita’) were opened in 1961. The clubs were an 
overwhelming success, much to the pleasure of the Party that realised that by 
creating upbeat and modern venues young upstanding Communists could be enticed 
to spend an enjoyable evening in a controlled environment. The clubs were also a 
popular place to bring foreign guests who admired the paintings by young artists and 
the modern music. To some, the jazz cages were ‘very strange, almost like private 
clubs’; to others, they appeared to be more the exclusive domain of the Party’s 
youth hierarchy.’418 In 1966, the state recording agency Melodiia began recording 
Soviet jazz and pop for distribution. By the mid 1960s European jazz groups 
frequented the USSR regularly drawing crowds, by the late 1960s only the big 
names drew significant crowds (i.e. The University of Illinois Stage Band (1969), 
Duke Ellington (1971), Thad Jones-Mel Lewis orchestra (1972)). In 1962, Benny 
Goodman toured five cities from June-July and his sidemen held numerous jam 
secessions. Klirushchev was at the Moscow show and joined the standing ovation.
In 1958, an American jazz LP sold on the black market for approximately four 
hundred roubles.4i9 As with jazz, the first rock songs were imitative and initially in 
English. Sabrina Ramet argues that while part of the rejection of rock music in the
416 Nikita Khrushchev, (01.12.1962) Prisciiia Johnson, Khrushchev and the Arts: the 
Poiitics of Soviet Culture. 1962-1964 (Cambridge: MIT, 1965) 103.
417 Stites, Russian Popular Culture.
418 Frederick Starr, Red and Hot 270.
419 Gunther, Inside RussiaTodav.
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USSR was due to the generational gap, rock coming into existence post WWII, it 
was also dismissed as not ‘serious’. ‘It was too Western. It got young people 
thinking about LA, the Big Apple, Chicago. ’420 However, as with jazz, rock and roll 
was to be taken over by the state with performers and audiences being granted a 
relative degree of freedom until the mid 1970s when control restricted but did not 
outlaw rock and roll. State bands such as the praisers of the glorious socialist future 
‘Happy Guys’ (founded in 1968) were to benefit from the increased controls.
In 1957, rock and roll from the West was permitted at the World Youth 
Festival thus ushering in such songs as See Ya Later Alligator, Love Potion Number 
9 and Tutti Frutti. The first rock music in the USSR was American and British in 
origin (both had rock concerts as part of their exhibitions in the 1950s), but Elvis 
Presley, Chuck Berry and this generation of rock was largely missed. Sally Belfrage 
recalls that on her train from Britain to Moscow and the festival the compartments 
were filled with Oxford, Cambridge and London School of Economics students, 
Scots in kilts with bagpipes who played and danced reels at every station along the 
way, several jazz bands, rock and roll bands, and folk singers.421 Later, in a 
conversation with the Muscovite Sergei in his flat that Belfrage was to describe as 
‘large and well furnished’, Sergei asked all about jazz: he was ‘simply horror-struck 
to find that I [Belfrage], a real American girl, didn’t know anything. He switched on 
a tape recorder and I recognised some of the latest American hit parade music, as 
well as old songs and the newest jazz.’422 Sergei revealed his source of the music as 
Voice of America and the World Youth Festival. Zoot-suiters, the Western 
equivalent to stilyagi, appeared in the 1950s with enough of a presence to make an 
appearance in Krokodil in which a call was issued to write a song about them. 
Alexander Gradsky, who was to form the group Tarakany (Cocki’oaches) in 1963 
recalled that upon hearing the Beatles for the first time ‘I went into a state of shock, 
total hysteria. They put everything into focus.’423 For Kolya Vasin recalling the 
introduction of the Beatles in the late 1950s early 1960s the Beatles were:
‘ ‘something heavenly. I felt blissful and invincible. All the depression and fear
420 Ramet, Rocking the State 7.
421 Belfrage, A Room in Moscow 13.
422 Belfrage, A Room In Moscow 30.
423 Sabrina Ramet, Sergei Zamascikov and Robert Bird, T h e Soviet Rock S cen e ,’ Ramet 
ed., Rocking the State 181-218, 182.
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ingrained over the years disappeared. I understood that everything other than the 
Beatles had been oppression. ” 424 Martin De whirs t also witnessed the impact of the 
Beatles in the USSR: Tt is unbelievable to somebody who was perhaps not around 
to follow it.’425 A generation of Soviet citizens were given a means of expressing 
themselves, the challenge for the state was to convert this predominantly English 
voice into a Soviet one. If in the 1960s the queues of youth outside the 
Molodezhnoe Café were there to hear Vadim Sakun’s jazz; then the lines in 1973 
were ‘for imported clothes and rock music. ’426 From the period of the 1960s to the 
1970s the issues dominating lyrics changed from going to the countryside and a 
return to nature to the West and materialism.427
Frederick Stair has argued that despite the mandate of creating an 
ideologically correct Soviet taste in the field of culture, the Soviet government 
consistently failed to provide a viable communist alternative to Western modern 
culture. 428 Music, like other cultural forms, fostered the idea that Russia was and 
needed to be part of Europe. This need was adopted and accepted by various sectors 
of society to further their own objectives. During the Klirushchev era the result was 
an ever-increasing exposure and availability of information. By the time of the 
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 cultural diplomacy had all but ground to a 
halt but the links with Western popular culture remained.
c. Printed Material: Angliia
In the post WWII era the West spent significant amounts of time and money, 
propagating an image of itself, typically to members of the Soviet elites. What they 
chose to focus on is indicative of how they wanted to be perceived, what they 
thought the Soviet audience should know, and what the censors would tolerate. It 
has been included in this study as it is a medium disseminating an image of the West 
that was both tolerated by the elite in the sense that the journal was distributed in the 
USSR and it is representative of a medium that was specifically taigeted at the 
Soviet elite. Another interesting aspect is that the images of Britain as seen in
424 Ramet 'The Soviet Rock S cen e’ 182.
425 Interview with Martin Dewhirst, Glasgow April 2001.
426 Frederick Starr, Red and Hot 293.
427 Svetlana Boym Common Places: Mythologies of Everyday Life in Russia (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1994).
428 Frederick Starr, Red and Hot 262.
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Angliia are remarkably similar to those generally held international stereotypes of 
Britain. Angliia is an example of British propaganda, or as many then preferred to 
call it, ‘projection’. The loss of prestigious markets, Soviet and other, to France, 
Italy, the United States and Germany, galvanised support for British involvement in 
cultural diplomacy, despite general British distaste for it. Sir Harold Nicolson wrote 
that:
the amicable tolerance of all our ways, persuaded us that we were universally 
liked, respected and admired. Our complacency was pierced by intimations 
that our best markets were being invaded by persistent and ingenious 
competition; even our self- assurance became clouded by the suspicion that 
foreigners did not invariably regard us as either so charming or so intelligent 
as we seemed to ourselves; and once aeroplanes came to crowd the sky above 
our island we realised that we had ceased to be the most invulnerable of the 
Great Powers and had become one of the most vulnerable. It was then that we 
first realised that our foreign competitors had been devoting effort, skill, and 
large sums of money to rendering their languages, their types of living, their 
scientific or technical resources and inventions, and the desirability of their 
exports, familiar to students and buyers overseas.429
Angliia: zhurnal o segodniashnei zhizni v Velikobritanii was first published 
in 1962 with a run of fifty thousand copies. By 1964, the run had increased to one 
hundi’ed thousand copies per issue. When the British organisers of the British Light 
Industrial Trade Fair of 1966 failed to get Soviet approval to distribute Angliia at 
the trade fair, they took to dumping them as rubbish in quantities too large for the 
dustbins behind the press tent. It was published quarterly without interruption until 
1993, when it became a supplement to Ekho Planety. Distribution limitations set by 
Soviet officials and agreed to by the British resulted m Angliia being produced 
ostensibly for an audience of senior officials, party members, and specialists 
working within various institutes. However, the plethora of articles on fashion, 
cosmetics, children’s toys, and the coverage of personal relationships is indicative 
of the targeting of a female readership. Between 1927 and 1976 the percentage of 
women in the party increased from 12.2 percent to 24.3 percent, but their presence 
was distinctly lacking in the senior levels.430 As women rarely held senior Party 
positions in the USSR, the inclusion of articles for them suggests ûmi Angliia was
429 Harold Nicolson, The British Council 1934-1955: Twenty- First Anniversary Report 
(London: 1955).
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not intended to be read exclusively for ‘official’ purposes. Thus, Angliia'^ readers 
encompassed a broad elite social stratum in both public and private terms. This 
targeting of the elite was in contrast with the Americans and their publication 
Amerika that targeted the masses. It was the assessment of the British Council and 
the British Foreign office that while Americans were excellent at the mass 
dissemination of information, and indeed the English language, the British strength 
lay not in addressing the masses but the elite. In his study of British propaganda 
Philip M. Taylor concluded that British propaganda is directed: ‘towards the 
educated classes of foreign societies. It was designed to influence people in 
governments, the media, education and commerce, individuals in other words, who 
were in a position to influence much larger numbers of their own people.’431 The 
British focus on those with influence is significant when considered in the context 
of Vera Dunham’s theory. Vera Dunham’s thesis of the Big Deal is that within the 
Soviet Union there existed an unwritten and unspoken contract between the 
government and that group of individuals, members of the intelligentsia, 
technocrats, and others exhibiting middle class like values. This group’s tacit 
support of the government stabilised and legitimised the Communist pai ty’s rule. 
The British were directing their propaganda at the group upon which the 
government was highly dependant. The disillusionment of this targeted stratum 
would contribute to the implosion of the communist system.
Angliia was a forum for British scientific and technological developments 
and a means of propagating trade relations. It was also a means of prosecuting the 
Cold War. If the West could create the image of itself as offering greater 
opportunities and material goods than the USSR, then there was the possibility of 
increasing discontent and rejection of the communist system. Whether the results 
were to be an active rejection of the economic viability of the communist or a 
crippling sense of despondency and apathy. The outcome would be the victory of 
the West (capitalism and liberal democracy).
hi terms of formatting and general appearance Angliia was an impressive 
publication. It was printed on high quality heavy glossy paper, averaged one 
hundred pages during the 1960s and was full of pictures. The average picture count
431 Philip M. Taylor, The Projection of Britain: British O verseas Publicity and Propaganda 
1919-1939 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981) 3.
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(1962-1970) was forty black and white and ten colour photos per edition. That is 
one photo for every two pages. The photos tended to be large and accompanied 
aiticles on consumer goods, technology, or agriculture. When photos involved 
people, they were happy and active. For example, the accompanying photos of 
British student Caroline Derston in her article on university life show her as well 
dressed and always smiling, even when bent over her books.432 The glossy, 
colourful, high quality nature of Angliia, was similar to that of the comparable 
American publication Amerika, the impact of which has been described by the 
student Shura as: ‘so popular that it was almost impossible to get... it was 
something beautiful in a world of shoddy production.’433
The respectability of the journal was enhanced by both the Queen’s 
addresses and those of then Prime Minister Harold Macmillan. Each volume 
consisted of a general theme as well as regular features. Editions would feature 
several articles on a single topic, which were then complimented by various other 
articles on other topics. The regular features were: quarterly indexes, BBC 
broadcast schedules, English crosswords, an English language section (essays, short 
stories, poetry or music lyrics in English), a travel section highlighting a British 
town, district, or city and a sports section.
The British editors chose topics perceived as being quintessentially British, 
either in a historical or modern sense, thus including articles on Shakespeare, T.S. 
Elliot, the Beatles, the Rolling Stones, Rolls Royce, synthetic fabric, the London 
theatre scene etc. Automobile manufacturing, agricultural production, consumer 
goods and children were all foci of Soviet society during this era, and there aie a 
correspondingly large number of articles about them. For example, the amount and 
specificity of information on the costs and availability of consumer goods is 
conspicuous. In addition to the régulai' features on the English language, the study 
guide for the Cambridge English as a Foreign Language competency test was 
published occasionally.434 (See Appendix B for a chart of the general themes of the 
issues from 1962 until 1970). Themes that regularly appealed included science and 
technology, education, society (fashion, fine aits, literature, popular persons, etc.),
432 Angliia. no. 16 (1965) 4.
433 Belfrage, A Room In Moscow 50.
434 Angliia no.30, 1969.
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consumer goods, English tourism, sports, (including sporting terms in English), and 
agriculture.
The overriding themes in the photos are abundance and modernity. In ‘How 
Fanners Live’ a photo of fertile fields precedes a two-page spread of a herd of fat 
healthy cattle. This idyllic image becomes a bit less bucolic but no less abundant as 
the herd is transformed into a mass of carcasses hanging from meat hooks.435 
Images of masses of bananas from Jamaica, overflowing fruit stands, supermarkets, 
fishmongers, butchers, and children’s toys permeate the magazine. Produce is often 
depicted in its final processed stage, clean and packaged. This cleanliness, the pre­
washed eggs, fruit and vegetables, was a new trend. During the exhibition in 
Sol’niki in 1959, the Americans flashed large colour images of the United States on 
movie screens. One of the images frequently commented upon was that of washed 
and topped carrots. The introduction of open shelved supermarkets in Eastern 
Europe was based on the American and/or English model and was justified as 
‘modern’ and therefore socialist.436
In an article on health caie there appears a picture of a pharmacy. This 
pharmacy has an open serving section with goods that one can collect oneself as 
well as goods that are kept behind the counters. On the counters and on the 
shelving every available space is full of goods. Well-dressed customers waiting for 
goods are seated comfortably and the pharmacists are, of course, smiling. The 
caption beside the photo reads that this is a photo of a pharmacy in Cheshire and 
that the majority of pharmacies work for the National Health Service. They also 
sell goods such as cosmetics, camera film and so on .437 As the intended audience 
was the Soviet elite, the editors of Angliia did not have to convince the readership 
that the goods were produced in quantities sufficient for the masses but that they 
were within an affordable price range. To this end, many of the aiticles about 
consumer goods are accompanied by captions that list the price of the articles both 
in British pounds sterling and in roubles. For example, when discussing modern 
footwear production a British subject was said to have on average 4.2 pairs of shoes 
that cost approximately six roubles and fifty kopeks per pair for women’s shoes and
435 ‘Peremeny, proisshedshie v angliiskoi pishchevoi promyshlennosti,' Angliia, no.25 
(1968) 28-44.
436 Crowley, ‘Warsaw’s Shops, Stalinism and the Thaw’ 44,
437 Angliia no.7 (1963): 10-11.
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eight roubles seventy kopeks for men’s (an average pair of women’s shoes in the 
Soviet Union cost forty roubles).43s The photograph accompanying the article 
showed dozens of stylish shoes. The ease of shopping in Britain was featured to the 
extent that it was explained that a customer could simply pick up interesting articles, 
try them on if clothing or footwear and then pay for them all at one till.439 This idea 
of ease of shopping due to open shelves, a wide variety of goods and sizes, and the 
ability to pay at a single electronic till, can be seen in Soviet archival documents in 
which the merits of shopping cultures in various countries are discussed.440 Prices 
in roubles and pounds were given for clothing, cars, cosmetics, services, children’s 
toys, etc. Some examples of prices given are as follows (price listed in 
roubles/pounds sterling unless stated otherwise):
• sterilising washing machine from 165-400/66-160,
• a load of washing washed at a Laundromat costs 1.25/10 shilling and 6 
pence if the client washed the clothes themselves or 1.65/13 shilling 6 
pence/ if the laundry was left to be done44i 
the car model ‘Princess’ by BMN 2,240/ NA 
the Triumph Spitfire, 1,600/640 
the Sunbeam Alpine 2,100/840 
Rolls Royce Silver Cloud approximately 13,750 /5, 500 
a tour of Kenya by two students 250/100
the travel costs of forty-one students who rented a bus and travelled to 
Moscow for 500/200 for the bus and 75/30 for Moscow.442
If the reader was one of the more affluent Soviet citizens who had disposable 
income but had found insufficient goods upon which to spend that money, this dual 
listing of prices would have permitted a mental comparison.
In the article ‘Changes taking place in the food-processing industry’ the food 
consumption of the average family is listed. While most of the products are 
standard foodstuffs such as milk, cheese, meat, and eggs, it also included modern 
items such as margarine and cornflakes.443 When first introduced margarine 
represented a significant scientific advancement in edible oil products and when
438 ‘Obuvnaia promyshlennost’,’ Angliia. no. 31 (1969): 10-25, 21,23.
439 ‘Odezjda, sootvetstvuiushchaia obrazu zhizni.’ Angliia. no, 9 (1964): 100-101.
440 S ee  for example the study about Swedish stores in which the main characteristics were 
listed as large airy buidllngs, open shelves, service available immediately upon requesting 
it, and the electronic till. ‘Otchet: o rezul’tatakh poezdki delegatsii Tsentrosoiuza v 
Shvetsiiu’ RGANI fond 5 opis 20 delo 178: 194-207, 195-196.
441 ‘Laundry Day,’ Angliia. no.23 (1967): 97.
442 'Lets go to abroad.’ Angliia no. 15. (1965): 27.
443 ‘Changes taking place in the food processing industry,’ Angliia no.25 (1968); 28-44, 31.
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introduced to the United States by Dr. Kellogg, cornflakes were labelled a 
dangerous aphrodisiac. Other exciting new foodstuffs listed included Heinz 
ketchup, Bird’s custard, Bournville cocoa, Nescafe instant coffee and coffee cream, 
and bottled soft drinks with straws.444 All of the previously listed foodstuffs were 
photographed in their convenient, modern packaging. Be the subjeet education, 
makeup, science, classical English literature or sports, the focus was on representing 
the cutting edge in various fields and on building a connection with the readership. 
One major difference between Angliia and its American counterpart Amerika was 
the large number of articles about complex scientific and technological advances.
\n Angliia the term ‘modern’ is used incessantly, despite the respected directive to 
illustrate the good, the bad and the ugly about Britain and British industry and life. 
The following is a list of vaiious major articles that appeared during the 1960s.
444 Angliia, no. 3, (1962): 23.
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The radio telescope’
‘Vertical flight’
‘The use of polyester and 
other synthetic products’ 
‘British Technology’ 
(repeated)
‘Across the Atlantic ocean in 
one night’
‘British Fashion’
‘Military planes’
‘Thomas Cooke: how to work 
as a tourist agent’
‘Clothes for the whole family’ 
‘Nuclear power’
‘Radio and TV in England’ 
‘Modern pictures in England’ 
‘The modern British menu’ 
‘Shakespeare in our time’ 
‘Modern England’
‘Fertilisers- a basis of 
production for agricultural 
farms’
‘Technology helps school 
children’
‘The well dressed 
Englishman’
‘New construction techniques 
in England’
‘New building materials’ 
‘Winter fashion’
‘Research work in the field of 
communication’
‘The country where everyone 
produces’
‘Methods of revealing public 
opinion’
‘A nation of cars’
‘Rolls Royce: the best car in 
the world?’
‘Lorries of England’ 
‘Problems of automobile 
movement in England 
‘High pressure oxygen 
treatment’
‘New methods of training 
footballers’
• ‘The British technician’
‘News in science in England’ 
‘The point of view of the 
buyer’
‘Fashion for the young and the 
self proclaimed young’
‘The British Industrial 
Exhibition 8-24.07.1966’
‘The prize for innovation’
‘The new electronic 
microscope’
‘ New cross-country vehicles’ 
‘News from automobile 
industries’
‘Orienteering: a new type of 
sport’
‘Coal mining without miners’ 
‘Methods of sociological 
research’
‘The modern English home’ 
‘Changes taking place in the 
food processing industry’
‘Our very own modern 
combine’
‘Modern English furniture’ 
‘What is new in fashion’ 
‘Innovations on the railways’ 
‘The future of doctors’
‘IBM in our lives’
‘How to make records’
‘How to collect albums’
‘New trains’
‘Modern English opera’ 
‘Problems of today’
‘Pulsars’
‘How to help an alcoholic
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The British image of a well ordered parliamentary system, an efficient postal and 
rail service, the well dressed English man, the land of Shakespeare and Dickens, 
London theatres, rugby and rowing, grand universities, Bird’s custard, treacle and 
proper English persists. Soviet youth during the late 1950s and 1960s were 
fascinated by British music, fashion and culture. The image of Britain as a bastion 
for all things modern was to reach its zenith in the 1950s and to wane during the late 
1960s.
The permitting of information about the West resulted in the formulation of 
an image of the West that was not entirely negative. Indeed, in areas of what was 
‘modern’ it was lauded. This praise meant that there was the basis for the creation 
of a positive image of a mythical other, an alternative. Once a non-negative 
alternative was created, the true path to a prosperous and better future became 
forked. It was only a matter of time until those travelling along the road to 
socialism became tired and distrustful of travelling along the road less travelled, and 
that has made all the difference.
Conclusion
Nixon asked God when Americans will be happy and prosperous.
Not earlier than thirty years.
Pity, I  will not live to then.
Pompidou asked God, when the French would become prosperous and happy.
Not sooner than fifty years.
Pity, I  will not live until then.
Brezhnev asked God when, finally, the Soviet people would become lucky, God
answered
To this, I  will not live. (Popular anecdote)44S
By the time that Neil Armstrong was to walk on the moon, the belief in the 
Soviet ability to catch up with and surpass the West had dwindled leaving behind a 
Castor and Pollux. Werner Knop described the image of the West as ‘greedy, cruel, 
decadent and voluptuous’ and ‘rich and efficient, so inventive, and glittering.’446 
Gunther’s assessment was that despite a generally evil nature, the West garnered 
respect for its ‘basic wealth, technological skills, and industrial energy. ’447 In
445 Dozens of variations of this anecdote exist, all with the sam e punch line. Shturman, The 
Soviet Union 231.
446 S ee  Barghoorn, The Soviet Image of the United States 257.
447 Gunther Inside RussiaTodav 84.
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Krasnaya Zvezda  the American folk were accepted as industrious and talented and 
as having made great contributions to world civilisation in the form of great 
scientists, writers and musicians but American billionaires remained ‘up to their 
knees in blood’ .448 Former Soviet spy and high ranking CIA official Karel Koecher 
wrote of sentiments in Czechoslovakia that were common to the USSR in general, 
when he stated that should the question be asked as to how powerful a factor the 
economic image of the West was in scuttling the communist regime ‘I [Koecher] 
would say that in my opinion [it] was indeed by far the strongest and possibly even 
the only really decisive one -  ideological opposition to communism in 
Czechoslovakia was certainly not so widespread as it is now being claimed...the 
anti regime feelings were indeed primarily a matter of materialistic envy.’449 This 
materialistic envy was widespread throughout the Soviet world. Officially, the 
fulfilment of materialistic aspirations was the charge of the communist regime. The 
material and technical basis of communism was to provide the Soviet people with 
the highest standard of living, as put in a popular anecdote:
W h a t  i s  C o m m u n i s m ?
You go out onto the street -  there are cars. Take any one and drive. You see 
jeans -  you take them and drive farther. You get to the square and there- 
beer, shoes, every thing you could need. This is communism .450
P r a i s e  f o r  a n d  t h e  d e s i r e  t o  e m u l a t e  v a r i o u s  a s p e c t s  o f  W e s t e r n  t e c h n o l o g i c a l
d e v e l o p m e n t  w e r e  t o  b e  o v e r s h a d o w e d  b y  t h e  r i s e  o f  a n t i - A m e r i c a n i s m  a n d  a n t i -
Westernism in the 1970s. After events in Hungary, Poland and Prague illustrated
t h e  l i m i t e d  n a t u r e  o f  t h e  S o v i e t  r e g i m e s ’ p o l i t i c a l  t o l e r a n c e  c o m b i n e d  w i t h
economic shortcomings there was an increase in passive discontent and apathy.
A n d r e i  A m a l r i k  w a s  t o  w r i t e  t h i s  a b o u t  t h e  i n c r e a s e d  v o c a l i s a t i o n  o f  d i s c o n t e n t :
Everybody is angered by the great inequalities in wealth, the low wages, the 
austere housing conditions, the lack of essential consumer goods, and 
compulsory registration at their places of residence and work and so forth. 
This discontent is now becoming louder, and some people are beginning to 
wonder who is actually to blame. The gradual though slow improvement in 
the standard of living, due largely to intensive housing construction, does not 
diminish the anger though it does somewhat neutralize it.451
448 CDSP {11.09.1957}.
449 Email from Koecher Subject: ‘Research’ 06.02.2002.
450 Marc Dybovskii, Istoriia SSSR  v anekdotakh (Rossiia; Smoienksii, 1991) 133.
451 Amalrik, Will the Soviet Union Survive Until 1984? 31.
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Anger was stoked by the privileged life led by Pai ty members and their families.
‘The elites were leading privileged and comfortable lives, buying Western consumer 
goods and foodstuffs in the beriozka, had cars, high level medical care etc and in 
many respects their standard of living... was commensurable with the standard of 
those living in the West. ’452 If the Party elite as the vanguard of communism could 
emulate Western consumption then the average citizen had the right to aspire 
towards it as well. One of Khrushchev’s most significant contributions to Soviet 
politics was the solidification of the concept of the alternative, even if the system 
could not tolerate the ramifications of the implementation of this idea.
The idea of the West that was to enter into Soviet consciousness was not based 
solely on the idea of the West as it was propagated by Western sources. It was a 
combination of Western sources, government sources and of a Soviet vision of the 
future. This melding of sources resulted in a particularly Russian/Soviet version of 
the West that was communicated largely through ideas of consumption and 
technology. Three specific examples, housing, clothing and automobiles, have been 
used to illustrate this melding. The final section of this chapter, culture, has been 
included to highlight the breadth of sources from which the images could be 
gleaned. Perhaps it is most accurate to use the term Russian and not Soviet as this 
perception of the West as evil but jolly (due to having a soft life), inequitable but 
with unlimited potential characterised by technological genius but with spiritual 
poverty was to endure past the collapse of the Soviet Union. Khrushchev’s calls for 
modernisation were accompanied occasionally with calls for restraint, for example, 
in ‘developing a country’s economy one must not set impractical tasks, one must not 
undertake to do more than is feasible in practice. If you do, you will overstrain 
yourself and roll back; [and] life will thrust you aside,’453 but did little to curb rising 
expectations. That expectations rose and the desire to consume skyrocketed did not 
mean that consumption was blindly adopted. The group Alisha was to use the 
infamous lemon squeezer from the American model kitchen in 1959 of which 
Khrushchev spoke so disparagingly (he commented that it was just as easy to stick a 
fork into a piece of lemon and twist) to represent the inane nature of some Western 
technology and consumption.
452 Email from Koecher Subject: ‘R esearch’ 06.02.2002.
453 Khrushchev, Marxism-Leninism 14.
143
All o f a sudden, I  see something coming my way
But I  can’t figure out what it is
No matter how hard I  try
It looks like a tractor, like a nuclear reactor
And somewhat like a squeezed lemon
It is white like a hospital, birds are scared o f it
It is strong as a safe
It is slimy like a jellyfish
It is o f no use like a burden
It is moving among flowers and different types o f grass 
What are you? What the hell are you?
And it answers me: I  am your juice squeezer. 454
454 As translated in Ramet, ‘The Soviet Rock S cen e’ 194.
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3: Exhibiting Alternatives -  Windows to the West
Introduction
The early Cold War period presented untold opportunities for the 
propagation of mass images. In the Soviet Union, the population was highly 
literate; media was state controlled; changes in technology facilitated the rapid 
acceleration of mass information dissemination; and life within the nation, for the 
majority of citizens, had reached a level of stability and comfort that allowed for the 
luxury of inquiry. A spin off of the post War stability and superpower status was a 
demand for parity with Western nations. This parity was not an ambiguous goal: it 
was defined and delineated. It is into this milieu of communist consumerism and 
rising expectations that the burgeoning international and national exhibitions are 
inserted. Promoted as advancing peaceful co-existence and expanding trade ties, 
exhibitions were simply too large to not have a significant impact on Soviet society. 
Evidence of the dispersion of information from trade fairs can be seen in the 
incorporation of aspect of the fairs into popular culture: for example the lemon 
squeezer of the American Exhibition into popular music, the usage of paraffin wax 
as chewing gum or the introduction of new music and fashion styles. Exhibitions 
had a special status as they constituted short and intense occasions when Soviet 
citizens were permitted controlled but direct contact with the West (this author in no 
way seeks to suggest that censorship did not occur, but does suggest that what was 
permitted occurred with comparatively little Soviet filtering). Exhibitions allowed 
for first hand contact with foreigners, foreign goods and foreign ideas and were to 
occur with a degree of regularity that constituted a steady cultural impact but 
infrequently enough to satisfy piqued curiosity. In terms of the research questions 
of this study, in this chapter the formation of the image of the mythical other as well 
as its dissemination and impact is addressed. As the focus is on the technological 
and scientific sections of exhibitions a particular picture of technological images 
can be formed. Exhibitions involve the participation of the West, the Soviet 
government and the Soviet populace in the process of myth creation and 
dissemination. By showing what was being achieved and what could be achieved, 
the linkage between consumption, the Soviet future and the West is particularly 
clear in this chapter. In this introductory section, an overview of the nature of
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foreign exhibitions will be presented as well as a breakdown of the subsequent 
sections of this chapter.
The first foreign exhibition in the post-War Soviet Union is generally 
accepted to have been the Finnish National Exhibition in 1946, in which the Finnish 
government and industry displayed goods and industry over twelve thousand square 
metres. After 1946, the number of exhibitions increased almost yearly, and in 1966 
there were eighty-three ‘foreign’ exhibitions, of which seven were international, 
three were national and seventy-three specialist exhibitions. Seven million people 
attended the eighty-three exhibitions. Of the ten major exhibitions involving 
Westerners in 1961, which attracted approximately 6.6 million spectators, the 
British Trade Fair was deemed the most prominent, at the time being referred to as 
the most prominent of all foreign exhibitions.472 Between 1957 and 1969 over 140 
exhibitions involved Western nations/companies. Foreign participation in industrial 
exhibitions was actively sought by Soviet planners, while national exhibitions 
tended to be tolerated. An example of Soviet efforts to host an international 
exhibition can be found in the bid to host Expo 67 (Moscow was passed over for 
Montreal). The theme was to be ‘peace and progress’ and the ‘massive progress that 
humanity has obtained through the development of science and technology and the 
culture and work that can accompany the human genius’. A principle impetus for 
hosting Expo 67 was the possibility of combining the celebration of the Fiftieth 
Anniversary of the October Revolution (Expo was to run from 20.05.1967- 
20.11.1967) thus using the international prestige of Expo to validate the successes of 
the October Revolution. This conflating of foreign status symbols and success with 
Soviet achievements was not uncommon during the Khrushchev era. In addition to 
prestige building, post-WWII Soviet officials used exhibitions for several purposes 
that included but are not restricted to: showcasing technology (notably Sputniks and 
peaceful uses of atomic energy), gathering information on foreign technology, 
providing Soviet citizens with a glimpse of their technological future, demonstrating 
the superpower standing of the state, and advancing the idea of peaceful co­
existence.
472 ‘Protokol: zasedaniia soveta VTP 2 3 .0 6 .1 9 6 1 Rossiiskil qosudarstvennvl arkhiv 
ekonomiki fRGAE) fond 635 opis 1 delo 450: 2-26, 19. From here on fond, opis, delo will be 
listed a s such 635/1/450 for example.
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During the 1950s and 1960s the vast majority of exhibitions were in 
Moscow, Leningrad and Kiev. Larger exhibitions were held in parks, for example 
SokoTniki while smaller exhibition were held in institutes and factories. Both larger 
and smaller exhibitions often had ‘pavilions’ in local factories, or had local workers 
man lines exhibited. The large international exhibitions such as Chemistry (1965, 
1970, 1974) or Agriculture (1966, 1972, etc) operated on a four to six year cycle.
By the 1970s, exhibitions were moving out of Moscow and Leningrad to other 
cities, for example the British Literature Exhibition in Novosibirsk (1968). An 
exhibition or trade fair could range in size and media coverage from the Shoe 
Company Krauss and Co. (28-29.11.1968) that was attended by forty-six invited 
individuals and received no official press coverage to the Exhibition of Chemistry in 
Industry, Construction and Agriculture (11-26.09.1965) in which twenty-one 
countries represented by 969 firms entertained over 1,500,000 Soviet citizens 
directly and received national coverage. The average attendance figures for 
exhibitions in the 1960s were between 300,000 to 500,000 individuals. From 1957 
to 1965, the number of exhibitions in which Western companies or countries 
participated remained constant, between five and ten, with Western exhibitions per 
year being outnumbered by socialist exhibitions by approximately five to one.
Using 1960 as an example, there were thirty-three exhibitions in total of which six 
were international and these six had a combined attendance figure of approximately 
6.6 million visitors. The annual number of exhibitions with foreign (capitalistic) 
content was sufficient to allow exhibitions to form a habitual form of entertainment 
for the citizens of Moscow and the ensuing press coverage would have rendered 
exhibitions a potentially interesting source of foreign information but not an unusual 
occurrence.
Exhibitions could be broad national affairs, industry specific or product 
specific. For example, for seven days in September 1965, the Poly technical 
museum, exhibited a single model of a modern cash register that listed quantity, 
itemised pricing and calculated a total sum at a fast tempo. Due to ‘significant 
advertising’ undertaken before the exhibition opened, the exhibition of the cash 
register was covered by Izvestiia, Vechernaia Moskva, the radio and TV.
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Attendance was four thousand.473 Of the eight tills left in the Soviet Union, two 
were allotted to three months of in-store testing in Moscow.474 Large thematic 
exhibitions, for example the Automotive Industry Exhibition of 1968 involving 280 
companies from fourteen countries (Austria-7 companies, England-12, Denmark-1, 
West Germany including West Berlin-54, USA-3, France-3, Switzerland-1, Sweden- 
2, Japan-2) were preferred by Soviet planners and had higher attendance figures 
than national exhibitions. Attendance at industrial exhibitions was often fostered 
through the workplace, for example the largest single group of viewers at the 
Automotive Industry Exhibition came from the automobile factory Ch. A. 
Mikhailev.475 If one was unable to attend this exhibition in person, it was possible 
to read about it in Izvestiia, Vremia (TV), radio, the cinema journal Novosti Dnia, 
and the journal Moskovskii avtozavodets etc.476 As with other exhibitions the 
number of foreigners present (293 in this case) was considered worthy of press 
coverage. Participation in all exhibitions was by invitation only, and the general 
failure of American companies to act upon their invitations was a source of 
disappointment. 477
The presence of foreigners was as problematic as the existence of 
exhibitions; proud of having foreigners present and advertising their presence, the 
Soviet officials also instituted policies and procedures to limit contact between 
foreigners and locals. In the official debriefing of exhibitions there was a section for 
incidents and notables that typically held details of minor indiscretions by Soviet 
staff, complaints of inadequate training of translators, a list of which firms left their 
exhibition material behind, and an overview of trade deals discussed and concluded. 
In the case of Automotive Industry Exhibition the section included; the sale of the 
ZIL; the items left behind by the Swiss and English components firms; the inability 
of twenty-five to thirty percent of Soviet translators to translate freely (and a notable 
lack of knowledge of scientific and technological terms); the refusal of Western
473 ‘Op. otchet; Upolnomochennogo Vsesoiuznoi Torgovoi Paiaty na spetsializovovannoi 
vystavke elektronnykh kontroi’no izmeritel’nykh, nauchnykh, i anaiitichiskikh priborov 
britanskoi assotsiatsii ‘Saim a’.’ RGAE 635/1/635: 50-86, 59.
474 'Op. otchet: Upolnomochennogo Vsesoiuznoi Torgovoi Paiaty na vystavke kassovykh 
apoaratov.’ RGAE 635 /1/637: 50-65, 52,
475 ‘O provedennoi vystavke sovrem ennogo tekhnologicheskogo oborudovaniia,’ RGAE 
635/1 /800; 51-73, 53.
476 ‘O provedennoi vystavke sovrem ennogo tekhnologicheskogo oborudovaniia’ 61.
477 ‘O provedennoi vystavke sovrem ennogo tekhnologicheskogo oborudovaniia’ 51-53.
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f i r m s  t o  p a y  f o r  t h e  p o o r  t r a n s l a t i o n  s e r v i c e s ;  a n d  t h e  o r g a n i s a t i o n  o f  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
d r i n k i n g  n i g h t s  b y  t h r e e  o f  t h e  S o v i e t  c o n t r o l l e r s  ( a p a r t  f r o m  t a k i n g  t i c k e t s ,  t h e y  
w e r e  c h a r g e d  w i t h  e n s u r i n g  t h a t  p a r t s  o f  t h e  e x h i b i t i o n  w e r e  n o t  r e m o v e d  w h o  
s u b s e q u e n t l y  c a m e  t o  w o r k  u n s h a v e n ) .4 7 s
In an attempt to dampen the impact of Western exhibitions, the Soviet 
government ran a concurrent East European or Baltic exhibition. Announcements 
of an impressive Soviet/socialist exhibition not in Sokol’niki were read as indicative 
of a possible Western exhibition at SokoTniki, for this was the preferred exhibition 
location. This face-off was not always in the best interest of the Soviet exhibitions. 
For example, an All-Soviet exhibition ran simultaneously with the American 
Exhibition in 1959 with a content that competed directly with the American 
Exhibition in such areas as the use of plastics and préfabrication in building 
construction, colour documentary films, and home appliances. Unlike the 
temporary plastic pavilions of the Americans, those of the All-Soviet proved to be 
unstable and suffered major damage during a strong storm at the beginning of the 
exhibition. Counter-exhibitions did serve their purpose when the national 
exhibitions were overcrowded, and this drain-off effect was used to lower 
attendance. During the French National Exhibition in 1961, the counter-exhibitions 
were the Hungarian National Exhibition and the Japanese National Exhibition. 
Despite fluctuating between Western and non-Western in the eyes of Soviet 
officialdom, the Japanese exhibition can be seen as diversionary as the Japanese 
tendency to exhibit machines and production lines and techniques resulted in drier 
exhibitions that were preferred by Soviet organisers. In 1961, the fact that the 
Japanese had a more ‘technical’ exhibition than either the French or the Hungarians, 
resulted in it being the favourite with organisers. Both the Hungarian and the 
Japanese exhibitions focused on that French industry that was of great importance 
for the Soviet Chamber of Commerce: clothing and textiles. The Japanese focused 
on the production of materials and the Hungarians on finished products (work 
clothes, winter attire and children’s clothing). One result of the different exhibition 
styles was that by focusing on finished products, the Hungarians exhibited a more 
luxurious image of their economy than the Japanese. The French also focused on
478 ‘O provedennoi vystavke sovrem ennogo tekhnologicheskogo oborudovaniia’ 63-72.
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the finished products, presenting the finest that they produced choosing to maintain 
the image of haute couture.
This chapter is divided into two sections. In the first section, the historical 
significance of exhibitions, why exhibitions occurred and the general nature of 
foreign exhibitions will be examined. Building upon the first section, the second 
section then examines and compares several national and industrial exhibitions, in 
particular the British Industrial Exhibitions, the French and American National 
Exhibitions and such international industrial exhibitions as Shoes-69.
Historical Background of Exhibitions
a. Historical significance of exhibitions
The historical significance of exhibitions is as multi-layered as the levels of 
society upon which exhibitions impacted. In general, exhibitions provided windows 
to the West, not just for the specialists, or for those of correct political 
indoctrination, or even for those who attended the exhibitions but also those who 
read about or heard about the exhibitions. Exhibitions were government organised, 
sought, and promoted events. This afforded exhibitions and the information 
contained within them a degree of legitimacy, not because it was always perceived 
as objective but because it was non-Soviet. Regardless of Soviet government 
reports questioning the availability or the necessity of many items displayed, the 
very existence of the goods and their desirability was accepted. Governmental 
acquiesce to foreigners exhibiting to Soviet citizens permitted a degree of flexibility 
in the image of ‘foreign’; all foreigners, foreign information and goods could not be 
subversive or the Soviet government would not expose its citizens to them. Thus, 
all things foreign could not be corruptive. The consumer-based nature of Western 
society was prevalent in the Western exhibitions and trade fairs and thus reinforced 
the idea that consumption was acceptable. That the information source was Western 
further underscored the legitimacy: ‘if, during the trips of Soviet specialists in 
Europe the best of the Western experience was taken, but then presented as a 
national Soviet success, then exhibitions did not permit this genre of camouflage.’479
479 Larissa Zakharova, ‘Le réseau des canaux officials de transferts des m odes 
vestimentaires occidentals en URSS dans les années 1950-1960’ conference paper. Susan  
Reid ed. Women in the Khrushchev Era (Forthcoming) 6.
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Exhibitions served to normalise the adoption of Western goods, practices and 
standards as goals for the Soviet elite, specialists and to some degree public. 
Attending an exhibition or reading about one in the press was a legitimate risk-free 
means of making contact with and informing oneself about the West. This was not 
an illegally disseminated image and one did not have to be politically active or even 
overly concerned with politics to engage in exhibitions. The women’s journal 
Rabotnitsa contained regular coverage of international festivals and exhibitions 
typically mentioned developing nations sympathetic to the USSR and Western 
nations. The former was subjected to patronising and token coverage, while the 
later received both praise and condemnation.480
Occasionally, even if citizens were not attending an exhibition or paying 
attention to the media, they were brought into contact with foreigners and their 
technology through their place of work. Most foreign visitors were treated to an 
intensive ‘cultural and ideological excursions’ programme that would include not 
only the fine arts but also industry-specific tours. For example, workers and 
representatives of the ‘Holz Maschine Ring’ of Brussels attended a performance at 
the Bolshoi theatre, and visited Furniture Factory 13. Furniture Factory 13 
employees, whether they were privy to the exhibition from the Holz Machine Ring 
company or not, would have participated in the creation of an image of the West 
through the customary sprucing up of the factory, instructions to wear one’s best 
work clothes (frequently new outfits, and when not handkerchiefs, were issued). 
Another aspect of the integration of the workplace into the exhibition was the 
installation of foreign machines into local factories and the manning of foreign 
machines both on exhibition grounds and in factories by Soviet workers. One such 
interactive display occurred during the Swiss Industrial Exhibition (28.05.1966 -  
11.06.1966) when production lines of Swiss timepieces were manned by Soviet 
workers from the Second Moscow Watch Factory (later known as the Slava 
Factory48i). Western mass production and cutting-edge technology was quite
480 Rabotnitsa, No. 8 August, (1957): 2. Page one also illustrates this point, a s the lead 
photo is of extremely elegantly dressed women from a country with an European heritage, 
while the smaller trailer picture show s women from Sudan swathed in their traditional dress.481 Slava produced civilian watches and the movement of the earlier watches w as based on 
the pre-war French movment the Lip T-15.
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literally within the grasp of the average Soviet worker.482 It was an ‘interesting and 
intelligent demonstration of modem Swiss machine-tool machines, and machine 
construction.’483 Factory visits as well as the use of factories to demonstrate foreign 
running machine lines were an intimate form of contact, controlled, direct and not 
as Potemkin villagesque as visits to the theatre.
Foreign exhibitions were representative of the new social contract between 
the state and the population as the populous’ demand for consumer goods and 
information about the West was in part satisfied through exhibitions. Exhibitions 
were windows to the West, affording Soviet citizens the opportunity to ‘travel’ 
abroad. In this sense, the exhibition was a highly effective means by which the 
Soviet government released some of the pent up pressure to travel without having to 
deal with Soviet citizens travelling abroad. Exhibitions also complemented the 
government policy of catching up with and surpassing the West as it gave a tangible 
image of the economic and technological objectives, while often warning of the 
cultural pitfalls (for example abstract art). Exhibition attendance was a 
confirmation that fascination with and belief in the fruits of capitalism was not 
restricted to the Soviet elite, but was a cultural perception. The bounty portrayed 
was the Soviet future and existed not merely within the imagination of the Soviet 
planners and socialist realist authors. With the motivation of obtaining and 
surpassing the wealth of the capitalist system, the Soviet regime invited exhibitions 
as external bargaining chips into its negotiations with Soviet society. Musya Giants 
has written that: ‘it is widely acknowledged that the Soviet Union sought to use both 
Western and Soviet cultural output to shape popular opinion’.484 Thus, the Soviet 
Union was increasingly defining itself not in terms of opposition to the West but as 
attempting to follow on a path of modernisation and consumption with the West, 
while maintaining its own path of moral superiority and a command economy. 
Inevitably, failure to successfully implement either path resulted in the tarnishing of 
the image of the socialist economic path, while the path followed by the West 
remained successful and obtainable: so long as one did not follow socialism.
482 A. Babadzhanian, ‘Shveitsarskaia vystavka v Moskve,’ Vneshniaia toraoviia no.8 (1966): 
36-37, 37.
483 Babadzhanian, ‘Shveitsarskaia vystavka v Moskve’ 37.
484 Musya Giants and Pamela Kachurin, ‘General Introduction,’ Journal of Cold War Studies 
Voi.4 no.1 Winter (2002): 3-5, 4 .
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Having accepted the highest standard of living as an objective, the West’s success in 
improving the general standard of living allowed the ends to justify the means.
b. Why exhibitions?
Exhibitions represent moments in which the Soviet government raised the Ii'on 
Curtain, occasionally to a select audience, often literally to millions. They tended to 
be massive logistical and organisational undertakings followed by fanfares of 
activities. Inherently illogical from an information control viewpoint, exhibitions 
were either actively sought or grudgingly tolerated. The official public explanation 
given for exhibitions was that exhibitions were part of peaceful co-existence and 
supported international contacts of cultural, scientific and economic nature and 
promoted trade. Press coverage and government assessments of completed 
exhibitions regularly listed tentative sales agreements. The inter-govemmental 
justifications were that trade fairs/exhibitions provided opportunities to examine 
technical innovations, to acquire scientific knowledge (without the need to purchase 
or to exchange ideas), to increase trade ties, and to motivate Soviet 
specialists/workers. In a 1959 governmental explanation as to why exhibitions were 
permitted it was stated that exhibitions afforded: ‘a large number of Soviet 
specialists with attainable access to branches of foreign science and technology. ’485 
In an attempt to maximise the economic and technological potential of exhibitions, 
the Soviet Chamber of Commerce was active in foreign exhibitions. The lists of 
important goods imported into the Soviet Union during the Thaw period (chemical 
industry equipment, automotive parts, textiles, synthetic thread, furniture, footwear, 
and pharmaceuticals etc) were all to appear in numerous exhibitions.
Foreign responses to Interorgtekhnika 1966 contribute another piece of the 
justification for exhibitions. Marcello Checolli, a representative for the Italian firm 
Olivetti is quoted in Moskovskaia Pravda as saying that: ‘the director of the 
Moscow factory ‘Freezer’ was interested in our ‘provincial’ technology and told me 
that in a year he would be able to obtain it. I would like to give the director some 
advice. A year is time, time that is needed to prepare the internal systems. We are 
prepared to help ‘Freezer” achieve the technology more quickly. ’486 The issue was
485 RGAE 635/1/388: 5.
486 ‘Vystavka zakryta,’ Moskovskaia Pravda (16.09.1966): 1,
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n o t  t h a t  t h e  S o v i e t  U n i o n  c o u l d  n o t  p r o d u c e  t h e  g o o d s ,  b u t  t h a t  i n  t h e  i n t e r e s t  o f  
s a v i n g  t i m e ,  o f  f u l f i l l i n g  t h e  w i s h e s  o f  t h e  p o p u l a t i o n  f a s t e r ,  f o r e i g n  t e c h n o l o g y  
s h o u l d  a n d  c o u l d  b e  p u r c h a s e d .  T h e r e  w e r e  t h o s e  w i t h i n  t h e  e l i t e ,  a m o n g  t h e m  
K h r u s h c h e v ,  w h o  o f t e n  b l a m e d  t h e  t u r g i d  n a t u r e  o f  t h e  S o v i e t  e c o n o m y  o n  t h e  
f a i l u r e  o f  w o r k e r s  t o  d r i v e  t h e m s e l v e s .  T h e  p u b l i s h i n g  o f  c o m m e n t s  s u c h  a s  t h o s e  
m a d e  b y  C h e c o l l i  s e r v e d  a s  a  p r o m i s e  f o r  t h e  f u t u r e ,  a s  a  v e r i f i c a t i o n  o f  t h e  
i m m e d i a c y  a n d  a s  a  p r o v o c a t i o n  f o r  h a r d e r  a n d  f a s t e r  w o r k  d u r i n g  t h e  p r e s e n t .  A 
s u p e r p o w e r  t h a t  h a d  S p u t n i k s  s h o u l d  b e  a b l e  t o  m a s t e r  ‘p r o v i n c i a l  t e c h n o l o g y ’ a n d  
i t s  c i t i z e n s  s h o u l d  h a v e  a c c e s s  t o  f r e e z e r  u n i t s .  As r e p o r t e d  i n  t h e  S o v i e t  p r e s s  t h e  
O l i v e t t i  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  t h e n  w e n t  s o  f a r  a s  t o  r e m i n d  t h e  p u b l i c  t h a t  O l i v e t t i  
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  w e r e  a l w a y s  p r e s e n t  i n  M o s c o w  a n d  t h a t  t h e y  c o u l d  b e  c o n t a c t e d  b y  
t e l e p h o n e .4 8 7
Despite the ties between imports and exhibitions, exhibitions were not the 
most productive way to obtain information and to procure trade agreements.
Reports from the State Committee for Science and Technology (SCST) show that 
sending specialists abroad for long visits to gather information, often with the intent 
to purchase technology from the host company, was more effective than exhibitions 
despite foreign companies often seeking to limit visits in size, duration and 
frequency. Also, for exhibitions to serve their role as foreign science and 
technology outlets, there was no need for them to be public, and not all exhibitions 
were open to the public. Thus, the public nature of numerous exhibitions must be 
attributed to sources other than the gathering of technical information. This would 
include, but is not limited to: motivating the masses, the use of information about 
the West as a bargaining chip in the new social contract and as part of co-existence. 
As much as exhibitions were about trade, they were about perceptions. Science, and 
innovation, as aspects of socialist theory, had become instruments of policy and 
tools of economic progress.488 At the time of the American Exhibition New York 
Times columnist Max Frankel wrote: ‘Surely one reason why the obviously uneasy 
Soviet hosts tolerated this carnival was to give Russians a glimpse of the rewards of
487 ‘Vystavka zakryta,’ Moskovskaia Pravda (16.09.1966): 1.
488 Paul Cocks, ‘Organizing for Technological Innovation in the 1980s,’ Gregory Guroff and 
Fred Garstensen, Entrepreneurship in Imperial Russia and the Soviet Union (New Jersey: 
Princeton University Press, 1983) 307.
154
hard work and the fulfillment of Premier Khrushchev's economic plans. ’489 
National exhibitions like the American Exhibition were public because the 
participating governments insisted that they be so. In a documented conversation 
between Soviet officials, the response to murmurs of discontent over the toleration 
of a model home at the American Exhibition in 1959 was met with: ‘this exhibition 
can open the doors for trade between the Soviet Union and America; desired goods 
that the Soviet Union could then purchase would be present!’490 National 
exhibitions like the American or the French drew tremendous crowds, but or 
perhaps because of this, were not favoured by officials. Exhibitions like the British 
or Italian Industrial Exhibitions, which took the fonm of national exhibitions, but 
which took place without any official government participation, were more 
positively received by the authorities, and industrial exhibitions like those for 
construction, chemistry, automotives etc were preferred. Lack of official foreign 
involvement was a nebulous concept, as most foreign governments had accepted the 
importance of cultural activities in order to foster political and economic relations. 
Even the British who studiously separated business and government worked on a 
policy that acknowledged ‘to those who say that this extension in influence 
(cultural) has no connection with commerce, we reply they are totally wrong; the 
reaction of trade to the more deliberate inculcation of British culture which we 
advocate is definitely certain and will be swift. ’491 Perception of the lack of official 
governmental participation vacillated between being perceived as a compliment 
from foreign businesses that were willing to treat Soviet purchaser and specialists as 
trade equals and as a political slight from Western governments. Concretely, low 
levels of governmental involvement typically resulted in more numerous smaller 
negotiations and increased difficulties in procuring the corresponding loans.
The propagandistic potential of national exhibitions led to them being a 
delicate balance between cultural diplomacy and propaganda, with some nations 
fairing better than others. The French tended to display the best they had to offer, 
and the result was a correlating positive image of their nation. The English
489 Max Frankel, ‘Ivan Appears to Like the Way the Jon eses Live: but Visitors to Moscow  
Fair Have Doubts on Wealth’s  Distribution,’ New York Times {02.08.1959), 5(E).
490 ‘Protokol 1 : Zasedaniia soveta VTP; 21 .04.1959,’ RGAE 635/1/ 387; 22-49, 23.
491 ‘Report of the British Economic Mission to South America: 18.01.1939,’ Public Records 
Office (PRO), Foreign Office (FO) 371/14178, A 1908/77/51, 55.
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approach was moderate with the idea that plausibility was tied to discretion and that 
an acknowledgement of challenges and problems would complement the modest 
information give. While the British image put forth was largely accepted, it did not 
evoke the same degree o f envy as the French or the American. The American image 
was brash and impressive, yet subject to more incredulity than either the British or 
the French. Despite being praised for their objectivity, the Japanese, like the British, 
were also to suffer for their modesty. The Japanese were extolled as exemplary 
exhibitors: they focused on production, not end products, functionality not flare, and 
were not particularly active in exhibiting their nation’s ‘way o f life’ ; they were also 
extolled as excellent at replicating Western technological advancements, but they 
did not arouse envy.
Another reason for governmental acquiescence was the faith, perhaps
arrogance, that the Soviet Union had nothing to fear. It had survived the war and
Stalinism, it was a superpower and it was going to dominate the world.
Communism was going to provide the world with the highest equitable standard of
living, so why not allow citizens glimpses o f the future through the windows of the
West? Why should the regime worry about toasters, plastic dishes, modem tractors
or fashion? Writing after the Christian Dior shows in 1959 in Moscow, Harrison
Salisbury’s comments follow this line of reasoning:
Dior was brought in because the government wants to take the Russian woman 
out o f her flowered print and give her a chance to look like her Western 
sisters. Why? Because, I would guess, the Russian woman wants to look like 
her Western sisters and the present Russian government can see no reason of 
policy why she should not. Neither Puritanism nor emphasis on heavy 
industry is going to divert the Russian woman much longer from the heritage 
of her sex, the right and opportunity to look just as pretty as she wants to .492
But why the governmental inclination to pay attention to the fashion interests of the
Soviet woman? It was as much a question o f national prestige and the need for a
social contract as it was support for the Soviet woman’s right to pursue the
aesthetical heritage o f her sex. John Gunther attributed exhibitions with playing a
role in the social negotiations between state and society:
pressure from the people for more and better consumer goods, as well as food, 
grows more apparent all the tim e... Not only do people yearn for motor-
492 Harrison Salisbury, To Moscow and Beyond: a Reporter’s  Narrative (London: 
Joseph, 1960) 47-48.
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scooters, silk thread, casseroles, and umbrellas, but for prettier things, articles 
more gay... Khrushchev wants above all to broaden the basis of his support, to 
bring people more closely into the family of government so to speak, but the 
only substantially effective way to do this is to increase vastly the amount of 
consumer goods available, which at the present moment cannot be done.493
Through exhibitions, both foreign and Soviet, the idea of goods could be consumed. 
The Czechoslovakian National Exhibition of 1959 was tremendously popular and 
the crystal was to set the Soviet ‘must have’ standard for many years. The Christian 
Dior fashion show organisers made no concessions to the supposed conservatism of 
Soviet fashion or to the practical clothing requirements of the Soviet people.
Despite mixed official reviews, within a few weeks of the exhibition women were 
wearing imitations of the simpler design, and expensive spiked heels appeared in 
the House of Shoe Styles.494 This openness to the West and occasionally 
accompanying frivolity gave the impression that the Soviet Union was leaving the 
period of pride in austerity and sacrifice behind and entering into a period in which 
the society as a whole expected the provision of practical and aesthetically pleasing 
goods in exchange for its support of the communist system.
The grounds for the participation of foreign firms and nations in exhibitions 
are also varied. As early as 1951, American sociologist David Riesman imagined 
an alternative to the arms race, ‘Operation abundance,’ alias the ‘Nylon War.’ The 
basic principle of the Nylon War was that if Soviet citizens had knowledge of 
American riches they would become intolerant of Soviet national funds being 
diverted away from such consumer ‘riches’ towards the military and demand that 
the Soviet regime supply said riches. Thus, the Soviet leadership would be forced 
to divert resources towards consumer goods or face mass discontent. ‘By 
bombarding the USSR with Toni wave kits, nylon hose, stoves, and refrigerators, 
the United States would force Moscow to abandon weaponry for consumer 
goods. ’495 The gendered nature of the term nylon war ties in with historical 
research into the formation and modification of national images during the 1950s 
and 1960s. In essence, the prime consumers during this era were women and as 
consumers, women assumed a key role in the creation of the new economic life of
4 9 3 Gunther, Inside R ussiaTodav 423.
494 Salisbury, To Moscow :47.
495 Reid, ‘Cold War in the Kitchen’ 222; also s e e  Stephen Whitfield, The Culture of the Cold 
War (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991).
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the nation. While developed through the improving of the hearth, this very public 
role of consuming citizens was to contribute to the defining of a national identity as 
national prowess came to be increasingly associated with personal prosperity. One 
of the most readable and convincing examples of the genderization of consumption 
and the ties to national identity can be found in Erica Carter’s work on the role of 
female consumption in the reconstruction of post-war West Germany, in which 
Carter clearly and concisely illustrates the roots of so many now accepted aspects of 
German national identity.496 That women were granted the role of the bearer of 
consumerist rationality did not protect them from being viewed as potentially weak 
points in nations ideological defences. It is interesting to note that during the 1950s, 
the idea of consumption as a form of ‘voting’ (democratic empowerment) co­
existed with the notion of consumption as a particularly female weakness.
In an era when conventional weapons were increasingly limited in usability 
and nuclear weapons came to represent MAD, moving the battlefield to such 
innocuous items as Hoovers held appeal. The Nylon War dealt with the winning of 
the average citizen, ostensibly side stepping ideology, politicians and political 
systems. Thus, it appealed to the populist mentality of many Americans allowing 
them to de-villainise the average Soviet citizen. This citizen offensive was 
facilitated by the close relationship between business, foreign policy and 
consumption in the West (USA in particular), for example the inventor of the 
Polaroid camera was an intelligence consultant for the U-2 flyovers; and Jack Ryan 
helped design both Barbie and Hawk and Sparrow III missile systems.497 
Participation in an exhibition allowed businesses to promote peace, educate Soviet 
citizens, display civic responsibility and contribute to the war effort, all while 
pursuing possible business ventures.
Doing business in the Soviet Union was potentially lucrative for Western 
businesses, but the way to success was convoluted and long. Sufficiently lucrative 
successes, or the image thereof, existed and businesses continued to do business in 
the Soviet Union, despite issues of red tape, credit, licence agreements, and 
industrial espionage. By the mid-1960s exhibitions had been occurring regularly for 
ten years. Businesses were perceptive to the practices in the Soviet Union and
496 Carter, How German is She?.
497 for more information on the topic se e  Whitfield, The Culture of the Cold War 238.
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cognisant of the challenges, but this did not prevent Western representatives from
becoming frustrated with the Soviet system. Western comments in visitor books
from the 1960s testify to this. 498 For example, the entry from the American
President of Peterson Engineering discussing his team’s experiences at the
Agricultural Exhibitions.
At the present agricultural exhibition we two lived in different hotels. At the 
1964 exhibitions we were three and we were divided between three hotels. 
Ideally, it would be preferable if all personnel of a firm could be in one and 
the same hotel... Today is the 3F ‘ of May. Only three days until the closing 
of the exhibition, and we still do not know for certain if we have sold our 
goods... For Americans in Moscow -  it is losing time. Here, the value of 
time is truly unknown. In order to resolve a few questions, for which one 
really need spend a few minutes, here one needs several hours, and 
occasionally day s.499
The President of Peterson Engineering did praise the women working at the 
exhibition as being very competent. The representative of French company Renault 
praised the organization of the exhibition, the accommodation provided, the 
personnel, and the food, but voiced his displeasure at the failure of the Ministry of 
Trade to visit Renault’s stand. Renault’s representative continued by comparing the 
trade habits ‘in all exhibitions throughout the world, before the exhibitions or, at the 
very least, during the exhibition, it is already known, what would be purchased and 
what would not be purchased. Not a few times were we asked to wait for them [the 
Ministry of Trade] at our stand. And only after three to four days, as a result of our 
protests, did we finally meet with one of them . ’500 The representative for the 
Belgium Firm Mandrel was less critical, but voiced a similar concern with the 
failure to utilise the full economic potential of the exhibition: ‘we are very happy, 
that we received a medal, but it would be better if our machines would be 
purchased. ’501 G. D. Rempel, the spokesman for the New Aidia Farm Equipment 
Company, was succinct in his condemnation: ‘should you decide to host another
498 Visitor books were not archived with other VTP documents. The archivists at RGAE 
supposed that visitor books for smaller exhibitions were held at the host location.
499 ‘O mezhdunarodnoi vystavke sovremennykh se l’skokhoziaistvennykh mashin i 
oborudovaniia 16-19.05.1966,’ RGAE 635/1/698:180-236. 232-233.
500 ‘O mezhdunarodnoi vystavke sovremennykh se l’skokhoziaistvennykh mashin i 
oborudovaniia 16-19.05.1966,’ 233-234.
501 ‘O mezhdunarodnoi vystavke sovremennykh se l’skokhoziaistvennykh mashin i 
oborudovaniia 16-19.05.1966,’ 235.
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agricultural exhibition in 1968, we are afraid that you will have to excuse us/ 502 
Typically, Soviet authorities invited companies of economic and scientific interest 
to the Soviet Union to present and the refusal of companies to return constituted lost 
potential for business and information as well as an embarrassment for officials 
amongst themselves and specialists. Despite Western interpretations to the 
contrary, Soviet trade officials were making efforts to ensure that trade agreements 
occurred. Part of the ‘limited’ nature of the effort was due to official policy 
encouraging copying and reverse engineering, a policy aided by the jacking up of 
outgoing freight costs on exhibition goods. Companies invited to participate in 
exhibitions were often those with which negotiations were in progress, or indeed 
signed. In the period before Fiat had signed the contract for the AVTOVAZ, and in 
the period directly afterwards, it regularly participated in exhibitions. Despite 
having already agreed to the Fiat 124, Fiat was to display more modern and 
luxurious models. It was the era of the Thaw and the Soviet Union was a taiga of 
opportunity.
c. What was displayed?
Exhibitions were cornucopia of goods, services, and systems. Everything 
from pioduction lines to fashions shows, modem artwork to building cranes, iron 
lungs to children’s books, was on display. While Soviet officials preferred to have 
the focus on production, those displays that highlighted end products created a more 
luxurious, wealthy, and technologically advanced image of the company and of the 
ensuing nation than those that adhered to the Soviet request for processes. The 
luxurious, advance technology images were to have a profound impact on leaders, 
purchasers and the layman. The nations known for their luxurious image were 
France and the USA. Tlie French, like the Americans, were charged with ‘not 
giving true technical information about the instruments’ on display and for focusing 
on the product and not the process.sos This is in contrast to the Swiss and Japanese 
who were praised for their organisation, posters, diagrams, photos and descriptions. 
What appears to be a relative lack of American participation in exhibitions is
502 ‘O mezhdunarodnoi vystavke sovremennykh se l’skokhoziaistvennykh mashin I 
oborudovaniia 16-19.05.1966,’ 233.
503 ‘Na frantsuskol vystavke elektronnykh priborov,' RGAE 635/1/801: 108.
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deceptive, as while American firms participated relatively infrequently in 
comparison to French, Italian or Swiss companies, American firms avoided political 
repercussions and side-stepped strategic goods lists largely by displaying 
questionable or outright strategic goods through European affiliates. Strategic 
goods were displayed. On occasion they composed the entirety of the goods 
displayed. For example, in a closed exhibition at the Polytechnic Museum in 
Moscow, there was a two-week display of the latest in French and American 
aviation equipment and navigational systems.504 Assessing the exhibition as ‘very 
interesting’, and having gone ‘calmly’ the exhibition organisers were pleased to 
report that Mashpriborintorg officials were willing to purchase eighty to ninety 
percent of the exponents that were on display.505 While this particular exhibition 
was closed to an elite audience of four thousand, both firms were to display similar 
items at Interorgtekhnika~66. The range of products displayed at exhibitions was so 
broad as to make those items censored by Soviet officials appear as oddities, more 
conducive to a need to randomly censor something than as part of a systematic 
system of censorship. For example, public lavatories could not be built, but model 
homes and flats containing modern plumbing fixtures could and Pepsi-Cola was 
permitted but Heinz-57 sauce ran into difficulties when custom officials opened the 
boxes labelled “57” and the content far exceeded the quantity of fifty-seven.
d. Press coverage
Speaking before Congress in 1955, Eisenhower said that ‘international 
exhibitions and fairs provided colossal significance for foreign governments’.506 
For the Soviet Union, they provided the opportunity to increase trade contacts; 
improve national prestige; entice the local population; and broaden opportunities to 
gather industrial information. The coverage o f exhibitions in Vneshniaia torgovlia 
ran almost exclusively after the exhibition had ended; included praise for socialist 
innovation; acknowledged Western participation and activities; and proclaimed the 
value of trade deals concluded. The international exhibition at Luzhniki in 1964 in
504 Exhibition of American Firm Friden and French Firm Aleksandr Gober and Co.
505 ‘Operativnyi otchet po vystavke schetno-vychislitel’nykh priborov amerikanskoi firmy 
‘Friden’ ustroitel’ fransuzskaia firma ‘Aleksandr Gober I Ko.,’ RGAE 635/1/692; 67-76, 
67,74.
506 I. Bol’shakov, ‘Sovetskii Soiuz na mezhdunarodnykh vystavkakh I iarmarkakh,’ 
Vneshniaia torgovlia no.11 (1957): 53-60, 58.
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celebration of the mechanisation of construction equipment, referred to as the 
development of ‘armies of construction’, can be used as an example of standard 
press coverage.507 Due to the nature of the equipment presented, the exhibition was 
spread over a massive area, with varying displays from both socialist and capitalist 
countries. The published list of guest nations read alphabetically: Austria, England, 
Belgium, East Germany, Holland, Denmark, Italy, Poland, USA, West Germany, 
Finland, France, Czechoslovakia, Sweden, Switzerland, Yugoslavia, and Japan.sos 
Articles about the exhibition opened by stating that during the course of the 
exhibition the USSR emerged ‘as the largest producer and exporter of construction 
equipment’.509 The largest pavilion at the exhibition belonged to the USSR with 
two hundred exponents, and was followed by East Germany. From page three of the 
article ‘At the international exhibition for construction and transport equipment’ 
both socialist nations and capitalist nations received press coverage with the 
socialist countries receiving half a page while capitalist countries received one and a 
half. The Italian pavilion was perceived to be of particular interest as was the 
display by the Japanese firm Hitachi. The representative director of Hitachi, 
Kumashiro was quoted by the Soviet press as saying ‘our nations are neighbours and 
neighbours should be well aware of the trade possibilities... Our business people 
are here to make purchases of goods and of licences’.5io Speaking on behalf of 
Soviet attendees, the reporter stated that: ‘we saw many beneficial things at the 
Swedish, French, Italian and English films’ stands. The exhibition showed such 
wonderful possibilities... This was the opinion of many of the guests’.si i In 
conclusion, it was also noted that a particularly high level of interest in foreign 
stands was shown and innovations of specific Western firms and the trade 
contacts/sales were presented. The idea of profitability, both in terms of exposure 
and establishing business ties but also in terms of purchases and sales, runs 
throughout the articles on exhibitions, typically occurring in the conclusion and 
occasionally in the introduction.
507 ‘Na Mezhdunarodnom smotre stroiternykh i dorozhnykh mashin v Luzhnikakh,’ 
Vneshniaia Toraoviia no. 10 (1964): 3-6.
508 ‘Na Mezhdunarodnom smotre stroiternykh I dorozhnykh mashin v Luzhnikakh’ 3.
509 ‘Na Mezhdunarodnom smotre stroitel’nykh i dorozhnykh mashin v Luzhnikakh’ 3.
510 ‘Na Mezhdunarodnom smotre stroitel’nykh i dorozhnykh mashin v Luzhnikakh’ 5.
511 ‘Na Mezhdunarodnom smotre stroitel’nykh i dorozhnykh mashin v Luzhnikakh’ 5 ,
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Press coverage favoured the use of Westerners to legitimise the exhibitions. 
In an article Swedish trade representative L, Gustavsson was quoted as saying that 
‘trade between Sweden and the Soviet Union has a long tradition and we believe 
that exhibitions aid in the exchange and trade of Swedish-Soviet goods’.512 A  
representative from French company Tishauer, F. Cauchet was quoted as being 
pleased with his company’s first visit to a Soviet exhibition. Participation had 
proven profitable, as Tishauer had signed a contract with Mashinoimpoj't for ninety 
thousand roubles for a crane. For: ‘a country that uses advanced industrial methods 
of building and planning, as is seen in the Soviet Union, this crane can but 
contribute to a high speed of building.’ 513 Numerous quotes, of which the source 
was predominantly Western, reiterate the ideas expressed in the quote by K. 
Shtemmler, head of Shtemmler-Imeks of the Netherlands: ‘the exhibition was 
grandiose. Its organisation and how it was conducted deserves good marks. The 
USSR showed that it can organise an extremely large exhibition’ .514 The inclusion 
of such quotes constituted more than mere self-praise. The department of trade, 
which was involved both in the publication of Vneshniaia torgovlia and in the 
organisation of the trade exhibitions, appears to have included the positive 
commentary as a form of validation of and a promotion for exhibitions. This 
interpretation is reinforced by the continuous references to the profitable sale of 
Soviet goods and of the purchase of special equipment that was to aid Soviet 
economic development.
Both open and closed exhibitions were covered in the press, just as both 
open and closed exhibitions were not. National exhibitions always received press 
coverage as advertising and coverage was regularly written into the agreements, but 
coverage of industrial exhibitions was a decision that lay solely with Soviet 
officials. Despite national exhibitions being guaranteed coverage, there were means 
by which Soviet officials could minimise coverage. The Americans complained 
that during the American Exhibition in 1959, the posters announcing the exhibition 
were late being put up, and then had no date or location listed. Soviet organisers 
excused the failure to produce fully detailed posters suitably early by claiming
512 Torgovat’ s Sovetskim Soiuzom vygodno,’ Vneshniaia toraoviia no.11(1964): 37-38, 37.
513 Torgovat’ s  Sovetskim Soiuzom vygodno’ 37.
514 Torgovat’ s  Sovetskim Soiuzom vygodno’ 38,
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insufficient high quality artistic and printing staff. Other means of reducing 
coverage included articles without any titles, pictures without articles, or articles 
that opened and closed with socialist achievements with the foreign information 
sandwiched in between. Occasionally, an exhibition would be covered 
retrospectively, or as close to the closing date as possible. In many ways the media 
coverage that did occur bore an inverse relationship to general public interest in an 
exhibition. For example, the 1966 international exhibition of agricultural machines 
was covered by forty-three newspapers, sixteen journals, was mentioned in 
seventeen television programmes and one hundred times on radio programmes. The 
1965 exhibition of the American shoe company Roman Fielding received no official 
coverage. Shoe exhibitions raid  y received coverage but the International 
Exhibition of Literature on Entomology (2-9.08.1968), at which twenty-five firms 
from capitalist countries were present, received national coverage. Consumer 
oriented exhibitions were not excluded from press coverage, but there was an 
inverse correlation between consumer goods and press coverage.
While not all exhibitions were of interest to, or for the consumption of, the 
public, this did not exclude them from being advertised. For example, the 
‘Technical Books USA’ exhibition that ran in Moscow (23.01-24.02.1963), 
Leningrad, and Kiev, was announced with over four hundred posters for Moscow 
alone, and numerous radio advertisements. Official attendance in Moscow was 
listed at 25,000. The American firm Roman Fielding was a company that 
represented five US companies and by the time of its largest exhibition had 
completed two and a half million USD worth of agreements with the Soviet Union. 
In 1963, its displays featured synthetic cloth and leather and were targeted at 
specialists. Given 635 square metres of exhibition space 7 Chermushkinskaia Kv. 
20a Korpus 24, Roman Fielding filled the space with sixty-five tons of material for 
the perusal of the ten thousand by invitation only visitors. Although closed to the 
public, news of the exhibition could be found in the local press, for example in 
Moskovskaia Pravda (23.11.1963) and Vecherniaia Moskva (16, 22.11.1963). The 
media coverage of closed exhibitions is indicative of the state wanting to 
appropriate the prestige confen ed upon foreign exhibitions while controlling direct 
public exposure. In 1965, Roman Fielding would exhibit again, focusing on 
synthetic shoes, their production and repair. This time, only 2,500 special tickets
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and twenty-eight information letters were sent, and while unofficial guests did 
attend it was not open to the public and there were neither advertisements nor press 
coverage. Machines, lines and synthetic material were purchased. Items and lines 
purchased or donated after the Fielding exhibitions were duly incorporated into 
larger exhibitions and displayed for the public.515 A section on ideological work at 
the exhibition was an insignificant aspect of the reports on industrial exhibitions and 
consisted of the sites to which the visitors were escorted and any incidents that 
occurred.
The exhibition of the Danish electro-technology firm Briiel & Kjær A/S 
(precision instrumentation for acoustics and vibration measurement) was closed to 
the public but received official press coverage. This closed nature combined with 
media reports of the substantial monetary and technological purchases contributed to 
the creation of an unrealistic image of Western technology. Like Roman Fielding, 
Briiel & Kjær A/S had conducted several million roubles worth of agreements with 
the USSR in the two to three years prior to their exhibitions; and like the Italian firm 
Innocenti (an Italian machinery works, that Post-WWII was known for its Lambretta 
scooters and later the BMC -  later British Leyland -  Mini. The company is 
sometimes known as Leyland Innocenti at this time), official sources citing the 
firms’ credentials included their relationship with other Western nations and 
companies. For example, Briiel & Kjær A/S was reported to export fifty percent of 
its goods to the USA and twenty-five percent to the Federal Republic of Germany 
and twenty-five percent to the USSR. The official specialist assessment of the 120 
exponents displayed at the exhibition was that they were ‘of a level of modem 
devices’ .516 The exhibition by the Swedish electro-medical equipment firms Elema 
Schonander (one of the pioneers in pacemakers-not to be confused with Siemens- 
Elema from the 1920s that was also in the field of medical technology and 
pacemakers) and Lars Ljunberg (ventilation systems for motors etc), involved three 
hundred standard invitations, eighty-six addressed invitations and 450 lecture 
tickets. Attendance exceeded this figure with 3,450 official visitors, in the official
515 ‘Otchet srochnogo remonta obuvi firmy Fomein Fel’dinq Inc. USA.’ RGAE 635/1/635: 
1-6 .
516 ‘Op. Otchet upolnomochennogo VTP na vystavke elektronnykh izmeritelnykh priborov 
firmy Briiel & Kjær A/S Danila.’ RGAE 635/1 /572: 118-127, 121.
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report assessing the exhibition the respective comment was that the ‘demonstration 
hall was always fu ll'.517
That the Soviet regime sought to limit the exposure of its citizens to 
Western/ foreign influences is logical. What is then perhaps surprising is the 
frequency with which foreign exhibitions received front-page coverage. Of sixty 
articles on international exhibitions found in Moskovskaia Pravda between 1961 
and 1968, thirty-two were on the frontpage. From 1961 to 1966 exhibition articles 
were predominately on the first page, but as of 1967, were first seen on page three 
or four. The titles of the articles ranged from vague ‘To a new exhibition of science 
and technology’, to detailed ‘The Italian trade fair opens in Moscow’. The 
attendance of foreign dignitaries received press coverage similar in nature to the 
attendance of the exhibitions by Soviet officials; see for example British Prime 
Minister H. Wilson’s impending visit to the second British Trade Fair in 1966.5is 
Exhibition articles had a standard format that included: a who’s who list of 
foreign and Soviet dignitaries attending the opening/exhibition, if international a 
(usually alphabetical) list of Western and socialist nations participating; mention of 
a few interesting aspects of the exhibition with a balance between capitalist 
developed and socialist; the awarding of gold medals (balanced between Socialist 
and non-socialist nations); and a conclusion about the prospects of trade agreements 
or the amounts of trade agreements, contracts or offers established (typically listed 
in roubles and /or US dollars). Frequent mention was made of consumer goods that 
were within reach of the Soviet people. These goods needed to be judiciously 
chosen and introduced however as R. Borisov wrote: ‘one of the prices of such 
technological progress was the growth of psychological illnesses’ .519 This 
formulaic reporting was to remain consistent throughout the period. Coverage of 
international exhibitions often focused on the achievements of the socialist bloc 
countries, for example during the International Construction Exhibition, the Day of 
Britain and the Day of Bulgaria occurred simultaneously and while the foimer got 
mention, the latter was the featured.
517 ‘Op. otchet upolnomochennogo VTP na shvedskoi vystavke elektronnogo 
meditsinskogo oborudovaniia firm: Elena Shenarder AV i AV Larslunberg I C o.,’ RGAE 635/ 
1/635: 7 -16 ,14 .
518 ‘K priezdu Prem’er-mlnistra Velikobritanii H. Wil’sona,' Moskovskaia Pravda 
(08.071966): 1.
519 R. Borisov, R. Borisov, ‘Reklama I zhizn’ 214, 215
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In 1965, an international chemistry exhibition was held in Sokol’niki. 
Divided into two main themes, chemistry in industrial construction and chemistry in 
agriculture, it was attended by 1,800 firms from twenty-one countries including 
‘large’ specialist firms from the West: ASA (British), Sina Viscosa (large scale 
production of the casein fibres - Italian), Union Carbide Corporation (ethylenes and 
polypropylene - USA) and others.520 The exhibition ran over two weeks and was 
viewed by one and a half million people.521 With contracts totalling 220 million 
roubles having been signed the exhibition was deemed a success.522 VT ran articles 
on the exhibition in November and December of 1965. Of specific importance were 
the contracts with the GDR, Poland and Italy. The majority of the companies 
exhibiting were active in various fields of the chemical industry with the Italian 
companies at the exhibition Eni, Snam, and Agip all specialising in the oil and 
gas/petrochemical industry, and were specifically interested in providing 
information on petrochemical plants and petrochemical product production. After 
noting Anich’s leading role in the petrochemical industry, the head administrator for 
Anich (then parent company to Eni), is quoted as calling for increased contact 
between the two nations and their respective industries.523 In 'Itogi 
mezhdunarodnogo foruma po khimiV Western companies with which contracts had 
been signed were listed before the discussion of the important role of socialist 
countries. After the comments on socialist countries, the article returns to Western 
business representatives. The director of the Dutch company Shtemmler-Imeks is 
quoted as acknowledging the fast rate of change in industry and the impossibility of 
scientists staying abreast without the use of exhibitions, conferences etc.524 The 
director of the British ASA is quoted as declaring that ‘discussion’ was one of the 
most beneficial aspects the exhibition and that building upon this basis would result 
in long standing working relationships.525 In articles on this exhibition, as well as 
on exhibitions in general. Western representatives were disproportionately quoted
520 K. Parmenov, ‘itogi mezhdunarodnogo foruma po khimii,’ Vneshniaia torqovlia 12 
(1965): 13-17.
521 ‘Khimiia v Sokol’nikakh,’ Vneshniaia torqovlia 11 (1965): 18-19.
522 ‘Khimiia v Sokoi'nikakh’ 18-19.
523 ‘Khimiia v Sokol’nikakh’ 19.
524 Parmenov, ‘Itogi Mezhdunarodnogo foruma po khimii’ 15.
525 Parmenov, ‘Itogi Mezhdunarodnogo foruma po khimii’ 16.
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on the value of contacts; the need for discussion; interest in Soviet products; and, 
successes in concluding trade contracts.
Susan Reid has written that: ‘visitors’ books are, it must be emphasised, a 
problematic source of evidence: the entries can hardly be considered a candid or 
representative reflection of opinion, least of all in a culture of surveillance such as 
the Soviet Union. To engage in assessing their degree of sincerity is a fruitless task. 
Rather, comment writing should be treated as a foim of role performance or self 
alignment.’526 This is true of articles in the press as well. The opinions expressed 
by individual journalists were interpretations of official opinion. This consumer 
vision was often tempered with caution against excesses of consumerism. Opinion 
in press coverage ran the gamut. The severest condemnation was unleashed on 
modem art, despite such endeavours as the publishing of Sovi'emennoe 
amerikanskoe iskusstvo by Lloyd Gudrich concurrent with the American exhibition 
in which the development of modern art over the previous twenty-five years as 
characterising America and conveying the sensation of the mechanisation of life in 
the 20* century was explained.527 The highest praise was saved for the Socialist 
bloc countries, notably Czechoslovakia and East Germany.
Exhibitions opened with official addresses that were intended for both 
international and local audiences. Speeches made from abroad carried special 
significance both in their potential for the audience to glean information about 
abroad but also through Khrushchev’s use of his acceptance from foreign leaders as 
a sign of his political prowess. Several well-known examples are: the Geneva 
Convention, his trip to the USSR, and his trip to Britain. Another example was the 
Leipzig Exhibition in 1959. Traditionally, Leipzig was internationally renowned for 
its trade fairs. The socialist regimes of the 1950s sought to retain Leipzig as a 
significant centre for trade, trade fairs, and as a ‘showcase for socialist 
technology’528. The full text of Khrushchev’s address at the Leipzig Exhibition was 
carried by the major media sources and is representative of his early exhibition
526 Reid. T h e Exhibition Art of Socialist Countries, Moscow 1958-1959’ Style and Socialism: 
Modernity and Material Culture in Post-War Eastern Europe 101-132. 116,
527 Lloyd Gudrich, Sovrem ennoe amerikanskoe iskusstvo (Moscow: 1959); 3.
528 Stokes, Constructing Socialism . 69. For more information about Leipzig and Leipzig 
trade fairs s e e  Stokes, Constructing Socialism . Chapter three.
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addresses.529 A brief introduction and pleasantries led into the importance of trade,
T do not talk about socialist countries’ he points out but ‘Western countries like 
West Germany, England, France, Italy and others with whom trade has such large 
possibilities to grow . ’530 Klirushchev then detailed the progress that had been made 
in developing working relationships with 177 Western capitalist firms of which 
eighty-one were from West Germany, twenty-eight from England, fifteen from 
France, and thirteen from Holland.531 The English firm Marconi, (radio technology 
and televisions) was presented as an excellent example of a company with which the 
USSR had good trade relations but, according to Khrushchev, Marconi could be 
more active, and trade levels with Great Britain were ‘not sufficient’ .532 Despite 
trade with the USSR being a ‘profitable business’ for Italian companies (trade with 
Italy, then most active exhibitor of the Western nations, had expanded two and a 
half times),533 the Soviet Union had to initiate talks. Khrushchev made it clear that 
he held the West responsible for low trade levels charging the west with the 
boycotting of Soviet goods, trying to secure an ‘economic blockade’ in order to 
ensure that ‘technological development’ in the socialist countries remained at a ‘low 
level’, and refusing to grant socialist countries ‘the possibility to further raise the 
well-being of their people’ .534 The situation with the United States was extremely 
disappointing, demeaning and senseless. Khrushchev’s exasperation with the poor 
state of trade can best be summed up by his proclamation: ‘don’t want to trade with 
us? Don’t trade. We will wait until you yourselves knock on our door’ .535 Whether 
the Soviet Union quickly obtained technology through contracts or quickly through 
native developments, it would acquire the technology. These themes of trade 
potential, current needless trade difficulties, and the ability of the USSR to ‘raise the 
well-being’ of socialist peoples without Western trade were common refrains that 
appeared in the media reports and speeches surrounding exhibitions.
529 N. S. Khrushchev, ‘Vneshniaia torgovlia -  zdorovala i prochnaia osnova mirnogo 
sosushchestvovaniia gosudarstv,’ Vneshniaia torqovlia no.3 (1959): 1-8; and Pravda 
07.03.1959:1.
530 Khrushchev, ‘Vneshniaia torgovlia’ 1-2.
531 Khrushchev, ‘Vneshniaia torgovlia’ 2.
532 Khrushchev, ‘Vneshniaia torgovlia’ 2, 4.
533 Khrushchev, ‘Vneshniaia torgovlia’ 3.
534 Khrushchev, ‘Vneshniaia torgovlia’ 4.
535 V. Naborov, ‘Normalizatsiia sovetsko-amerikanskikh torgovykh otnoshenii otvechaet 
Interesam obeikh stran,’ Vneshniaia torqovlia no. 12 (1959); 6-11, 11.
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Khrushchev’s public addresses also acknowledged the appeal and
desirability of the consumerism exhibited. In this instance speaking about the
American National Exhibition in 1959 as covered in Izvestiia:
[it] has many interesting things. For example, plastic articles, household 
goods, synthetic textiles, and various manufactured articles...I not only 
experienced a feeling of satisfaction, but also, to a certain degree, a feeling 
of envy. But this is good envy, in the sense that we should like to have all 
this in our country as soon as possible...This exhibition is useful to us, we 
can learn something from it. We regard the American Exhibition as an 
exhibition of our own achievements in the near future.536
In this instance the appropriation of the Western present as the Soviet future is
clearly stated by Khrushchev. The coverage of consumer goods was less complete
than reports of trade agreements but was prevalent through direct or indirect
commentary. Writing about interesting aspects of Interbutmash-68\
A French firm showed an interesting machine for boiling water. At the Italian 
stand there was an interesting model of a machine for the chemical cleaning of 
clothes... There were also many interesting technical things to see in the 
pavilions of Yugoslavia, Japan, England, USA and other countries.557
Despite praise for interesting foreign technical items, it was not unusual for articles
on international exhibitions to acknowledge Soviet superiority in overall terms, and
to praise Western oddities, the Italian machine for boiling water or the American
plastic lemon juicer, being representative of this practice. A common commentary
style in regards to Western consumer goods was the qualified or backhanded
complement that acknowledged the technological innovation while calling on Soviet
intellectual and moral superiority to shun the frivolity behind the innovation;
Good kitchen -  the dream of any hostess! And they constructed this taking it 
into consideration: a separate kitchen [as opposed to communal], a kitchen 
exemplary of a city apartment, a kitchen of a typical average American. But 
we know, that the USA -[is] a highly industrialised power. We have read 
and heard a lot about the talented American engineers and studies solving 
difficult modem technical problems, about the largest qualified worker force 
in the world; factories, creations of the wonderful century of production. 
Truly, what the Soviet people wanted to see was evidence of the
536 Nikita S. Khrushchev, ‘Our people want friendship with the American people and with 
the people of all countries,’ Izvestiia (25.07.1959): 1.
537 A. Zhetvin, ‘Bol’shol uspekh interbutmash-68’ Vneshniaia Torgovlia no.B (1968): 37-40, 
39.
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technological progress o f America ingenuity but not through kitchen 
appliances... 538
Following along these lines, R. Borisov wrote that ‘even the most modem of 
refrigerator will not keep perishable ideas.’539 Less common was unqualified 
praise:
For us America is -  for many of us as a matter of fact, the not too distant 
future... it is our future because today the United States is first in the world in 
industrial production, in output production, etc.. The Soviet Union holds as 
one of its main economic objectives: to catch up with and overtake America in 
all o f these areas. It is for this reason that all walks o f professions workers, 
engineers, farmers, students, doctors, artists and the seniors and youth of the 
country, people with diverse professions and interests came with great interest 
to the exhibition at Sokol’niki... W e liked the simple and comfortable 
fumiture, the various electrical appliances, meant to alleviate the drudgery of 
housework, the refrigerators with freezer units, the televisions, the use of 
plastic materials, synthetic fabric and furs, the comfortable and attractive sport 
goods, and of course the sumptuous automobiles.’s40
These are not the words o f samizdat dissidents but official opinions. This is the 
public opinion of men like Khrushchev, of official policy makers. Once this 
information was released, individuals could incorporate it into their image of the 
W est and o f the Soviet future without fear o f retribution. However, the acceptance 
o f the image o f the W est was increasingly separated from the belief that 
communism as guided by the Communist Party o f the USSR could provide this 
future. As the government became aware that it was providing an image not of the 
Soviet socialist future but o f an alternative path of consumerism, positive 
government propagated images of the W est were to wane.
The image o f a technologically wealthy and advanced United States was a 
permanent aspect o f Soviet thought during this era. The coverage of the technical 
side of a Western exhibition, with a few exceptions such as Khrushchev’s comments 
about the stupidity o f a lemon squeezer,54i was subject to far less ridicule than the 
cultural components. Amidst praise for progress, caution was urged. Soviet citizens 
were requested to ask themselves: ‘But do we need such automobiles?’ or such
538 Konstanin Vishnevetskii, ‘O mezhdunarodnoi torgovo promyshlennoi vystavke,’ Izvestiia
(26.07.1959).
539 R. Borisov, R. Borisov, ‘Reklama I zhizn’ 217,
540 V. Smolianskii, ‘Liudi, tekhnika i vremia,’ Novoe vremia no. 36, (1959): 25-27, 25.
541 ‘The U.S. in Moscow: Russia C om es to the Fair.’ Time Magazine (03,08.1959): 13.
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watches, or such a kitchen?542 A response to Ford’s claim that the automobile 
played a ‘not insignificant role in the contemporary standard of living’ o f Americans 
was: ‘of course, the automobiles o f Ford, Chrysler, and General Motors are good 
and technically sound... [but] these cars possess excessive, practically non­
warranted ratings. They are heavy and not economical, and very difficult to 
repair.’.543 Luxury Italian cars received general praise but were occasionally 
dismissed as frivolous and unnecessary. The citizens of the Soviet Union did not 
need such vehicles; they needed vehicles ‘suited for the terrain and the weather’ o f  
their country (the result was the Lada/Zhiguli based on the Fiat 124 and which 
required a phenomenal alteration o f sixty-five percent o f its components in order to 
be produced in and suitable for the USSR).544 ‘People who needed puerile goods 
were an anachronism to socialism’ .545
In an interview the scholar Martin Dewhirst stated that the idea o f a 
boomerang effect or counter-productiveness o f Western exhibitions did not arise 
until the late 1960s -  early 1970s. Later Soviet resentment could be interpreted as a 
combination of: a rejection o f the unobtainable; a distaste for consumerism as it was 
co-opted by the Soviet regime; and part of a global trend towards consumption 
cynicism. Dewhirst’s assessment of the Soviet population’s reaction to the 
American, and British Exhibitions (1959-1961) warrants citing at length. Starting 
with the American exhibition he was to assess the general response as positive, there 
having been ‘huge crowds’, and a surprising sense of inventiveness as visitors stole 
a wide range o f items at an astonishing speed. He believed the crowds o f people 
‘went to see the new American gadgets at the American exhibition. They were very 
impressed they were very excited. Some of them I heard had been back time and 
time again if they could get in.’.546 On the British Industrial Exhibition, at which he 
worked at a stand selling weaving looms, the crowds and queues were also 
substantial, the questions were extremely detailed and there was a dominant mood 
of optimism, and that the asking o f questions into technological procedures that 
were as yet unknown in the Soviet Union was a patriotic inquiry into the near future.
542 Smolianskii, ‘Liudi, tekhnika i vremia’ 25.
543 Smolianskii, ‘Liudi, tekhnika i vremia’ 26.
544 Interview with K. Bakhtov in A. Shavrin, VAZ: 30 Letiiu volzhskogo avtomobil’nooo 
posvlashchaetsia. Stranitsv istorii (Finland: Benecap, 1997) 130.
545 Smolianskii, ‘Liudi, tekhnika i vremia’ 26.
546 Interview with Martin Dewhirst, Glasgow April 2001.
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However, there was a feeling that Western products were superior to Soviet made
goods. At the British Light Industrial Exhibition, the British restaurant and pub
(intended for exhibition staff but visited by Russians) were staffed primarily but not
exclusively, with Soviet waiters. The languid nature of the Soviet serving style was
to cause the British waiters great distress.
It is a little bit tantalizing - you could enter Sokol’niki and see the American 
exhibition or the British exhibition - it was as if  you had suddenly left the 
Soviet Union behind you in most respects [and]... found yourself in the West 
for half a day or a whole day or two or three hours and then you have to go 
back again to the reality o f Soviet grim life and it could well be that on the 
rebound you felt more fed up and distressed than ever.
Be the press coverage laudatory or dismissive, there was an overarching 
sense that the West was at a point in modernisation where the Soviet Union wanted 
to be. The West represented a fixed point in the Soviet future and this future was 
exhibited with the objectives o f amassing information, building international 
political and economic contacts, and motivating Soviet citizens. It provided the 
images for Khrushchev’s controlled consumption that was a significant aspect o f the 
social contract between the state and the population. The idealism of the revolution 
had faded and the brutality of Stalinism was set aside and then consumerism filled 
this void. The imagery o f the objective did not need to be created, as it existed 
within Western nations, all that needed to be done was to disseminate a motivational 
image; and to insure that there was no conflation o f the ideas of consumption and 
democracy.547
547 Oleg PIsarzhevskii, ‘Vstrecha v sokornikakh,’ Kul’tura i zhizn’ no. 9 (1959): 50-53, 51
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Exhibitions
a. American National Exhibition 1959
Khudozhniki Ameriki 
Svezha Pamiati 
Vot byla vremechko voina!
Den 'gi tekli v karman 
Krov' îekla iz ran 
No krov ' 
Lelas’ daleko 
Ot nas 
Den 'gi blizko 
(A, Zamoshkin) 5 4 s
Organised by the United States Information Agency (USIA), the American 
exhibition was a collaborative government and industry effort with the industry 
contributions from approximately eight hundred firms supplying stands, samples, 
staff and shipping, surpassing that of the government. Despite calls from influential 
Americans such as US ambassador Llewellyn Thompson and George Allen that it 
would be best to keep the exhibition modest (under five million US dollars) the 
enthusiasm displayed by American businesses and the seizing o f this potentially 
unique opportunity on the part o f the American government, resulted in an 
extravagant display o f the American way o f life. For American businesses 
participation tended to be more patriotic than profitable.
The general themes presented in the American exhibition were similar to 
those at the French, English or Italian National Exhibitions. The themes included: 
labour, agriculture, health, education, atomic research, transportation, consumer 
goods, petrochemicals, fine art and lifestyles. Pavilions were designed and 
constructed to display successes with modem materials and architectural innovation. 
At the US exhibition, these structures consisted o f a geodesic dome and a pavilion 
made entirely out o f plastics. Some highlights of the American exhibition included 
the IBM RAM AC computer that was pre-programmed to answer four thousand 
questions in ten languages; the supermarket with its frozen food section; the photo 
exhibition of the Family o f Man; the children’s playground complete with building 
blocks, bicycles, paint sets, construction kits, doll houses, stuffed animals, games, 
sledges, scooters, fire trucks, chemistry sets, electric trains with railroad stations, a
548 A. Zamoshkin, ‘Khudozhniki Ameriki,’ Oaonek no.5 (31,01.60): 16.
174
cowboy ghost town, and a helical slide made out o f fibreglass; the six room pre­
fabricated ranch house; the Polaroid station where, based on official attendance 
figures, one in five visitors or fifteen thousand people per day could have their 
picture taken; the regular fashions shows with models o f diverse ethnic origins 
dancing to rock and roll music; the twenty-two American cars; and the Pepsi-Cola 
sample booths. There was also a very popular variety show directed by Ed Sullivan. 
After becoming discouraged by the tense atmosphere surrounding those writing in 
the open guest books and the comments in the books, the Americans altered the 
format to simulate individual polling booths with comment ‘ballots’. In addition, a 
poll run on the RAMAC computer was used to gauge the ‘average’ reaction to the 
exhibition. A positive rating o f eighty-five percent was listed with the RAMAC 
computer and sixty-five percent o f the comments in the guest books were 
predominantly favourable.
The umbrella theme o f the American exhibition was ‘average’ America and 
lengths were taken to ensure that this was communicated. Coupled with the idea of 
average was the idea that the USA was a land of the people, that the wealth of the 
land was the wealth o f the ‘average’ American. In his opening address. Vice 
President Richard Nixon went so far as itemise the wealth o f the average family: 
‘every family purchases on average nine suits and dresses and fourteen pairs of 
shoes a year’.549 This concentration on ‘average’ was far more prevalent at the 
American exhibition than at other national exhibitions. For example, while the 
British felt that they had to present a realistic and plausible image, see such topics as 
‘Rolls Roy ce: the best car in the world?’ in which the supremacy o f the Rolls was 
not really questioned or ‘Problems o f automobile movement in England’ in which 
the logistical problems o f having a plethora o f passenger cars was addressed (it was 
illustrated by a picture o f a traffic jam on the motorway) they made little attempt to 
exhibit the ‘average’. French participation, particularly in fashion, made no attempt 
at ‘average’. The American obsession with presenting the ‘average’ was derided 
even by American journalists who interpreted it as ‘the Russians' built-in suspicion 
that all national exhibitions are really lavishly produced Potemkin villages.’550 The
549 A poor family was said to be one that on average purchased one suit every two years, a 
jacket every 10 years, a woman’s  hat every two years and a woman’s winter jacket every 
five years and a summer jacket once every four years.
550 Max Frankel, New York Times (27 July 1959) 12(P).
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Soviet press, commenting on the General Electric kitchen, home of the infamous 
kitchen debate, praised it as ‘such a kitchen’ but noted that it could not possibly be 
representative of an ‘average’ kitchen in Kentucky (as was claimed), as Kentucky 
was a ‘disaster region’ .551 The Soviet press dismissed the electronic kitchen with its 
wealth o f gadgets as ‘expensive, even for the United States’ .552 William Benton, 
former Assistant Secretary of State said that: ‘the United States was selling its 
lifestyle... an image of a free and peace-loving America in which citizens lived in 
comfort with all modern conveniences’ .553 Much to the disappointment o f many 
Soviet officials, the consumer and cultural aspects of the exhibition overwhelmed 
the industrial. Even industrial aspects o f the exhibition were geared towards the 
final product and its avail ability. 554
Refusing to be limited by Soviet censors, initially all American films, 
performing art groups and slide shows as well as many books were censored, the 
USIA and American industries had a great deal o f success in determining the 
composition of their displays and samples. Initially banned on the basis that it 
might cause ‘stampedes, ’555 the distribution o f Pepsi Cola, Polaroid pictures, plastic 
bowls, and prepared foods was negotiated. The distribution of samples was not 
unique to the American exhibition. At most national and industrial exhibitions 
souvenir items, brochures and samples from working lines were distributed. John R. 
Thomas, an American guide, wrote that the distribution o f cosmetics, Pepsi,
Polaroid photos, prepared foods, plastic bowls, souvenirs, lapel buttons and an 
estimated twelve million brochures did indeed create ‘near riots. ’ 556 Particular 
concern was expressed that excessive attention would be paid to American 
cosmetics and cosmetic samples as Soviet policy had recently started promoting the
551 Borisov, ‘Reklama I zhizn’ 215.
552 Smolianskii, ‘Liudi, tekhnika I vremia’ 25.
553 Marilyn S, Kushner, ‘Exhibiting Art at the American National Exhibition in Moscow,’ 
Journal of Cold War Studies Vol.4 no.1. Winter (2002): 6-26, 7.
554 One method of displaying the facts w as to have large placards detailing figures such as  
w ages, and cost in terms of work hours. For example, the placards that surrounded a 
donated Chevrolet contained information describing the internal workings of the vehicle, the 
number of hours ‘the average man’ would need to work in order to purchase the car, and 
describe the waiting list for such an item. The Soviet spectators were to be informed that in 
the United States ‘every seven  seconds there is a new baby born and every twenty seconds  
a new car is turned off the production lines. ‘McClellan, Harold, ‘A Review of the American 
National Exhibition in Moscow July 25-Septem ber 4th,’ USIA (1959): 8,
555 Hixson, Parting the Curtain 189.
556 John R. Thomas, Report on Service with the American Exhibition in M oscow (Santa 
Monica: The Rand Corporation, 1960) 24.
176
use o f skin care products and make-up: ‘many women still have not thrown off the 
idea that taking care o f one’s face- the necessity o f a nice complexion and the use of 
cosmetics is indulgent and vain. Exactly now, when the woman is constantly under 
everyone’s gaze in the factory, in society, in enterprises, she should have a tidy, 
proper and beautiful appearance. ’557 There was some Soviet cosmetic production, 
for example the Svoboda plant on the outskirts o f Moscow was responsible for 
supplying forty percent o f all toilet soaps and creams, All-Union Theatrical 
Association that produced lipstick, rouge, nail polish and eye pencils for theatrical 
and general consumption, Rassvet manufactured lipsticks, mascara and creams, and 
Novaya Zaiya which produced perfumed products. In response to a query about 
official opinion on using cosmetics, an official representative of Svoboda was to 
answer that the government had never been against cosmetics, but that it was only 
with economic improvements that industry and consumers could indulge in 
increasingly popular items such as powders, eye makeup, nail polish, perms and hair 
dyes.558
An American plastics and synthetics specialist uncharitably likened Russians 
to ‘locusts’ and declared that the children were proficient ‘little capitalists’ who 
would barter for souvenir pins and chewing gum .559 Martin Dewhirst, who worked 
at several British exhibitions, recalled similar reactions at the British exhibition in 
1961. The British, Americans and other nations/firms, designed certain aspects of 
the exhibition to facilitate theft. Tangible exposure was not to be limited to those 
attending the exhibition. In the journal Soviet Culture, one can read o f the novel 
open shelf book display containing eleven thousand titles, with multiple copies; and 
that the Americans were constantly ordering replacements.seo In the first day, six 
hundred books including fourteen bibles were missing and within a few days after 
opening, the display had to be shut down, as seventy percent of the books were 
gone. A photo o f the British Industrial Exhibition of 1961 taken by John Massey
557 As quoted in Mary Neuburger, ‘Veils, Shalvari, and Matters of Dress; Unraveling the 
Fabric of W omen’s Lives in Communist Bulgaria,’ Style and Socialism: Modernity and 
Material Culture in Post-War Eastern Europe.’ 169-188: 183.
558 Corstni, Caviar For Breakfast 130.
559 ‘Office of the American Exhibition in Moscow, Washington D.C.’ USIA American 
Exhibition in Moscow (AEM) no. 65 (03.09.1959) 1.
560 A. Smirnov, ‘The exhibition is not a counter for rotten goods,’ Soviet Culture.
(06.08.1959).
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Stewart shows a crowd o f people looking at the shoe exhibit, which is represented 
by more empty spots where shoes used to be than actual shoes.56i
American self-censorship of goods and technology displayed was ridiculed. 
Why was America prepared to purchase the Soviet turbo drill, but refusing to exhibit 
or to sell bits?’.362 Indeed, while caution to not exhibit goods on the strategic goods 
list was exercised at the American exhibition, it was not atypical for American firms 
to display strategic goods listed technology directly or to display and sell through 
European affiliates and branches. The International Exhibition o f Chemistry in 
Industry, Building and Agriculture o f 1965 with fifty-seven participating American 
companies is one such instance of American firms displaying goods that they were 
not permitted to sell.563 Soviet organisers were frustrated and disappointed that after 
having managed to get American companies to participate, the lack o f American 
presence in most thematic exhibitions was striking, many of the American firms had 
failed to receive the appropriate authorisation that would have allowed the sale o f  
the technology/goods exhibited.564 During the course of the exhibition in 1965, over 
one and a half million Soviet citizens viewed goods that could not be purchased. 
Another instance was the closed exhibition for four thousand specialists o f the latest 
developments o f French and American aviation equipment and navigational systems 
companies,565 Considered a success, success being defined as having been 
interesting for specialists and having gone ‘calmly’, Soviet officials were thwarted 
in their reported willingness to purchase eighty to ninety percent o f the 
components.566 The companies were to man similar displays at Interorgtekhnika- 
66, which was attended by over one million visitors.
Preliminary American research of the facts to be presented at the exhibition 
involved scouring Soviet sources for figures about American goods and services. 
Pravda  in particular, was a source o f many of the American ‘facts’ and figures.
561 Private collection of John M assey Stewart.
562 a s cited in ‘Visitors’ Reactions to the American Exhibit in Moscow: a Preliminary Report,” 
USIA AEM {28.09.1959) 4.
563 ‘O mezhdunarodnoi vystavke khimii v promyshlennosti, stroitel’stve i se l’skom 
khoziaistve,’ RGAE 635/1/641: entire delo, 1- 2.
564 O mezhdunarodnoi vystavke khimii v promyshlennosti, stroitel’stve i se l’skom  
khoziaistve,’ 1 7 .
565 Exhibition of American Firm Friden and French Firm Aleksandr Gober and Co
566 ‘Operativnyi otchet po vystavke schetno-vychislitel’nykh priborov amerikanskoi firmy 
‘Friden’ ustroitel’ frantsuzskaia firma ‘Aleksandr Gober I Ko.,’ RGAE 635/1/692: 67-76, 
67,74.
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American reasoning was that as the figures were ‘familiar’ to Soviet citizens and as 
Soviet citizens could verify the figures, they allowed for greater plausibility. This 
tactic was not restricted to the Americans, Khrushchev used inflated American 
figures on Soviet missile capabilities in Soviet reports, which the Americans than 
translated, interpreting the correlation between the two figures as proof o f American 
intelligence accuracy. Having established plausible figures, lists o f products 
according to price, work hours needed to purchase an item, production figures, 
and/or availability were compiled. This breakdown was applied to items such as the 
twenty-two automotive vehicles and the prefabricated home with Macy’s 
furnishings (including the white pineapple base lamps, wall-to-wall carpeting, 
cocktail tables, and enamel ashtrays). As was the accepted norm, prices o f goods 
were listed in more than one currency. Despite the American use o f some Soviet 
statistics, the Soviet government did not interpret the American presentation as an 
accurate representation of facts and figures, but as sensationalist propaganda.567 
During the late 1950s and 1960s the average size of an overseas American 
trade fair/exhibition was one hundred tons o f goods. The American Exhibition in 
M oscow consisted of over three thousand tons, o f which seven tons were prepared 
foodstuffs.568 In comparison, the British Industrial Exhibition in M oscow in 1961 
was made up of just over one and a half thousand tons. Enormous for a national 
exhibition, the American exhibition was comparable to the international thematic 
exhibitions that occurred during the mid 1960s, for example the Exhibition o f  
Construction and Mechanisation o f Construction Work (1964), Chemistry in 
Industry (1965), Construction, and Agriculture (1965), or Modern Means of 
Mechanising Administrative Governmental Work (1966). Exhibiting nations and 
companies were encouraged to leave unsold exhibited materials behind through a 
transportation pricing system that allowed for cheap transport o f incoming goods 
and exorbitant transport of outgoing goods.569 In response to the punishing return 
shipping prices the commerce department o f the American exhibition announced its 
intention publicly to auction off 1,800 items (including the model kitchen, the
567 ‘Pokazyvaet amerikanskaia firma: noveishee oborudovanie dlia prachechnykh i 
khimchistok,’ Moskovskaia Pravda (23.10,1963): 7.
568 T h e McClellan Report’ 44.
569 se e  various documents In Torgovo-promyshlennaia Palata SSSR  Upravlenie 
Mezhdunarodnykh i Inostrannykh Vystavok v SSSR; RGAE 635/1/-.
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contents o f the model home, tools, automobiles, office supplies, photographic 
equipment/supplies, specifically Polaroid, etc). Humanitarian items such as the iron 
lung were to be donated. The donations were accepted, the auction banned, and 
most o f the material was simply left behind. Six months after the exhibition closed, 
replicas o f many of the displayed goods appeared. For example, G.U.M. earned 
clothes modelled on those seen in the American fashion show, and USIA  
documented an increase in the availability o f processed foods.570 Considering the 
turgid nature of Soviet industry, that only six months were needed represents a 
significant political commitment to the provision o f Western trends.
In principle, the American exhibition was not significantly different from 
other exhibitions/trade fairs. The Italian government supported its national 
industries’ activities, the British displayed a plethora of consumer goods and 
promoted the Beatles, and in a display o f all that was modem and chic the French 
imported hairstylists publicly to cut the hair o f Soviet models. Articles featuring the 
French hair stylist Kurt Mumer described how he used technology to make women 
in over twelve countries beautiful.57i The American exhibition was not such a 
breach in containment that the Soviet officials decided to do away with exhibitions; 
indeed, exhibitions were to increase in frequency. What the American exhibition 
was bigger (both in size and in attendance with official figures o f seventy to eighty 
thousand per day over six weeks), brasher and earlier than most exhibitions. Most 
importantly, it was American. No other Western nation, and therefore exhibition, 
evoked such a strong reaction. By the 1950s, the question ‘what is America?’ was 
internationally answered with a list o f commodities: cars, jeans, jazz, soft drinks, 
chewing gum and plastic products. The economic and cultural image o f the United 
States in the Soviet Union correlated to the international economic and cultural 
image o f the USA. In a study o f Cold War cultural propaganda Frances Stonor 
Saunders wrote that due: ‘largely to Russian propaganda, America was widely 
regarded as culturally barren, a nation of gum-chewing, Chevy-driving, Dupont- 
sheathed Philistines. ’572 The American Exhibition reinforced this image. Russian 
writer Vasily Aksyonov described the exhibitions as one o f the ‘most important
570 Hixson, Parting the Curtain 211.
571 se e  for example M. Stoianov and V. Markov, ‘Chego ne znaet posetiter,’ Moskovskaia 
Pravda (04.06.1968): 4.
572 Saunders, Who Paid the Piper? 19 and 191.
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events in the opening up o f the Soviet Union,’ a process begun in the 1950s and 
continuing through to the foimation of the Commonwealth o f Independent States.573
b. British Trade Fairs (1961,1966,1968)
Although there was a composite image of the West, each nation had its own 
separate identity. Britain, as the birthplace o f industrialisation, had a special role 
within the umbrella image of the West. The economic image o f Britain including 
ideas such as industrial, modern, dignified, modest, reserved, professional was one 
that both the Soviet government and English exporters o f cultural images chose to 
propagate. To this end, the official Soviet and English images complemented each 
other. The nature o f the British presence in the USSR was reinforced by the extent 
of British trade with the Soviet Union. During the 1950s, the main Soviet trade 
partners were Finland and England. By the end o f the 1960s, they were West 
Germany, France and Italy. There were several conduits through which British 
organisations and the Government could directly present themselves to the Soviet 
public; Angliia, films, cultural exchanges (i.e. ballet, theatre groups), academic 
exchanges (both students and professors), and trade fairs/exhibitions.
The first British Industrial Exhibition, often referred to as the English Light 
Industrial Exhibition in the Soviet press, took place in M oscow 1961 at Sokol’niki 
under the auspice of the umbrella organisation English Industrial and Trade Fairs 
Ltd. The construction time was sixteen days, and involved the building o f two 
pavilions by Belgian firms assisted by French and English companies. One of the 
two new pavilions was wired to hold one hundred quintessential British telephone 
booths with city lines.574 The park paid for beautification work on older pavilions, 
for example façade painting.575 Montage for the British exhibitions was a joint 
effort o f English and Soviet workers. Large numbers o f Soviet workers were 
regularly brought together to work with foreigners during the montage stage of
573 Kushner, ‘Exhibiting Art at the American National Exhibition in Moscow’ 19.
574 ‘Op. otchet upolnomochennogo VTP na angliiskoi torgovo promyshlennoi vystavke v 
1961 qodu.’ RGAE 635/1/456: 6.
575 Writing about the m ontage period of the American exhibition ‘now between aluminium 
and plastic structures...Americans worked hand in hand with young Soviets’ PIsarzhevskii 
expressed that for him, the greatest impact of the exhibition was the futuristic nature of 
engineering, decorations, and the joie de vivre. Oleg PIsarzhevskii, ‘Vstrecha v 
Sokol’nikakh,’ Kul’tura i zhizn’ no. 9, (1959): 50-53, 50.
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exhibitions; the British Exhibition o f 1961 involved 503 workers. Soviet organisers 
were often critical of what they perceived to be the weak showing o f the Soviet 
contribution, citing poor building organisation, poorly qualified workers and inferior 
grade equipment, tools and materials as their chief complaints.576 Soviet organisers 
also complained of poor Soviet departmental organisation, technical support, and 
maintenance o f the fairgrounds.577 W hile the Soviet organisers o f the British 
Industrial Exhibition voiced their displeasure, there were ‘no reprimands’ reportedly 
made by the English. This is in contrast to the American exhibition, as the 
Americans filed complaints about material quality, safety standards and worker 
motivation. Perhaps the Soviet workers had stopped claiming the right to a day off 
on one’s saint’s day as they had during the American exhibition when after one 
enterprising Soviet worker was granted the day off as it was his saint’s day and 
others followed. The English did complain about the hotels, but this was attributed 
to the slowness o f service in the restaurants, and about the need for English tea and 
cigarettes.578 In response, the English were permitted to sell tea and cigarettes:
the English workers complained about the lack o f English cigarettes and tea. 
The exhibition organisers passed the complaints o f the English workers on to 
the Moscow restaurant officials stating that Russian cigarettes and tea would 
not be to the taste o f the English .579
The stress on Soviet departments and industries caused by exhibitions was 
pronounced. The large exhibitions constituted massive bureaucratic undertakings 
for the Soviet state with literally dozens o f committees and hundreds o f departments 
being involved. The Chemistry Exhibition in 1965 involved thirty-two Soviet 
committees and approximately eight hundred industrial enterprises.58o Thus, the 
impact o f exhibitions included not only the hundreds o f thousands who attended an 
exhibition, the millions o f readers/listeners o f various media sources, the hundreds, 
occasionally thousands that worked on the exhibitions, and the friends and families
576 'Op. otchet upolnomochennogo VTP na angliiskoi torgovo promyshlennoi vystavke v 
1961 godu' 12.
577 ‘Op. otchet upolnomochennogo VTP na angliiskoi torgovo promyshlennoi vystavke v 
1961 godu’ 12.
578 ‘Op. Otchet upolnomochennogo VTP na angliiskoi torgovo promyshlennoi vystavke v 
1961 godu’ 25.
579 ‘Op. otchet upolnomochennogo VTP na angliiskoi torgovo promyshlennoi vystavke v 
1961 godu’ 29.
580 ‘O mezhdunarodnoi vystavke khimii v promyshlennosti, stroitel’stve i se l’skom 
khoziaistve,’ RGAE 635/1/641 : entire delo, 38.
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of all of the above, but also workers in dozens of different governmental 
departments and enterprises.
Displays at the British Industrial Fair (1961) were divided into nine 
categories: factory and mechanical equipment; electronic technology (radars, radios, 
and TVs); precision instruments; electronics; chemical and pharmaceutical goods; 
transportation; raw materials and partially fabricated elements; and consumer goods 
(cloth, clothes, shoes, toys etc). 725 firms participated including:
• Imperial Chemical Industries Ltd. (ICI),
• English Electric Co.,
• Rootes Group (now defunct British automobile manufacture that tried 
to take on the Mini with its Glasgow area produced Hillman Imp),
• Automatic Telephone Electric co.,
• Dunlop Rubber Co. Ltd,
• Frank V. Clifford Ltd,
• Associated British Landry Engineers, etc.
Many of the exhibitors were building on experience with the Soviet Union. For 
example in June 1960, the Imperial Chemical Industries of Great Britain organised 
an exhibition of plastics in Moscow which contained ‘broad examples of the 
possibilities of plastics in our day’ssi that included: details on passenger cars, a 
motorboat, a bathroom made entirely out of plastic including tub and toilet, kitchen 
appliances and fixtures, (including a refrigerator); a building, shoes, clothing, rope, 
furniture, synthetic fur and leather, and toys. The plastics exhibit was to display 
items that were of interest ‘even to the non-specialist’ .582 Of the components shown 
at the British Fair eighty percent were industrial components and twenty percent 
were consumer goods.583 This ratio of industrial to consumer goods was 
comparable with the ratio in Soviet national exhibitions, for example in New York 
in 1959. In accordance with standard practice, specialists received invitations to 
lectures, seminars and technical films. These lectures, films etc often comprised a 
significant aspect of the exhibition and the title specialist was flexible enough to 
permit large numbers. At the British Industrial Exhibition there were four hundred 
and thirty lectures and approximately two hundred technical films. Non-technical
581 I. Karev, ‘Na angliiskoi vystavke « P la stich esk ie  m assy v prom yshlennosti»,' 
Vneshniaia torqovlia no.7f1960l: 16.
582 Karev, ‘Na angliiskoi vystavke’ 16,583 ‘Op. otchet upolnomochennogo VTP na angliiskoi torgovo promyshlennoi vystavke v 
1961 godu’ 31.
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films were shown at a separate film festival that same year. As with the American 
exhibition, thousands o f Russian copies o f an exhibition catalogue were printed for 
distribution, individual companies were permitted to distribute prospectuses, and 
souvenirs and samples were available. Another similarity with the American 
exhibition was the alarming rate at which pieces o f the exhibition went missing.
Fig. 10 Missing Shoes ( Courtesy o f John Massey Stewart)
In the above photo, Soviet viewers are examining the open display o f women’s 
shoes. Note the missing o f shoes on the right hand side o f the display as seen in the 
empty gaps. In addition to the militiamen who at any time numbered twenty or 
more, there were ninety-six controllers. Official attendance figures put attendance 
at sixty to eighty thousand a day.584 (See images British Trade Fair courtesy of John 
Massey Stewart) The first major press conference was held on 18 April in Moscow  
well in advance o f opening (05.06.1961). The press coverage o f the fair was of a 
‘working nature,’585 and in comparison with the coverage o f the American 
exhibition, was rather modest.
584 ‘Op. Otchet upolnomochennogo VTP na angliiskoi torgovo promyshlennoi vystavke v 
1961 godu’ 31.
585 ‘Op. Otchet upolnomochennogo VTP na angliiskoi torgovo promyshlennoi vystavke v 
1961 godu’ 4.
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1^Fig. 11 Visitors on American Geodesic Dome: British Trade Fair 1961
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Fig. 12 Visitors: British Trade Fair 1961
In conversation with British Council representatives, the chairman of the 
Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign countries G. A. Zhukov noted that 
Western nations demonstrated a pronounced inability to comprehend that the prime 
objective o f contact was economic: “ the rule we stick to is this: you offer us your 
‘merchandise’, we choose and buy what we need. We offer you something in turn, 
and you buy what you like. If you don’t like it, you don’t have to buy it.’’5*6 It 
should be ‘business like’ and not for ‘political propaganda.’.587 It was Zhukov’s
586 ‘G. A Zhukov’ PRO USSR/680/1 (14/10/61).
587 ‘Record of a Meeting between Her Majesty’s  Ambassador and Mr. Zhukov at the State 
Committee for Cultural Relations with foreign countries on 16/11/60,’ PRO 
USSR/1753/17/11
f
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request that the British conduct themselves in a befitting manner, that is
professionally and business-like.sss
In 1965, the English organisation Sima (which represented 180 companies)
opened a large exhibition (917 square metres), in the Polytechnical museum in
Moscow. The Soviet press and organisers considered the exhibition prestigious due
to the participation of numerous large British companies. In the report assessing the
results o f the exhibition, an abridged list of companies that participated is
accompanied by a table o f products that includes such details as equipment
specifications, model numbers, price, function o f machine and the contact address,
and includes the following companiesssg;
Associated Electrical Industries Ltd,
A VO Ltd,
Bell and Howell Ltd.,
Cambridge Instrument Co. Ltd.,
Croydon Precision Instrument Co.,
Dow Industry Ltd.,
Derritron Ltd.,
Digital Measurements Ltd.,
Electronic Instruments Ltd.,
Electro-thermal Engineering Ltd.,
Elga Pro. Ltd.,
A. Gallen Kamp and Co. Ltd.,
Griffin and George Ltd.,
Hilger and Watts Ltd.,
Joyce Isbel and Co. Ltd.,
Marconi Instruments Ltd.,
Metal Research Ltd.,
Measuring and Scientific Equipment Ltd.,
Muirhead and Co. Ltd.,
Perkins-Elmer Ltd.,
Pye-Ling Ltd. (mechanical acoustics/vibration engineering), 
W. G. Pye and Co. Ltd.(instrument makers),
Racal Communications Ltd. (now part o f the Thales Group), 
The Rank Organisation,
SE Laboratories Ltd.,
Solartron Electronic group Ltd.,
H. Tinsley and Co. Ltd. (precision instruments).
588 ‘Record of a Meeting between Her Majesty’s Ambassador and Mr. Zhukov at the State 
Committee for Cultural Relations with foreign countries on 16/11/60’
589 ‘Op. otchet upolnomochennogo vsesoiuznoi torgovoi palaty nespetsiaiizirovannoi 
vystavke elektronnykh kontrol’no izmeritel’nykh, nauchnykh, analitichiskikh priborov 
britanskoi assotsiatsii ‘Saim a,’ RGAE 635/1/635; 50-86.
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This exhibition of scientific and analytical instruments was attended by twenty-five 
thousand people of whom fewer than half (ten thousand) were invited specialists. 
Nine lectures were given and drew an audience of 2,700 specialists (lecture halls 
were overflowing) and all major newspapers, radio and T V  covered the exhibition. 
Soviet citizens who had organisational contact with the exhibition included: forty- 
two translators, one administrator, nine exponent watchers, one electrician, and one 
buffet person. The English provided 115 personnel. Of the 607 exponents that 
received ‘high marks’, ninety-six were purchased immediately. Half a billion 
roubles worth o f import contracts to become effective in 1965 were signed during 
the course o f the exhibition.590 Each firm displayed its own instruments and each 
firm negotiated its own contracts. The Soviet organisers saw the lack o f thematic 
organisation and a central negotiating body as marked drawbacks.59i In the 
‘ideological section’ o f the assessment o f the exhibition the Vsesoiuznaia torgovaia 
palata (VTP) reports having had difficulties in ensuring that the foreigners were 
sufficiently busy at spectacles and only transported by private bus.592 However, the 
challenges did not deter the British from organising another fair in 1966.
In 1966, the second British Industrial Fair (08.07.1966-24.07.1966) was held 
in Sokol’niki. The exhibition involved 498 firms and cost the British 2,500,000 
pounds. The British Prime Minister Harold W ilson represented the government and 
his speeches conveyed its support o f the expansion of trade contacts between British 
and Soviet industry as well as alluding to facilitating the establishment of trade ties. 
While attended by the usual high-ranking officials and specialists, the Second 
British Industrial Trade Fair also drew significant general attendance. The 
habitually modest assessments o f the Soviet press were that half a million Soviet 
citizens attended the festival.593 The official figures are in line with the published 
ones with 452,300 laymen and 75,000 specialists attending the exhibition and 
31,000 specialists/students attending the coinciding sixty-two lectures, and twenty-
590 'Op. otchet upolnomochennogo vsesoiuznoi torgovoi palaty nespetsiaiizirovannoi 
vystavke elektronnykh kontrol’no izmeritel’nykh, nauchnykh, analitichiskikh priborov 
britanskoi assotsiatsii ‘Saima’ 67.
591 ‘Op. otchet upolnomochennogo vsesoiuznoi torgovoi palaty nespetsiaiizirovannoi 
vystavke elektronnykh kontrol’no izmeritel’nykh, nauchnykh, analitichiskikh priborov 
britanskoi assotsiatsii ‘Salm a’ 70.
592 ‘Op. otchet upolnomochennogo vsesoiuznoi torgovoi palaty nespetsiaiizirovannoi 
vystavke elektronnykh kontrol’no izmeritel’nykh, nauchnykh, analitichiskikh priborov 
britanskoi assotsiatsii ‘Saima’: 70-71.
593 Vneshniaia torqovlia no.8, (1966): advertisement on inside back cover.
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one technical films.594 In addition, 1,305 British guests attended. Advertising was 
adequate with 1,200 posters, seventeen advertisements in all major newspapers, TV 
exposure and the BBC had an open information centre.
As with other exhibitions, the official attendance figures are low due to 
unofficial entrance to the park. There were political motives behind accessing 
attendance at national exhibitions as lower than they were. The official figures have 
general attendance o f the British Industrial Fair as being less than those for the 
International Poultry Farming exhibition of 1966 that reportedly drew 650,000 
laymen and 32,000 specialists.595 Reporting on the exhibition, A. U l’ina, noted that 
it was the ‘largest exhibition o f the economic potential/capacity o f English firms for 
the Soviet Union,’596 Reportage on Great Britain increased during 1966 with 
journals such as Dekorativnoe iskusstvo SSSR featuring Britain. Articles were a 
combination o f praise and caution, for example, an article on the London tourist 
design centre that produced ‘great’ tourist products, both modem and traditional: 
mugs, jugs, plates, highland cow plush key chains etc.597 The London street 
exhibition included the wonders o f modem dustbins, bus stops and street lamps. 
These too got mention in the press.598
Dominated by such themes as metallurgy, electrical technology, pulp and 
paper etc the consumer industry was represented at the 1966 fair; of the 498 firms 
forty-four were textile-related and while many of these firms were selling lines, they 
exhibited end-products. Fabrics that were not yet available within the Soviet Union 
were displayed as common items; bright colours and intricate pattems were also 
popular. Appliances such as personal electronic and radio devices were also 
popular display items. More than nine hundred Soviet citizens were involved in the 
running of the exhibition. Two incidents were listed in the main report of VTP: that 
the controller Domanin Ivan Dmitievich while on duty was found drunk and in the 
company of equally inebriated foreign (predominantly Finnish) workers and that the 
translator Gennadi Ivanovich Smirnov was unable to work due to having taken
594 Mezhdunarodnve I inostrannve vvstavki v SSSR  1946-1972 (Moskva: Torgovo- 
Promyshlennaia Palata SSSR , 1973).
595 Mezhdunarodnve i inostrannve vvstavki v SSSR .
596 V. Urina, TorgovyI partner...’, Vneshniaia torqovlia no. 7(1966): 33-34, 33. In this article 
the attendance figures for specialists is given as seventy thousand.
597 Felisati Eshba, ‘Londonskli dizain-tsentr,’ Dekorativnoe iskusstvo SSSR  no.11 (1966): 
44-45.
598 ‘Gorodskoe oborudovanie Londona,' Dekorativnoe iskusstvo SSSR  no. 8 (1966): 42-43.
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ill.599 Officially, the British trade fairs were assessed as good in all areas, although 
the British were accused of often labelling an exhibition as international that 
exclusively contained British products/firms.eoo Soviet specialists were reported to 
give ‘high marks’ to British machinists and instrument-making technicians.eoi In 
relation to the tool machine industry displayed at the Second British Industrial Fair, 
an unnamed Soviet engineer was quoted as saying that the British machine-tool 
industry machines demonstrated a ‘comparatively high level’ .602
Another British success was the British Exhibition of Scientific Instruments 
(18.03.1968 -  27.03.1968) in which eighty-one firms (295 staff members) manned 
displays covering 4,160 square metres. 251,768kgs of goods arrived and 118, 523 
left, with purchases of just under two million roubles. Attendance was estimated to 
be sixty-four thousand with six hundred attendees coming in from other cities. 
Major themes included agriculture, medicine, and scientific research (laboratory 
work). VTP listed the exhibition as having been of interest to specialists, eighty 
percent of exponents being worthy of examination, the firms ‘certainly displayed 
good and new technology in the exponents, among which were those that were 
listed on the so-called strategic goods list’,603 while the Ministry of Culture 
dismissed the exhibition as not being of any particular interest.604 The British 
specialists were considered to know their material well and to be of a high level.eos 
The British also received praise for making the majority of their presentations in 
Russian. Metropol hired special waiters for the duration of the exhibition, as there 
were a prolific number of networking dinners. The hiring of speeial waiters to work 
both with the general public at exhibitions, for example, the combined waiters that 
worked the typical British pub at the English Light Industrial Fair (1961) or the 
special team of waiters that worked the small and largely exclusive Swiss firm 
Varian exhibition that was held at the Lomonosov University to serve foreigners, 
was common.
599 ‘Op. otchet upolnomochennogo vsesoiuznoi torgovoi palaty na spetsiallzirovannoi 
vystavke elektronnykh kontrol’no-izmeritel’nykh, nauchnykh, i analitichiskikh priborov 
britanskoi assotsiatsii 'Saima”.
600 Na vsekh kontinentakh mira 17.
601 V. Ul’ina, ‘Torgovyi partner’ Vneshniaia toraoviia no, 7, (1966): 33-34, 34.
602 urina, ‘Torgovyi partner’ 34.
603 ‘Na britanskoi vystavke nauchnykh priborov,’ RGAE 635/1/803: 75-89, 77.
604 ‘Na britanskoi vystavke nauchnykh priborov’ 77.
605 ‘Na britanskoi vystavke nauchnykh priborov’ 81.
190
The image of the British as conservative, stable, hard working, logical (see the 
respect given to British engineers), culturally wealthy (think Shakespeare), modest 
and as having achieved modernity without excess, bore a marked similarity to 
Khrushchev’s homo sovieticus. Britain was the land of the practical Land Rover as 
opposed to the chrome and fin-tails of the Americans, while still being modern 
enough to produce the Beatles. Perhaps in part because British exhibitions matched 
Soviet exhibition norms in terms of consumer goods content, the British image 
never contained the overpowering resonance of consumption of the Americans. In 
the inverse correlation between consumerism and soulnessness, the British were the 
point where the two converged. Having given the world great literature, music, and 
art, England was buttressed by past culture and remained less debased. British trade 
fairs and exhibitions, and the participation in other thematic fairs reinforced this 
image. Passion, flair and style were given to the French and the Italians. As Martin 
Dewhirst recalled:
... I was rather offended by the fact that the favourite country, I often asked 
them where they would go if they could go to one Western country, it was 
neither Britain nor America but it was France.. .it was Paris that they wanted 
to see and die if necessary... there had been a little breath of France in 
Moscow in 1960...606
c. French and clothing exhibitions
In 1960 (08.08.1960), the Central Committee declared that the assortment of 
merchandise purchased from abroad would include clothing, textiles and associated 
clothing merchandise of the ‘high quality and assorted diversity that was demanded 
by the population. ’607 This allowed Soviet purchasers to solicit offers from Western 
countries regarding textiles, production lines, and garments. One means of 
acquiring information on Western textiles, clothing etc was to invite companies to 
exhibit their products in either national, industrial, or company specific exhibitions. 
‘Fashion shows, including foreign ones from East and West, were held regularly in 
the Soviet Union and annual meetings of fashion designers from the fraternal 
countries were convened.’eos In 1965, the American Firm Petrocelli Clothes Inc.
606 Interview with Martin Dewhirst, Glasgow April 2001.
607 KPSS V rezoliutsiiakh i resheniiakh s ”ezdov. konferentsii Î plenumov TsK. Vol. 9 1956- 
1960 (Moskva) 563-564; Zakharova, ‘Le réseau des canaux officials de transferts des  
m odes vestimentaires occidentale en URSS dans les années 1950-1960’ .
608 Crowley and Reid Style and Socialism 2.
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held a small exhibition of men’s outerwear/overcoats, at which the ratio of Soviet 
attendees to US representatives, family and models was five to one. The outer 
clothes on display received praise for their workmanship, cloth and style.609 Many 
of the fashions exhibited at these fairs would be replicated and introduced in the 
larger Soviet fashion houses. Clothing and accessory exhibitions were small in 
comparison to other thematic exhibitions, but they were numerous and many 
received press coverage. The best articles of clothing and footwear displayed either 
at closed or open exhibitions during the 1950s and early 1960s were gathered for 
and displayed at the International Clothing Exhibition in the autumn of 1967. At 
the International Clothing Exhibition, the collusion between state and foreign was 
taken further than usual, as it was a Soviet organised event in which foreign 
fashions were displayed. Of the Western nations, France was the definitive nation 
in fashion.
The French National Exhibition opened on 15 August 1961 and its official 
purpose, as printed in the Soviet press, was that the French ‘wanted to show the best 
achievements of our [their] country in industry, agriculture, science and technology. 
Along with this, we would like to show the character of France in the regions of 
culture, art and everyday life.’eio It covered forty thousand square metres, and was 
proclaimed, like other national exhibitions, to be the ‘biggest foreign trade fair 
ever’ .611 The main themes included: school, professional life, public health, fine 
arts, fashion, transport and social security. For the public there were ‘sweets in 
colourful wrappers, [with] bunnies and pretty little stars...We [the Soviet attendees] 
were amazed that France was able to do this’.6 i2 Some newspaper articles 
mentioning the nicely wrapped French sweets also cautioned the reader against 
interpreting France as a children’s paradise: ‘but remember that 100,000 children 
per year fail to finish school as their parents lack the funds’ .613 The Soviet 
exhibition goers were reported as having been delighted by the ‘beautiful dresses, 
make up, vehicles, and transformers’.6i4 While the displays of fashion and make-up
609 'Petrocelli Kloudz Eng ko,,’ RGAE 635/1/ 635: 94.
610 P. Efemov, ‘Znakomstvo s Frantsiel I mysli o Frantsil,’ Movoe vremla no.34(1961): 12- 
14 , 12 .
611 Na vsekh kontinentakh mira 21.
612 Efemov, ‘Znakomstvo s Frantsiei i mysli o Frantsii’ 12.
613 Efemov, ‘Znakomstvo s Frantsiei i mysli o Frantsii’ 12,
614 Efemov, ‘Znakomstvo s  Frantsiei i mysli o Frantsii’ 13,14.
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in the French exhibition received praise, they had been condemned in the American 
exhibition with comments such as: ‘for whom were many of the goods on display? 
‘For the philistines! ... From the ultramodern dresses and to the painted faces.'ei5 
The modern synthetic French carpets, to which Dekorativnoe iskusstvo dedicated an 
entire article,6i6 and the art display, were likewise well received. Perhaps the 
success of the art display can be attributed to the tractor theme that dominated a 
large section of the exhibit.61? However, the French were subject to a charge 
similar to that levelled at the Americans for ‘not giving true technical information 
about the instruments’ on display.eis Despite the charge of focusing on consumer 
goods, the exhibition organisers dedicated two days (17-18.08.1961) to technology 
during which lectures about construction, the chemical industry, electrical 
technology and prefabricated industry were given. Of particular interest for 
specialists was the discussion of France’s uranium production and its role in atomic 
research and development. The final assessment of the journalist P. Efemov was 
that France had potential, but needed to be on a more socialist and peace-loving path 
in order to allow working families to eat meat every day and to achieve its potential 
as a great nation.6i9
During the exhibition the French distributed 200,000 copies of the magazine 
Elle. The special edition of the magazine served the dual purpose of representing a 
typical French publication as well as serving as the fashion catalogue for the 
exhibition. The sale of the clothing was forbidden, nonetheless the majority of the 
clothing and exhibited goods remained in the USSR. Many of the clothing items, 
including lingerie from the lingerie boutique, were to serve as models for Soviet 
production. This use of French fashion for prototypes was the continuation of a 
process that had begun as early as 1957 when the president of USSR Chambers of 
Commerce Nesterov sought to have dresses of the great French fashion houses sold 
in G.U.M .620
615 Smolianskii, 'Liudi, tekhnika i vremia’ 26.
616 V. Vygoiov, ‘Vozrozhdennoe iskusstvo -  kovry na frantsuzkoi natsional’noi vystavke/ 
Dekorativnoe Iskusstvo SSSR  no.12 (1961): 39-43, 40.
617 Vygoiov, ‘Vozrozhdennoe iskusstvo’ 40.
618 RGAE 635/1 /801: 108.
619 Efemov, ‘Znakomstvo s Frantsiei i mysli o Frantsii’ 14.
620 Zakharova, ‘Le réseau des canaux officials de transferts des m odes vestimentaires 
occidentals en URSS dans les années 1950-1960’ 7.
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For Soviet planners the introduction of modem synthetic fibres was more 
important than modern fashion and the adequate provision of footwear was 
paramount. Chronic shortages of footwear had resulted in Soviet planners actively 
seeking external remedies: new production methods, new fabrics, and new styles. 
Thus, an ensuing number of shoe exhibitions. In 1965, the shoe company Fielding 
(USA) held a closed exhibition for two and a half thousand invited guests only. On 
15, 18, 19, and 20 November 1968, the French Shoe Federation exhibited to an 
invitation only audience at Dom modelei odezhdy. While neither exhibition was 
publicly advertised nor open to the public, a contract with the federation, which 
represented twenty-five exhibiting firms, was signed and an initial 270 pairs and 
twenty-nine individual shoes were purchased from a total of 1,571 pairs of men’s, 
women’s and children’s summer and winter shoes (almost twenty percent of the 
exhibited shoes).62i While the purchased pairs of shoes could be used either for 
industrial purposes, or for personal puiposes, going straight onto the feet of party 
elite and their families, it is fairly certain that the purchased half pairs of shoes 
served little purpose other than replication. Indeed, shoes and shoe production was 
such a notorious failing of the Soviet system during this period -  there was a 
running anecdote about an Indian leader visiting the Soviet Union and seeing empty 
stores except for one with piles of shoes. Running in to get a pair of shoes he 
examines them and notes that in India they would not wear such shoes either. A 
week after the French Shoe Exhibition at Dom modelei odezhdy, the Austrian shoe 
company ‘Kraus and Co.’ (28-29.11.1968) exhibited. Attendance was limited, but 
the outcome was deemed positive as four hundred popular men’s, women’s and 
children’s shoes were purchased. Of the four hundred, a reported one hundred were 
immediately slated for production.622 The VTP report also notes that Raznoeksport 
had signed a contract with Kraus prior to the exhibition for the purchase of shoes for 
1969, however no supporting figures are given.623 The Soviet specialists invited to 
the various shoe exhibitions were concerned with modern production methods, 
materials and given the number of different shoe models purchased, style. For the
621 ‘Osnovnye svedeniia 0  vystavke <Obuv’>,’ RGAE 635/1/806: 1-2, 2.
622 ‘<Krauz i Ko.> v gorode Moskve,’ RGAE 635/1 /806: 3-4.
623 “<Krauz i Ko.> v gorode Moskve,' 4.
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Soviet shoe industry, foreign shoes serving as prototypes presented challenges in 
fashion as well as in production methods and materials.
Fig. 13 Shoes-69 in Volzhskii avtosroiteV (11.10.1969)
The largest thematic exhibition on footwear was Shoes-69 (24.09.1969- 
OS. 10.1969). Shoes-69 was o f interest to both the layperson and the specialist due to 
its modem portrayal o f ‘new production and technological lines processing natural 
and synthetic leather, shoes and different handling o f leather and other materials’ as 
well as ‘shoes o f all types and models’.624 Through the display o f ‘new 
technological methods’ one could learn about ‘rational organisational forms o f the 
work place’.625 Despite being extensively covered by the media and having an 
official attendance record o f 700, 000 laypersons and 100,000 invited specialists 
with a number o f foreign specialists from the GDR, FRG, Czechoslovakia, Poland, 
Hungary, France, and Italy, the attendance figures were perceived as low due to
624 M. Arabekov, 'Sokol'niki v 1969 godu,’ Vneshniaia toraovlia no.11 (1969): 53-54, 53.
625 Arabekov, ‘Sokol’niki v 1969 godu’ 54.
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competition from concurrent exhibitions including Inpoligraftnash-69, the Polish 
National Exhibition, and the Bulgarian National Exhibition.626 In addition to the 
concurrent exhibitions, the cold October weather was listed as another reason why 
attendance was lower than expected. Complaints were to come from VTP that not 
only was public attendance disappointing but business participation was weak, 
specifically firms from ‘Austria, West Germany, Switzerland, Japan and the 
Scandinavian countries did not show sufficient interest in the exhibition.’627 Soviet 
officials determined that there was a lack of interest on the part of foreign 
companies and nations based on the square metres visiting companies and nations 
requested for a display and the comparative number of square metres that a nation 
had used for previous unrelated exhibitions. For example, while West Germany had 
used 9,514 square metres for Avtomatizatia -  69 and 8,977 square metres for 
Inpoligrafmash-69 they only reserved 2,944 square metres for Obuv’-69 (Shoes-69). 
The Scandinavians and the Austrians had similarly low figures.628 The low figures 
were attributed to the fact that the dates of the exhibition were changed at the last 
minute from 10-24.09.1969 to 24.09.1969- 10.10.1969, in order to allow exponents 
that were to be shown at the Parisian exhibition ‘Week of Leather’ to be included in 
the Soviet exhibition. In the end, 998 registered firms from thirty-seven countries 
participated as well as two international shoe associations. The exhibition was 
open-air and housed with most of the space being used by capitalist and developing 
nations 23,689 square metre (socialist countries had 7,911 square metres) with a 
strong showing of non-Western nations including; Algeria, Argentina, Brazil, Iraq, 
Iran, Cuba, Pakistan, Singapore, and India. While the capitalist nations were both 
indoors and outdoors, the Socialist nations only exhibited indoors. Below is a list of 
the nine major participants.629
626 ‘Obuv’-69,’ ’RGAE 635/1/857; 57.627 'Obuv'-69,', RGAE 635/1/ 857: 52.
628 ‘Obuv’-69,’ RGAE 635/1/ 857: 53.629 ‘Obuv’-69,’ RGAE 635/1/857: 54.
196
Table 3 Western Participation at Shoes-69
Number of 
Companies
Square metres
Italy 91 5680
West Germany 35 2944
France 77 2850
Czechoslovakia 40 2200
Great Britain 33 2194
Netherlands 75 1532
Austria 38 1400
East Germany 83 1456
Hungary 27 1372
Norway, Denmark and the United States were reported as being ‘weakly 
represented’ with stands covering twenty, fifteen, and seventy-eight square metres 
respectively. The American stand was a particular disappointment not merely due 
to its size (VTP had tried and failed to convince American firms to attend either 
directly or through European affiliates without success), but because it was 
dominated by examples of finished footwear and leather goods. 63o The official final 
exhibition report itemised each participant country and the relative success of its 
respective display. The thirty-three British firms were said to have generated ‘great 
interest’ at the exhibition and to have ‘actively participated’ in it.esi The British 
display was of interest as it combined not only displays of shoes and boots but also 
automated machines for punching out forms, gluing, repair machines etc. The three 
strongest British firms were Lotus, John White, and International Shoe Machinery, 
each of which signed a contract with the Soviet Union.532 The shoe association 
Anchi (Italian) representing a conglomeration of eighty-eight firms chose to dedicate 
sixty percent of its displays to industrial machines. In addition to the production 
lines on display, there was a ‘large assortment of shoes, leather and leather 
goods.’633 The Canadian stand was deemed interesting as it had a large display of 
synthetic and natural leather women’s, men’s and children’s shoes despite there only 
being one firm present (Satra).
630 ‘Obuv’-69.’, RGAE 635/1/ 857: 69.
631 ‘Obuv’-69/RGAE 635/1 /857: 63.
632 ‘Obuv’-69.’RGAE 635/1/ 857: 63.
633 ‘Obuv’-69,’RGAE 635/1/ 857: 66.
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In terms of size, the largest five foreign stands were in order of largest to 
fifth largest: Italy, West Gemoany, France, Czechoslovakia, and Britain. The graph 
below breaks down contracts and contract values for socialist versus capitalist 
countries.
Table 4 Shoes-69: Contracts
Total
Socialist
Countries
Capitalist
countries
Signed contracts 165 45 120
Contracts (Roubles) 249,303,300 216,312,400 32,990,900
Export 8,648,500 6,216,800 2,431,700
Im port 240,654,800 210,095,600 30,559,200
Purchased exhibition 
exponents
908,400 113,100 795,300
634
While the total number of contracts with capitalist countries was almost three times 
that with socialist countries, and is proportionate to allotted exhibition space, the 
total value of the imports was not quite one seventh that of socialist countries. The 
average socialist contract had a monetary value of approximately 4,800,000 roubles, 
while the average capitalist contract was only 27,000 roubles. The low monetary 
level of contracts with capitalist countries is in part off set by the value of goods 
purchased from the exhibition. The purchase of exhibition goods from the West was 
seven times greater than from socialist countries. When import contracts and 
purchased exponents are combined the socialist countries had a total sales figure of 
210,208,700 roubles and the capitalist countries of 31,354,500 roubles. Neither 
sales nor purchase figures correspond with the statements of important and 
innovative participation at the exhibition. These comments focused on the capitalist 
nations.635 Both foreigners and VTP staff charged that the commercial centre 
worked poorly, opening only after the tenth exhibition day. The total purchases and 
signed contracts were regarded as disappointing and due not to the failure of firms to 
exhibit but to the exhibition having a similar content to another exhibition that had 
occurred the previous year.636
634 ‘Obuv’-69,’RGAE 635/1/857: 88.
635 ‘Obuv'-69,’RGAE 635/1/ 857: 55.
636 ‘Obuv’-69.’RGAE 635/1/ 857: 56.
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A frequently published complaint about foreign and Soviet exhibitions was 
that the displayed items were not available for purchase. Exhibitions bore the 
charge of being impressive showcases for modern inventions and developments, 
which could not or would not be connected with everyday life. One of the common 
criticisms of the American exhibition was that the Soviet Union had similarly, 
‘wondrous’ items in its exhibition halls. This concern was great enough to be 
discussed factually and fictionally in the press. ‘In Exhibitions and in Stores’ is a 
fictional conversation between several women regarding clothes fabric. One 
woman comments that there were such exciting new advances in synthetic clothes 
production, texture, patterns, colours, it was all so different from the basic coarse 
fabrics of old. Another agrees but asks where can one find the new fabric?
Certainly not in the stores. The author of the article assures the readers that such 
fabric can indeed be found in the stores, ‘that sort of fabric exists, but there is little 
of it’ due to the need to conduct proper quality controls on the new synthetic 
material. The Ivanovksii textile factory exhibited twenty-five new fabrics in 1959 
but was only able to efficiently produce nine. The article concludes that while in­
store selection was more restricted than that seen in exhibitions, the Soviet goal was 
to produce enough fabric in enough variety that ‘not one customer leave a store 
unhappy.’637 A Rabotnitsa article about the All-Union Exhibition of Clothes,
Shoes, and Knitwear (1962) began with quotes of women complaining about the 
lack of purchasing ability: ‘Great [exhibition]!.. If only you could buy’ .638 This was 
followed by the rebuttal ‘Do you remember the fabric exhibition? The synthetic fur 
was also fairytale like. And now, where can you go and not see it? It is on the 
children and adults.’ 639
After the closing of an exhibition the most interesting items went to a 
highlights pavilion that was attached to the Chambers of Commerce. This pavilion, 
more so than the exhibition, was representative of the Soviet future. From the 
pavilion goods would be selected to go to various laboratories to serve as 
prototypes. For example, in 1959 the pavilion released 5,595 items to be imitated
637 L. Korniushin, ‘Na vystavke i v m agazine,’ Rabotnitsa no.8 (1959): 9.
638 S. Lapteva, ‘Bol’sh e  veshchei, khoroshikh I raznykh,’ Rabotnitsa no. 7, 1962: 9.
639 ‘Bol’sh e veshchei, khoroshikh I raznykh’ 9.
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and the feasibility and desirability of 37,311 items to be studied. 640 Direct 
purchases from international exhibitions remained impossible for the public; most 
exhibiting countries and some companies left all display models behind due to the 
Soviet policy of charging two widely divergent fees for shipping. The willingness 
of companies despite the high rate of left products is indicative of several 
mentalities. In some instances, the participating companies in the American 
exhibition being good examples, the companies participated more out of patiiotism 
than for prospective financial gains. The ideas of peaceful co-existence, of 
understanding between citizens regardless of government, race, religion, etc were 
becoming popular. Another motivation was the possibility of a large contract.
Soviet contracts had the potential to be considerable. Other companies were willing 
to abandon goods as they already had large contracts, one of the best examples of 
this was Fiat, which participated in numerous exhibitions after having received the 
VAZ contract. Countries, like France and the USA, unsuccessfully attempted to 
have consumer durables and goods auctioned off. While open auctions never 
occurred, many consumer goods filtered into the Soviet society.
The Soviet press heralded film as the cultural medium for the masses and the 
‘sensation of the 20^ '^  Century’641 and hailed their presence in exhibitions and film 
festivals as meeting points of cultures and modernity. Film festivals had a cultural 
impact on several levels. First there were those who saw the films. Seemingly 
benign backdrops or setting displayed a sense of style, modernity and prosperity: the 
audience could watch as ‘a man leaves his house, a train passes and a car tears 
along’.642 Associated with the visit of French President Charles de Gaulle and 
various cultural activities was the release of the film UAmeiique vue par un 
français (Françios Reichenbach) portraying a balanced view of the American way 
of life. The film, which was widely distributed in the Eastern Bloc countries and the 
Soviet Union, caused a stir as many of its scenes of poverty and of incarceration 
contained images of conditions superior to average Soviet ones.
The first extended footage of ordinary Americans in [everyday] situations...
was utterly revelatory, especially a scene showing prisoners staging a rodeo
for their own entertainment, visual evidence that American convicts enjoyed
640 Zakharova, ‘Le réseau des canaux officials de transferts des m odes vestimentaires 
occidentals en URSS dans les an nées 1950-1960' 7.
641 E. Tarasova, ‘Glubina ekrana,’ Rabotnitsa no. 8 (1963): 28-29, 28.
642 Tarasova, ‘Glubina ekrana’ 28.
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clothing and furniture o f manifestly better quality than what was available in 
the USSR. The film inventoried material culture fads such as hula-hoops, 
and devoted much attention to teenagers in general.643
The second impact of the festivals was in those cities where the VIPs visited. 
Typically the foreign dignitaries were on controlled parade and many from the local 
population were able to catch glimpses of the visitors. The third and most 
widespread was the coverage in the mass media. Fashion was a glamorous and 
well-publicised aspect of international and national film festivals. Foreign directors 
and stars were present at the international and national film festivals, Federico 
Fellini, Sophia Loren, Simone Signoret, Marina Vladi, and Steve McQueen all 
attended festivals in Moscow. Press coverage in typically began with a brief 
statement noting the significant Western presence, then moved on to a discussion of 
socialist achievements or of those of a developing nation, perhaps mention of Soviet 
achievements, and then a detailed discussion of Western products and people.
Conclusion
The interest in Western exhibitions was to remain strong throughout the
1960s. John Preston, then European Manager of CalComp recalled an
Interorgtekhiika exhibition in Leningrad for which more than a million citizens
queued and the army was called in to maintain order, as the sheer pressure from the
crowds was damaging the structure of the stands (the Mannesmann stand was
destroyed).644 The West in general, and the United States in particular, represented
a fixed point in the Soviet future. This future was exhibited with the objectives of:
amassing information, building international political and economic contacts, and
motivating Soviet citizens. Klirushchev’s controlled consumerism was a significant
aspect of the social contract between the state and the population. The idealism of
the revolution had faded and the brutality of Stalinism was set aside, and
consumerism filled this void. The imagery of the objective did not need to be
created, as it existed within the West.645
[w]e may not like the toys depicting little monsters... but we understand 
very well the merits of a machine capable of answering four thousand
643 Mark Alien Svede, 'All You Need is Lovebeads: Latvia’s Hippies Undress for S u ccess’ 
Style and Socialism: Modernity and Material Culture in Post-War Eastern Europe 194-195.
644 In an email ‘Hello’ from John W. Preston iohnwDreston@dial.oioex.com 29.09.05.
645 Pisarzheyskii, Vstrecha v Sokol’nikakh’ 51.
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questions, or the quality of plastic dishes... But we also understand very 
well that to attain all this, one doesn’t necessarily have to live under the 
capitalist system! We are confident that in the very near future all these 
blessings of material culture will have a greater mass distribution here 
than in America.646
Khrushchev said that: ‘[t]he socialist economy is developing towards 
increasingly greater satisfaction of the material and of the members of society, 
towards continuous expansion and improvement of production on the basis of better 
technology.647 This greater material satisfaction was intrinsically linked to the 
economic image of the enemy, which flooded and seeped into Soviet consciousness. 
The image was the result of the technical quality of a film at an international film 
festival, the durability of a lipstick sample, comments from Khrushchev that the 
pavement at French airports were better than that in the USSR, press releases 
declaring that the Soviet Union needed to work with Fiat if it wanted to mass 
produce reliable, affordable automobiles etc. Having chosen the West as a 
benchmark, any failure on the part of the Soviet leadership to provide an accepted 
standard of living could result in Soviet society accepting the ideas of modernisation 
and consumption as integral to the Soviet future without maintaining the faith that 
these could be achieved in the Soviet context.
646 N. Sergeyeva, T h e American Exhibition,’ Soviet Culture (30.07.1959),647 Nikita S. Khrushchev, ‘Report of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the 
Soviet Union to the Twentieth Party C ongress,’ Pravda (15.02.1956): 1.
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4: Image Conduits: Soviet Elites and Western Technology
We must study the capitalist economy attentively and not take a simplified view o f 
Lenin’s thesis o f the decay o f imperialism, but study all the best that the capitalist 
countries’ science and technology have to offer in order to use the achievements o f 
world technological progress in the interests o f socialism. (Directives o f the Sixth
Five-Year Plan)64H
The ‘Soviet world has been seduced by the myth o f technique, the sense o f the 
cosmic [sputniks] and by great public works’ (Abraham Guillen)û49
One o f the primary goals o f international trade for the Soviet Union in all levels o f 
socialist construction is the assistance to the maintenance o f the high rates o f the
development o f the Soviet economy. (D. Fokin, 1965)650
Introduction
The Thaw is marked by political, social and economic changes. The 
economic changes represent a nation’s attempt to modernise and to negotiate a new 
social contract. The Party objective can be defined as having sought ‘to bind the 
Soviet people to the regime by creating a society of plenty.’651 The lurching 
attempts to graft modem consumer orientated economic policies onto an industrial, 
scarcity driven economy was fraught with problems. Foreign technology and 
expertise were often imported as short-term solutions, the proverbial plaster as it 
were, for inabilities to meet political promises and requirements. New technology 
either domestic or foreign was adopted in the hope of correcting economic problems 
that owed their origins to institutional issues. As Joseph Berliner wrote ‘there is 
some disposition among the governors of the Soviet economy to regard borrowed 
technology as the deus ex machina. It offers a way of attaining the high rate of 
technical advance greatly sought, without having to tamper once again with the
64B T h e Directives on the Sixth Five Year Plan: 15.01,’ Leo Gruliow ed. Current Soviet 
Policies II: The Documentary Record of the 20th Communist Party C ongress and its 
Aftermath from the Translations of the Current Digest of the Soviet Press (New York: 
Praeger, 1957) 31.
649 Abraham Guillen, T h e Struggle Between Capitalism and Socialism,’ Abraham Guillen 
ed., Philosophy of the Urban Guerilla: the Revolutionary Writings of Abraham Guillen (New 
York: Marrow, 1973) 164.
650 D. Fokin,‘SSSR  V 1964 godu.’ Vneshniaia toraovlia no.11 (1965): 7-19, 13.
651 George Sokoloff, The Economy of Détente: the Soviet Union and Western Capital 
(Leamington Spa: Berg, 1987) 181.
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fundamental economic structure.’652 This faith in borrowed technology was
indicative of an elite with both access to information about the West and a
willingness to accept the West as positive. Importation as a solution to
economic/industrial backwardness was a losing proposition as it failed to address
social and organisational malfunctioning. Initially, the viability of importation was
sustained by Post War opportunities and later through high oil and gas prices in the
1970s and shortages of natural resources in Western Europe, which allowed Soviet
leadership to buy time, but left the fundamental malfunctioning unresolved. Paul
Cocks has argued that:
The absence of an internal dynamic and adaptive capacity has resulted in the 
general pattern throughout Russian history of change largely by fits and 
starts. Intermittently, the state is forced to administer the shocks of 
adjustment in the form of modernising ‘revolutions from above’. Typically, 
change is accomplished by heavy doses of technological borrowing from 
abroad and administrative coercion from within.653
The puiposes to which foreign technology was put resulted in foreign technology 
being ‘an instrument of policy and tool of economic progress.’654
Bezborodov has written that science and technology had multiple functions 
within Soviet society: as the locomotive in the technological race with developed 
countries o f the West in the context o f the Cold war; as the basis o f the war 
technology revolution that permitted the USSR to maintain international superpower 
status; and as a means o f transforming defence development into the civil sector o f  
the economy.655 In 1967, the economist S. Heinman wrote that the Soviet policy in 
the field of technological progress provided a means of communication between the 
economic policy of the state and the core means of developing the sciences through 
technology and the production o f goods.656 In general, the impact o f trade with and 
sanctions against the Soviet Union was moderate in nature. Taken independently, 
each year o f imports was not significant enough to destabilize the Soviet Union. 
However, with each successive year o f imports, not only the economic burden but
652 Joseph S. Berliner, The Innovation Decision in Soviet Industry (Cambridge: MIT Press 
1976) 518.
653 Paul Cocks, ‘Organizing For Technological Innovation,’ in Guroff, Entrepreneurship in 
Imperial Russia and the Soviet Union 306-346,345.
654 Cocks, ‘Organizing For Technological Innovation’ 307.
655 A. B. Bezborodov, Vlast’ I nauchno-tekhnicheskaia poiitika v SSSR  seredinv 50kh- 
seredlnv 70kh godov (Moskva: Izdatel’stvo ob”edinenila Mosgorarkhiv, 1997) 3.
656 Bezborodov, Vlasf I nauchno-tekhnicheskaia poiitika v SSSR  14.
204
also the cultural and social impacts increased. By the early 1980s, the myth of the 
Soviet capacity for superior technology and standard of living had been thoroughly 
rejected.
Faith in science and in the capacity of the USSR in scientific fields would 
not have been without grounds during the 1950s and early 1960s: in the post-war era 
USSR scientists took Nobel prizes in 1958, 1962 and 1964, won numerous other 
prestigious scientific awards and secured respect for Soviet academic achievements. 
The scientific and industrial community derived its legitimisation from a source 
other than the Party: the rationality of science. They were ‘our scientific coryphaeus 
[leading light].’65? Between 1950 and 1965 scientific organisations were to increase 
five fold and between 1955 and 1960 the absolute growth in individuals studying or 
in the service of scientific institutions increased 256.7 percent. 658 At the beginning 
of 1961, excluding military and defence, 3,660 scientific institutes employed 
583,000 workers. Another 517,000 workers were employed in affiliated offices and 
design centres. The state ministries of aviation technology, radio electronic 
technology, shipbuilding and defence employed over 700,000 highly qualified 
specialists and workers in 1960.659 The growing group of specialists had a 
significant weight in Soviet society. They were also a group with marked exposure 
to positive aspects of Western science, technology and economics. For example, a 
wide range of journals notably in the fields of science, construction, and engineering 
were available. Foreign literature came under two categories: express and normal. 
Express literature received priority translation and dissemination within fifteen days. 
Some industries had greater percentages of express infoimation: for example the 
chemistry industry, aviation, rockets (military), and atomic energy were favoured. 
Discussing the need of specialists in the chemistry industry for Western infoimation. 
Deputy Director of the Institute of Computer Technology Dimitrii Panov went so far 
as to declare it ‘impossible’ to effectively develop the chemistry industry without 
contact with foreign countries and the research they were producing. 660
657 Bezborodov, Vlasf i nauchno-tekhnicheskaia poiitika v SSSR  34.
658 Bezborodov, Vlasf i nauchno-tekhnicheskaia poiitika v SSSR  17.
659 Bezborodov, Vlasf i nauchno-tekhnicheskaia poiitika v SSSR  105.
660 ‘Stenogramma zasedaniia Gostekhnika SSSR  ot 19.01.1956,' RGAE 9480/2/14: 31-72, 
44.
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In Robert English’s work Russia and the Idea o f the West, an elite-identity 
framework methodology is used to provide a through assessment of intellectual 
contact with the West through publications, travel and Eastern European 
influences.661 Technocratism dictated that an elite of professionals should rule in 
accordance with scientific principles and liberal socialism spoke for economic 
reforms: decrease Party control over economic affairs, increase consumer fields, 
increase real prices, increase the autonomy of factories, increase material incentives 
and increase the permission for risk taking in technological innovations.662 What 
was needed was a vanguard overlapping the Party and the academic community. 
Merle Pain sod has argued that the incentive system rewarded those individuals who 
were part of or in direct contact with the Party officials or state administration, 
intellectuals who complied, and managers, engineers and shock workers who were 
particularly successful.663 The changing conditions and new demands associated 
with this new stage of industrial revolution placed unprecedented importance on 
scientific and technical progress. It was during the 1960s that science and 
technology were officially adopted as forces of production. Scientific and technical 
progress were key forces driving modern society and a major arena of competition 
between two opposing social systems.664 The significance of the policy is 
highlighted by contrast with the policy of the 1970s. During the 1970s, the Party 
objective was altered from tangible consumerism to more abstract ideas in an 
attempt to reduce the pressure to produce material goods and still retain a significant 
amount of tacit support from the scientific and technological elite.
The Soviet elite was the vanguard of the proletariat. Indications of the 
existence of the mythical other, a positive image of the West, within this vanguard 
would be evidence that the idea of an alternative to communism existed in the very 
group responsible for leading Soviet society. The then widely accepted believe that 
science and technology was inherently objective meant that they could be adopted 
with few charges of ideological deviation. This chapter is broken down into two 
main sections: ‘Science, Technology and the State’ and ‘Gathering, Purchasing and
661 Robert English, Russia and the Idea of the West: Gorbachev, Intellectuals, and the End 
of the Cold War (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000).
662 Shlapentokh, Soviet intellectuals and Political Power 161.663 Fainsod, T h e Komsomol: Youth Under Dictatorship’ 37.664 Cocks, ‘Organizing for Technological Innovation in the 1980s’ 307-308.
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Assimilating Science and Technology’. The first half discusses the scientific 
technological revolution, various government organisations and Party officials in 
reference to their contact with, and perceptions of, the West. Together these 
subsections provide the background milieu for the second half of the chapter that 
deals with scientific and technological penetration, how Western technology and 
science was sought out, acquired and implemented. By adopting and implementing 
Western science and technology there was a tacit acceptance of Western leadership 
in fields that were so coveted in the Soviet Union.
Science, Technology and the State
The objective of industrialisation and modernisation is apparent throughout 
the Soviet period. 665 It was fundamental to the economic policy of the state. Lenin 
wrote that: [t]he sole economic basis of socialism is large-scale machine industry. 
He who forgets this is not a communist.’666 He also stated that ‘[n]o dark force will 
withstand the alliance of science, the proletariat, and technology. ’667 For Soviet 
Russia, bourgeois technology was a lesser evil than industrial backwardness and 
international weakness. Historically, the preference within the USSR was for 
disembodied technology. The underlying assumption was that technology was 
primarily ‘an assemblage of pieces of information, which can be extracted or 
expelled from one sector of organised creativity and transposed to another to 
produce different outputs... The whole process is reduced to clerical reporting.’668 
However, modem economies were increasingly dependent on human capital for 
their vitality, and the only effective way to import human capital was through 
human contact and cultural change.669 The importation of Western technology and 
science in the post-War period could not have occurred without human contact. In 
addition, Soviet political and scientific elites sought to expand this contact. Starting 
in the mid 1950s, not only ‘Soviet-technology, but all Soviet culture renewed its ties
665 Coined by Franklin Mendels In 1972, the term Proto-Industrialisation explains the 
transition from traditional, autarkic, subsistence agricultural communities into modern, large, 
market orientated, industrial and capitalistic societies,
666 Vladimir Lenin, Polnoe sobranie sochinenii vol. 44 5’^  ed.. (Moskva: Politizdat, 1964) 50.
667 Vladimir Lenin, Collected Works vol 30 4^  ^ed ..f London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1960)
376.
668 Cocks ‘Organizing For Technological Innovation’ 312.
669 Dana Allin, Cold War Illusions: America. Europe and Soviet Power 1969-1989 (New 
York: St. Martin’s Press, 1994) 159.
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with countries East and West.’670 Despite a preference for minimal non-elite 
contact, there were a number of turnkey projects, beginning in 1958, for the 
production of synthetic fibre, plastics, synthetic rubber and fertiliser. The West was 
the major provider of turnkey factories, which required a great deal of contact 
between foreign and Soviet citizens. An example of a turnkey factory was the 
factory in Mogilev where the Pol y spinners Consortium built a synthetic fibre 
complex based on a contract signed in 1964. Fifty-two Soviet engineers spent three 
months in the UK with Constructors John Brown; twenty Soviet machinery 
inspectors went to the UK staying for up to two years. One hundred and ten 
specialists were trained in the UK; two hundred British technical staff spent several 
months each over a two year period in Moscow working on engineering; and 
hundreds of British construction technicians and supervisors together with their 
families spent up to four years on the construction site in Mogilev.671 Two of the 
largest contracts in the chemical sector during the 1960s included: twenty million 
pounds for a high pressure polyethylene plant with Simon-Carves in 1963, and 
thirty-one million pounds with Polyspinners consortium in 1964 for the polyester 
fabric plant at Mogilev, (seven thousand Soviet workers producing seventy 
products). The polyester plant is but one example of numerous turnkey projects. In 
the next chapter another turnkey factory, AVTOVAZ, will be examined in detail.
The absorption and application of technology is a profoundly personal 
experience, affecting literally the food on one’s table and the clothes on one’s back. 
Post-Stalinist society upheld the idea of the necessity of technological and scientific 
progress and the international nature of this progress. This is expressed both in the 
attention given to science and technology by laypersons and in the preferential 
treatment of specialists by the regime. In incorporating Western technology 
scientists, who were amongst the most highly regarded citizens, often had extremely 
high levels of contact with Westerners and Western knowledge. One result of this 
was that when scientists, supposedly rational and objective by nature of their study, 
compared the Soviet Union unfavourably to the West, citizens listened. The Party 
goal was for the Soviet Union to acquire the brawn of industrialisation and
670 Boffa, Inside the Khrushchev Era 31.
671 Hanson, The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Economy 86.
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modernisation without the brains that create apolycentric society. This research 
suggests that they failed.
a. Scientific Technological Revolution (STR)
Soviet Academician Piotr Nikolaevich Fedoseev, full CPSU Central 
Committee member (since 1961) and Vice President of the Academy of Sciences 
defined the scientific technological revolution (STR) as: ‘basically the radical, 
qualitative reorganisation of the productive forces as a result of the transformation 
of science into a key factor in the development of social production. The STR at the 
same time influences all aspects of life in present day society, including industrial 
management, education, everyday life, culture, the psychology of people, the 
relationship between nature and society.'6?2 The theory of the STR has been 
described as a conservative doctrine that attempts to rationalise and to legitimise the 
‘wholesale incorporation’ of capitalist technology, technica, and infrastructure, into 
the ‘transfer culture of communism.’673 Mervyn Matthews has described the STR as 
being a euphemism for the computer age and the post-industrial process.674 
Khrushchev used the term STR in the 1960s to legitimise the fonnation of the SCST 
(State Committee for Science and Technology) and in conjunction with the goals of 
the CPSU’s third programme. The final document of the 1969 conference of 
Communist and Workers Parties contains the passage: the ‘scientific and technical 
revolution has become one of the main sectors of the historic competition between 
capitalism and socialism.’675 Integrated into the idea of the STR was recognition of 
the gap between Western and Soviet technology. A letter of appeal from dissident 
but concerned Soviet scientists to Party and government leaders March 1970 
acknowledged the new age: ‘We are simply living in a different era. The second 
industrial revolution came along and now, at the onset of the seventies, we see that 
far from having overtaken America, we are dropping further and further behind. ’676
672 Matthews, Soviet Government 217.
673 Frederick Fleron, ’Afterward’, Technology and Communist Culture. 484.
674 Matthews, Soviet Government 15.
675 Mezhdunarodnoe soveshchanie kommunlsticheskikh i rabochikh partil: dokumentv I 
materialv (Moskva: Politizdat, 1969) 303.
676 Dissidents were Andrei Sakharov, Roy Medvedev, and V. F. Turchin ‘Letter of Appeal of 
Soviet Scientists to Party and Government Leaders of the USSR,’ March 19, 1970 reprinted 
in Survey, no. 76 (Summer 1970): 161-170; Cocks, ‘Organizing For Technological 
Innovation’ 308.
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Developments in ‘the productive forces touched off by science and its discoveries’ 
were to ‘become increasingly significant and profound.’677 The task ahead was ‘to 
organically fuse the achievements of the scientific technical revolution (thus 
associating the STR with the West) with the advantages of the socialist economic 
system.’678 The new official policy was to be one of selective interdependence. ‘If 
the gap in industrial development is to be narrowed, East-West intercourse must 
extend well beyond the mere exchange of physical goods. The domain of ideas, in 
both technology and management, must be given primary attention.’679 The idea of 
the international nature of the STR took root during the late 1950s and 1960s as it 
extended deeply into the organisation of Soviet production and institutes (for 
example, the Institute of World Economics and International Relations and the 
Institute for the Study of the USA and Canada were to devote a large percentage of 
their research to management studies).
Beginning during Khrushchev’s regime and extending to Brezhnev’s 
Western technology was to be incorporated increasingly via a capitalist friendly 
framework. This involved the use of Western consultants in areas of design and 
construction; allowed for training by Westerners and in the West of both workers 
and managers; and involved Western onsite management. Western contribution was 
to be tolerated on the ground level and encouraged on the governmental level. 
Jeffrey Brooks has argued that despite high levels of investment in imported 
technology and industry, technological and economic stagnation and backwardness 
was inevitable due to the cultural constraints placed on Soviet leaders and their 
confederates. If this view was shared by Soviet society, either before or after 
coming into direct contact with Western industry, it would have severely 
undermined the legitimacy of the Party’s rule.6so
677 Materialv XXIV s ’ezda KPSS fMoscow: Politizdat, 1971) 57.
678 Materialv XXIV s ’ezda KPSS 57.
679 Samuel PIsar, C oexistence and Commerce: Guidelines for Transactions between East 
and W est (Allen Lane: Penguin Press, 1970) 34.
680 Jeffrey Brooks, Thank You. Comrade Stalin! Soviet Public Culture From Revolution to 
Cold War (Princeton; Princeton University Press, 2000) 245.
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b. Government Organisations and Party Officials
During the 1950s and 1960s, there was a wide spread idea that continual 
Soviet achievements in the creation of advanced machinery and equipment 
legitimated a high international standing. From this strong point, involvement with 
Western technology was put forward as enhancing technological and scientific 
development and international status. Thus, technological co-operation should not 
be rejected out of hand. In ‘On improving management of industry, perfecting, 
planning and enhancing economic incentives in industrial production,’ Alexei 
Kosygin declared that it was often more profitable to purchase a licence than to 
devote time and energy in developing an indigenous solution.681 In the Directives of 
the 23“^*^ Party Congress, the government was charged with ‘improving the import 
structure of foreign trade [by ensuring the purchase of] such types of raw materials, 
commodities and finished goods as involve higher current costs and capital 
investments when produced within the country. ’682 Another ground was that it was 
‘essential that we make use of everything that science and technology give us in our 
country more rapidly and exhaustively and take more boldly all the best that foreign 
experience can give.’683 At the 23^ "^  Party Congress Kosygin was to announce that 
‘it is becoming more and more evident that the scientific and technical revolution 
under way in the modem world calls for freer international contacts and creates 
conditions for broad economic exchanges between socialist and capitalist 
countries.’684 Through necessity-validation declarations for contact with the West, 
at least within the STR context, the Party created a realm within which the 
discussion with and about the West was permissible and formed a linkage between 
economics and politics. The linkage can be seen in the careers of the Central 
Committee members of whom, for the period of 1956-1959, twenty percent had 
industrial backgrounds.685
Numerous bodies were involved with Western science and technology.
Under Klrrushchev it was difficult to find an organisation that did not have a
681 Alexei Kosygin ‘On improving management of industry, perfecting, planning and 
enchancing economic incentives in industrial production’ New Methods of Economic 
Management in the USSR {Moscow: Novosti Press Agency, 1965) 19.
682 XXII S ”ezd KPSS. stenoaraficheskii otchet (Moscow, 1961) vol.1, 63.
683 XXII S ”ezd KPSS. stenograficheskii otchet 63.
684 A. Kosygin, Direktivv XXIII s ”ezda KPSS po oiatiletnemu planu razvitlia narodnogo 
khoziaistva SSSR  na 1966-1970 qoda (Moskva: Izdatei’stvo politicheskoi literatury, 1966).
685 Granick, The Red Executive 275.
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friendship society or an international affairs department. The abundance and size of 
organisations that were ostensibly active with Westerners, is indicative of a high 
level of willingness to engage in international contact and a relatively high rate of 
potential exposure to images of the West. Below is a list of some of the major 
organisations that dealt with foreign trade, science and technology.
Council of Ministers -  head of the Soviet government organisation and the formal 
repository of State authority. It was the theoretical locus of administrative 
responsibility for trade. The Council of Ministers was the highest executive -  
administrative organ to ensure that the policy aspirations of the Communist Party 
leaders were realised - notably in economic affairs. However, this body often did 
more rubber-stamping than decision-making. In 1962, six of the USSR Council of 
Ministers seventy-one ministers were Gosplan representatives. Kosygin, for 
example, was Minister of Light Industry in 1959, and in 1960 chairman of Gosplan, 
and Chairman of the Council of Ministries and Presidium.
USSR Academy of Sciences - made up of approximately six hundred members 
(1960s) who supervised scientific research work. Its jurisdiction included 
approximately two hundred scientific establishments employing roughly 300,000 
people. Its Administration of Foreign Affairs monitored scientific development and 
participated in scientific exchanges. Research results and requests had to be 
submitted to the SCST.
Gosplan -  state-planning commission. Gosplan was the chief agency of the central 
government for conducting general economic planning, including import planning.
It was responsible for drawing up plans for the consideration of the government. 
This constituted submitting reports directly to the Politburo, A primary function 
was reconciling ministerial requests. It contained two types of departments, the 
summary (svodnyi) departments for overall balance and branch departments, as well 
as four research institutes for information and policy debate. Gosplan’s Department 
of Foreign Trade had the prime responsibility of integrating foreign trade into the 
national economic plan. It was also responsible for Research and Development 
through the Department for the Comprehensive Planning of the Introduction of New 
Technology into the National Economy. Charged with enforcing national 
cooperation, this Moscow centred organisation transferred some power to the 
republics/regions in 1957 (sovnarkhozy).
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Gostekhnika/State Committee on Science and Technology GKNT/ SCST -  its 
primary responsibility was the coordination of Research and Development. It 
served as the chief advisory body to the central government on the issue of national 
technological policy, which included developing strategies to acquire Western 
technology and to integrate it with the R&D done by domestic industries. The 
SCST participated in the acquisition of and negotiations for sophisticated 
technology, often providing technical expertise. It represented the final decision on 
utility. It was the first initial entry point for foreign catalogues, brochures etc. and 
no licence was to be purchased without its approval. In exceptional cases it could be 
bypassed for the Council of Ministers. ‘SCST’s pre-eminence in the realm of 
technology transfer is illustrated by the fact that it may issue obligatory orders 
within its sphere of operation to all ministries, including the MFT (Ministry of 
Foreign Trade)’.686 The SCST was responsible for passing along pertinent foreign 
assessments of Soviet industry and technology.
As the body responsible for research and development coordination, the 
committee was often represented during contract negotiations. The reports, letters, 
and steno-graphed meetings of this committee provide an insight into the 
professional mentality of an elite group of individuals who were responsible in part 
for insuring that the Soviet economy was in line with Western norms. In the reports. 
Western production figures and economising techniques are used to justify 
investments, to spur action, to chastise the current techniques/outputs and to 
benchmark future objectives. That such a high ranking body refrained from 
forwarding its economic objectives without comparative Western information is 
indicative of the penetration of the idea that the basis of that comparison was 
international as opposed to temporal. Rarely did reports focus on progress, or lack 
there of, that had been made in an industry and then propose an entirely Soviet 
solution. Discussion of the necessity of an item typically began with a comparison 
between Soviet and Western (usually American) industry and the application of the 
item/method in the West. The prolific translations and summations of assessments 
by various Western economists of the Soviet economy and its potential are
686 George Holliday, Technology Transfer to the USSR. 1928-1937 and 1966-1975: the 
Role of Western Technology in Soviet Economic Development (Boulder: W estview Press, 
1979} 100.
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indicative of the value placed on Western assessments. For example, in the report 
from Gostekhnika chair V. Kirillin to A. N. Kosygin on the publication o f the four- 
part American Congressional Committee on Foreign Economics and Political 
Developments, American and Soviet economies were compared with a focus on the 
effectiveness of Soviet economic reforms. In the Soviet assessment (Kosygin) was 
to read that some of ‘the conclusions in the report are worthy o f note especially 
those concerning the poor use made o f products, the ineffective nature o f the 
systems o f technical supply, the backlogs o f the rate of growth in worker’s pay and 
the general rates o f development in agriculture and transport, as well as the general 
tempo of technological progress.’687 The critical nature o f reporting was not 
atypical and seems to call into question the ability of Soviet leaders and planners to 
‘place a screen between themselves and reality, which also acts as a mirror which 
transmits back to the planners an image o f their own wishes . ’088 This is not to argue 
that the elite world of planners did not insulate themselves from the full onslaught of 
Soviet reality.
Ministries -  43.788 industrial organisations served as the intermediate level between 
the enterprises o f production associations and the central and republic governments. 
Ministries were organised by branch and by product and each ministry had its own 
Department of Foreign Affairs. Particularly active in foreign affairs were the 
chemicals, machine tools, automotives, and petroleum ministries. The Ministry of 
Foreign Trade consisted o f dozens o f import-export associations organised around 
various products and administered Soviet trade. Technically no trade could occur 
without its authorisation. Associations acted as intermediaries between ministries 
and foreign firms and in rare circumstances were empowered to sign contracts.
R&D institutes under individual ministries specialised in applied research and were 
known for their expertise in accomplishing reverse engineering. There were over 
two thousand organisations in the USSR subordinated to various ministries that 
specialised in applied research.689
All of these organisations, in addition to others such as the State Bank that 
are not discussed here, contributed to the importation and dissemination of
687 ‘No. 9-p 13/i-67g,’ RGAE 9480/9 Ed. Khr314; 18.
688 Nove, Political Economy and Soviet Socialism 120.
689 Technology and East W est Trade: Office of Technology A ssessm ent Congress of the 
United States (Allanheld: Gower, 1979) 215.
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information about the West, even if that information was specialised and localised. 
The USSR was simply too bureaucratic for the bureaucratic privilege of contact with 
things Western to not have had a significant impact. Also, the breadth and depth of 
the delving into information about the West often provided information that served 
as the factual basis for the decision making process of Soviet policies. The sessions 
of the Soviets show no fundamental criticism of policies. The amendments which 
are put forward and accepted have been agreed to beforehand by the government, 
and represent the end of a political process,’690 a process that involved considerable 
contact by large numbers of influential people with Western ideas.
One forum where the issues of Western and Soviet technology were 
addressed was in the publication of Vneshniaia torgovlia. An expensive publication 
by Soviet standards, its target audience was members of the various branches of 
government, foreign companies and governments and Soviet specialists interested in 
trade. Foreign words regularly used in Vneshiaia torgovlia include: vizit, bank, 
kredit, vits president, boikot, firm, demping, biznesmen, mister, balans, prognozy, 
and marketing.69\ Although there are no concrete indications that ‘average’ citizens 
read the journal, access to the publication was not restricted and the format of 
graphs (see image of graph illustrating increased in consumer goods below) seems 
indicative of a wide readership. Khrushchev’s speeches; and coverage of 
exhibitions, trade agreements, statistics and industrial development are be used to 
help construct an understanding of the nature of industrial information about the 
West, and how this related to the average Soviet citizen.
690 Lane, Politics and Society in the USSR 164.
691 S ee  for example Vneshniaia toraovlia no.4 (1963): 46, or Vneshniaia torgovlia no.12 
(1966): 21-22; or Vneshniaia toraovlia no.12119661: 37.
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1963 1964
Chart 2 Imports o f  Consumer Goods: Vneshniaia torsovlia no. 11 (1965) 15
Lamentation about the current trade status with the USA was frequent in 
Vneshniaia torgovlia. For example, trade with the USA was listed as eight times 
lower than that with France.692 This ‘illogical situation’, that the US and the USSR  
were equals in the international political, cultural and military arenas but failed to 
trade as equals, is indicative o f the frustration of the then optimistic superpower. 
Trade, like the state o f  industrialisation and modernisation, was subject to the idea 
of catching up: ‘now, in our time not only Soviet specialists can learn something in 
the USA, but American specialists can learn from Soviet engineers.’693 Some 
Americans, like Nelson Rockefeller, were reproached with being obstructive in their 
obsession with the Lend Lease Deal and deliberately obtuse about potential, thus 
overlooking present and future trade possibilities.
Assessing the Gross Domestic Product o f Western Europe, the United States 
and the Soviet Union, Khrushchev acknowledged that although Soviet GDP had 
risen throughout the 1960s, it still lagged behind. This lag was due, not to the war, 
but to monopolies and boycotts conducted by the West from the 1920s on. Despite
692 V. Naborov, ‘Normalizatsiia sovetsko-amerikanskikh torgovykh otnoshenii otvechaet 
interesam obeikh stran.’ Vneshniaia torgovlia no. 12 (1959): 6-11, 7.
693 Naborov, ‘Normalizatsiia sovetsko-amerikanskikh torgovykh otnoshenii’ 10.
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these challenges, the Soviet Union was currently importing those goods, materials 
and machines that would ‘effectively’ ‘contribute to the technical progress’ of the 
nation.694
Many aspects of the character of the Soviet economy are changed by the 
structure of our imports. The Soviet Union brings in such necessary goods 
for the people’s economy like machines and production lines for the 
increased development of progressive industries, transport, rubber, ... wool, 
synthetic fibre etc.695
The media attention given to trade with the West belies the fact that three fourths of 
all trade was with socialist countries.696 Although direct statements indicate 
otherwise, the figures given, as well as statements about the nature of trade with 
capitalist nations indicate that many of the important aspects of trade involved the 
West.
The media often covered meetings between high-ranking Soviet officials and 
Western business contacts. Coverage tended to reinforce or refute stereotypes, 
expound on the visitors’ satisfaction with various cultural and industrial activities, 
and speak of potential deals. For example, the 1963 visit of 170 British 
businessmen, bankers, commerce, industrial leaders and journalists, under the 
auspice of the British-Canadian company Thomson Newspapers Ltd. received 
simultaneous coverage. A Vneshniaia torgovlia article, which was written two days 
into the visit began; ‘Saturday. Seven o’clock in the morning. The British guests 
are already up... And no word of relaxing at the end of the week, as it is written of 
English traditions. Work -  before all else’.697 Having met with various ministries 
and Khrushchev, primarily about the automobile industry (V. Stewart, a director 
from Rolls Royce was in attendance), guests were invited to view Chaikas, Volgas, 
and Moskvich cars before touring Moscow in them. The visit was deemed 
successful as several of the businessmen stated that they would be returning shortly
694 N. Patolichev, ‘Stroitel’stvo materiarno-tekhnicheskoi bazy kommunizma v SSSR  i 
vneshniaia torgovlia,’ Vneshniaia torgovlia no.11 (1967): 3-14, 10.
695 Patolichev, ‘Stroiterstvo materiarno-tekhnicheskoi bazy kommunizma v SSSR  i 
vneshniaia torgovlia’ 11.
696 Patolichev, ‘Stroitel’stvo material’no-tekhnicheskoi bazy kommunizma v SSSR  i 
vneshniaia torgovlia’ 11.
697 D. Trofimov, Angliiskie biznesm eny v Moskve,’ Vneshniaia torgovlia no.4 (1963): 32- 
33,32.
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on business.698 In 1967, Soviet Minister of Foreign Trade Nikolai Patolichev 
published the ‘Building of the material-technical basis of communism in the USSR 
and international trade’ in which he discussed the importance of improving the 
welfare of the country through trade.699 Such rhetoric, hyperbolic as it is, waiTants 
study as it provided a state dictated yardstick.
Gathering, Purchasing, and Assimilating Science and Technology
While the veracity of Soviet statistics has provided much fodder for scholars, 
this study is more concerned with what was said than its accuracy. That is to say 
that figures showing the USSR as behind the West in general and the USA in 
particular, would have conveyed a sense of backwardness, regardless of their 
statistical precision. In 1957, a collection of statistical materials under the title of 
The Countries o f Socialism and Capitalism by Ya. A. Ioffe was published in which 
the relative industrial output between the USSR and the USA is compared. In the 
work Ioffe has changed his 1939 published percentages to allow the post-Stalin 
economic increases vis-à-vis the West to appear more impressive. Regardless of the 
set of figures used his report clearly states the Soviet Union’s relative industrial 
output remains comparatively low.
Table 5 Industrial Output Compared by Ioffe. 700
~------- -------— — — 1913 1937 1950 1955
1939 publication 6.9 32.7
1957 publication 6.8 24.3 32.1 47.9
This lagging behind the West can also be seen in the Narkhoz figures for Soviet 
material production expressed as a percentage of American production in 1963 and 
in 1967. In the 1967 publication, the 1963 figure was sixty-three percent and in the 
1969 publication it was sixty-five percent.70i The Soviet annual statistical 
handbooks contained dollar value comparisons of Soviet and American national 
income and/or Soviet income as a percentage of the American figure.702 The dollar
698 Trofimov, ‘Angiiiskle biznesm eny v Moskve’ 33.
699 Patolichev, ‘Stroiterstvo materiarno-tekhnicheskoi bazy kommunizma v SSSR  i 
vneshniaia torgovlia’ 3-14.
700 Jasny, Essays on the Soviet Economv 89.
701 Hanson. The Rise and Fail of the Soviet Economv 126.
702 Hanson. The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Economv 126.
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valuation was usually based on purchasing power and the service sector was usually 
excluded. Inaccurate, incomplete and intermittent, published Soviet statistics could 
be favourable for specific industries vis-à-vis the West, but the overall picture was 
one of Western economic superiority. Trade with the United States was another 
area in which Khrushchev and other officials acknowledged that potential was 
failing to be met, in 1946 the United States held first place in terms of volume of 
foreign trade but by 1963 it had dropped to less than half a percent of Soviet foreign 
trade.703 However, this did not stop trade with the Americans from receiving an 
inordinate amount of coverage. In Na vsekh kontinentakh mira, the dismal state of 
trade is acknowledged just before an entire chapter is devoted to the United States.
It is the only nation to receive an entire chapter to itself.704
Khrushchev’s memoirs provide insight into the leader’s belief in the need to 
catch up with the West and the reality of Soviet economic failures: ‘we threw 
ourselves into the development of our oil and gas industries. We needed machine 
tools. I received reports that ours weren’t anywhere near the same level as the 
American [tools].’705 The logistical challenge of promising consumer goods cannot 
be underestimated. Consumer goods were often lightweight and plastic. Few Soviet 
plants were equipped for the production of consumer goods. For example the steel 
industry was set up for heavy industrial equipment and not all machines and 
factories could be converted to consumer goods, so either re-equipping or building 
new plants was in order. In an attempt to meet the challenges associated with 
transforming from industrialisation to modernisation, foreign trade was expanded.
Between 1950 and 1958 Soviet foreign trade increased 257 percent, of which 
seventy-five percent was with socialist countries.706 Between 1953 and 1954 
Western sales to the Soviet Union increased by fifty-two percent, between 1954 and 
1955 by eighty-five percent and between 1955 and 1956 by 133 percent. Between 
1961 and 1969 imports doubled and by 1975 they had increased tenfold.707 Despite 
the significant increase in trade both with socialist countries and the West, overall 
trade levels remained lower for the USSR than for Western nations. This low level
703 Na vsekh kontinentakh mira 7.
704 Na vsekh kontinentakh mira705 Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers: the Glasnost Tapes 110.
706 Hanson, The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Economv 126.
707 Sokoloff, The Economv of Détente 10.
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of trade has often resulted in foreign trade being assessed as comparatively 
inconsequential. However, foreign trade was to have a disproportionately large 
impact on industries and society. West Germany was the largest supplier of 
machinery and equipment for the USSR, providing a third of Soviet imports, Japan 
twenty percent and the USA less than ten percent. Japan was the largest supplier of 
oil refining equipment.708 France was more likely than Germany to export high 
technology, specifically computers and processors. By 1970, France was the Soviet 
Union’s third largest trading partner. French exports consisted of fifty percent 
machinery and thirty percent semi-finished products in the form of turnkey plants, 
chemical products, gas lift equipment, computers, metallurgical, industrial and 
petrochemical equipment. France’s status was to diminish over time. Between 
1960-1966 American contracting organisations did sixty-four percent of world 
contacts for chemical plants, but did not fill any socialist contracts. During the same 
period the UK exported thirty percent of its chemical work to socialist markets. The 
UK was overtaken by West Germany and Japan as the major chemical industry 
supplier in 1969. As of the late 1960s, the Soviet Union got most of its plastics 
imports from the West (Italy, Japan and West Germany). The bulk of imported 
synthetic fibres came from Great Britain. From 1965 to 1970, one third of the 
Soviet imported chemical equipment came from West, but this was to decrease with 
the increased presence of Eastern Europe equipment sales.
708 Technology and East W est 12.
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Table 6 Table o f  Soviet Imports o f  Western Machinery and Transport Equipment709
Y iSr —~----------- Millions of US Dollars
1955 104
1956 139
1957 128
1958 123
1959 717
1960 310
1961 390
1962 436
1963 402
1964 489
1965 366
1966 395
1967 457
1968 639
1969 889
Soviet imports remained relatively small in relation to the GDP. This accepted, 
Western imports occurred in greater proportion in priority industries. They also 
received coverage in the press, and naturally, were the topic of discussion within the 
ruling and scientific elite. Vneshniaia torgovlia annually ran figures based on 
imports and exports. It also ran figures of ‘important imports’. During the 1960s, 
these tables of important imports were broken down into the total import in millions 
of roubles and then divided into capitalist and non-capitalist country. The average 
list contained approximately thirty items and contained heavy industry goods as well 
as consumer goods. Below is an excerpt from the 1960-1965 list that was printed in 
1966.
709 Philip Hanson, ‘International Technology Transfer from the West to the USSR ,’ US 
Congress, Joint Economic Committee Soviet Economv in a New Perspective (Washington; 
Government Printing Office, 1976) 795.
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Table 7 Import into the USSR o f Important Goods in I960-657W 
In millions o f roubles unless stated otherwise
1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965
Light Industry Equipment 
Total 43.9 58.1 74.2 72.8 72.1 86.9
Capitalist 22.3 22.9 19.0 14.7 17.8 20.9
Chemical Industry Equipment 
Total 167 171 141.8 190.2 186.4 187.4
Capitalist 122.8 120.5 79 111.6 101.9 99.5
Automotive Parts 
Total (millions of pieces) 3238 2001 2100 1869 1798 1619
Capitalist 8 14 - 17 25 5
Raw Textiles Total 328 273.1 254.6 305 263.6 322.1
Capitalist 242.1 220.8 211.7 277.1 233.6 294.4
Synthetic thread/yarn Total 
(per 100,000) 12.2 12.9 13.8 11.7 4.2 4.2
Capitalist 12.2 12.9 13.8 11.7 4.2 4.2
Pharmaceuticals including 
perfume and makeup Total 27.5 40.9 65.8 86.1 99.3 111
Capitalist 3 2.7 14.8 6.1 8.1 9.2
Furniture Total 58.8 64.5 88. 134.4 146.8 139.6
Capitalist 1.5 1.4 2 1.6 1.6 2.4
Shoes (Leather) Total 
In thousands of pairs 3098 2580 3157 4063 2098 3484
Capitalist 2975 2435 3120 4020 2070 3448
a. Fact Finding
The Khrushchev era is one with comparatively high access to Western 
information. Exhibitions and displays were a public forum of information for both 
specialists and non-specialists. Printed material was restricted but the strata of the 
population granted access were relatively broad. Taking primary and secondary 
dissemination together, information about the West would have been sporadic in 
nature. Despite an increase in exchanges and delegations in the post-Stalin era, they 
were to remain an activity of the elite. Indeed, freedom of travel abroad was one 
aspect of international elite culture denied to the Soviet elite. Scientific and
710 ‘Import V SSSR  vazhneishikh tovarov v 1960-65’, Vneshniaia torgovlia no.8 (1966) 11- 
16.
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technological information gathering was permitted and encouraged in various 
governmental levels and in institutes. The SCST was a committee charged with 
gathering information about Western science and technology. It was not atypical to 
find statements in the reports of the SCST reminding the committee of the purpose 
of the foreign contacts and information: the rapid growth of Soviet science and 
technology in comparison to foreign countries. One sign of the Westernisation of 
the ‘fact finders’ was the prevalence of the term nou-khau (know-how) in reports.
In this section archival material from the SCST will be used to look at how foreign 
material was being assessed. The first example is taken from the textile industry; an 
industry in which a comparatively large amount of interest was generated and the 
results of Western technology affected the decision makers, the producers and the 
consumers.
As early as the mid 1950s there was an awareness that the Soviet textile and 
garment industries were failing to meet national demand and to keep pace with 
international changes. In one SCST report assessing the state of the industry it was 
referred to as having ‘weak technical levels and an absence of the necessary 
equipment resulting in factories not introducing new technological processes. The 
level of technology in the majority of factories lags behind the level of the most 
developed capitalist countries.’? 11 The resolution was to call on the Ministries of 
Chemistry, Machinery and Light Industry to prepare suggestions for the 
improvement of the quality of fabric production based on the wide introduction of 
progressive technology and to present them to the Council of Ministers of the 
USSR.712 In an article in the Textile Research Journal (04.1962), it was noted that 
in the USA research was being carried out in the field of volumetries and elasticity 
of synthetic yarns and fabrics with positive results. The SCST recommendation was 
that this should be of interest to the Soviet Union and that investigations into various 
synthetic fabrics should be made.? 13 After an initial introduction detailing 
improvements in Soviet production, the SCST report on the advances in the 
development of the manufacturing of knitted textile materials included a chart 
comparing Soviet production of stockings, underwear, and outer knit-wear with
711 ‘V. Kirillin,’ RGAE 9380/ 9/ 96: 54.
712 ‘V. Kirillin’ 54.
713 ‘Letter from K. Rudnev to A. N. Kosygin no.199p 20/Up~1962,’ RGAE 9380/ 7/ Ed.Khr 
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Western nations. A year later, a similar chart detailed Soviet production in 
comparison with Western nations. The USSR was behind the West in all categories, 
as well as trailing the GDR in all three categories.7i4
Table 8 Knit Wear Production
ReinàN^
Units of 
measurement 
per person
USSR
1961
USA
1959
England
1959
France
1960
FGR
1960
GDR
1960
Czechoslovakia
1960
stockings pairs 4.6 10.2 8.5 5.8 7.8 8.9 3.6
underwear pieces 2.3 7.6 3.7 3.4 5.8 8.2 2.9
knitted
items
pieces 2.8 8.6 5.4 4.6 7.7 9.4 6.0
In another report it was stated that both quality and quantity needed to be improved 
in order to reach modern standards and that this was dependant on new 
machines/lines meeting foreign technical standards.? is Foreign machines from GDR 
or Czechoslovakia were suggested as being modern enough, while British and 
American lines were superior.
Research into foreign garment and footwear production methods included visits to 
various factories, for example the 1962 tour of Italian shoe factories (26.10.1962- 
10.11.1962). A focus of the trip was on the efficient use of supplies in relation to 
both natural and synthetic leathers, rubber etc. For example, the Italian company 
Cir demonstrated synthetic shoe (slippers and boots for men, women, and children) 
production and the presence of a chemical factory for synthetic materials in front of 
the shoe factory was deemed as conducive to effective research and development 
and minimised supply issues. The Italian synthetic material production levels of 1.5 
times higher than a comparable Soviet factory were attributed to a higher level of 
organisation.?16 The SCST recommended that a contract for technical cooperation 
be entered into and the Italians’ expertise utilised in the construction of a Soviet 
factory for synthetic footwear materials. The report was sent to Gosplan (N.N. 
Mirotvortsev) and to the Council of Ministers. A related "Spravka’ for the trip 
included a more detailed assessment of the findings, and contained the assessment
714 ‘O merakh po preimushchestvennomu razvltliu trikotazhnogo sposoba proizvodstva 
tekstil’nykh materialov 04.01.1963,’ RGAE 9380/ 7/ Ed.Khr. 99: 14-17 ,15 .
715 ‘O merakh po preimushchestvennomu razvltliu trikotazhnogo sposoba proizvodstva 
tekstil’nykh materialov. 04 .01 .1963’ 15.
716‘‘Cir’ 04.03.1963.’ RGAE 9480/ 7/ Ed Kr 99: 188-190, 189.
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that a most interesting aspect of the trip was the new leather factory in Pescara that 
was equipped with the ‘latest’ technology for box-calf leather. The specifics of the 
floor space and units not active in production were assessed as corresponding to 
accepted Soviet norms but the sanitary and industrial conditions were assessed as 
superior.? 17 Of particular interest was the system of preparing the box-calf leather 
(black calfskin leather tanned with chromium salts) from large horned livestock for 
footwear. The quality was considered exceptionally good and the report continues 
that there was less wastage and fewer defective leathers than seen in Soviet 
factories.? 18 Calfskin leather shoes were produced in the Soviet Union but were 
typically reserved for display or the elite. The document contained no criticisms of 
the Italian factory nor of its processes. In a period of mass production needs, 
scarcity and demand, research into calfskin leather suggests misplaced priorities on 
the part of the delegates and their ruling organisations. This focus on the best and 
highest quality is seen in other spheres as well and was common among those in a 
position to assess foreign goods and companies. Production techniques and 
products were often looked at based on prestige and not necessarily applicability to 
Soviet industry. The Italian shoe company mentioned above in one example: the 
Rootes Motor Co. that was invited to display transportation automotives based on its 
prestige of working with Rolls Royce, Perkins, and Cummins is another. The firm 
Univac earned respect from Soviet researchers for its work with such military 
affiliated firms as Vickers. In her work on the clothing industry, Larissa Zakharova 
has remarked upon the disconnect between the priorities of researchers who 
favoured French fashion houses and luxury fabrics over the needs of the society. 
This disconnect exposes an elite with sufficient information about Western products 
to recognise and to be interested not only in high quality of goods but prestigious 
labels. It also exposes the elites’ abuse of position: using the mandate of obtaining 
Western technology to provide needed goods for the people to provide luxury goods 
for themselves. Finally, the elite’s consumption of Western goods was visible 
evidence of their attitude towards Western consumption and consumer goods.
717 ‘Spravka iz otcheta gruppy sovetskikh spetsialistov po komandirovkie ikh na kozhevno- 
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The introduction of new material under the auspices of the Ministry of Light 
Industry was discussed in 'O merakh po daVneishemu uluchsheniiu obespecheniia 
trudiashchikhsia spetsiaVnoi i rabochei odezhdoV (23.01,1964). Point twenty-three 
of the project involved approval for the foreign purchase of 1500 complete specialist 
costumes, eight hundred pairs of specialist shoes, and five hundred miners’ helmets 
of the best quality. The SCST were entrusted to pass along the goods and samples 
of new techniques that came with the purchase.?i9 In all reports, much mention was 
made of rationalising the ordering and purchasing of foreign stuffs. In a 1966 
assessment on textiles, knits, and the shoe industry, the SCST considered it 
necessary to report on issues of volume and quality of basic products. In the opinion 
of the committee, ‘the majority of the fabrics produced in the USSR are 
considerably inferior to the best foreign samples. ’?20 Soviet fabrics had a shrinkage 
rate that was two to three times greater than the analogous imported fabrics and a 
durability of painting that was one to two points below the imported materials.
When there were synthetic materials they were inferior in quality. Finishing was 
poor and the ready-made fabrics had no packaging. There was an overall absence of 
attention to quality. Regardless of the material, output was too low.
Another challenge of modernising and expanding production of a product 
was the need to expand the affiliated factories. For example, from 1958 to 1965, 
cotton production increased by one billion metres, and silk fabrics by 250 million 
metres. In the same period, the capacity to finish and dye fabrics remained at two 
billion metres per year. A new, preferably Western, factory needed to be built to 
rectify the situation.?2 i A report assessing textile production usually followed the 
format of an unfavourable comparison with the best of the West, moved to a 
condemnation of the failings of the Soviet system, and concluded with a 
recommendation for the import of Western (occasionally East European) 
technology. The format was provocative in nature, challenging readers to establish 
the Soviet Union as the best in the field. In 1966, as part of the third American 
Soviet agreement there was an exchange of textile delegations. The Soviet 
delegation toured five textile factories, three knitting factories, and several
719 ‘05.10.1965.’ RGAE 9 4 8 0 /9/Ed. Khr. 10: 1-2.
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businesses. The American delegation saw, in Moscow alone, two textile institutes, 
The All Soviet House of Fashion, a knitting factory, several textile factories; as well 
as facilities in Minsk, Tashkent, Ivanovo and Leningrad.
The objective of mass synthetic fabric and ‘modem’ international clothing 
(multicoloured and patterned) production, necessitated that the textile industry 
modernise throughout - from yarn production, to fabrics, to designing and sewing. 
One example of the problems faced by the producers after an executive decision had 
been made was the decision to have the House of Models in Leningrad provide 
pleated skirts for the spring-summer collection of 1961. Technically unable to work 
with pleats, the Soviet textile manufacturers replaced the pleated skirts with 
appliqué skirts.722 Internal tensions arose as purchasers of foreign technology, who 
were rarely directly affected by the ramifications of trying to implement the new 
technology, made purchases that were inappropriate for Soviet industry. Susan Reid 
has written that:
From 1959, the press began to publish more trenchant critiques of the negative 
effects of central state planning: it gave little incentive to innovate and 
encouraged factories to produce ornate, labour-intensive items that could be 
sold more expensively. Meanwhile, factories could continue to produce ugly, 
badly designed wares with impunity because, given the chronic shortages of 
consumer goods, they had an insatiable market.723
This is evidence of the widespread dissemination of knowledge of Western 
superiority in consumer goods.
Justification for a new technology could be as simple as that everyone in the 
West was doing it. In a committee meeting about the pulp and paper industry: the 
question arose of how to double output in four years in order to meet the 1960 
targets. In response to V. A. Malyshev’s question about the viable solution found 
by the delegation that went abroad, the response was that the foreign processes were 
‘very good processes but too expensive’ and as Malyshev had noted ‘the state needs 
products not forests’ ,724 implying that even if natural resources needed to be sold off 
or high wastage occurred this was secondary to the prime objective of 
manufacturing products for the Soviet Union. According to the SCST, the Soviet
722 Zakharova, ‘Le réseau d es canaux officials de transferts des m odes vestimentaires 
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timber industry had wastage o f twenty-five percent in the production o f wood pulp 
and timber while the Swedish timber industry had one and a half to two percent.725 
In a related discussion pertaining to paper producing machines it was declared that 
throughout Europe, the United States and Japan the capacity was double that o f the 
Soviet Union. New technology was validated with: ‘all European firms work with 
this technology.’ 726 Another example is found in Gostekhnika, as the auto industry 
and the ministry o f car transport discussed the adoption of electrostatic lacquer 
application. Comrade Malyshev o f SCST opened by stating that what was 
important was that in America there were thousands of such electrostatic 
installations; that in Italy three workers could paint 750 motorcycles per shift; and 
that it was cheaper to buy this technology than it was to produce it oneself.
Malyshev continued that it was the ‘work of scientific research to lead and to make 
use o f foreign experiences and, if  it is necessary, to purchase samples to get them 
cheaply and to master them . ’727
A preferred form o f information gathering was the delegation. Delegations 
were to be as large as possible and were to visit for as long as permitted. A truly 
successful delegation came back not only with contacts and product information but 
also with the ability to begin prototyping without the purchase o f licences or 
machines. An example o f delegation work was in the field of food technology. In 
1960, Kozlov was to submit a report on foodstuffs in the USA, which he 
characterised as fast, filling, and mass-produced. Of special note for Kozlov was the 
mass processing o f potatoes (crisps, chips, and instant mashed potatoes), com  
(cornflakes and popcorn), soft ice cream and biscuits.728 Khrushchev him self was to 
visit farms and food processing factories. Delegations were sent to visit Garst on his 
farm and to gather information on com  production. In September 1964, a delegation 
spent thirty days in the US examining the food industry. They visited Green Giant, 
Post Co., Kellogg Co., Idaho Potato Processors, Lay’s Foods and Potato Chip 
Institute, and Blue Star Foods. Food processors and retail outlets in the Washington 
area were also toured.
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In 1963, there were thirty-seven British business delegations to the USSR 
ranging in size from one to twenty-three people, travelling for three to eighteen days 
and giving zero to eight lectures. Some of the companies involved were:
• Hercules Powder 
(Head Office USA),
• Dekka Navigator,
• Turner Brothers Asbestos,
• Hugh Smith (ENG) Ltd. (shipbuilding, pressure vessel and 
fabrication industries),
• Thermal Syndicate Ltd.,
• Guinness,
• Armour Hess Chemicals (in 1959 Armour Industrial Chemical and 
Dan Hess in England established a joint venture),
• Allen and Son, the Cigarette Components Ltd. (cigarette filters),
• Associated Electric Inc. Edward Vacuum,
• EIGA (European Industrial Gases Association),
• Sir James Farmer Norton (textile processing and finishing 
machinery),
• Langley, the Society of Motor Manufactures and Traders Ltd.
Soviet delegations to the UK numbered thirty ranging in size from two to eleven 
participants, and travelling for periods of five to twenty days. Soviet delegations 
requested that their visits be not shorter than two weeks. In 1964, there were only 
thirty delegations to the USSR but they were on average for longer periods (up to 
twenty-four days) and included more lectures. Some of the companies in 1964 
included:
ASA Chemical Industry,
English Electric (Leo computers),
Davy Ashmore (Ashmore Benson Pease/Davy Ashmore, at the time one of 
the UK's largest plant design contractors),
Shell International Petroleum (went on to give a symposium and lectures in 
1967 June, and in August 1968 for twelve days),
Kodak (went on to give lectures and demonstrations in 1967),
Patterson Engineering (structural engineering and steel fabrications),
Elliot Automation (through mergers was to become part of English Electric), 
Plessey,
BBC,
Thermal Syndicate,
IPV Export (milk products, fruit juices and beer brewing)
229
In 1965 not one British delegation visited the USSR.729 In 1966, there 
were twenty English delegations and thirty-six Soviet delegations (138 individuals). 
In 1967, Electro-Chemical Engineering of England alone gave forty-five lectures. 
The standard lecture format was one and a half hours of presentation with questions. 
The text was to have been sent ahead for translation by SCST. Lectures could either 
be open or closed, with open lectures typically being attended by several hundred 
Soviet specialists and workers. When Kerry Wiliams spoke on specialised computer 
programming, each of the two ‘open’ lectures were attended by 250 individuals 
from the Ministries of Electricity, Radio, Academy of Science, Gosplan etc.730
A more specific example of involvement by Western firms and foreigners in 
the USSR was the case of Castrol Oil, which involved the Soviet government 
seeking simultaneously to improve domestic products while generating international 
revenues. Having fallen by the wayside, talks with Castrol Oil (UK) were renewed 
in 1965. From the Soviet side the idea was that they were forced to sell oil at a low 
price but if Soviet oil was sold under the Castor name than it would command a 
higher price.731 The Soviet Union would provide oil, Castrol Oil the refining 
technology and then the resulting oil would be used in the Soviet Union and sold to 
pay for the technology. Castrol Oil had been used with better results than Shell or 
Esso Oil in the ZIL factory in Moscow since 1959. The primary targets for the 
goods were the auto and aviation industries. In the discussions with D. M.
Gvishiani in June 1967, Castrol Oil was told that they could proceed with the 
scientific and technical agreement but that the commercial aspect would have to be 
resolved by a separate committee. Castrol Oil representative Parson’s response was 
that despite interest in a scientific and technical agreement, it was not possible to 
have a scientific and technical agreement without a commercial one.732 The issue of 
Castrol Oil was to come to a head with the construction of VAZ and the inadequate 
nature of Soviet motor oil.
Be it in potato processing (Lays Foods), motor oils (Castrol Oil) or 
computers, Soviet experts were busy investigating, assessing, and purchasing the
729 ‘Central Statistics,’ RGAE 9480/327/982: 147.
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technology for application in the USSR. In 1951, the first Soviet stored programme 
electronic digital computer became functional less than a year after the American 
version. It was put into serial production two years later, less than a year behind the 
US. Shortly after this, the Soviet military chose not to invest in computers, denying 
the industry an influx of talent and resources that potentially would have allowed the 
USSR to compete with the West. The 1966-67 attempts (with military backing) to 
reverse engineer computers were largely unsuccessful. The next attempt, which 
involved East German knowledge (East Germany had access to IBM computers), 
was successful but was a case of functional duplication as opposed to reverse 
engineering and took as long to develop as the original IBM computers. When 
American Control Data Corporation Vice President Miles visited the Soviet Union 
in March 1967 to inform SCST that he had received US governmental approval to 
sell the model 3400 (01.1964) and 3600 (05.1962) computers, the same models as 
he was to be selling to West Germany and Switzerland, he was forced to 
acknowledge that further models, the 6600 (07.1962) and the 6400 (12.1964), were 
no longer in the prototype stage and were being used by NASA. Anatoli N.
Miamlin informed him that the USSR had greater needs than other nations and that 
the only computer model of interest was the 6600. Miles responded that the sale of 
the 6600 would most likely be embargoed, but he would apply for a trade licence.
G. N. Pronskii then requested that Soviet specialists visit Control Data in the US to 
which Miles agreed.733 In a subsequent conversation, Miles was asked if it was 
possible to get the programme for the model 1604 (first introduced 04.1958), to 
which he answered that it was indeed possible to acquire the programme through 
COOP despite the interjection from an unknown comrade that this was not 
necessary, Soviet labs could reproduce it themselves. In the end, Control Data was 
prepared to sell two 3300 computers and one 6600. Pronksii then asked about the 
price, which was ‘complex to determine’, approximately 5.6 million dollars. Miles 
than presented the official invitation for the Soviet specialists.734 In 1969, IBM 
made the computer and computing system IBM System/360 (mainframe computer 
first announced publicly in 04.1964) along with manuals, training of personal for
733 ‘Zapis’ besedy Tov. Pronskogo G.N. s V. P. Kontrol Data Mailsom 17.03.1967,’ RGAE 
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construction etc available. The co-manufacturing of the IBM System/360 began 
shortly thereafter, with the product being used in the Soviet Union and sold in 
Belgium, Holland, Finland and India. Other computer companies that were active 
during this period were Control Data, Sperry-Rand, UNIVAC, Honeywell and 
General Electric.
During the 1960s, the Soviet Union was to import electrical and computing 
technology (General Electrics, Mallard Equipment, Plessey and others). Plessey 
Company pic began as a manufacturer of wood machining tools, pianos and organs 
but soon expanded into electronics. During WWII, it specialised in classified 
navigation aids, radar, and aircraft radio systems. Plessey’s post war production 
was based on radios, TV sets, and electronics for the defence industry. It also 
specialised in the manufacturing of semi conductors. In 1961, Plessey acquired the 
entire share capital of Ericsson Telephones Limited and the Automatic Telephone 
and Electric Company Limited, and merged them into a defence and civil 
electronics and communications company. In 1962, Plessey was a partner in the 
development of the Atlas computer. Discussions between Plessey and the Soviet 
Union began in 1964 and involved extensive visits from Soviet delegations; in May 
and June 1964 (five people per trip from Goskom Electric Technology and 
GKKNIR), in January, April, May, and September 1965 (thirteen, five, eleven, and 
three people from AN SSSR and the Ministry of Electrical Industry) and in March, 
July, and August 1966 (eleven, thirty-four, and four people from AN SSSR and the 
Electrical industry). Plessey representatives were to make two trips to the USSR, 
one of three persons in November 1964 and one of five persons in 1966. Lectures 
were given in conjunction with both visits. Visits occurred in 1967 and 1968 as well. 
Plessey was also active in exhibitions, for example at the British Industrial 
Exhibition in 1968. In the draft of the protocol between Plessey and SCST the five 
points tabled regarded purchasing radio navigation, television, radio components, 
computers, and licenses for computers. Added later were automation and aircraft 
equipment. Specific interest was expressed in the civil application of computer 
techniques in industry, notably construction; radio measuring instruments and 
control systems; air traffic control and radar systems; components for colour and 
monochrome TVs; equipment for the production of electrolytic foil and capacitors. 
The inquiries into Plessey’s radio navigation equipment were not unique to Plessey.
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Soviet officials also approached Hawker Siddeley, Fiat and other manufacturers.
The specifications of the machines that were of interest to the Soviet planners would 
have revealed a great deal about the state of Soviet radar technology. As Plessey, 
Hawker Siddeley and Fiat all worked with various defence ministries (American, 
British, Italian etc) it is logical to conclude that the purchasing inquiries were known 
to the various military establishments. Knowledge of the Soviet radar technology 
and ground to air missile technology may help explain why the Americans felt 
confident in conducting the U-2 flyovers.
One field in which Hawker was not interested, at least in 1967, was the 
Soviet aviation industry. In 1967, talks were conducted between the USSR and 
Hawker Siddeley Group Inc., a British manufacturer of aircraft that was also active 
in the chemical industry, machine building and agriculture. Hawker Siddeley was 
interested in co-operation in the fields of ingots and agriculture. The British 
representatives first visited the USSR, then were asked to organise a return visit of 
Soviet experts. The British representatives then offered to send specialists to 
Moscow. The Soviet official understanding was that Hawker Siddeley was looking 
for an agreement that would allow construction in the USSR with sales of a 
percentage of the goods in developing nations. Amongst Soviet officials, the Soviet 
delegation to Britain was perceived as providing specialists with access to 
information ‘not only in the area of agriculture’ .735 In a letter from Sir Percy Lister 
to Academician Kirillin the potential sale of the following products and processes 
were to be the focus of discussions: a polythyrene lining material (a moisture 
extracting material that could be used to keep cocoa, rice, etc dry), sewage and 
water cleaning units, and sheep shearing machinery equipment. The review of 
previous arrangements, for example the trade of Kestrel diesel electric locomotive 
engine and marine diesel engines for Soviet forgings, and aluminium ingots was 
cautious (Hawker was marketing Soviet ingots world wide). Mention was also 
made of the joint production of crop drying machinery.736 Hawker Siddeley’s 
interest in agriculture did not prevent it from sending various test materials and 
machines to Soviet factories. The Soviet response to the expansion of ties with 
Hawker through agriculture is exemplified in a letter from Gosplan to SCST in
735 ‘Rukovoditeiiam firmy Khoker Sidlei,’ RGAE 9480/9/432: 23.
736 ‘Letter from Sir Percy Lister to Academician Kirillin 21.12.67,' RGAE 9480/9/432: 25-27.
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which it was stated that one could not ‘see how Hawker Siddeley goods could be of 
use to Soviet agriculture’ and as the Soviet Union was producing its own diesel 
engines and had a contract with Burmeister and Wain (large established Danish 
shipyard and leading diesel engine producer) through a factory in Latvia careful 
consideration should be given before increasing the production o f ingots.737 In 
October 1967, V. A. Kirillin met with the President o f Fiat, Giovanni Agnelli. 
During the visit the discussion turned to the possibility o f Fiat assisting with the 
civilian aircraft industry. The Soviet specialists had assessed Fiat’s electrical 
aviation branch as ‘small but of the highest technical quality. ’738 Angelli responded 
that although it was true that o f Fiat’s five thousand workers, one thousand worked 
in electrical aviation ‘it is all military and the largest contracts come from the USA,’ 
and declined the offer of civil aviation contracts.739
The study of Soviet information gathering on and purchasing of technology 
and the assimilation thereof, does not deal with an exclusive programme that 
impacted solely upon industries as the military, petrochemicals or oil and gas. 
Industrial exposure involved textiles and clothing for civilian usage (stockings, 
slippers, men’s shirts etc), passenger cars, and prepared foods (potato crisps, frozen 
foods, popcorn) to mention just a few sectors upon which an impact was made.
b. Purchasing Information and Technology
Unlike Soviet researchers who inquired into the full range of technology 
from the practical to the frivolous, Soviet purchasers were typically charged with 
purchasing reliable, affordable, and not necessarily the most up-to-date and 
affordable equipment. This can be seen in the above mentioned purchasing request 
for the programme for the Control Data computer model 1604 that had been on the 
market since 1958, and was by Western and Soviet standards out of date by the 
request date in 1967, but for which the Soviet officials had been unable to create a 
successful programme. Government discussions conducted in the summer of 1959
737 le t te r  from Gosplan to SCST 28.05.1968 No. 5454-142/20-142 -12.1966,’ RGAE 
9480/9/432.
738 Zapis’ besedy Tov. V. A. Kirillina s  presidentom Fiatom D. An’elli 6 .10 .1967,’ RGAE 
9480/9/457: 189-191.
739 ‘Zapis’ besedy Tov. V. A. Kirillina s  presidentom Fiatom D. An’elli 6 .10 .1967 ,’ RGAE 
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show the Soviet trade focus to be on chemical equipment, automatic machinery and 
textile machinery. These areas retained their high import status throughout the 
1960s. The modem groups or sectors of the Soviet economy (for example 
petrochemicals) absorbed more than a third of the industrial investment. The logic 
behind the import plan was that ‘no equipment or machinery, instruments or ships 
should be acquired from foreign markets except where it is economically more 
advantageous to buy them abroad than to manufacture them at home, or where the 
necessai'y quantities and desirable quality cannot be produced nationally within the 
specified time limits. ’740 What constituted economically more advantageous, 
necessary quantities, desirable quality and an acceptable period was the Party’s 
decision. As a Soviet institution could eventually produce most if not all of the new 
technology (if indeed not all), a major challenge was justifying the purchase, which 
often came in the form of promises of parity. In 1956, in a discussion of purchasing 
foreign technology and research for the Ministry of Oil and Gas, Comr ade Galumov 
(SCST) said ‘I don’t understand the politics of the Minister for Oil and Gas. The 
ministry has six hundred million roubles for geographic work. Who would it bother 
if some of that money went towards technology? We lag behind not only the USA, 
but also neighbouring capitalist countries and even Hungary and Czechoslovakia.’74i 
The lagging behind the USA and other capitalist countries was a frequent complaint 
and the lagging behind Czechoslovakia was not uncommon. Continuing with the 
idea of investing in technology for the oil and gas sector Western methods were held 
up as cost saving processes as the ‘cost of the [Soviet] working method is ten to 
fifteen times more expensive than the American. ’742 The final statement was that in 
‘overall quality, we are ten or more times behind foreign levels. When we copy 
foreign samples, it is with greater backlogs. ’743
In a discussion with Mikoyan and C. Douglas Dillon the Under Secretary for 
Economic Affairs in Washington Januaiy 19, 1959, Dillon said: ‘I noticed that one 
of the main things you indicated an interest in were the products of the chemical 
industry, such as plastics, synthetics, and so forth. Purchases of those products
740 Metodicheskie ukazaniia 1974; Sokoloff. The Economy of Détente 161-162.
741 ‘Stenogramma zasedaniia Gostekhnika SSSR  ot 01.03.1956,’ RGAE 9480/2/14: 200.
742 ‘Stenogramma zasedaniia Gostekhnika SSSR  ot 01.03.1956’ 203.
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require negotiations with our chemical industry/ 744 He goes on to note that the 
American chemical industry had bad experiences with the Soviet Union -  
specifically the lack of repayment and respect of royalties. Mikoyan’s response was 
that he had been informed of the issue but that of the seventeen oil and chemical 
firms with which there were patent disputes after WWII, fifteen of the disputes had 
been settled and of the two remaining the issue was the sum of compensation and 
not the right to compensation.745 Mikoyan himself was rather successful in securing 
deals with the West. His dealing with Rolls Royce resulted in a contract for the 
Rolls Royce Derwent that was to become the Soviet RD-500; the Rolls Royce Nene 
that was to become the RD-45 (the RD-10 was from Junkers Jumo 004 and the RD- 
20 was from the BMW 003).
The British Plastics Federation mission to the USSR (06.1968) was 
sponsored by the British National Export Council and actively sought by the Soviet 
officials. After the United States, the United Kingdom was a world leader in 
petrochemical production and products and sold a greater percentage of its products 
and licensed more of its methods than the USA. The mission concluded that the 
Soviet industry was developing but lagged in terms of volume and quality, that ‘the 
overall attitude is that an adequate job must suffice’ and that the Soviet officials 
were ‘keen’ on developments in the UK.746 However, it seemed unlikely that the 
British would get many contracts as although ‘satisfaction was expressed with the 
quality of British goods, it was said that we [the British] were uncompetitive on 
price. ’747 Most of the chemical machinery that was being imported was Japanese 
and German and was described by Soviet officials as doing work and providing 
developments ‘along the same lines as Du Font’s work. ’748 A reading of the SCST 
reports on plastics reveals that Du Pont was regarded as the best in the field but due
744 ‘Visit to the United States of Anastas i. Mikoyan; Conversation with Vice President; 
Washington 06.01.1959,’ US Department of State Vo! X Part 1, FRUS, 1958-1960: E. 
Europe Region: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1183  
http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/frus/frus58-60x1/08soviet2.html. 17/11/00.
745 ‘Visit to the United States of Anastas I. Mikoyan; Conversation with Vice President: 
Washington 06.01.1959,’ US Department of State Vol X Part 1, FRUS, 1958-1960: E. 
Europe Region: Department of State, Conference Files; Lot 64 D 560, CF 1183  
http;//dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/frus/frus58-60x1/08soviet2.html. 17/11/00.
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to an outstanding patent issue with Du Pont, commercial relations were unlikely. 
Developments within the industry were heavily reliant on imported technology and 
the objective was modelled on a foreign capitalist company.
Du Pont was not the only company to show reluctance to enter into 
agreements with the Soviet Union, and numerous companies declined to enter into 
subsequent contracts. Despite Britain, along with Finland, having been a leading 
trade partner of the Soviet Union during the 1950s, British firms soon became 
increasingly cautious of entering into agreements, even for those that only 
concerned exhibiting. Statements from a SCST document from 13.01.1966 
illustrate this point declaring that in 1964 ‘England has held its agricultural 
exhibition but at the end of the exhibition the English firms did not receive the 
agreements from the Soviet Union that they had expected. Due to this, English 
firms are now very cautious to enter into agreements for exhibitions and talks.’749 In 
response, it was stated that the Soviet representative was authorised to make it clear 
that his trip to the UK was ‘not fact finding, but of a business nature’.750 In response 
to a repeated request that Soviet specialists be permitted to tour a filial of the 
American company Monsanto in Milan, the Monsanto representative Palmer 
answered that ‘Soviet specialists had already been to the firm and were acquainted 
with the firm’s production.’751 By the late 1960s, this caution dampened but did not 
end international co-operation.
The May 1958 plenum dropped the Five Year Plan and replaced it with a 
Seven Year Plan. The Seven Year Plan involved a massive allocation of funds into 
industry and a huge capital construction programme. Investment in new and refitted 
plants between 1959 and 1965 was 9.1 billion roubles.752 Construction work was 
conducted on four hundred plants and installations in 1959 alone. For 1959-1965, 
47.6 percent of foreign investment went to nitrogenous fertilisers, chemical fibres, 
plastics and synthetic rubber. By 1960, over a third of the chemical equipment in
749 ‘Zapis’ besedy zam. nachal’nika Upravlenila Vneshikh Otnoshenii T. Ovsiannikova, 
13.01.1966,’ RGAE 9480/9/209: 2-5, 3.
750 ‘Zapis’ besedy Tov. Ovsiannikova M. D.s torgovym sovetnikom posol’stva Velikobritanii 
Rotni v S S S R . 19.01.1966.’ RGAE 9480/9/209: 7.
751 ‘Zapis’ besedy 13.05.1966,’ RGAE 9480/9/209: 68-69.
752 Mathew J. Sagers and Theodore Shabad, The Chemical industry in the USSR: an 
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usage (36.7 percent) was imported. This represented a 96.2 percent fulfilment of the
investment plan.753 The
results of the chemicalisation programme were impressive, although not 
close to the target figures initially presented. In physical terms, the 
production of mineral fertilisers increased two and a half times, the output of 
plant protection agents went up four and a half times, the chemical fibre 
output grew by a factor of two point five, and the production of plastics 
increased by almost three and a half. However, the initial production levels 
of plastics and chemical fibres were quite low, particularly in comparison 
with those of the developed Western countries, and quality remained a 
severe problem. 754
In the 1950s and1960s, the chemical industry had industrial priority. In the 1950s it 
was ten years behind the West. It took six to seven years to import and install 
technology that was three to four years old at the time of purchase. In the 
University of Birmingham study The Technological Level o f Soviet Industry it was 
found that in most of the areas examined -  nuclear capabilities, electric power, 
metallurgy, machine tools, computers, and chemicals - the technological gap with 
the West had remained unaltered over the past fifteen to twenty (1950s-1960s) years 
and that growth in output had been the result of traditional technology. 755 
Petrochemicals had increased relative to chemicals in general despite of, or perhaps 
due to, being manufactured with older, proven technology. By the 1970s, the slow­
down in the West provided the USSR with an increased opportunity of coming 
closer to catching up. However, for all of its priority, there is no documented case 
of the USSR first producing a major plastics material. This fact alone makes it seem 
implausible that the extensive funds of the chemical industry were invested into 
research and development on a national level.
‘Characteristic for modern international trade of capitalist countries is the 
trade in new products, which were not available or practically not available before 
W W n ’ .756 These new products were of importance. Taking the United States, 
Britain and France as prime examples, there were numerous references to significant 
aspects of post 1937 trade in non-traditional goods, such as certain raw materials
753 Sagers, The Chemical Industry in the USSR 8 7 .
754 Sagers, The Chemical Industry in the USSR 89.
755 R. Amman, J M Cooper and R W Davies eds., The Technological Level of Soviet 
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(i.e. titanium), butane, propane and goods and technology related to the chemical 
and electronic industry.757 An article on the electrical industry opened with ‘as a 
result of technological progress, in the market there are only new and newer 
goods’.758 Particular attention was given to the chemical and electronic industry, 
through the provision o f figures, company names, identifying company directors etc. 
The basis o f the new American trade was said to be ‘new goods o f a mass 
[produced] type’ consisting o f ‘houses out o f plastic, paper clothes, cars and 
turbines, etc.’ that were the future o f international trade and stood for the betterment 
of the people .759 The general mechanisation of agriculture was worthy o f note, 
particularly the processes in England, Switzerland, and the USA as well as the 
proliferation of tractors (domestic and export) in the United States.760
The electronics industry can be segmented in four sections, the first two 
were military in nature, the third involved consumer goods, and the fourth was non­
military industrial applications. Particular mention was made of General Electrics, 
UNIVAC, the Sperry Rand Corporation, the RAM -  650, RAMAC, Vickers and its 
counting machines. General Electric, English Electric, Ferranti, Elliot Erasers, IBM 
France etc., and of transistors, cameras with flashes, computers, calculators, and 
transistor radios. General Electric dominated the US industry and, along with 
Westinghouse Electric, profited from the combined military and civilian 
applications of new products. The US and Great Britain were the acknowledged 
leaders in electronics, followed by Japan and France, in that order.761 The 
progressiveness of the increasingly widespread use of adding machines (calculators) 
and computers was promulgated as an economisation of time and labour, thus 
establishing ‘stronger’ firms.762 The information on various pieces of technology 
could be remarkably specific, with lists of applications, capabilities and costs in 
foreign currency. At least one product of the above listed companies had its 
specifications published.763
757 E. Menzhinskii and I. Ivanov, ‘Novye tovary v mezhdunarodnoi torgovie,’ Vneshniaia 
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W hile the British (with 1,500 firms producing a range o f 2,700 different 
electrical products)764 exported proportionately more than the US, the US led in 
overall quantity, controlling about one third o f the international electronics trade.765 
This market control was more noticeable when international branches o f US 
companies were included in the calculations.766 European companies such as, 
Olivetti, Ericsson, etc. were listed as suitable alternatives to US firms. It was also 
noted that Japanese products were ‘almost twice as cheap as an analogous product 
from an English or American company’ and that in terms o f the production of 
transistors, the Japanese were second only to the USA with the USA importing 
forty-six percent o f Japanese exported transistors.767 Unlike articles on exhibitions 
in which Soviet and socialist achievements were regularly mentioned, there was 
little specific mention and direct comparison o f and with the Soviet electronic 
industry. There was, however, some general information on Soviet electronic 
export. For example that the combined exports o f England, France and Japan was 
less than the USSR, but that it was ‘evident’ that the US dominated the market, and 
that in the past few years Soviet electronics had started to gain international 
recognition (as noted in the Financial Times) and that the Soviet Union was set to 
export its goods to countries throughout the world.768
Continuing the theme of new, the introduction of articles on synthetic 
material tended to contain statements such as ‘known to everyone, the international 
markets were full of new products.’769 In the article ‘Sinteticheskie moiushchie 
sredstva -  Ttovyi tovar v mezhdunarodnoi torgovie \  the first synthetic compounds 
addressed were wash detergents and soaps. Both were reported as being widely 
produced and sold in many countries, notably in the USA (already during WWII), 
England (in the immediate post-war era), France, Italy, and Japan. This revelation 
was followed by an analysis of the properties of detergent, and its application. 
Specific companies mentioned as dominating research and the market included 
Procter and Gamble, Colgate-Palmolive, and Unilever (English-Dutch), which
764 Levshin, ‘Produktsiia elektronnoi promyshlennosti v mezhdunarodnoi torgovie’ 37.
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torgovlia no. 10 (1969): 37-40, 37.
766 In’kov, ‘Novyi tovar v mezhdynarodnoi torgovie’ 33.
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between them controlled sixty-six percent of the American market. The dramatic 
increase in sales permitted these extremely profitable companies to spend enormous 
amounts on advertising through cinema, television, radio and the printed press. The 
advertising budget of Procter and Gamble was listed at fifty million USD per year, 
and Unilever at not less than twenty-five million pounds sterling per year.770 Not 
only was capitalist technology closely followed, but methods of management, and 
marketing as well. In an article on marketing in the United States one reads about 
the numerous ‘large’ companies that maintain their own team of ‘economists, 
statisticians, psychologists, and sociologists’ in order to recommend marketing 
techniques.771 Marketing has proven very successful for such conglomerates as 
Procter and Gamble, and for the manufacturer of the new detergent Bold (Unilever), 
the sales of which amounted to thirty eight million dollars in 1966.772 The listing of 
companies in various industries is indicative of knowledge of the activities of 
foreign companies. The hierarchical ranking of companies/products based on size 
reinforces the concept of the large Soviet complexes by pointing to the successes of 
various large multinationals. It could also have served as a justification for or an 
indication to the industry specialist as to with whom negotiations ought to be 
conducted. Unlike exhibition articles in which most prices were quoted in roubles, 
the prices in the articles assessing new products used local currencies. This implied 
a general understanding of exchange rates.
Another area in which synthetic products was to be significant was in the 
textile industry. Reportedly, the Soviet textile industry had lagged behind those of 
the West due to a lack of opportunities and tradition in the sector. In turn, both of 
these factors allowed countries like the USA, Great Britain, Germany, Japan and 
Italy to advance, until hitting a crisis in 1952-53. The industry started to recover in 
1955 with the mass production of synthetic fibres and automated weaving machines, 
although the American industry was considered to be struggling in the 1960s, as it 
was unable to compete with cheap imports. The US industry survived on the export
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of machinery.773 Examinations of various levels of import/export sales, country 
specific and differentiating between equipment, finished products and raw materials 
appeared in Vneshniaia torgovlia concurrent with articles in Rabotnitsa about the 
need for and benefits of synthetic materials, specifically for textiles and shoes. It 
was acknowledged that during the 1920s and early 1930s machines were purchased 
almost exclusively from the West due to its ‘monopoly’774 and that machines and 
lines would continue to be purchased from the West as they would fulfill a 
‘necessary place in Soviet imports’ allowing for ‘rapid progress’.775 This reliance 
on Western machines was however, expected to change. Since the end of WWn the 
Soviet Union could purchase machines and lines produced in socialist countries, hi 
1946, of 197 million roubles worth of machines, the Soviet Union imported 7 
million roubles from socialist countries and by 1966 this figure stood at 1803 
million roubles of 2308 million roubles.776 These machines or lines were often 
referred to as ‘complete equipment for technical progress’ .777
The deal with Pepsi permitted one of the prior symbols of capitalist 
decadence, soft drinks, to enter into the Soviet Union. Like the deal with Castrol 
Oil, it also represented an attempt to make the importation of Western consumer 
products self-funding. Prior to the deal with Pepsi Co, the Soviet Union had 
marketed Stolichnaya vodka tlirough a small American import firm (Monsieur Henri 
Wines Ltd). Under an agreement that had been arranged with the assistance of 
Cyrus Eaton Jr, Richard Nixon, Donald Kendall, David Rockefeller and Meyer 
Lansky, Pepsi got the exclusive rights to sell Soviet vodka and wines in the USA. 
The drink was first introduced to the public at the American Exhibition and its 
presence required a shift in taste as well as political rhetoric as post WWII Russia 
had used cola as an anti-Western and more specifically anti-American totem, a 
symbol of the decadent degenerate decay. At the American exhibition Khrushchev 
initially declined the cola but Mikoyan sampled it and proposed that Khrushchev try 
it. Tlie Chairman of the Presidium of Central Committee Kliment Voroshilov’s 
comment was recorded as ‘not bad’ and the Minister of Culture Yekaterina A.
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Furtseva responded to Soviet reports asking if  she liked the drink; ‘Look for 
yourself, I’m drinking it . ’778 In response to an American journalist’s question ‘do 
you think that the Soviet Union will now have a cola drink? a Soviet bystander 
answered ‘You saw who was drinking it and you saw how much they liked it, didn’t 
you? ’779 The deal was one litre o f Pepsi concentrate for one litre of vodka, 
champagne or Armenian brandy, and was designed to prevent Soviet producers from 
getting the formula. Pepsi was to renovate a Soviet bottling plant in Novorossiisk, 
install high speed bottling lines, and train the Soviet personnel. After the initial 
plant in Novorossiisk had been built, plants in Leningrad, Tallinn, Kiev, Tashkent, 
Novosibirsk, Moscow, Alma A ta and Sukhumi were to be opened within seven 
years. Production was set at seventy-two million bottles per year. The bottles were 
not those traditionally used in the USA as there was concern that Soviet citizens 
would keep the bottles as collector items. To prevent this, standard Soviet bottles 
with foil souvenir stickers were used. The advertising campaign slogans were 
‘Peelin’ Free’ and ‘a swallow of cold Pepsi-Cola will put you in a good mood and 
refresh you.’ The price for a good mood and a refreshing feeling was steep: the 
Soviet government set the cost o f the final product at forty kopecks per bottle in 
comparison with the local soft drinks that sold for a few kopeks. One theory as to 
why the Soviet government was willing to bring in Pepsi, as proposed to Kendall by 
a Soviet counterpart, was that ‘if  there was a prestigious consumer item like Pepsi, 
Russians would spend their savings on it instead o f on vodka. ’780 While it is 
plausible that the Soviet government sought to divert personal resources away from 
alcohol, the production of seventy two million bottles per year, for a population o f  
250 million would have resulted in one bottle per year for every third person. The 
initial sale o f Pepsi was restricted to resorts, beriozki and some hotels and 
restaurants. This restriction further negates the argument of Pepsi being used as an 
alternative to vodka, but is indicative o f the linkage between Pepsi as Western and 
Pepsi as a Soviet symbol o f elitism and leisure. Another theory as to why Pepsi was 
permitted was that Western consumer goods were sought by the elite and that it ‘was 
in the interest of the state to keep this W estemphile elite content and feeling
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prosperous for they run the organs of state, edit the newspapers, sing at the Bolshoi 
and design the nuclear rockets.’781 The latter explanation is consistent with research 
into the techniques for and the purchase of calf leather boots and Alfa Romeos.
The record of a meeting on trade ties between the USA and USSR that 
included Averell Harriman and K. N. Rudnev reveals that there was a genuine 
interest in trade ties with the USA, but that the Soviet Union was willing to go 
elsewhere. This point was emphasised when Rudnev noted that the USSR had good 
scientific and technological ties with France, England, Italy and Japan. For his part, 
Harriman expressed interest in the Soviet agreement with Fiat, and the science and 
technology agreements with France, in particular the clauses covering colour 
televisions acknowledging that the Americans had been sluggish on the issue of 
colour televisions and expressing his hope that there was room for cooperation. 
When the Soviet representative Pronsky was asked why Fiat was chosen, the short 
answer was that the decision was made by thepraviteVstvo, followed by the 
explanation that Fiat was ready to cooperate with the USSR on mutually 
advantageous terms and was willing to acquaint Soviet specialists with its 
enterprises. Rudnev interjected that the agreement with France in the field of colour 
televisions was carried out on an equal footing and was mutually beneficial to the 
two countries, and that the agreement with France did not exclude cooperation with 
American industry so long as the systems were compatible. The very first 
experimental colour TV broadcasts were performed in 1928 in Great Britain Baird 
and H.E. Ives in the USA and the USA was the first nation to start regular colour 
broadcasts (1953). In 1960, Japan was second, using the American NTSC TV 
(National Television Standards Committee) broadcast system. In Western Europe, 
no consensus was found on a colour TV broadcast system with France instituting 
SECAM (Sequential Colour With Memory), while most of the remainder of Europe 
decided to use PAL (Phase Alternate Lines -  a modification of the American 
system). Despite Britain’s relatively late start with regular colour broadcasts (1967 
along with West Germany), the British were active in promoting their system. In 
the end. Eastern Europe and Russia along with several African nations were 
equipped with a modified SECAM system. The SECAM system was developed in 
France in light of both technical and political considerations (the need to develop
781 Finder. Red Carpet 216.
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and support domestic industries and a strong resistance to initially German systems 
like PAL). The transmission of programmes could not be prevented by 
implementing SECAM as opposed to PAL, but these programmes could only be 
viewed in the lest desirable black and white format. Work on SECAM began in 
1956 in France with Russian assistance. Part of this co-operation lead to the 
development of NIR or SECAM IV by the Moscow based Telecentrum. SECAM 
systems are highly individualised and the modified versions are not necessarily 
compatible with each other. An interesting research project would be the 
comparison of French, British, and American motives in actively pursuing colour 
television contracts with the Soviet Union.
Like the Americans and the French, the British had also been active in the 
contract bidding for colour televisions. The BBC engineering division for colour 
television was willing to supply technical help, engineering, training both in 
England and in Russia, and equipment (the same as used by BBC but with 
outsourced manufacturing). In a letter from L. Maksakov (on behalf of the 
Goskomitet for radio and television) to the Central Committee (09.07.1965) it was 
stated that despite differences between the British and the Soviet colour television 
systems, it was expedient to establish fields of cooperation with the British in this 
sphere.782 In 1967, the BBC was again visiting the USSR to discuss colour TV 
systems. A general level of disappointment on the part of foreign firms in light of 
Soviet purchases after exhibitions and delegations, did not deter trade.
Despite Khrushchev’s decision to favour car pools over private passenger 
vehicles, research into updating the automotive industry occurred during his 
leadership. Research into the issue began with assessments of the Soviet passenger 
car in comparison with foreign vehicles, and was limited initially to specifications 
and aspects of production that were seen as challenges to producing a ‘Western’ 
standard car. Foreign companies were contacted either with the intent to purchase 
parts that would be integrated into pre-existing plants and models; and/or the 
purchase of new models and production lines. An example of the first was fitting 
the Moskvich or the Volga with tubeless tyres ‘as is standard in the USA and in
782 ‘09.07.1965 3-11/379,' RGAE 9480/9/185: 1964-1966.
245
Western Europe.’783 In the report on the production of auto parts based on foreign 
models for the Moskvich and Volga it was stated that ‘it is necessary to act like the 
Japanese and to purchase a licence.’784 The initial research on foreign models 
focused on the below listed manufacturers and models.785
Table 9 Foreign Car Models Researched
Brand Model
Italy Alfa Romeo 1900 super
Lancia Aurelia PS, GT 2500, GT 2500 super
Fiat 1100
UK Pathfinder Rover Rover-90
W est Germany Hansa BMW 502
Mercedes 220, 300c
Opel Captain
Ford (Germany) Taunus
Porsche
France Peugeot 203
Citroen
USA Nash Metropolitan
The new model Moskva of 1956 was compared unfavourably in the report ‘On the 
question of the preparation of the automobile Moskva' with the Fiat 1100, Austin A- 
50, Nash Metropolitan, and Volkswagen deluxe. The research focused on 
specifications and not on price categories.786
In 1967 (28.02-18.03), SCST sent a delegation to look at the British 
automotive industry, specifically Ford, British Motors Corp, Leyland Motors and 
Perkins. During this trip, car parks, in house training, bonus systems and speed of 
model innovation for both passenger cars and buses were documented. The British 
system of repairs was considered ‘good’ but the Italian and American organisation 
of repairs were better.787 The result of the trip was the purchase of three Panthers 
from Leyland and three Red A it o w s , six model Viceroys and thirty tourist buses 
from Duple Motor Bodies as well as four licences for three factories in Moscow and 
the Yaroslav Motor Factory.788
783 ‘Po voprosu podgotovki proizvodstva legkovogo avtomobila m-402 na moskovskom  
zavode malolitrazhnykh avtomobüei,’ RGAE 9480/2/3: 115-125, 116.
784 ‘Z. b. St. Referenta UVS,’ RGAE 9480/9/455: 113.
785 ‘Po voprosu podgotovki proizvodstva legkovogo avtomobila m-402 na moskovskom  
zavode malolitrazhnykh avtomobilei’ 121-123.
786 ‘Po voprosu podgotovki vypuska avtomobilei ‘Moskva’,’ RGAE 9480/2/3: 149-151, 151.
787 ‘Plessi 17.11.1967,’ RGAE 9480 9/431: 103-104.
788 ‘O poseshchenii avtomobil’nykh i traktornykh zavodov Anglii,’ RGAE 9480/9/431: 124- 
133.
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The process of researching and applying foreign technology and practices 
was prominent throughout the 1960s, despite increased reservations of the viability 
of emulating Western practices. This emulation process can be seen not only in the 
attempt to provide equivalency in goods but in the use of foreign successes as 
indicative of Soviet successes. For example, in a letter to the Central Committee of 
the CPSU from SCST (12.03.1969) and signed by A. Shelepin, V. Kirillin, M. 
Keldysh, and G. Panisheva, the concept of a new scientific journal, described as 
providing information on scientific and technological progress, economic and 
scientific organisational research, propaganda for technical findings and results in 
the research fields of agriculture, applied sciences and technology, was floated. The 
journal was to be an accessible study of national and international scientific and 
technical progress for the layman and professional and serve as a technical 
supplement to the popular journals Science and Life and Youth Technology and a 
readable supplement to the existing, often inaccessible and overly technical, Soviet 
journals. The format of the proposed journal was modelled on International Science 
and Technology (USA) and its viability was justified by indicating thoi International 
Science and Technology had a print run of several million and that analogous 
journals were published in England, France, Czechoslovakia, GDR and other 
countries.789
The purchase of foreign technology and the importation of ideas provided a 
wide stratum of Soviet society with tangible evidence of Western scientific and 
technological skills. The careful deliberation surrounding the necessity of the 
purchase enhanced the prestige of what was purchased. In addition, through the 
purchasing process, the information was transferred from one group of Soviet 
specialists to another, thus further disseminating the idea of Western science and 
technology. The purchasing of Western science and technology showed the 
advances of the West in their own right as well as highlighting the deficiencies of 
the Soviet system. The next stage, the process of installation and integration, was 
often marred by bureaucratic failures and industrial shortcomings.
789 ‘OTPR VTsSPSno.SOn ot 12.03.1969,’ RGAE 9 4 8 0 /9/Ed. Khr. 772: 30-32.
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c. Assimilating technology
Foreign technology was typically associated with short-term remedies in a 
system in which failing to meet short and medium teim goals had the potential to 
cause great disruption. In the West, technology quickly became part of production 
and served as a springboard for new technology. However, in the Soviet Union the 
‘same quality of scientific resources that launched satellites into space were 
simultaneously incapable of incorporating sufficient technological potential into the 
production process in order to progressively improve consumer welfare.’790 
Exposure to Western technology meant exposure to the potential of success or 
failure of the application of said technology. Western technology came at a high 
price: it strained systems, was associated with higher quotas, and often needed to 
prove itself. Failures to assimilate it were frustrating, embarrassing and potentially 
disruptive for personal careers and the Party.
Studies tracing the decision-making process to import new technology 
through to production have not cast Soviet industry in a favourable light. The 
unwieldy nature of the Soviet industrial complex was to frustrate both Western and 
Soviet specialists and workers, for example, on average it took Soviet chemical and 
tool sectors twice as long as their Western counterparts to complete a new 
process.791 In 1967, it took the Soviet Union forty-one months from licence 
purchasing to production start up of the Pilkington float glass-making process792; the 
average time required by sixteen other international purchasers was twenty-seven 
months.793 Continuing to compare the UK and the USSR, the first electronic 
controller entered into production in 1951 in the USSR and 1949 in the UK. The 
next generation, the transistorised controller, did not start in the USSR until 1974 
but was implemented in the UK by 1959. On average, the Soviet Union required 
two and half times longer than the UK to institute new technology.794 Below is a
790 Christoph Schneider, Research and Development Management From the Soviet Union 
to Russia (Heidelberg. Prysica-Verlag, 1994) 1.
791 Technology and East W est Trade: Office of technology A ssessm ent Congress of the 
United States 223.
792 Float glass was often used in the automotive industry it is made by melting raw 
materials: sand, limestone, soda ash, dolomite. Iron oxide and salt cake. Pilkington is 
considered to be an innovator of this process of producing flat, smooth, even sh eets of 
glass.
793 Holliday, Technology Transfer to the USSR. 1928-1937 and 1966-1975 89 .
794 ‘Reshenie: Gostekhniki SSSR  po voprosu razrabotki konstruktsii i tekhnologii 
izgotovlevniia beskamernykh avtomobil’nykh shin,' RGAE 9480/2/3: 58-60, 58.
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chart with a few examples of implementation times in the Soviet Union in 
comparison with other Western nations. The table below contains figures showing 
the introduction of technology by year, and the number of years until the first plant, 
commercial venture etc was operative.795
Table 10 Introduction and Implementation o f Technology
-------- - ------ - ------- USSR USA UK West Germany Japan
Oxygen converters 1956 1954 1960 1955 1957first plant
16 12 5 11 5
Continuous flood of steel 1955 1962 1958 1954 1960first plant
17 7 16 14 10
Synthetic fibres 1948 1938 1941 1941 1942
beginning of mass production
25 21 23 23 21
Alternating high pressure 1956 1954 1962 1955 NA
current
first line
14 16 7 18
Nuclear energy first commercial 1954 1957 1956 1961 NAelectric station
21 14 6 9
Machine tools with numerical 1958 1952 1956 1958 1958
programme
first working mass produced 
prototype 13 13 12 15 15
The comparatively lengthy period from the introduction of a new technology, be it 
foreign or national, was attributed to vagueness, extensive documentation, lack of 
direct contact between the supplier of technology and the final user, inexperienced 
workers assigned to installation, inability to operate and maintain complex 
equipment, poor management, and shortages of trained personnel and raw 
materials.796 Slow start-ups were often due to labour problems exacerbated by a 
lack of living quarters. Indeed, the lack of living accommodation was severe 
enough that Soviet negotiators would occasionally insist on the foreign company 
building accommodation.797 In a report on the utilisation of American and 
Czechoslovakian machines in the agriculture industry one can read that the imported 
machines appear to work in accordance with the primary functions but ‘with
795 Bezborodov, Vlast’ i nauchno-tekhnicheskaia poiltika v SSSR  seredinv 50kh- seredinv 
70kh godov 163.
796 From an unpublished manuscript of Philip Hanson and M. R. Hill, Technology and East 
W est Trade 224.
797 Nove, Political Economy and Soviet Socialism 163.
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reference to our [Soviet Russian] conditions, have demanded some alteration. ’798 
These Soviet conditions involved energy spikes, overly high humidity levels, poor 
quality materials, inadequate oil, and substandard materials. Alterations often 
resulted in decreased efficiency and quality. Workers, plant managers and industry 
bosses could not but have been aware of and frustrated by the Soviet failure to 
successfully adopt the new technology. These difficulties occasionally appeared in 
the Soviet press. In 1969, a Soviet economist used six chemical projects designed 
for the Soviet Union by Western companies to illustrate the failure of the Soviet 
regime to properly use labour saving technology provided by the West. In one of 
the projects, the Western firm believed that the Soviet Union should have been able 
to work with the same number of auxiliary workers, in this case ninety-one. The 
Soviet project required 723 auxiliary workers, three and half times more engineering 
and technical workers and fifty-five percent more chief technicians than stipulated 
by the Western design.’ 799 Another example of the failure of implementation was 
the purchase of a foreign license for the production of disk brakes and brake 
equipment for the automobile industry: the Ministry of Automotive Industry did not 
organise quickly enough and the license expired before production could begin.soo 
Complaints about poorly qualified workers were common both in the press 
and amongst officials. When Kerry Williams of Computing Consulting presented 
his assessment of the Soviet computer programming sector he stated that he was 
prepared to help revamp the industry and to find foreign companies willing to 
provide information and machines but that Soviet workers were not ready to work 
with the current level of Western technology.soi The American firm Puritan Fashion 
was invited to present production techniques (factories) for men’s and women’s 
light clothing (suits, dresses) in February of 1967, to tender an offer for new 
factories, and to assess the Soviet garment industry. The purchased factory for 
men’s shirts employed 930 workers, cost 3.5 million USD and was financed at 7-7.5 
percent interest with repayment to be half cash and half goods. It had a production
798 ‘O Rezul’tatakh p ro v ed en iia  v 1956 godu proizvod stvennyk h  opytov po v n esen iiu  
Z hidkikh... 21 .12 .1956 / RGAE 9480/2/13.
799 E. Manevich, ‘Problemy vosproizvodstva rabochei sily i puli uluchshenila ispol’zovaniia 
trudovykh resursov v S S S R ,’ Voorosii ekonomiki no.10, 1969.
800 Pravda (12.03.1974) 1.
801 ‘Otchet o prebyvanii v SSSR  direktora anglilskol firmy Computer Consultants 10- 
20.10.1966’ 1-67.
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capacity of ten million units per year. Construction began two months after the 
contract was signed, the construction of two subsequent factories one for dresses 
with a production capacity of five million per (2.56 million USD) and one for 
corsets, bras etc with 1048 workers and a capacity of 8 million units per year (2.97 
USD) were negotiated. The American firm provided the credits for all of the 
factories. In the contracts it was written that Puritan Fashion would build homes for 
workers around the new factories. Despite the large contracts, there was concern 
that Soviet workers would not have the technological knowledge to man the lines. 
Miles Rubin, the president of Puritan Fashion, toured Soviet Factory 52 (shirts) and 
calculated that the factory should have been producing twelve million units per year 
and not three. According to Rubin, the problem lay in workers at thirty percent 
capacity, poor organisation of leadership, poorly qualified workers, slow speed of 
work, primitive production lines, poor mechanisation, outdated methods and 
machines, and poor quality controls (for example, he noted that the end of the work 
day was reached when a day’s worth of goods - with or without flaws - had been 
produced). Rubin offered to revamp Factory 52 by altering the ratio of master to 
worker, installing new machines, reorganising the factory, and retraining the 
workers for 1.5 million USD. Output was to increase from three to nine million 
units per year and income by forty to forty-five million roubles per year.so2 The 
ability to dramatically increase production and income without needing to build a 
new factory, was of interest to the Soviet government, and resulted in a great deal of 
attention being committed to Western organisational and management methods. 
Rubin was also under whelmed by the skills and work ethic of the Soviet worker ‘as 
I [Rubin] mentioned in our meetings, machinery alone cannot bring the desired 
result.’803 However, as Levison has commented: ‘How do you motivate the 
appallingly low paid workers in a joint venture when they know that half of the 
profits are going back to the capitalist camp?’804 The railway worker Grigorii 
Artemenko (born 1942) was to transfer the charge of inefficiency back to the system 
when he commented in an interview with David Mandel ‘on the imported 
equipment, the worker has all the conditions for productive work. The capitalists
802 ‘Z. b. zamestitelia predsedatelia Gostekhniki D. M Gvishiani s predsedatelem Soveta  
direktorov amerikanskoi firmy Puritan Fashion 11 .03.1967/ RGAE 9480/9/455: 251-253.
803 ‘Letter from Miles Rubin to Gvishiani 26 .05 .1967 / RGAE 9480/9/431: 77-78.
804 Levinson, Vodka-Gola 261.
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insist on this with a view to their own profits.’ 805 According to Artemenko, Soviet 
equipment was of poor quality and design. The failures of the Soviet system were 
highlighted through the assimilation process, and responsibility was shifted from 
one social group to another. Ultimately, it was to be placed at the feet of the system 
itself.
Domestic and industrial electricity presented another large challenge to 
Soviet industry in relation to the assimilation of Western technology. In a published 
speech Malenkov stated that the Soviet: ‘lagging behind the USA in labour 
productivity is closely connected with our inadequate provision of electric power 
facilities to labour.’soe In the drive to provide a comparable standard of living there 
was a significant increase in housing, appliances etc. He went on to attribute the 
American growth in power resources to the construction of modern power plants 
with large turbine units with a capacity of 150,000 to 260,000kw. This was in 
contrast to the significantly lower capacity of Soviet turbine units.so? At the time of 
this statement the USSR did not have the necessary turbines in production let alone 
installed. In addition to not having the same level of electricity, utilisation patterns 
were different. In the late 1950s, Soviet electrical usage allotted 15.5 percent to 
agricultural and municipal use while the level of domestic electricity consumption 
alone in the USA was as twenty-seven percent. The Soviet energy famine was to 
challenge mass automation as well as the utilisation of labour saving devices in the 
home.
The failures of imported technology were also due in part to application and 
organisation. F. Brambilla of Pirelli’s assessment of Soviet tyre factories was that 
‘we saw much good mechanised and automated equipment, but it is necessary to 
correctly use all of it.’sos Brambilla also noted a general lack of selection. In the 
1950s, Pirelli Rubber Company had been contracted to build a plant worth fifty 
million USD for tyre production. In 1967, Pirelli agreed to sell eight different lines
805 Interview with Griogorll Artemenko in David Mandel, Interviews with Workers In the 
Former Sovite Union: Perestroika and After: Viewed from Below (New York: Monthly 
Review Press, 1994) 12.
806 (19.02.1957 Pravda 6-8, Izvestlla 2-4); T h e Directives on the Sixth Five Year Plan 
15.01 ’ Gruliow, Current Soviet Policies II 31.
806 Speech by G. M. Malenkov, Gruliow, Current Soviet Policies 94.
807 Speech by G. M. Malenkov, Gruliow, Current Soviet Policies 95.
808 ‘Z. b. zamestitelia predsedatelia Gostekhnlke D. M Gvishiani s  predsedatelem  
Ital’ianskol firmy Pirelli F. Brambilla 28 .04.1967,’ RGAE 9480/9/457:106-112, 109
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for tyre production for the Fiat 124, thereby providing for some flexibility in the
system and variety for the consumer. This was rejected by the Tyre Institute for a
level more on par with the West: twenty-five lines producing three types of both
winter and summer tyres. Gosplan was to reject the idea of twenty-five lines and
favour the purchase of eight lines, which were to be dismissed as inadequate shortly
after production began. The final contract was negotiated in 1975.
An American steel delegation surveying the Russian steel industry, notably
Magnitogorsk in the summer of 1958, was to remark on the focus on speed and on
the number of eranes at the open-hearth shops (double that which would be present
at an American one).so9 Writing at the time, David Granick stated that:
The economic forces at work are simple. Labour is relatively plentiful in the 
Soviet Union compared to the United States. Russia is still a country, which 
can afford to use women with brooms to keep the streets spotless. But 
machinery and gadgets are expensive. Freight cars are expensive. New 
investment is still concentrated upon increasing production, and not on 
saving labour. It is still cheaper to use seven men with hand trucks instead 
of one man with a power truck. When this situation changes, as it long ago 
changed in the United States and has recently changed in England, we may 
be confident that fork trucks will find their way into Russian plants. Until 
that time, the Russian leaders are sufficiently good businessmen to keep their 
wild-eyed engineers under wraps.8lo
However, the Russian leaders were not able to keep vast sections of society under 
wraps. They simply could not control all those individuals who researched the 
West, had contact with the West, had contact with Western technology in their place 
of work, or had spoken with individuals who worked with Western technology. The 
Soviet press spoke of the successes and challenges of assimilating Western 
technology. Khrushchev spoke of it. The masses spoke of it. If it was a secret than 
it was one in which the empire wore no clothes.
809 Granick, The Red Executive 112.
810 Granick, The Red Executive 212.
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Conclusion
The terminology employed by the Bolsheviks was industrial. From the
earliest days of the Soviet state terms such as constructing, building, forging,
working, were emphasised.Bii During the 1930s, it was not unusual to see
personification of industrial processes with emotions typically associated with a
family being applied to industry, ‘little Magnitka,’ love for one’s furnace, life being
given to machines, lines and factories and the use of human developmental stages to
describe the construction of a factory. Statements about the building of factories
were accompanied by statements about how man was being rebuilt, thus
strengthening the ties between the Soviet person and industry giving each
characteristics of the other. The adoption of Taylorism, the study of human
movement in the attempt to make it more machine-like, is another example of this
melding. This connection to and personification of industry was strengthened
during WWII when the nation’s survival depended in part on the tremendous
endeavour of moving factories east of the Urals in order to ensure supplies for the
front and for the population. The employment system and distribution of goods also
contributed to this, as the work place was often responsible for supplying food,
shelter and other goods and services. After WWII, technology in the form of
nuclear advances assisted in vaulting the USSR into superpower status and
endowing it with all of the rights and responsibilities that this entailed. All of this
was to increase the importance of industry for the individual, and contribute to
Soviet society’s sensitivity to economic and technological success. Looking at the
situation in the late 1950s and early 1960s, Richard Nixon was to conclude that need
for economic and technological success was to result in significant deviations from
Communist practices:
the people in the Communist empire [particularly true in the Soviet Union], 
in order to get production moving, have had to depart from Communist 
principles. For example, in factory after factory that I visited I found that the 
differential between those who were the top producers, the best thinkers, the 
most creative contributors, on the one hand, and the average worker, on the 
other, was far greater in the Soviet Union than in the United States, or in any 
other capitalist country in the world today, I found that the rewards, which 
are given to scientists and to engineers, are relatively greater than they are in
811 For exam ples of the use of the system s approach In management s e e  G. Pospelov, 
T he System s Approach’ Pravda (21.03.1974) 2.
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a country like the United States.. .The way they are improving production is 
by departing radically from Communist principles.8i2
Giovanni Agnelli was to extend this to senior Soviet officials when he commented: 
‘they’re really ravioli revolutionaries, much more capitalist pasta than revolutionary 
meat.’813
The basic economic law of socialism posits the ‘steady expansion and
improvement of production or the basis of advanced techniques with the aim of the
fullest satisfaction of the steadily increasing requirements and the many sided
development of the members of society.’814 As the vanguard, the Communist Party
sought to maintain power through an economic system that it acknowledged as
failing to match Western economic development.815 The Party was ultimately
responsible for this failure, despite its attempts to deflect it.8i6 The sense of official
frustration and eventual avoiding of responsibility can be seen in such documents as
the speeches concerning the Directives of the Sixth Five Year Plan.
The fact of the matter is that the successes of our industry have turned the 
heads of some economic and Party officials, have fostered conceit and 
complacency in them, and in a number of cases have brought about an 
underestimation of the need for continuous improvement of production, for 
introduction of the latest achievements of domestic and foreign science and 
technology. We still have many officials ‘men in mummy cases’ who fear 
everything that is new and advanced. An old fossil of an official argues: ‘Why 
should I become mixed up in all this? There will be a lot of bother and it might 
even lead to unpleasantness. They talk about improving production! Is it 
worthwhile knocking your brains out over it? Let the highers up 
worry...Another official, after he has received instructions, directs his energies 
largely to evading a vital job or merely going through the motions of tackling
it.817
Taking into account charges of inefficiency and of hare-brained schemes, the 
period from Sputnik to the first man on the moon, was one in which the isolation 
from foreign competition, restricted technology transfer and reduced contact with 
foreign specialists of the Stalin era was fundamentally altered and in which 
improvements in economic circumstances were brought to the average citizen. The
812 Nixon, The Challenges We Face 32-33.
813 Levinson, Vodka-Cola 280.
814 David Dyker ‘Ideology and Soviet Economic Policy,’ Stephen White ed., Ideology and 
Soviet Politics: 11-135, 115.
815 Buck-Morss, Dream World and Catastrophe 39.
816 Lewin, Stalinism and the S eed s  of Soviet Reform 239.
817 ‘The Directives on the Sixth Five Year Plan 15.0T 39.
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economic developments under Khrushchev in the early years were suecessful 
enough to ‘give rise to unduly optimistic expectations and, unwisely, forecasts.’sis 
The equipment, production lines, technical expertise and turnkey factories that were 
purchased and installed during the 1960s were to form the productive base of many 
enterprises into the 1980s.si9 Imported technology was used until it became 
obsolete and ‘further domestic development to improve the national technology base 
and its international status was not encouraged. ’820 The technological and economic 
gap between the West and the Soviet Union was a discussion with which scientists 
and Party officials were concerned and questioned the veracity of the claim that the 
Soviet Union was catching up with the West.821 As early as 1965 Soviet physicist 
Petr Kapitsa had written that the gap between Soviet and American technology was 
increasing.822 Airplane designer Oleg Konstantinovich Antonov entered into this 
discussion when he made the sardonic published remark; ‘Kiev mathematicians 
have calculated that, in order to draft an accurate and fully integrated plan of 
material technical supply just for the Ukraine for one year, one requires the labour 
of the entire world’s population for ten million years. ’823
Despite the comparative economic failure, in absolute terms, there was a 
significant increase in the material wealth of the population. The failure to match 
American output while substantially increasing in consumer goods can be illustrated 
in increases in numerous consumer goods between 1965 and 1975 (See Appendix 
E). A solid estimate of consumption levels for the period of 1960-1964 shows a 
growth rate of 1.9 percent per annum.824 In 1950, consumption of goods and 
services constituted sixty percent of the Gross National Product (GNP). This was to 
rise promisingly and then fall. By 1980, it had fallen to fifty-four percent. This 
despite consumption of goods having grown at an annual rate of 4.3 percent per year 
since 1950 and services increasing from 4.2 percent to 4.7 percent of GNP. Thus, 
consumption fell relative to the wealth of the nation but not relative to historic
818 Roger Munting, The Economic Development of the USSR (London: Cromm Helm, 1982) 
132.
819 Boris Kagarlitsky, The Disintegration of the Monolith trans. Renfrey Clarke (London: 
Verso, 1992) 17.
820 Schneider, Research and Development Management From the Soviet Union to Russia 
5.
821 S ee  Hanson, The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Economy 92.
822 As quoted in Hanson, The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Economy 62.
823 As found in Nove, Political Economy and Soviet Socialism 120.
824 Hanson, The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Economy 87.
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precedents. Real per capita consumption nearly tripled between 1950 and 1980.825 
Consumption of soft durables constituted a particularly successful branch of the 
economy increasing from six percent to eleven percent.826
Table 11 Some Indicator's o f Soviet Consumption 1965-1970&n
--------- -^------------ -------- 1965 1970
Per capita consumption of soft 
goods
Cloth per square metre 26.5 30.4
Knitwear units 4.2 5.3
Footwear in pairs 2.4 3
Stocks of durables per 1,000 
persons
Radios 165 199
TVs 68 143
Cameras 67 77
Motorcycles 17 21
Refrigerators 29 89
Washing machines 59 141
Measured at factor cost, the Soviet per capita consumption increased at an average 
annual rate of 2.9 percent from 1950 to 1969 and 2.2 percent from 1970 to 1980. 
This decrease is a reflection of both the overall slow down of GNP growth and the 
falling share of consumption in the GNP. Khrushchev’s era was one in which 
consumer consumption held a comparatively high economic priority. This occurred 
during a period of increased interaction with the West and Western science and 
technology.
Khrushchev’s claims that important elements of communism could be 
attained in the space of a generation implied that the problems hindering progress 
were technical and not socio-political.828 It encouraged a focus on economic 
problems, and resulted in the evaluation of party activity in terms of economic
825 Gertrude Schroeder and Elizabeth Denton, ‘An Index of Consumption in the USSR ,’ 
USSR: Measures of Economic Growth and Development. 1950-1980: Studies Prepared for 
the U se of the Joint Economic Committee Congress of the US (Washington: US 
Government Printing Office, 1982) 317-401, 325.
826 John Pitzer ‘Gross National Product of the USSR 1950-1980,’ USSR: Measures of 
Economic Growth and Development. 1950-1980: Studies prepared for the use of the Joint 
Economic Committee Congress of the US: 3 -1 6 9 , 19.
827 Hanson, The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Economy 115.
828 Grey Hodnett ed., Resolutions and Decisions of the Communist Party of the Soviet 
Union: Vol 4 the Khrushchev Years 1953-1964 (Toronto: University of Toronto, 1974) 8.
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production being a defining characteristic of Khrushchevism.829 As printed in 
Pravda: ‘the toilers of our country know that the continuing improvements of the 
material well being of all segments of the population -  workers, kolkhozniki, and 
intelligentsia - and the maximal satisfaction of the constantly growing material and 
cultural demands of the whole of society, have always been and continue to be the 
object of particular concern for the Communist party and the Soviet government’ 
and that this was to be achieved by ‘giving productive application to the 
achievements of Soviet and foreign science and technology.’s30 Again in Pravda, 
but over a decade later (1965), the main task of the party was to ensure ‘high rates of 
development... [and that] to achieve this it is necessary to ensure in practice the wide 
economic application of the newest achievements of domestic and foreign science 
and technology, scientific organisation of labour, and improvements in the quality of 
production.’831 The responsibility was put on the ministries before the Party, state, 
and Soviet people for the successful development of the economy and the ‘fuller 
satisfaction of the needs of the population for high quality consumer goods.’832 
The groups of individuals who were charged with assessing and 
implementing Western technology were those from which the Communist Party 
required the most support. The access of broadly defined elite groups to things 
Western, was to be a source of contention for the public and meant that those at the 
top of the Soviet social structure were very likely to be disenchanted and 
disillusioned with the comparative results of the Soviet experiment. These elites 
had few illusions regarding the economic and technological differences between the 
Soviet Union and the West, As a group that had access to many of the economic 
benefits of the West, it is unlikely that they would have tried to maintain the illusion 
amongst themselves. By the mid 1960s, it was publicly acknowledged that there 
had been a significant amount of ineffective decision making from the state organs 
regarding science and technology.833 In a report for the Council of Ministers
829 Hodnett, Revolutions and Decisions of the Communist Partvof the Soviet Union 8.
830 Pravda (06.03.1953) 1.
831 Pravda (01.10.1965); Donald V. Schwartz ed., Resolutions and Decisions of the 
Communist Party of the Soviet Union Vol. 5: the Brezhnev Years 1964-1981 (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 1982) 54.
832 Schwartz, Resolutions and Decisions of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union 54.
833 Bezborodov, 'Vlast' I nauchno-tekhnicheskaia politika v SSSR  seredlny 60kh- serediny 
70kh godov’ 127.
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Comrade Rudnev asked how the Soviet economic output could realistically increase 
by sixty times over 1960 levels by 1980.834 No answer was given.
834 ‘Z. b. Soveta min. SSSR  Tov. Rudnevy K, N.,’ RGAE 9480/7/6 : 103-104.
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5: Driving Towards Communist Consumerism: 
AVTOVAZ835
In setting ourselves the task o f overtaking and surpassing the capitalist countries in 
per capita output, we at'e setting ourselves the task o f overtaking and surpassing the 
richest capitalist countries in the matter o f per capita consumption, o f achieving a 
complete abundance in our country o f every type o f consumers’ goods.
(N. S. Khrushchev) 836
Introduction
The era in which the AVTOVAZ project was first proposed was one of 
optimism. The great patriotic war had been fought and won, the extreme scarcity of 
resources of the war and immediate post war era had passed and, even taking into 
consideration the potential doctoring of figures, an impressive growth in GDP/GNP 
had occurred. The AVTOVAZ was one of the first and lai'gest post-WWH 
international projects, and had a significant impact that was not restricted to a few 
individuals or to a specific geographic area. The VAZ project brought together the 
Soviet elite, specific Soviet workers, the general Soviet public, and Western 
purveyors of technology. It also brought together the ideas of an elite with an 
openness to Western technology; the general Soviet belief in the benefits of Western 
technology; the usage of Western technology to forward a Soviet objective for its 
future; and demands of the general population for consumer goods. In the case of 
VAZ, one of the most prominent articles of consumption, the private passenger car, 
was being introduced to Soviet society as dependent on both Soviet and Italian 
efforts. The introduction of this chapter provides a description of the historical 
nature of the Soviet automotive industry, with its ties to the West, through 
Khrushchev’s reluctance to invest in private passenger cars; and on to the public 
acclamations of the Italian-Soviet joint project. In the section ‘The necessity of 
foreign presence’ public opinion is surveyed regarding the Soviet ability to develop 
quickly and efficiently the automotive industry without foreign input. The 
overwhelming rejection of this possibility demonstrates the penetration of the 
positive technological and scientific image of the West. As the car was a prime
835 I would like to thank the Loukin family for their kindness and assistance with the 
research conducted in Tol’iatti.
836 XX S ”ezd Kommunlsticheskoi Partii Sovetskoao Soiuza. stenoaraflcheskii otchet 82.
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Symbol of consumption, an analysis of the connections between worker 
contentment, standard of living and the VAZ project can be used to highlight how 
Soviet workers were addressing personal consumptive expectations within a 
partially non-Soviet setting. The VAZ project provided Soviet citizens with a 
connection to the West through technological advancement and the universal theme 
of the passenger car.
‘The Volzhsky automobile giant plant amazed people all over the world and 
made them believe again in the ‘Russian miracle’. But it was not a miracle. It was a 
job that was as good as a deed, and it was a deed that was as good as a job.’83? The 
method of cooperation employed for the building of the AVTOVAZ was referred to 
as the ‘modified systems approach’, which involved long term or continuous 
contacts; project oriented industrial co-operation and Western involvement in 
training and in the decision making process. By the early 1970s this was to become 
the preferred method of production in high priority industries.838 The AVTOVAZ 
project is representative of the importation of a technical idea from the West and the 
reality of the West as seen in the cooperation with Fiat.839 The widespread 
awareness of knowledge of Western co-operation was to have an equally wide 
spread impact on mass perceptions. By publicly announcing the benefits, if not the 
necessity of international co-operation, the Soviet regime laid the groundwork for 
the assimilation of the idea of Western approaches into the longue durée of Soviet 
public thought.
The automobile remained an elite item in the Soviet Union until the 1950s 
when it became a symbol for, although not a possession of, the masses. This symbol 
included associations with freedom, power, privacy and technology. Cars granted 
individuals the opportunity to travel when they wanted, with whom they wanted, 
and where they wanted (within reason). The individual was encapsulated in a 
private possession that acted as a barrier to the togetherness of Soviet life. If the 
communal flat was adopted as a means of concretely bringing communism into the
837 Julia Smarnova, Avtovaz: Segodnia I zavtra (Moscow: Interbook, 1991) 3.
838 Max Ralls, ‘Worker’s  Social Perceptions,’ Leonard Schapiro and Joseph Godson, The 
Soviet Worker: Illusions and Realities (Macmillan, 1982): 242.
839 The primary source material for this work reflects the primary objective of examining the 
econom ic image of the W est through the VAZ experience. Thus, figures have been taken 
as representing what w as being said and not what w as actually the case. This approach 
also m eans that extremely rich archival material has not been included.
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homes of citizens, than the introduction of privately owned passenger cars provided 
an escape route from the communalisation of daily life. One of the most important 
images assoeiated with the car was as a haven from the panoptic eye of society and 
the unreliability of public transport. This can be seen in such mundane practices as 
the use of the parked car as a ‘make out haven’ and the use of ‘going for a drive’ as 
a synonym for needing to be alone or needing to speak in private. That the car was 
seen as a viable alternative to the unreliable and often crowded public transport and 
the failure of public transport to reach destinations (often dachas) resulted in a 
transfer of onus from the state to the individual. The state provision for the masses 
was seen as less desirable than the industrial provision for individuals. Here it is 
necessary to differentiate between state and industry, as this researcher would argue 
that individuals made this differentiation at that time. Thus, the image provision of 
transportation by the individual as preferred over provision of transportation by the 
state would have challenged both the role of the state as provider and the communist 
ethos. This researcher did not speak with anyone who felt that the state was 
responsible for their having acquired a vehicle. It was also a place where the 
individual was in control. The Soviet media put forward the idea that the car was a 
combination of international technical culture and of the national character, and that 
‘it may be ranked with such phenomena of culture as architecture, theatre, and 
painting.’840 The adoption of the car as a major cultural icon was logical because 
images of modernity, speed, and advancement were integral to the Soviet concept of 
self; and it was destabilising because it intrinsically involved ‘values of 
individualism and private property’ two values seemingly antithetical to the 
Communism of the USSR.s4i Viktor Nikolaevich Poliakov, the former first general 
director of VAZ, reiterated a phrase attributed to Stalin: ‘the passenger car is a 
bourgeois notion’ .842
From its inception, the Russian and then Soviet car industry has been 
international in nature. Although the Tsarist Empire paid little attention to the 
industry, by 1901 there was the beginning of an overwhelmingly imported auto-
840 Smarnova, Avtovaz: segodnia i zavtra 7.
841 Michael Bull, ‘Soundscapes of the Car: a Critical Ethnography of Automobile Habitation,’ 
Daniel Miller ed,, Materializing Culture: Car Cultures (Oxford: Berg, 2001) 185-202, 186.
842 S ee  for example: V. N. Poliakov, ‘Molodezh’ dolzhna reshat’ na VAZe glavnye zadachi,’ 
Volzhskii avtostroitel’ (27.04,2000): 2.
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industry. By 1918, based on sub-assembly lines, Nizhny Novgorod was the main 
automotive centre producing six models of vehicles. During WWI the 
Ryabushinsky Kuznetsov Company in Moscow produced and repaired a modest 
number of vehicles for the war, and in 1920, under Lenin’s instruction, it began to 
work on a Soviet designed truck. The truck was first produced in 1924 at the 
Moscow Automobile Society (AMO), (the Ryabushinksky factory renamed) with a 
total production of one thousand units. The Soviet passenger car industry began 
when the Soviet Union signed an agreement with Ford to build the Gorkii 
Automobile Factory (31.05.1929). Production of the GAZ A, in essence the Model 
A Ford, began in 1931, with the first Soviet designed passenger car, the GAZ MI, 
being produced in 1936. In 1936, a new car factory, under the name of ‘Tire Plant 
Named After Stalin’ began production of the ZIS 110, a passenger sedan. While 
automobile production in Russia began at a relatively late date and in small 
quantities, by 1937 the Soviet Union was producing 200,000 units a year of which 
18,300 were passenger cars. This placed the Soviet Union fourth in terms of 
international production.843 This rapid increase was due to the industry being 
granted a high level of ministerial priority, which spiked with the AVTOVAZ 
project in the late 1960s early 1970s and the Kama truck factory in the early 
1 9 7 0 s .B44 Both Kama and VAZ were publicly acknowledged to have planning 
priority: ‘the central committee and the government have rendered the widest 
support for the construction of the plant. VAZ’s orders were fulfilled very quickly, 
cargos bound for the All Union Shock Work Construction Project were given the 
green light’.845
WWn saw industrial priority being given to the production of transport with 
military and/or industrial capabilities and a drastic decrease in the production of 
passenger vehicles. This acknowledged, during the war GAZ maintained its overall 
industrial priority and received substantial allotments of natural resources and 
manpower. Thus, at the end of the war, GAZ was in a relatively strong industrial
843 William P. Baxter. The Soviet Passenger Car Industry. (Novato: Presidio Press, 1983) 
219; or Avtomobil’nyi Transport za 50 let S S S R ,.’ Avtomobirnvi transport no. 1 (January 
1973) 3-4. A comparative study of the East German Trabant can be found In Jonathan 
Zatlin, T he Vehicle of Desire: The Trabant, the Wartbug, and the End of the GDR,’ German 
History Vol.15 no.3 (1997) 358-380.844 A. Nikitin, ‘Budet Na Kame Avtozavod,’ Trud (11.10.1969): 4.845 B. M. Katsman, ‘Glavnyi vyigrysh vremia,’ Ekonomika i oroanizatsiia promvshlennoqo 
proizvodstva no.1 (1976) 65.
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position. Beginning in 1943, production of passenger vehicles resumed with the ZIS 
110, a large luxury sedan designed for transporting the Party leadership, William 
Baxter has proposed that one of the prime motives behind the production of the ZIS 
110 was to increase the ‘Soviet prestige at Yalta and other high level international 
conferences’ .846 This perceived need is consistent with the behaviour of various 
Soviet leaders, Khrushchev was to recall his chagrin at being the only world leader 
to not arrive at the Geneva conference of 1956 in a jet plane. Vladimir Nicholevich 
Novikov stated that in ‘Europe, in the USA, ten new models were produced yearly, 
and the run on passenger cars was in the millions. And what did we have in 
comparison? The primitive Moskvitch.. .and, well, a few test models, and that was it. 
Nothing wealthy’ .847 Giuseppe Boffa has argued that the agreement with Fiat is 
representative of Kosygin’s most significant attempt at economic and technical 
parity with the West.848
In 1945, representatives from the car/truck factories of; Yaroslavl (two 
representatives), GAZ (three representatives), ZIS (one representative), and 
Ulianovsk (one representative) were sent to the USA to acquaint themselves with 
the American auto industry. Viktor Nikolaevich Poliakov, the first general director 
of VAZ, recalled that by the early 1960s it was widely accepted that, after a long 
period of isolation, it was time to produce automobiles to international norms, and 
using international methods.849 In 1950, the Automobile Plant Named Lenin, began 
production of the Moskvitch 401, a four-passenger sedan, and GAZ introduced a 
five-passenger sedan, the GAZ M 20 (the early model known as Pobeda and the later 
model V o /g f l) .8 5 o  In 1957, the never popular Zaporozhets, a four-passenger sedan 
was introduced. Of the vehicles being produced during the 1950s and 1960s, the 
Chaika and the ZIL sedans were allocated for official use. By 1954 newspapers and 
journals were calling for changes to the car industry against: ‘a background of rapid 
growth in other branches of machine building, the backwardness of the auto industry 
becomes ever clearer; gradually the situation of the auto industry has come to be
846 Baxter, The Soviet P assenger Car Industry 225.847 Interview with V. N. Nicholeylch Novikov in A. Shavrin, VAZ 25-26.
848 Boffa, Ot SSSR  K Rossii 21. An indepth study of archival materials in which Soviet car 
production was compared with Western production can be found in Istoriia avtomobil’noao 
transporta Rossii: 1945-1965 (Moskva: Niiat) 2000.
849 interview with V. N. Poliakov in A. Shavrin, VAZ 32.850 Between 1950 and 1957 GAZ w as changed to ZIM and then back to GAZ, and the ZIS 
w as changed to ZIL.
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characterised by the very unpleasant word, stagnation’.851 Upon returning from a 
visit to the United States in 1959, Mikoyan began his official press release with a 
positive discussion of his visits to Ford, Chrysler, and General Motors.852
Discussion of the problems facing the Soviet light automotive industry began 
under Khrushchev, despite Khrushchev’s decision to favour car pools over private 
passenger vehicles. Research was conducted into the viability of fitting current cars 
with modem Western components, for example fitting the Volga with tubeless tyres 
‘as is standard in the USA and in Western Europe’853 as well as purchasing new 
vehicles. Information was gathered on various models from Fiat, Alfa Romeo, 
Lancia, Rover, Opel, Mercedes, Ford, Porsche, Peugeot, Citroen and Nash etc.854 In 
1962 the Second Industrial Exhibition of Italy was held in Moscow. Despite the 
general nature of the exhibition, including a focus on the Italian way of life, the 
purity of the sun, the beauty of the landscape, and the culture of the nation, a 
dominant theme of the exhibition was on transportation: displays, models, and 
examples of cars, buses, planes, gas stations, and electric trains. Highlights of the 
transportation section were the Selena a joint Fiat-Ford product and the GIA an 
elegant model from Fiat that had been displayed in the previous year but which now 
had a new steering wheel. The work of the Italian car designers and engineers was 
reported as ‘astonishingly industrial and artistic’.855
Despite indications otherwise, Khrushchev was officially against further 
developing and expanding the passenger automotive industry.856 Instead, he 
advocated an increase in public transport and the creation of fleets of communal 
vehicles. To this end, in the 1950s, line mileage for the railways increased by 
approximately ten percent, passenger train service increased and the cost of tickets 
decreased.857 Khrushchev’s enthusiasm for car fleets was not shared by the public.
851 Promvshlenno-Ekonomicheskaia Gazeta 14.11.1954: 2.
852 S ee  A. I. Mikoyan ‘Press-Konferentsiia A.I. Mikoiana,’ Pravda. (25.02.1959): 5.
853 ‘Po voprosu podgotovki proizvodstva legkovogo avtomobila m-402’ 116.
854 ‘Po voprosu podgotovki proizvodstva legkovogo avtomobila m-402’ 121-123.
855 A. Radkin, ‘Na ital’ianskol promyshlennoi vystavke,’ Dekorativnoe iskusstvo SSSR  no.8 
(1962) 43-44.
856 Khrushchev’s dislike of private cars was not shared by the other officials. S ee  Papovskii 
‘Komu nuzhny legkovye automoblili.’ Kommunist XXXVI no. 14. (1959): 126-128.
857 Ernest W. Williams Jr., ‘Transportation: som e aspects of the structure and growth of 
Soviet transportation,’ Comparisons of the United States and Soviet Economies: Papers 
submitted by panellists before the subcommittee on economic statistics Parts l-lll (1959) 
(New York: Greenwood Press, 1968) 177-18, 185.
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A public opinion poll conducted during the mid 1960s revealed that the average 
citizen wanted a passenger car above all other consumer goods.858 Given the lack of 
spai'e parts, the lack of service garages, the rationing of petrol and the poor state of 
the roads and highways, it is unlikely that this desire was based on reasons of 
practicality. Indeed, there was a trend for Soviet car owners to keep their cars in 
distant private garages, using them for special occasions or for going to the dacha; 
thereby maintaining their dependence on public transport during the working week.
In 1965, Aleksei Nikolaevich Kosygin announced that the Soviet Union was 
manufacturing vehicles that were obsolete in the West and that were poorly suited to 
the Soviet economy.859 Concurrent with Kosygin’s announcement was increased 
coverage of international car shows, articles on the benefits and modernity of 
passenger car production, and the unfeasibility of development without foreign 
participation. The question was not if private passenger cars were necessary but 
what type was most suitable for the nation. A reading of the Soviet Press during the 
1960s leads to the conclusion that there was a ‘determination’ on the part of the 
leadership to automobilise the nation.860 K. Bakhtov, a member of management at 
VAZ, recalled that during the 1960s it was widely accepted that the car industry was 
simply too far behind international standards to catch up independently.861 Evgenni 
Artemovich Bashindzhagian, part of the initial negotiating delegation, believed that 
‘from the very beginning the course (of events) was such that it must be a 
completely modern European car’ .862 Although the Soviet elite did choose to 
introduce new lines and technology into pre-existing car and truck factories by 
means of foreign cooperation, the preference was to establish new international 
turnkey factories.863 Less mentioned were the extremely favourable credit 
conditions.
In the 8^ '^  Five Year Plan (1966-1970), the increased output of automotives 
was slated at 220 percent. This was to be achieved by renovating existing plants and
858 V. A. Zamozikin, UN. Zhilina and N. I Frolova ‘Sdvlgl v m assovom  potreblenli I llchnostl 
Voprosv filosofli no.6, (06.1969): 33 or s e e  N. F. Rokatushin ‘Kakoi verkh avtomobiliia vy 
predpochltaete?,’ Volzhskli Avtostroiter no.25 01.11.1969: 4.
859 A. N. Kosygin, ‘Povyshenie nauchnoi obosnovannosti planov - vazhnelshala zadacha  
planovykh organov,’ Planovoe khoziastvo (April 1965); 6, 9-10.
860 Baxter, The Soviet Passenger Car industry 225.
861 interview with K. Bakhtov in Shavrin, VAZ 129.
862 Interview with E. A. Bashingzhagian in Shavrin, VAZ; 63.
863 For details of this discussion se e  the December 1969 Party Plenum and the 24“^ Party 
Congress in March-April 1971.
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new production (VAZ) and was to be complemented by increases in priority of 
support plants.864 The success of the renovations can be seen in the notable increase 
in passenger car production before VAZ began production. The following graph 
indicates the production and distribution of passenger cars from 1963-1971.865
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These increases left production six million units behind the United States, and 
seventh in world production, and large sectors of the society (namely agricultural 
workers) without means of obtaining an automobile.866 In 1969, the Minister of the 
Automotive Industry, Aleksander Mikhailovich Tarasov announced that automobile 
output was to be two million units per year by 1975. This meant that for the first 
time in Soviet history, the output of passenger cars, according to the 1971-1975 Five 
Year Plan, was to be greater than commercial vehicles. At the 23"^  ^Congress of the 
CPSU Kosygin reiterated four times that the Soviet Union was committed to the 
development and expansion of the passenger car industry. In the opening address of 
the 24^  ^Congress of the CPSU in 1971 Brezhnev confirmed his nation’s 
commitment to the improvement of transport.86?
864 Matveev, ‘Perspektivy razvitiia automobil”noi promyshlennosti v novom piatiletii,’ 
Planovoe Khoziastvo (July 1966): 28.
865 Distribution of Soviet Passenger Car Production 1963-1971 based on William Baxter 
239.
866 Baxter, The Soviet P assenger Car Industry 226.
867 ‘Na sovremennom etape ekonom icheskogo razvitiia vozrastaet rol’ otraslei narodnogo 
khoziaistva, prizvannykh obsluzhlvaf protsess proizvodstva -  transporta, sviazi, 
materlal’no-tekhnicheskogo snabzhenila I drugikh.’ in ‘Avtomobil’nyi Transport za 50 let 
S S S R .,’ Avtomobil’nvi transport no. 1 (January 1973):.3-4, p.4.
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Although the Soviet elite chose to introduce new lines and technology into 
pre-existing car and truck factories by means of foreign cooperation, the focus was 
on establishing new international factories. The partnership with Fiat constituted a 
public acknowledgement of the proposed benefits of economic co-operation.868 
Inquiries were made into the possibility of a partnership with American, Swedish, 
French and German companies as well as with Italian companies. For various 
economic and political reasons. Fiat and Renault were the two companies most 
willing and able to enter into a deal with the USSR. West Gennany and Japan were 
ostensibly dismissed as being too technologically inferior due to a lag caused by 
losses from WWII. This dismissal was not in accordance with purchasing patterns 
that showed substantial imports from West Germany and Japan. It is more likely 
that the German and Japanese companies were dismissed due to political or financial 
considerations or unwillingness on the part of the West German and Japanese 
manufacturers to enter into an agreement with the Soviet Union. Automobile 
industries with close ties to military complexes, i.e. Sweden’s Saab with its 
connection to airplane/jet plane engines, were excluded themselves from the 
competition. Military ties were not a problem for Soviet purchasers. Fiat was active 
in radar technology (the military was the largest purchaser of this technology). 
Negotiations began with Renault, and were almost concluded when they suddenly 
failed to reach an agreement. Discussions with Fiat began on 1 July 1965 between 
the Soviet Ministry of Science and Technology and representatives of Fiat. Later, 
the Soviet Ministry of the Automobile Industry joined the negotiations. On 20 July 
1966 the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Council of Ministers of the USSR 
decided to build a new city and factory one thousand kilometres south east of 
Moscow, near Stavropol on the Volga. Production was to begin no later than 1972. 
Due to the priority given to VAZ, the leadership team was chosen personally by the 
Politburo. A contract with Fiat of Italy to build the AVTOVAZ, (VAZ) factory for 
the production of what was in essence the Fiat 124 (estimated at 600 million US 
dollars), was concluded (15.08.1966)869 and construction was to begin six months
868 (for details of this discussion se e  the Decem ber 1969 Party plenum, and the 24"’' Party 
Congress in March-April 1971),
869 The 1965 reforms included a policy that stated that new technology enterprises were to 
have the opportunity to retain more of the self-generated profits to reinvest or distribute as
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later (14.01.1967) with 25,000 workers, of whom 15,000 were youths, working in 
sub zero temperatures amongst snow and frozen ground. 870 In the autumn of 1967 
the project was announced in the major papers under titles such as ‘Under the 
address of: Tol’iatti, automobile’ in which it was explained that twenty ministries 
had travelled abroad to many countries in order to bring the most technologically 
advanced and suitable automobile to the USSR.sti By 1968, the factory alone 
employed 19,760 workers and by 1969, the city’s population had swelled to 
approximately seventy thousand of whom ten thousand were komsomols and eighty 
percent were youths. In addition to the deal with Fiat, there were contracts with 
Smiths of England to work on technological improvements for the Zaporozhets and 
with Renault of France to modernise and expand the capacity of Moskvitch 
production (estimated at 250 million Francs with an additional 37 million USD in 
machine tools).872 This increase in commercial relations was not limited to the 
automotive industry. Between 1966 and 1975 commercial relations between the 
USSR and the West increased in general.873 V. N. Poliakov defended the deal with 
Fiat by stating that the technical levels of Fiat were in accordance with international 
standards and that Fiat often worked with Ford and other respected automotive 
manufacturers.874 The journal V neshn iia  to rg o v lia  described the agreement as 
giving ‘Soviet specialists the opportunity, to the extent that it was necessary, to 
become acquainted with the firm’s work experience -  its achievements in the field 
of automotive production and also its plans for the future, especially the 
development of variants of the F ia t  724.875 In Italy, between 1963 and 1965 
investment had decreased by fifteen percent, unemployment had increased by 530, 
000 and hours were cut by eight and a half percent.876 Fiat faced a take-over by
the directors saw fit. It also required them to sell their products. This reform however, had 
little impact.
870 Photos from ‘Step’ drognula, nekhotia podchiniaias’ Liudiam,’ Volzhskii avtosroitel’ 
( 12.01 .2002): 1 .
871 ‘Po adresu, Tol’iatti, avtomobil’nyi,’ Sovetskaia Rossia (10.08.1967); 1.
872 ‘The Modernization and expansion of Moskvitch production is being carried out by 
RENAULT of France, who agreed to furnish technical assistance.’ A. Blokhin, ‘Zavodskoi 
put’ ‘moskvicha,’ Izvestiia (16.07.1969): 3.
873 Holliday, Western Technology Transfer to the Soviet Union 168
874 V. N. Poliakov, ‘Vaz dlia mania -  eto v se ,’ Volzhskii avtostroitel’ (01.02.2000): 2-3, 2.
875 V. N. Sushkov, ‘Sotrudnichestvo s firmoi Fiat rasshlriaetsia ,' Vneshniia torgovlia no. 8. 
(1966): 44.
876 Sergio Riccio, ‘Italian Contradictions,’ International Affairs, no.8 (Ausust 1966); 39- 
43:40.
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General Motors. These factors combined to result in Fiat and Italy offering 
extremely favourable terms of agreement in order to win the major long-term 
contract.
Leonid Sergeyevich Kolosov,87? recalls how the negotiations with Fiat had 
come to a standstill due to a disagreement over interest rates.878 The banking firm 
Instituto Mobiliare Italiano was to front a loan of 322 million USD (ninety percent 
of the total cost), but wanted the going rate of eight percent while the Soviet 
negotiators, under instruction from Kosygin, could go no higher than six. Leonid 
Kolosov met with one of his contacts and informed him that if the negotiations with 
Fiat went badly, the Soviet Union would conclude a contract with Renault. In 
response Kolosov received an unofficial document listing six and a half percent as 
the Italian minimum. Kosygin agreed to offer the six and a half percent thereby 
giving the Soviet minister Tarasov the green light for concluding the deal.879 The
877 Born in 1926, w as a KGB spy who worked in Italy, Spain and France, under the 
auspices of being a reporter for Izvestiia.
878 'On April 15th and then in July 1966 a sixteen-man delegation, headed by the Soviet 
minister for the car industry, Niklai Tarasov, cam e out to Rome to discuss details of how 
Flat could help us build the factory of our dreams on the River Volga. Valetta led the Italian 
team in ten days of tough talks, held at the Ministry of Industry, which I covered for Izvestiia. 
The Soviet side asked for a credit. The Italians agreed and offered the average European 
interest rate of eight percent. But Kosygin had m ade ciear to our negotiators that Moscow  
could not afford to pay more than six percent. The talks were deadlocked. Tarasov called 
the Soviet team together at our em bassy. ‘What are w e going to do?’ he said. ‘Kosygin 
won't budge. W e have no room for manoeuvre,’ ‘What about your friend Fritz?’ [Fritz was a 
long standing Italian KGB informer who reported to Kosolov] Konstantin Petrovich asked  
me. He knew that my informer, while being a member of the opposition, had good contacts 
In the Italian government. ‘Leave it to m e,’ I said. I went out that night and made a small 
chalk cross on the column outside Fritz’s house. He responded quickly to my signal. I told 
him the negotiations with Fiat were going badly and there was a big risk the Soviet Union 
would conclude a deal with Renault of France instead, thus depriving Italy of a major 
contract, it w as a lie, but he believed it. He asked me to give him a little time and promised 
to do what he could. Three days later Fritz brought me a top-secret Italian government 
document that showed that Rome’s bottom line w as in fact an Interest rate of six-and-a-haif 
per cent. Tarasov cabled Moscow and Kosygin agreed to this figure, it made a huge 
difference to the Soviet Union, which saved about $ 40 million on the deal worth a total of 
$320 million. But the rezident said: ‘Let them wait another day before we say ‘y es’.’ The 
next day Tarasov returned to the negotiating table, banged his fist on it and told the Italians: 
‘Six-and-a-haif- per cent or tomorrow we leave for Paris.’ The Italians agreed instantly and 
that w as how the Deal of the Century w as concluded....’ Helen Womack ed., Undercover 
Lives: Soviet S o les in the Cities of the World (Phoenix. 1998) 12-15. Mafia involvement 
and trading of secrets is also propagated by Konstantin Bakhtov, an early management 
member at VAZ in ‘Chtoby poluchit’ VAZ, Fiat raskryl nam voennye sekrety,’ Vlast’ no.4 
(30.01.2001): 60-63.
879 Fritz received $25,000 USD, and Kolosov w as promoted to the rank of major, for being 
‘capable handling of an agent which led to considerable benefit for the Soviet state’, and 
received a hand-made hunting rifle, one of a limited edition of 2,000 guns made by the
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contemporary journal Vlast’ has run articles written by a former member of VAZ 
management who was present at the negotiations, in which it is alleged that Fiat 
received the contract as military secrets were used to sweeten the deal.sso In August 
1966, Tarasov made the agreement public. The Fiat protocol was signed in Turin 
(04.05.1966), at which time the bank loan details were also ratified.881
The contract with Fiat was based on the production of 600,000 passenger 
cars a year and included $550 million USD worth of machinery plus technical 
assistance. The output level of VAZ was to be one car every twenty-two seconds.882 
Fiat was to assist with the start up, and to provide continuing technical and 
organisational advice. Production was to begin in 1969, with full capacity being 
reached by 1972. The streamlined factory was to employ between thirty-five and 
forty thousand workers, ten thousand fewer workers than a comparable plant in the 
West. This was to be achieved through copious amounts of automation.883 This 
high level of automation was to contribute to extensive technical ties, quality 
controls, training, joint technological developments etc, being maintained over a 
decade.884 Thus, the VAZ contract included several clauses that would result in 
personnel cooperation.885 AVTOVAZ was to epitomise the commitment to a 
modem management method that included: significant levels of independence, 
accountability of managers, the wage system and supplements for professionals. In 
reality, an average of ninety-six thousand workers were employed.886 Despite 
industrial priority and rapid construction, the first cars were not produced until April 
1970, when in commemoration of Lenin’s 100^ *’ birthday, the first vehicle was 
produced with the use of sub-assemblies brought in from Italy. General production
famous Kalashnikov manufacturers for Khrushchev to present to visiting dignitaries’ se e  
Womack.
880 Konstantin Bakhtov, ‘Chtoby poluchit’ VAZ, Fiat raskryi nam voennye sekrety,’ Vlast’ 
no.4 (30.01.2001): 60-63.
881 For more information on the background deal s e e  V. Sushkov, ‘Sotrudnichestvo s  firmoi 
Fiat rasshlriaetsia,’ Vheshniaia torgovlia no.8 (1966): 43-45.
882 M. Sbornik, Avtovaz -  sovrem ennoe proizvodstvennoe ob”edinenie. (Znanie, 1977) 5.
883 iz dokiada pervoqo sekretaha obkoma KPSS V. P. Orlova na Vi! pienume obkoma 
KPSS o zadachakh oblastnoi partoroanizatsii v sviazi so  stroitel’stvom zavoda po 
proizvodstvu iegkovvkh avtomobilei’ 27 .05.67 . 27-31 a s printed in VAZ: istoriia v 
dokumentakh:1966-198300 (1985) 28.
884 Sergio Riccio, ‘Italian Contradictions,’ International Affairs, no.8 (August 1966): 39-43: 
43.
885 in a press interview, the president of Fiat, Giovanni Agnelli, stated that: ‘construction of 
such scope ensured a great demand for our technical specialists.’ S e e  L. Yugov, ‘Soviet- 
itaiian Contacts Expand,’ International Affairs July (7): 33-39, 3.
886 M. Sbornik, Avtovaz -  sovrem ennoe proizvodstvennoe ob”edinenie (Znanie, 1977) 5.
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began in August that year and capacity was reached in 1974. There were to be three 
versions of the Zhiguli produced: the standard, the luxury, and the family edition. 
Thirty percent of production was to be sold for export. Like most Soviet industries, 
VAZ was not dependent on exports for the continued survival of the factory, but 
typically workers received bonuses and/or higher wages for work on expoits.ss?
Despite the generally positive response to the building of the AVTOVAZ 
there was some concern, voiced in such public forums as Pravda, that the 
technology being employed would cause problems for supplying factories. Concern 
was justified. Many of the initial parts for the Fiat 124A^AZ2101/Zhiguli/Lada were 
to be supplied by other plants, many of which were to be newly constructed or 
modernised. At the time that the contract with Fiat was signed, the Soviet Union did 
not produce the 92-octane petrol (if the vehicle were to run on the standard 66- 
octane petrol, then there would be no possibility of reaching the maximum 
140kms/hr),888 lubricants, coolants, or the motor oil, upon which the Fiat 124 ran. 
There were also safety concerns resulting from inadequate materials. For example, 
the Ministry of Petroleum-refining and Petrochemicals was unable: ‘to supply us 
[VAZ] with good-quality door seals, packing glands, brake seals and other rubber 
articles. The safety of people riding in cars depends on these seals.... Probably it is 
unprofitable for the petrochemical plants to bother with ‘small stuff -  after all, their 
plan is expressed primarily in tons’.889 N. I. Letchford recalled a conversation with 
Poliakov in which they spoke of the difficulties in producing the necessary quality 
of metals.
-Viktor Nikolaevich, I am not getting any results. All the regimes, all the 
variants that I have tried -  crap
- What do you want from me?
I need Italian metal
- Think again. It won’t happen.
- Look, its necessary so that I can understand, as a metallurgist what to do, I
need a sample.
Ok. But only as an exception.S90
887 Interview with Nikolai Naumov in which he d iscu sses his work In Moscow in David 
Mande), interviews with Workers in the Former Soviet Union 66.888 Zhitkov has said that the petrol w as available in Moscow, but that it w as difficult to find. 
A. A. Zhitkov, Vershinoi zhiznl stai VAZ (Toi’iatti, 1997) 32.
889 ‘More Difficulties of the Auto A ge,’ CDSP Vol. XXVII, no.l 6-7:7. For more complaints 
specific to the Zhiguli s e e  CDSP. Vol. XXVI no. 51: 27-28.
890 N. i. Letchford in VAZ: stranitsv istorii. vospominaniia i faktv 116.
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The plastics industry was simply unable to meet contemporary demand for 
automotive parts: the Volga had no basic plastic parts; and the Moskvich had forty- 
nine parts weighing in at 3.36 kilograms. The international average at the time was 
one hundred and thirty details at eight kilograms.891 Eventually, the Fiat 124 was 
modified for lower plastic usage. It was also modified for Soviet road and weather 
conditions. In the end, Soviet engineers altered sixty five percent of the parts.892 
Thus, it is not surprising that the press was able to run interviews with Italian 
workers in which one read: T come from Turin, am familiar with Fiat and thought 
that in Tol’iatti, I would see a copy of the Italian establishment, but nothing was 
duplicated’.893 In response to the increased production of passenger cars, the 
Ministry of Transportation called for the creation of new lorries in order to ship this 
new abundance of cars.894 Press commentaries agreed that the production problems 
lay not solely with VAZ but with its suppliers. V.N. Poliakov estimated that the 
VAZ production required the introduction of up to one thousand new components 
and materials and that this was an excellent opportunity to bring Soviet industry as a 
whole up to a new level of modernity.895 Subsequent research supports the idea that 
VAZ made a substantial contribution to bringing both car manufacturing and the 
national economy to a new qualitative level.896 As Soviet designers, engineers, 
planners, and workers were presented with the challenge of creating new materials 
and components to ‘international standards,’ the idea of Western modernism was 
reinforced. The AVTOVAZ with its plethora of new parts and materials was 
significant in this domino effect. In the official press release commemorating the 
fiftieth anniversary of the USSR the heroic furthering of the socialist economy 
through the work of those at VAZ was hailed.897
891 S. Mateev, ‘Perspektivy razvitiia avtomobii’noi promyshiennosti v novom piatiietii,' 
Planovnoe khoziastvo (Moscow) no. 7. (Juiy 1966): 21.
892 For a detaiied description of the technical details for the VAZ-2103/Zhiguii se e  
‘Avtomobir VAZ.2103 « Z h ig u li» .*  Avtomobil’nyi transport no. 6 (June 1973): 41-47, 47.
893 ‘U vas est* chemu pouchit’sia ,’ Volzhskii avtostroitel’ (25.06.1974): 2.
894 S ee  A. Zbar, L. Plriatlnskii, and V. lurchenko, ‘Avtopoezd dlia perevozki avtomobilei VAZ 
2101,’ Avtomobil’nvi transport no. 6. (June 1973):45-47; or M. Sidorov, ‘Avtopoezd dlia 
perevozki avtomobilei VAZ,’ Avtomobil’nvi transport no.3 (March 1973): 44-46.
895 In an interview with Poliakov, ‘Moiodezh’ dolzhna reshat’ na VAZe giavnye zadachi,’ 
Volzhskii Avtostroitel’ (27.04.2000): 2.
896 Smarnova, Avtovaz: Segodnia I zavtra 19.
897 as reprinted in VAZ: Istoriia v dokumentakh: 1966-1983gq 65.
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The Necessity of Foreign Presence?
The Soviet Union was not bereft of technological advances under 
Klirushchev and Brezhnev. Its military capabilities had made it one of two 
superpowers, and its space programme was leading the world. However, when 
VAZ workers interviewed and surveyed in 2002898 by the researcher were asked if 
the Soviet Union could have developed and mass-produced an economy car without 
foreign co-operation, 92.3 percent (See Appendix F) said that foreign cooperation 
was necessary. Former VAZ translator Elvira Simonovna, stated that she felt that 
Fiat was as necessary to VAZ, as Ford was to Gorkiy, if not more so. She expanded 
on this by noting that foreign participation, ‘this was more than just Italian’, was 
necessary as it brought with it a new town, new technology and a better life for 
Soviet workers.899 Not one person interviewed believed that the Soviet industry 
could have adapted and modernised a pre-existing factory i.e., the Moskvitch 
factory. Question five of the survey asked why the factory was established at 
Tol’iatti as opposed to modernising pre-existing factories. The majority (37 of 40) 
responded that it was primarily due to the abundance of natural resources in the 
area, gas, hydro-electricity from the Volga, and proximity to a main transportation 
artery. A supplementary explanation given was the need to create something new: 
‘we in the Soviet Union had never had a noimal automobile and we were far behind 
the West’.900 This need for the new was a by-product of the stunning political, 
social and economic changes of the Khrushchev era. Question six of the survey 
asked, ‘if Fiat was necessary, why?’ The answers focused on the fact that Fiat 
offered a modern, affordable product, an economical means of achieving a goal, and 
access to new technology.
898 The criteria for the representative sam ple were individuals present from either the 
beginning of the construction of the city/factory, or from the beginning of production. Of the 
40 respondents 25 were male and 15 female. In total, 7 were members of the Communist 
Party. Those who responded to the questionnaires represent a broad section of workers at 
the factory from individuals who worked (work) on the assem bly line, in the presses, in 
maintenance a s well a s  in design, translation, engineering, and other sectors run by but not 
technically part of the production of the factory, eg. doctors who worked in the AVTOVAZ 
polyclinic. In addition to the questionnaires, interviews were conducted either as a 
supplement to, or instead of, the written questionnaires.
899 From an interview with Elvira Simonovna 17.03.2002.
900 Questionnaire no. 6.
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• ‘At that time in Russia we didn’t produce an automobile of that class’ ;90i
•  it offered ‘advanced technology to the standard that existed in other 
countries’; 902
•  a  ‘m o r e  o r  l e s s  f a s t  m e a n s  o f  m a s s  p r o d u c t i o n ’ ;903
• ‘for the USSR it was necessary to have experience in the European field of 
automobiles’;904
• ‘our level of automotive industry was low. At that time, the level of Fiat 
was at the level of the world’;905 and
• ‘I think that the partnership could have been with another European 
automotive firm but in the competition for the project Fiat won’.906
The theme of the necessity of a new standard of international passenger cars is 
indicative of effective propaganda intersecting with a welcoming recipient. That the 
international car industry was to be lauded and then overtaken could only be in the 
best interest of Soviet citizens. In 1969 public discussions about advances made in 
the compact car sector started appearing regularly. For example, the author Yu. 
Maksimov writing of the advances in the USA, Western European and Japanese 
markets, concludes that in capitalist countries ‘it is difficult to find a another 
industry where scientific-technological strength has been so active, as in the 
automotive industry’, noting that in the USA alone, between 1954 and 1969, 
between seven thousand and nine thousand inventions were patented.go? Beginning 
11 February 1970, Volzhskii avtostroitel’ contained a section entitled Technological 
Pages. On these pages were both Soviet and international developments pertaining 
to the automotive industry. Of the nine articles that ran on the first day, two dealt 
with activities of the USA, and one respectively with each of England, Japan, Italy 
and West Germany.gos Longer articles comparing the advantages of Honda,
901 Questionnaire no.39
902 Questionnaire no. 36.
903 Questionnaire no.31.
904 Questionnaire no. 26.
905 Questionnaire no. 3.
906 Questionnaire no. 7.
907 Yu. Maksimov, ‘Gonka Na Avtomobii’nom Rynke,’ Volzhskii avtostroitel’ (22.10.1969): 4. 
S e e  also Japanese advancem ents in Likvidatsiia Razbitykh Avtomobilei,’ Volzhskii 
avtostroitel’ (01.07.1970): 3.
908 se e  Volzhskii Avtostroitel’ (11.02.19791: 2.
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Volkswagen, Fiat, Toyota, and Ford vehicles were popular.909 As early as 1969, the 
Soviet press was commenting that the new Renault 12 and the Fiat 128, a 
‘wonderful small car’, were already on the streets of Europe.9io Three years after 
the plant began producing, articles were still being printed about foreign technology 
and Fiat. The general theme of the articles was that the foreign technology enabled 
well-trained, hard working Soviet workers, to optimise production capacity.
Foreign technology was being adapted and improved by local engineers, and new 
technology was continuously being imported.gii
Western technology did not remain an abstraction. VAZ engineer O. 
Rozenkov wrote that his fifty percent automated Fiat line was more economical in 
terms of materials and that the machine did not need as highly qualified workers as 
lines with which he had previously worked.912 Nikolai Maksimovich recalled how 
he and his fellow workers ‘saw, learnt, and became acquainted with the Fiat factory 
- it was absolutely of another standard. More progressive rigs, instruments, 
effective control means, organised use of technology, and better economic and 
control standards’.913 Head engineer Stanislav Petrovich Polikarpov, recalled the 
excitement and priority given to VAZ during the planning phases. He was always 
flown to Moscow, where he was put up in the best hotels, served at the best 
restaurants, and chauffeured in the best cars, ‘all because we were to build the best 
automobile’.914 Stanislav Petrovich recalled the gradual dwindling of optimism that 
followed quickly because, ‘when we had finished VAZ, in the West it was already 
practically old...by that time, they had already gone further’ .9 15
The myth versus the reality of Soviet modernity, quality and organisation 
were to be sorely tested by VAZ. Three areas particularly affected were in the idea 
of modernity, as seen above, quality and organisation. In 1968, A. Tsygankov, a 
chemistry specialist who had worked at the automotive repair factory Gruziia, along 
with his ‘enthusiastic friends’ came to work in Tol’iatti, although they were aware
909 D. Beiikanov, Trebovaniia narodnogo khoziaistva k tekhnicheskomu progressu v razvitii 
avtomobil’nykh transportnykh sredstv,’ Avtomobli’nvl transport no. 11 (November 1974): 1- 
11.
910 P. Livshitsh, ‘Fiat 128 Na dorogakh.’ Volzhskii avtostroitel' (01.11.1969): 4.
911 B. Antipov, ‘Siuzhba KiPiA -  operativnaia.’ Volzhskii avtostroitel’ (06.03.1973): 3.
912 0 .  Rozenkov, ‘Svarka... Namorazhivantem.’ Volzhskii avtostroitel’ (06.03.1973): 3.
913 Interview with Nikolai Maksimovich Golovko in VAZ: stranitsv istorii. vospominaniia i 
faktv 208.
914 interview with S. P. Polikarpov in Shavrin, VAZ 42-43.
915 interview with S. P. Polikarpov In Shavrin, VAZ 47.
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that what was currently needed were construction workers, cement and steel 
specialists, etc. He was hired and placed in the department that produced radiators 
and decorative parts.9 i6 He remembered that there were so many new people that 
the majority of fellow workers were unknown and the working conditions were ‘half 
chaos’. The result of the propaganda and hiring practices was a massive gender 
imbalance (more men than women), groups of men waiting to begin their work, and 
newly moved families without the usual support networks. In the spring of 1969 the 
chaos expanded woth the flood of new workers to the main building that was not yet 
finished as bulldozers were doing double duty trying to finish work on the building 
and to keep the snow out, and the Italian specialists were to arrive in late spring with 
the main conveyor/assembly line. The subjective impact of the disorganisation was 
magnified by the push to achieve a high level of completion before the foreigners 
arrived and to produce the first car in time for the hundredth anniversary of Lenin’s 
birth (19.04.1970). Unable to complete the building and the production lines, the 
building, as well as many of the smaller production units, were left unfinished.917 K. 
Bakhtov recalled a conversation with the head Italian engineer Mr. Bono. Bono: 
‘Listen, you are trying to do everything quicker and quicker, and for what? We 
ourselves don’t understand. We were at the factory together and saw how much 
work was left. It is not possible to complete it in a year and you want us to try to 
have it finished in half a year at the latest’ .918 Former motor master Vladimir Isakov 
remembers the oft-asked phrase in Italian: ‘why isn’t this work finished yet?9i9 
Another rush to prepare the factory was in response to Henry Ford Jr.’s decision in 
1970 to act upon an invitation to view the factory and to make recommendations.920 
In a conversation with A. A. Zhitkov over dinner, Zhitkov asked Ford if he would be 
able to build a factory like VAZ. Ford responded with ‘no’ and that he would not 
want to do so. Ford explained that industry was organised differently in the United 
States, with separate factories for separate parts being built and modernised based
916 Interview with Igor Nikolaevich 24.03.2002.
917 A. Tsygankov, ‘Kak molody my byli, kak iskrenne iiubiii,’ Volzhskii avtostroitel’ 
01.07.1997: 4.
918 S ee  both R. Bannikov, ‘Na kubok druzhby’ or Y. Litovchenko ‘Den’ bystrykh koles, 
Volzhskii avtostroitel’ (02.09.1970): 4.
919 Vladimir Isakov, ‘Zdravstvui, VAZ” Volzhskii avtostroitel’ (12.04.2000): 2.
920 Yurii Bezdetnyi, ‘Kak rozhdalsia avtogigant,’ Tol’iatti segodnia’ (19.06.1996): 6.
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on necessity and economic viability. After recalling this, Zhitkov noted ‘He was an 
intelligent man, Henry Ford Junior.’921
Despite a degree of disillusionment following the construction of VAZ, 
public opinion of the Zhiguli, and of VAZ remained high. In 1967, the book ‘New 
Soviet Automobiles’ by O. V. Gherkin drew attention to the integral role of the VAZ 
2101 in the realisation of the great possibilities of mass Soviet car production.922 
The magazine Krokodil (no. 1, January, 1969) was to announce the beginning of 
production in Tol’iatti with a front cover cartoon. In January 1970, the widely 
published journal Za rulem, ran a series on passenger cars that focused favourably 
on the VAZ 2101{Fiatl24). The Fiat 124 was generally considered to be the best 
economy car of the time, a ‘European type’ carpz.? that offered a cost-effective 
solution to the Soviet passenger car problem. When asked what their opinion of the 
Zhiguli was in the early 1970s, those surveyed generally praised both the car and the 
factory. VAZ employee Lidiya Nikolaevna stated that: ‘the automobile was 
absolutely comfortable and pretty; the factory was the best in the country, as big as 
Fiat’.924 Other individuals surveyed wrote that: ‘there wasn’t a factory like VAZ in 
all of Russia’;925 ‘the factory was the best in the USSR and one of the best in 
Europe’ ;926 I saw the prospective factory and automobile in 1969 and in response 
came to this city to build my life’ .927
• ‘My opinion about the automobile model Zhiguli is that it was a 
wonderful automobile, and about the factory - the foremost in 
technology’; 928
• ‘the factory and the automobile were of a high quality. 60 percent 
were sold abroad, taken by various countries’;929 and
• ‘at that time [beginning of the 70s] I was really amazed by the 
factory’.930
921 Interview with A. A. Zhitkov in VAZ: stranitsv istorii vospominaniia i faktv 73.
922 O. V. Chlrkin, Novve sovetskie avtomobili (Znanie, 1967), or se e  the review in 
‘Avtomobil’nvi transport’ n.7 (1967): 1.
923 The term European type had only positive connotations and was used in regular speech  
as well as by the press. S e e  V. Koftelev, ‘Ha volne pamiati,’ Toi’iatti segodnia (19.04.1997): 
15.
924 Questionnaire no. 4.
925 Questionnaire no. 36.
926 Questionnaire no. 2.
927 Questionnaire no. 19.
928 Questionnaire no.20.
929 Questionnaire no. 38.
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These opinions about the factory and its product were imbued with a sense of 
comparison with the West. The factory was as good as or better, as big as or bigger, 
as modem as any in Europe. It would take many years before the average citizen 
became disillusioned with the standards of the VAZ factory.
Incentives for Workers
Klirushchev’s numerous public statements to the effect that the task of 
overtaking and suipassing the capitalist countries in the per-capital consumption and 
of achieving compete abundance implied that in the West there was a degree of 
complete abundance. This allowed the regime to co-opt the interests of the average 
Soviet citizen who was more concerned with ‘status, job security, and more material 
goods and services for the nation and themselves’ than with issues of ideology or the 
legitimacy of the regime. 931 This co-opting was a means of legitimisation, and was 
of particular importance given the new regime’s need to establish themselves with 
an increasingly dissatisfied population. A survey conducted by Aaron Vinokur 
illustrates the issue of discontent. Vinokur’s research, conducted in 1967-68, 
involved groups of workers (2,460 workers) from four factories and looked at the 
levels of dissatisfaction as they correlated with age. The level of discontent was 
more prominent amongst the younger workers with workers under twenty indicating 
almost one hundred percent dissatisfaction and those between twenty-one and thirty 
registering a level of dissatisfaction of 93.5 percent. Even amongst the oldest 
groups surveyed, almost seventy percent rated their salaries as ‘much below needs’. 
This dissatisfaction was indicative of a general spread of dissatisfaction.
930 Questionnaire no.26.
931 S ee  Barghoorn, The Soviet im age of the United States 41.
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Chart 4 How Soviet Workers Rated Their Level o f Satisfaction with Salaries (Based
on Vinokur’s results) 932
100-t!
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■  Much below need
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Tol’iatti was to be a new modem city, affording all possible conveniences: a 
concrete example of the ability of the regime’s ability to match Western levels in 
automotive production but also in standard of living for the factory workers.933 It 
was a balm for the dissatisfaction of the average worker and a promise for a better 
future that was currently being realised (See Appendix G). Calls went out to young 
workers and specialists: a position in Tol’iatti came with the promise of a single 
family flat, modem facilities, fertile plots of land/dachas, and the prospect of rapid 
professional advancement. Residents were to be housed in maximum comfort in 
one of three grades of flats: ‘normal’ and then two higher categories (the deluxe 
split-level flats were spread over two floors). Regardless of the model, all interior 
walls were to be made from ‘modem wall materials’. Stores were to be located on 
every block, no workers’ residence was to be more than fifteen minutes from public 
transport and local schools, crèches and medical centres were to be conveniently 
located both in each block of housing and in the factory. By 1972, 36,000 flats were
932 Graph is based on a table 9.5 p.195 in Aaron Vinokur and Gur Ofer ‘Family Income 
Levels for Soviet Industrial Workers, 1965-1975’ in Ed Arcadius Kahan and Blair A. Ruble 
Industrial Labour in the USSR (New York: Pergamon Press, 1979) 184-208.
933 Reporter A. Nikitin wrote of the city surrounding the Kama factory: the city will be 
representative of the ‘communist tomorrow, a city experiment... built with the sam e skill and 
vision as the city of Tol’iatti’. ‘Budet na Kame Avtozavod,’ Trud (11.10.1969): 4.
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to be completed, and the local population was set at 150,000.934 The streets were 
designed to be straight and wide, in anticipation of one in four residents having a 
car. In essence, an advanced city for the workers and specialists of an advanced 
‘European type’ factory. Thus, there was a direct correlation between foreign 
standards and the new Soviet standard that was being built. As incentives to move 
were concurrent with the presence of foreign cooperation, the aura of new, 
prosperous, advanced, and to some extent personal wealth and freedom (due to the 
product being the personal automobile) was subconsciously linked with the West,
One of the many advantages of moving to Tol’iatti was the promise of a 
private flat. The average length of stay in the hostels was six months, a fraction of 
the time required in other cities, and flats were initially obtained directly thereafter. 
One interviewee from Moscow noted that while his family received a two-bedroom 
apartment within six months (1970) his friend, with whom he had studied and 
worked, and who had chosen to remain in Moscow, only received a private flat in 
the1980s. Irina Mikhailovna, an interviewee originally from Novosibirsk, moved to 
Tol’iatti, as half of a young couple. The couple’s primary objective was to get a flat, 
which they did within four months. Lina Mikhailovna noted that while she loved 
living in Tol’iatti due to the special theatre, numerous cultural groups, well stocked 
stores, and general modernity; and while working at the factory was wondrous (all 
you needed to do was ‘to turn a key’ and a line worked) she and her family left as 
benefits of working at VAZ decreased vis-à-vis northern pay.935 She did not regret 
having moved to Tol’iatti however, and credits her time there as laying the 
foundation for her and her children being able to acquire flats.
Another economic incentive was the absence of the old established elite, as 
this opened up advancement opportunities and the corresponding access to increased 
wages, goods and services. The average age of the workers was twenty-six,936 and
934 V. Pravosud, ‘la znalu gorod budet,’ Volzhskii avtostroitel’ (06.11.1969): 3. it is 
important to note that the figures given on the number of flats were published by the Soviet 
government and may be more inspirational than factual in detail. The propagandistic nature 
of figures used in the Soviet press is problematic only when used as facts. Here they are 
intended to convey the promises and the Soviet reality as presented by the Soviet 
government to Soviet citizens and not necessarily reality itself
935 In an interview with Irina Mikhailovna, conducted in spring 2002 Tol'iatti.
936 A young master who transferred from Gorkiy to VAZ in 1970 commented that although 
the factory w as huge and produced many cars, it w as more compact than Gorky and that 
his working group was in principle small, 17 workers, all of whom were young. O. Salbiev 
‘Vernyi orientir,’ Volzhskii avtostroitel’ no.6 (05.08.1972): 2.
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the average age of specialists sent to Turin was thirty-five. Igor Alekseevich 
Spektorov, remembers his mandate as being to locate The best workers from other 
factories and perspective young specialists who wanted to work and to bring them to 
Tol’iatti.937 The newly created elite had high expectations, one of which was to own 
an automobile someday. Despite working at the factory, technically, VAZ 
employees were to be treated like any other citizen trying to obtain a car. One 
worker noted with disgust that ‘Not only do automobile workers have to pay the 
same price for cars as other people, they even have to wait as long’.938 That said, 
the percentage of ownership found in the survey was approximately three times the 
national average. In a then contemporary series of articles about society and cars 
based on a survey of seven hundred Soviet citizens, citizens were asked when they 
thought that they would own a car. The response was within five to ten years 
among respondents under forty.939 An unanticipated result of the 2002 survey 
question ‘what was your best memory of the Lada and the factory’ was that 32.5 
percent felt that purchasing their first car was their best memory. There were 
several ways of obtaining a car. The official channels were winning the state 
lottery, as a reward for outstanding labour or social contribution, or through a 
waiting list. The average waiting list for the purchase of a Zhiguli/Lada (export 
name)940 was six to ten years, which effectively nullified economic pressure for 
technical improvements .941 Galina Valentinovna, an engineer who worked in 
design, recalled that she and her husband, a brigade leader, were on the waiting list 
although they doubted that they would ever have enough money to purchase a car. 
942 When they did receive a car in 1980, nine years after starting in Tol’iatti943, and
937 Interview with I. A. Spektorov in Shavrin, VAZ 147.
938 Ratis, T h e Soviet Worker’ 242.
939See for example N. F. Rokatushin, ‘Kakoi verkh avtomobilia vy predpochetaete?’ 
Volzhskii avtostroitel’ no.25 (01.11.1969): 4; or V. Ashkin, ‘Bagazhnik nuzhen, no kakoi?,’ 
Volzhskii avtostroitel’ no.22 (22.10.1969): 4.
940 The original name was the Zhiguli but the export name w as changed to Lada after 
Soviet officials were told that this sounded too much like Gigolo.
941 Z suzsa Kapitany, Janos Kornai and Judit Szabo, ‘Reproduction of Shortage in the 
Hungarian Car Market,’ Christopher Davies and Wojciech Charemza eds., Models of 
Disequilibrium and Shortage in Centrally Planned Economies (London: Chapman and Hall, 
1989): 375-404, 397.
942 Interviewees will be referred to using first nam es and patronymics In order to protect 
their anonymity. Initials, last names, and anonymity will be used in accordance with the 
journalistic practices of the time.
943 The transliterated spelling of Tol’iatti is being used. The city was named in honour of 
the Italian Communist Leader Palmiro Togliatti (1893-1964). Togliatti had a long and close
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earlier than anticipated due to people before them having been unable to claim their 
cars, they still had not amassed enough money. Nonetheless, they received the car 
due to their status as ‘senior workers’.944 Aleksei Pavlovich wrote: ‘I bought my 
first car, the VAZ 2103, in 1972. This day was, naturally, the best’.945 Or Vladimir 
Gennadyvich who wrote: ‘when I purchased the 2101 in 1974,1 was very proud and 
ecstatic, my dream of having my own car was fulfilled, and more so as it was a 
Zhiguli.946 Another received his Zhiguli from his father who originally purchased it 
in 1970 and between the two of them they drove the car for 24 years.947 ‘When I sat 
at the wheel of a Fiat 124 in Italy [I] understood that the future Zhiguli would be 
'klassnol ’948 The official means of obtaining a vehicle tended to be rife with 
cronyism and painstakingly slow. The non-official means included using blat or 
paying a black market price.949 Thus, there was a tension between the state mandate 
to provide cars for the ‘average’ citizen and the reality of obtaining, and 
maintaining, a car. This issue was internally generated but externally exacerbated 
by the use of and contact with foreign technology, personnel and knowledge of 
rapidly advancing standards in Western Europe and North America. In comparison 
to the 32.5 percent whose fondest memory was obtaining their first car, only two of 
the forty respondents, or five percent, mentioned working with foreigners or 
travelling to Italy as being their favourite memory, this despite 52.5 percent having 
worked with foreigners in Tol’iatti and 12.5 percent having been to Turin. ‘Working
association with the Soviet Union having spent most of an 18 years exile In Stalinist Russia. 
Togliatti maintained ties with Khrushchev, despite his written but never presented Yalta 
Memorandum in which he ascribed to the need for the autonomous development of 
socialism in various countries. He was in Yalta to m eet with Khrushchev, when he passed  
away in 1964. Two common transliterated spellings for the city are Tolyatti and Tol’iatti 
while the original Italian form of Togliatti is used typically to refer to the man but not the city. 
For more information on the naming of Tol’iatti s e e  V. A. Ovsiannlkov, Stavropol' -  Tol’iatti 
(Tol’iatti: Izdatel’stvo fonda <Razvitie cherez obrazovanie>, 1996) 350-355.
944 They did not drive the car but sold it for an older model, using the profits to purchase a 
garage and to help fund their daughter’s move to Moscow. Field note from a discussion  
with Galina Valentinovna 15.03.02 Tol’iatti.
945 Questionnaire no. 19.
946 Questionaire no. 6.
947 Questionnaires, 30 and 39.
948 Questionnaire no.28.
949 For an example of how the illegal m eans were showing up in society se e  the satirical 
letter ‘If you like to ride’ by R. Zakiyev and I. Loukin in Pravda as printed in CDSP Vol.XXVII 
no. 10: 20.
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in a new modem factory was very interesting and informative... The work at VAZ 
also gave the possibility to visit and to learn closely about Italy’ .950
Most individuals moved to Tol’iatti for the material incentives. Workers and 
specialists were made ‘irresistible’ offers: an apartment of their own, modem 
facilities, fertile plots of land/dachas, and the prospect of rapid professional 
advancement. The tradition of offering workers incentives dates back to the 1930s 
when the labour shortage lead factories to offer accommodation, food stuffs etc. in 
order to procure the necessary labour force. Like most colossal ventures, this one 
did not run on schedule and workers and families found themselves living in overly 
crowded hostels. Acknowledging the massive demographic changes occurring G.
N. Andreev stated that: ‘people are coming to our city. Only in the past four months 
[the population] has increased by five thousand people and is now at 155,000. This 
is not insignificant’.951 On 19 March 1969, Pravda ran an article stating that the city 
and the Volga factory was encountering larger problems than anticipated,952 but later 
that month A. Tarasov, the Minister of the Automotive Industry, wrote in Nedelia 
that construction was ‘advancing on all fronts. ’953
The increased possibility to travel and contact with foreigners were non­
economic or non-direct economic incentives associated with VAZ. Two and a half 
thousand Soviet specialists worked in Italy over a five-year period. The first 
delegation was sent to Turin in February 1966 and stayed until the beginning of May 
1966. The length of each stay was variable: three weeks to eighteen months. Soviet 
officials facilitated the travels wherever possible. For example, A. A. Butko, from 
the department of automotive imports, recalled how there was never an issue of the 
usual three to four week waiting period for a visa, he and other specialists could 
arrange to meet with any European firm within twenty-four hours. N. N. Poliakov 
noted that during the initial phases of VAZ he and his team of specialists were able 
get into the ‘work plane [and fly to] Moscow, Turin, wherever they liked...that was
950 Questionnaire no.2.
951 ‘Iz dokiada pervogo sekretaha Tol’iattinskogo GK KPSS G. N. Andreeva na VII pienume 
obkoma KPSS o zadachakh partorganizatsii g. Tol’iatti v sviazi so  stroitel’stvom zavoda po 
proizvodstvu legkovykh avtomobilei’ (23.05.1967): 33-34 as reprinted in VAZ: istoriia v 
Dokumintakh: 1966-1983qg 34.
952 S. Bogatoako and E. Manko, ‘500 Gektarov pod kryshei,’ Pravda (16.03.19691:2
953 A. Tarasov, ‘Avtomobilizatsia,’ Nedelia no. 9 (1969): 4.
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the type of freedom the specialists had’.954 Travel was facilitated by VAZ having 
been allotted a plane and pilots. Contact with Tol’iatti was also facilitated in Turin, 
where there was a direct line with Moscow and Tol’iatti. These privileges of being 
exempt from some of the bureaucratic drudgery and of having industrial priority 
were non economic incentives that were to be associated, if only subconsciously, 
with Western industry.
When asked what was the beginning of VAZ for him, A. I. Grechukhin, who 
went to VAZ as an inexperienced institute graduate and who was sent to Turin for 
thirteen months where he met his future wife, answered ‘an article by Marietta 
Shaginian in Izvestiia about VAZ, Fiat, the city. It was a well-written article. And I 
thought: it wouldn’t be a bad place to work in this factory.. .It was only a thought. I 
decided then to go’ .955 Not only did working for VAZ result in Grechukhin meeting 
his future wife, it also resulted in, soon after his return to Tol’iatti in 1968, being 
sent to Germany, Sweden and Denmark.956 The opportunity to work abroad 
provided new professional and personal experiences. Prior to 1968, engineer O. G. 
Oblovatskii had worked at the Yaroslavl tractor factory. Upon agreeing to work at 
VAZ, he was to spend a year abroad in Turin. Recalling this time: ‘we [Oblovatskiii 
and collègues] became acquainted with how to build an industry in the West, what 
capitalism was and how it worked’ .957 Head of the Department of Important 
Technology for VAZ, V. N. Ustinov remembered having great respect for the Italian 
specialists and his pleasure at being able to work with them in Italy. He discussed 
how the team of Soviet specialists and workers worked to assimilate knowledge 
down to the smallest piece. ‘Everything was unknown to us, new. We had many 
questions’.958 V. Shuliatev, who spent almost a year in Turin, reiterated this thought 
when he noted in his interview for a local Soviet paper that his initial group sought 
to absorb everything, as ‘everything was unknown and new’ .959
In general, the respondents who worked abroad were satisfied with the 
amount of hard cuiTency they were paid, and felt that they were able to purchase 
sufficient goods. Perhaps in recognition of the hardships of being abroad, or the
954 interview with V. N. Poliakov in Shavrin, VAZ : 34.
955 A. I Grechukhin, in VAZ: stranitsv istorii vospominaniia I faktv -kniga vtoraiia 29.
956 A. I Grechukhin, in VAZ: stranitsv istorii vospominaniia i faktv 30.
957 A. I Grechukhin. in VAZ: stranitsv istorii vospominaniia i faktv 30.
958 V. Shuliatev, ‘Odin Iz pervykh,’ Volzhskii avtostroitel’ (26.11.1969):3.
959 V. Shuliatev, ‘Odin iz pervykh,’ Volzhskii avtostroitel’ (26.11.1969);3,
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necessity of maintaining appearances, Soviet citizens who were to go to work or to 
train in Turin were given spending money, and extremely high away-from-home 
daily remuneration. This contentment with remuneration is in contrast with the 
reports of tourists who were interviewed in a study conducted in the 1970s by Max 
Ralis, in which five thousand Soviet citizens who were travelling in Western Europe 
were asked what they liked the best and the least about their country. The 
comments tended to note the insufficient quantity of hard currency:
• ‘When you get the chance to travel abroad -  which is rare, sometimes 
no more than once in a lifetime -  you re so restricted in foreign 
currency that you’re prevented from really enjoying your trip to the 
full’ (thirty-seven yeai' old mechanic from Rostov);
• ‘They don’t give us enough foreign cunency.’ (thirty-eight year old 
worker from Odessa);
• ‘Unfortunately we get very little foreign currency, and we can only 
dream of buying souvenirs’ (female worker from Orekhovo- 
Zuyevo).960
A degree of envy and resentment was expressed against those Soviet citizens 
who benefited personally from their time abroad. Upon leaving an interview 
conducted with a factory employee who often went abroad and a medical doctor 
from the factory polyclinic, the doctor asked if this researcher had noticed the 
unusually high quality of goods in the home. The doctor noted that the interviewee 
had gone abroad often and always came back with clothes, appliances and other 
sought-after goods, noting that the employee’s children were always better dressed 
and her house was always finer than those of people who were not able to go 
abroad.961 Another worker recalled that in the early period one of the best benefits 
of becoming a brigade leader at VAZ was that he could fly regularly and cheaply to 
the Baltics where he would buy children’s toys and sweets.962
Residents of Tol’iatti had not good, but better, possibilities of travelling to 
Italy as tourists. The travels normally included a visit to Turin, Venice, Florence, 
and Bologna.963 For some, travel abroad was a benefit that they experienced only
960 Rails, T h e Soviet Worker’ 244.
961 Interview spring 2002 Tol’iatti with Elena Aleksandrovna.
962 Interview spring 2002 Tol’iatti with Anatoli Petrovich.
963 Reports of these travels were published in the local paper Volzhskii avtostroitel’ . S e e  F. 
Nikolaev ‘Bol’shot drug?’ Volzhskii avtostroitel’ (01.07.1970): 1; N. Korshunov, Turistskim
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v e r y  l a t e  i n  t h e i r  c a r e e r s  a s  t h e r e  w a s  t h e  i n i t i a l  f l u r r y  a n d  t h e n  a  d r y  s p e l l  w i t h  
t r a v e l  r e s u m i n g  o n l y  t o w a r d s  t h e  G o r b a c h e v  e r a .  G a l i a  V a l e n t i n o v n a  t r a v e l l e d  
a b r o a d  f o r  t h e  f i r s t  t i m e  w h e n  s h e  w a s  50 y e a r s  o l d .  A l t h o u g h  s h e  h a d  l i t t l e  t o  
c o n t r i b u t e  t o  t h e  d e l e g a t i o n  a t t e n d i n g  a n  e x h i b i t i o n  i n  B i r m i n g h a m ,  s h e  w a s  d u e  f o r  
r e t i r e m e n t ,  a n d  h e r  p l a c e  i n  t h e  d e l e g a t i o n  w a s  s e e n  a s  a  r e t i r e m e n t  p r e s e n t .964 
O t h e r  n o n - w o r k  r e l a t e d  c o n t a c t  i n v o l v e d  t r a v e l l e r s  v i s i t i n g  T o l ’ i a t t i  i n  t h e  e a r l y  
1970s, a s  T o l ’ i a t t i  w a s  p a r t  o f  a n  o r g a n i s e d  t o u r  o f  s i x  c i t i e s  a n d  o f  c u l t u r a l  
e x c h a n g e s  r u n  b y  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  I n f o r m a t i o n  a g e n c y ,  U S I A .965 N o t  a l l  t h e  w o r k  
a n d  t r a v e l  e x p e r i e n c e s  i n  I t a l y  w e r e  f a v o u r a b l e .  V. Ya. A i m u k o v  d e s c r i b e d  h i s  s t a y  
i n  T u r i n  a s :  ‘w e  f e l t  o u r s e l v e s  t o  b e  l i k e  p a r t i c i p a n t s  i n  a n  a n e c d o t e ,  w h o  h a d  j u s t  
f a l l e n  a b r o a d .  O n e  s a w  i n  t h e i r  [ t h e  I t a l i a n ]  s t o r e s  a t  l e a s t  t w e n t y  t y p e s  o f  s a u s a g e ,  
t h i r t y  t y p e s  o f  c h e e s e ,  a n d  f e l t  f a i n t ’.966 A f u t u r e  G e n e r a l  D i r e c t o r  o f  V A Z ,  V. V. 
K a d a n n i k o v ,  c e r t a i n l y  d i d  n o t  e n j o y  t h e  e x p e r i e n c e .  K a d a n n i k o v  s t a r t e d  w o r k i n g  i n  
t h e  f a c t o r y  in  M a y  1967. S h o r t l y  t h e r e a f t e r  h e  w a s  s e n t  a s  p a r t  o f  a  l a r g e  g r o u p  o f  
s p e c i a l i s t s  t o  T u r i n .  A l t h o u g h  h e  f o u n d  t h e  n e w  t e c h n o l o g y  a n d  p r o d u c t i o n  m e t h o d s  
t h a t  w e r e  a s  t h e n  n o t  p r e s e n t  i n  t h e  U S S R  i n t e r e s t i n g ,  h e  w a s  ‘a l w a y s  s c a r e d ’ . He 
r e p e a t e d l y  h a d  a  t i c k e t  t o  r e t u r n  h o m e  o n l y  t o  h a v e  h i s  s t a y  e x t e n d e d .  ‘I w a s  
s t r a n g e l y  h a p p y  w h e n  V A Z  w a s  f i n i s h e d .  A l l  t h e  s a m e ,  t h e  m a i n  w o r k  w a s  d o n e  
h e r e ,  a n d  o v e r  a  y e a r  a b r o a d  w a s  m o r e  t h a n  e n o u g h  f o r  me’ .967
The individuals who were sent to Turin returned with new ideas, experiences 
and perceptions. Their new knowledge was transmitted to others in several ways. 
Professionally, they sought to quickly implement new norms, methods and 
practices, often straining the Soviet industrial system in their attempts to do so.
They communicated their personal experiences to colleagues, friends and family.
To some extent, the national press told and retold the stories of those individuals 
who, by working in Turin, were making a valuable contribution to the Soviet 
Union’s great leap forward. The exposure was extensive but not remarkable, for
marshrutom,’ Volzhskii avtostroitel’ (03.08.1971): 4; ‘Vstrecha s  molodymi kommunistami 
Rima,’ Volzhskii avtostroiter (25.05.1974): 2. Interviewees also noted that one of the 
benefits of working in Tol’iatti w as increased a ccess  to travel abroad, specifically to Italy.
964 Fieldnote from a conversation with Galia Valentinovna 15.03.02
965 Howard Sochurek, ‘Russia’s  mighty River Road: the Volga,’ National Geographic Vol. 
143. no.5 (1973): 579-613, 606.
966 V. la Aitukov in VAZ: stranitsv Istorii. vospominaniia i faktv: 131.
967 Interview with V.V, Kadannikov in Shavrin, VAZ 95.
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this was a period in Soviet history when it was fashionable to discuss what the West 
had to offer.
While the majority of the foreigners were Italian, the result of Fiat 
subcontracting large portions of the work to other firms resulted in a strong presence 
of other foreigners. Poliakov recalled that along with the Italian specialists there 
worked many teams from foreign firms in West Germany, France, Sweden,
England, Japan, the USA, and others.%8 Due to American embargos against the 
USSR, Fiat would purchase from or contract the foreign firms and then ship the 
goods and services to Tol’iatti. Poliakov is careful to recall that it was during the 
cold war, there were tensions with all Western countries and that France and Italy 
simply happened to be a bit friendlier.969 Visiting delegations were often covered in 
the local and national press, in the former usually on the first page.970 For example, 
in June 1970, the Soviet press announced the arrival of four international companies 
represented by their specialists in Tol’iatti, one American (Landis Tool), two Italian, 
and one German (SAKK).97i According to a US congressional report there were on 
average 850 foreigners present: six hundred workers from Italy, and two hundred 
other Westerners (Germans, British, French and Americans).972 Translator 
Liudmilla Petrovna noted that there was a demand for English that could not be fully 
met.973 The government sought to rectify this through a special course at the 
University of Leningrad for future VAZ employees. The course was a combination 
of English as a second language and a study of foreign car* enterprises.
Part of the contract between the USSR and Fiat provided that Soviet 
specialists would visit the plants, notably in Turin, and the Italians would assist in 
training, construction, and establishing the quality control in Russia. In a press 
interview, the president of Fiat, Giovanni Agnelli, said of the exchange of workers 
that; ‘construction of such scope ensured a great demand for our technical 
specialists. They [Fiat specialists] gained wonderful experience... Our young
968 interview with V. N. Poliakov in Shavrin, VAZ 33.
968 A. I. Mikoyan, Press-Konferentsiia.
969 V. N. Poliakov, ‘ Vaz dlia mania -  eto v se ,’ Volzhskii avtostroitel’ (01.02,2000): 2-3, 2.
970 ‘Finskaia delegatsiia na VAZe,’ Volzhskii avtostroitel’ (18.07.1974): 1 ; untitled article with 
photo in Volzhskii avtostroitel’ (14.12.1974): 1.
971 Y. Gurin, ‘Start blizok,’ Volzhskii avtfostroitel’ (13.06.1970): 1.
972 US Congress House Committee on Banking and Currency, Sub committee on 
International trade.The Fiat Soviet Automobile Plant and Soviet Economic Reforms 
(Washington Point: March 1967) 3.
973 Interview spring 2002 with Liudmila Petrovna.
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people came back full of enthusiasm and resolve’ .974 Several returned to Italy with 
spouses and approximately ten married and remained.975 A high-ranking interpreter, 
noted that life in Tol’iatti was extremely difficult for the foreigners and that many of 
them wanted to go home.976 While the Soviet workers and specialists were placed 
in Turin for six weeks to eighteen months, foreign workers tended to have far 
shorter stays, on average six weeks in Tol’iatti.
The Italians were either housed in the hotel in the ‘old town’, or in apartment 
blocks, which they themselves constructed. The hotel was supplied with an Italian 
chef, an espresso bar, Chianti, Italian TV and an Italian Catholic priest.977 To this 
day, the Italian constructed yellow brick buildings stand out from the monotonous 
rows of once white, slightly decrepit looking buildings that surround them and are 
considered to be prized accommodation, for, while they were constructed as 
communal flats, with five individual rooms sharing a kitchen and bathroom 
facilities, the walls are relatively soundproof. Those foreign workers who arrived 
before the completion of the housing complexes were put-up in the hotel and had 
their own chef, specially brought in Italian news, entertainment etc. While the city 
was designed so that no worker would have to travel more than twenty minutes by 
public transport to get to the factory, the foreign workers were shuttled in special 
buses to the factory. To the chagrin of some of the original Soviet workers, the 
foreign guests were allotted a single toilet in the entire two kilometre long central 
building, and this toilet was filled with water containing dead fish.978 The isolation 
and special considerations seem to be more in the nature of concessions and being a 
good host than deliberately trying to separate the Soviet citizens from the foreign 
workers.
P. M. Katsura has recalled how the working methods of the Italians were of 
interest to the Soviet workers. Tire Italian workers were ‘ready to complete any type 
of work. What interested then most of all was their wages, for our workers what 
was important was to see the end of the line, that today they finished their work... 
Never more, and less is also not permitted. It is necessary to have the even amount
974 Agnelli, Giovanni as quoted in L. Yugov, ‘Soviet-ltalian Contacts Expand,’ 3
975 Bystrova, Na volne pamiati 85.
976 Interview in Tol’iatti with Lydmilla Petrovna Spring 2002.
977 Sochurek, ‘Russia’s  mighty River Road: the Volga,’ 606.
978 Isakov, ‘Zdravstvui, VAZ,’ 2. It would be interesting to know how many toilets were 
allotted to Soviet workers and what that water w as like.
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that is needed’,979 The brigade formations were also different. The Italian teams 
worked more as a loose group of individuals with each doing what one could. In the 
article ‘Together With Us’ the press was pleased to report that 30 specialists 
representing companies from Italy, the Federal Republic of Germany, GDR, 
Denmark, and Bulgaria contributed to the success of the 6*'^  working day of the 
week.980 O. G. Oblovatskii, who worked both with the specialists from the German 
company Schuler as well as with Fiat specialists, remembered the impact of the 
Italians: ‘for hundreds and hundreds of Italians the city of the Zhiguli was not just a 
work address...because here they not only worked but lived, and worked, closely 
with Russia and its people, even fell in love, started families’.9Si He also recalled 
that there were many arguments between the Italians and the Russians. The 
redesigning of the parts proved extremely problematic as it resulted in the need to 
rebuild many of the presses. Many of the Italian assemblers refused to do anything 
other than erect the presses to Fiat specifications, resulting in Soviet brigades being 
left to refit the machines. Vladimir Isakov, a motor master who began working at 
VAZ in 1969, recalled his conversation with the Italian engineer from the Mirafiori 
factory in which the Italian was against the proposed changes but concluded by 
saying that it was a matter to be resolved by the Russian engineers and that they 
were responsible. Iskov responded with ‘thank you’ and ‘don’t worry’.982 The 
Soviet planners often refused to use the Italian recommended firms, choosing 
instead their own supplier or manufacturer. For example, the planners decided to 
employ the West German equipment producer Liebeherr instead of Pfauter, because 
they felt that the former’s new methods were better. In the end, Fiat refused to 
approve changes and thus to guarantee the part. However, some changes were 
common decisions. After the building of the first prototypes in the Krasnodarskii 
region it was discovered that the vehicles could not handle the Soviet road 
conditions: ‘the roads were not very good.. .and the car drove, but did not drive 
more than nine thousand kilometres’ .983 The Fiat also needed to be adapted in order
979 Katsura in VAZ 60.
980 A. Gusev, ‘Vmeste s  nami,’ Volzhskii avtostroitel’ (24.04.1971): 3.981 O. G, Oblovatskii In Bystrova, Na volne pamiati 82,982 Isakov, ‘Zdravstvui, VAZ’ 2.983 interview with K Bakhtov in A. Shavrin, VAZ 130.
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to function in winter conditions. The second test car drove a total of thirty thousand 
kilometres before needing major repairs.
Contact with the foreigners was neither restricted to the elite nor to work. 
Question seven of the survey asked about work with foreigners: 12.5 percent of the 
respondents had worked abroad, (sixty percent of them were male); and 52.5 percent 
of the total respondents had worked with foreigners in Tol’iatti, (thirty-three percent 
of them were women). From those who elaborated about working with foreigners 
came such comments as: T worked with the Italian specialists, they were good 
specialists’;984 ‘yes, we worked in Tol’iatti [with the foreigners], it was a fantastic 
work experience’;985 and T didn’t have contact with them, but I worked alongside 
them’.986 The tone of the newspaper articles discussing the participation of foreign 
workers is similar to that used by interviewees: there tends to be a generally positive 
discussion without any sense of exceptionality. Fiat and its employees were 
bringing modem technology that was impressive but which only through Soviet 
tempo, aggrandizement, and modification would become extraordinary.
The degree of outside help, and calls to do things ‘as it is done in the factory 
of Fiat’,987 do not seem to have affected the attitudes of the local citizens and 
employees of the factory, the overwhelming majority of whom said that the factory 
was ‘theirs’. Indeed, management was under constant pressure to ensure that every 
aspect of the production and end product would ‘be not worse than that in Fiat’.988 
Issues of ownership became clearer with three events. The first was the dispute over 
the colouring of the first cars. It is commonly believed (the veracity of this belief 
was confirmed by a senior member of the paint department) that the Italians thought 
that the first three cars should be coloured red, green and white for the Italian 
flag.989 The Soviet officials objected and stated that the first colours should be that 
of the flag of the Russian Republic. In the end, the first several hundred cars were 
white. The second was the fulfilment of the initial contract in 1975. When a 
representative of the factory who had worked there from the beginning referred to
984 Questionnaire no. 22.
985 Questionnaire no. 15.
986 Questionnaire no. 13.
987 Visakov, Volzhskii avtostroitel’ (15.09.1971);3.
988 In an interview with Poliakov, ‘Molodezh’ dolzhna reshaf na VAZe giavnye zadachi,’ 
Volzhskii avtostroitel’ (27.04.2000): 2.
989 Interview with Galina Valentinovna.
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the leaving of the Italians in 1975, she made it clear that she felt that the Italians had 
abandoned the Soviet project. Their contract was up and they simply left, regardless 
of what work remained to be completed. 990 By the autumn of 1975, the press wrote 
predominantly of the ‘Soviet’ Zhiguli with increasingly fewer references to the Fiat 
124.991 The third event was the development of the Niva, which was Soviet 
designed and produced.
During the stay of the Italian workers and specialists, various activities were 
organised that promoted contact. Many of these activities were organised by VAZ’s 
international friendship club. These activities tended to either be cultural, or sports. 
One example of a cultural event (15:09.1967) occurred in commemoration of the 
fiftieth anniversary of the October Revolution. Italian workers who were preparing 
the technical documents for VAZ joined workers and engineers working in Tol’iatti 
in celebration. The Day of the Fast Wheel was a cycling competition between 
employees of VAZ and of Fiat. Newspaper articles covering the events were 
peppered with Italian words and expressions, buona sera, finito, si si, ok, Ciao etc. 
Football matches, which eventually evolved into a tournament held in the local 
stadium, were, like cycling, to become a regular source of friendly national 
competition.992 In 1972, the success of the Italian-Soviet venture was immortalised 
on film. The Mosfilm studios, working together with the Italian film industry, 
produced a colour documentary about the Avtozavod on the Volga. The film 
‘Factory: Big And At Once’ was the story ‘not only about the birth of VAZ, but 
about the life of the Italian colony’993 and was produced for Soviet and Italian 
audiences. As one Muscovite was to recall: ‘we have to thank Italy, the Zhiguli was 
very well adopted -  it was wonderful. ’994
990 interview with Larissa Ivanova.
991 S ee  for example P. Barashev and N. Mironov, ‘VAZ; segodnia i zavtra,’ Pravda 
(28.08.1975): 2.
992 For an example of local coverage s e e  R. Bannikov, ‘Pod flagom druzhby,’ Volzhskii 
avtostroiter (16.09.1970): 4. or ‘Uvlekaternyl polufinal,’ Volzhskii avtostroitel’
(09.09.1970):4.
993 Interview with O. G. Oblovatsk in N. Bystrova, Na Volne Pamiati: Kniqa Pervaia 85.
994 interview with A. Kalinin (04.03.2003) Moskva.
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Conclusion
The international nature of the construction of the AVTOVAZ factory was 
much heralded by the Soviet press and leadership. For the Soviet regime it 
highlighted for its citizens its ability to provide Western quality consumer goods; 
that it was serious about meeting the material demands of the people; that there were 
impressive technological advances occurring within the Soviet Union, be this in 
terms of Sputniks or automobiles; and that the Soviet Union was indeed catching up 
with and would overtake the West. A then contemporary assessment of the 
relationship between VAZ and the Soviet regime was that the ‘rapid expansion of 
production of private passenger cars at VAZ was an integral part of the new 
leadership’s effort to provide quality consumer goods as incentives for Soviet 
citizens’.995 It was necessary in order to inspire and motivate collectively in order to 
create enthusiasm for new methods and products.996 It also constituted a 
commitment to a new, modern, management method that was to be advocated as the 
correct method for numerous industries. Elements of this style of management 
included: significant levels of independence, accountability of managers, the wage 
system, and bonuses for professionals. ‘Both the style of management and the wage 
system at VAZ are claimed to be more appropriate to a modem, technologically 
progressive enterprise’.997 At the Party Congress, G. K. Mironenko declared 
not only that the VAZ car was ‘guaranteed for life’ but also that it was a ‘symbol of 
state quality’.998 It was also an endorsement of the policy of co-existence.
In Tol’iatti there was the newest, best and most technologically advanced 
equipment. In Tol’iatti one could more quickly achieve those material goods to 
which the majority of Soviet citizens of the period aspired: a flat, a dacha, easier 
access to nursery schools, a car, and professional advancement. The AVTOVAZ 
factory was a testimony to the hard work of the Soviet worker. The Zhiguli/Lada 
was a Soviet car made in a Soviet factory, but both official sources and survey
995 Holliday, Western Technoloav Transfer to the Soviet Union 165.
996 Sotnikov, ‘Nekotorye voprosy khozialstvennogo rascheta,’ 124-128.
997 Ekonomlka I orqanlzatsila promvshlennogo proizvodstva no.1. (1976): 47-210. 181. A. 
K. Osipov, chief of administration of labour organisation and w ages at VAZ, spent a year 
and a half at Fiat and intimates that this experience was instrumental in formulationg VAZ’s  
w age system . S ee  ‘VAZ— Shkola upravlennii,’ Ekonomika i orqanizatsiia promvshlennogo 
proizvodstva no.1. (1976):116-117.
998 N. Poliakov, ‘Avtomobile Vaz 2101 -  the state symbol of quality,’ Volzhskii avtostroitel’ 
(19.04.1972): 1-2.
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respondents maintained that it could not have been done without the technological 
and managerial assistance of Fiat and other outsourced companies. The Soviet 
government did not issue only praise for the West. It was consistent in its 
condemnation of Western politics and the cruelties of capitalism. However, 
communists who professed to find the injustices of capitalist democracy repugnant, 
appear to have been able to laud Western-manufacturing methods. If these 
communists could call for Soviet workers to unite in catching up with and 
overtaking the West, then there must be something there worthy of the effort. The 
propaganda about the West in its entirety was inconsistent and complex. The 
separation of modem technology and capitalism as seen through the divergent 
nature of capitalist societies serves as a testament to the viability of a separation. 
However, Soviet propaganda never fully succeeded in articulating this partition, thus 
finding the nation bound to an oppositional image that was in the long term unable 
to convincingly present the argument of how to institutionalise modem technology 
without capitalism.
The AVTOVAZ is but one example of how the Soviet government facilitated 
the creation of a positive economic image of the West. Taken on its own it 
represents an intense episode of ‘positive’ economic exposure both industrially and 
personally. Placed within the context of its time, surrounded by numerous other 
examples of the propagation of this image, it illustrates the widespread phenomena 
that eventually resulted in Soviet citizens being provided with an ‘other’ that was 
seemingly better suited for the attainment of their material objectives. linages are a 
combination of concrete ideas and the shadows that surround them. What was not 
conveyed, the shadow as it were, of the economic image, was how it could be 
achieved without adopting the evils of capitalism. The society was provided with an 
objective, and an allusion to the system that was currently leading in the attainment 
of this objective. From the launching of Sputnik to the first man on the moon, the 
consistent valuing of Westem technology and implicitly the standard of living, 
coupled with the consistent vilification of the means of creating and achieving this, 
resulted in the creation of an image of the West in which the means were unfair, 
unjust and unacceptable but in which the results were lauded and sought.
This image was one of advanced technological and production capabilities.
It included images of youth, modernity, momentum, the power of the consumer, and
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while perhaps not high, but definitely higher, standards of living. Bruno 
Hessenmueller’s description of the new modern lifestyle was intended to apply to 
the Federal Republic of Germany but it is international in nature. Writing in 1956 
he stated that:
this kind of lifestyle... is of course strongly influenced by technical and 
practical considerations.. .It may take any number of forms, from the three- 
piece suit, through cutlery and the radiogram, to beauty aids or the products 
of the latest research in nutritional science. But in every case, what we have 
is a combination of technical perfection with formal beauty in design.999
The interpretation of communist ideology within the Soviet Union after 
WWn restricted the concept of technology by attempting to place it outside of the 
field of culture. This policy was adopted in an attempt to realise the objective of 
modernisation and increased standards of living while still condemning the 
ideologies of those nations from which the Soviet Union sought ideas and 
technology. The destination was the same; both the regime and the people wanted 
to be caught up to and ahead of the West. This resulted in the image of the West 
being a complex combination of evil personified and yet nearer to utopia than the 
Soviet homeland was. While it falls outside of the scope of this study, it would be 
of interest to trace this idea through to the present day and examine the ramifications 
this dual image has had on post Soviet Russia, which appears to have accepted the 
evils of democracy and of capitalism and the joys of consumerism. The frustration 
of unmet expectations was internally driven and externally exacerbated.
In many ways the factory has come full circle. It was once a joint venture 
and is moving towards this again. After the 1990s, when various mafia groups 
fought for control over the auto works, and which earned Tol’iatti the title of ‘murder 
capital of Russia’, the factory was subdivided with several divisions entering into 
partnerships with foreign automobile concerns. These joint venture divisions are 
considered more stable, and better paying than the independent Russian divisions. 
General Motors has revamped the Niva for the European market and production of 
the Micra is in the implementation stage. The general standard of living is higher in 
Tol’iatti than in the surrounding environs due primarily to the factory. The most 
‘modem’ factory in the Soviet Union has re-established its international contacts in
999 Bruno Hessenmueller, ‘Werbung für den modernen Lebenssti!,’ Pie Anzeiq 33. no.2 
(1956): 76.
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hopes of competing in the international arena. Many individuals today as in the late 
1960s and 1970s would share the opinion of the widely read journal Literaturnaia 
gazeta when it declared succinctly: 'VAZ- Eto StiV. woo
1000 T. Kol’tsova, 'VAZ-Eto Tem p,’ Volzhskii avtostroiter (08.10.1974): 2.
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Conclusion: The beginning of the end and the end of a 
beginning
It is time for us to stop seeming, and to start being. (Vissarion Belinskii)
How come in everything we do we have to be appealing to somebody else? Always 
somebody else to tell us i f  this right or wrong, i f  it good or bad... Is like we ain ’t 
have no self I mean, we have a self but the self we have is for somebody else. Is 
like even when we acting we ain’t the actor. (E Lovelace)woi
The economic and technological images of the West were constructed 
through a prism of Soviet tolerated and Soviet propagated images that found 
resonance in Soviet society. Examples of sources of these images included the 
Soviet media, foreign permitted media, Soviet and non-Soviet films, exhibitions, 
and contact through technical co-operation. These images were ones of technical 
successes that involved mass production, advanced technology particularly in the 
fields of clothing, petrochemicals, radio science, transportation and construction. In 
large part these images were associated with the consumer, with the notion that the 
technology would afford the individual more leisure and more comforts. An 
integral aspect of the economic and technological images was that they were 
positive and desired. A regime can hardly propagate the slogan of overtaking and 
surpassing the West if the image of the West is entirely negative. As David 
Joravsky has argued, overtaking and surpassing ‘coexisted with the need to stop 
kowtowing to the West, each inflaming the other.’ 1002 The crux of these images was 
an economic and technological West that was appealing enough to motivate, excite 
aspirations and promote allegiance without crossing the line to social unrest.
Another fundamentally problematic aspect of the images was that despite being 
promoted as Westem, the artefacts of the images were to metamorphose to either 
culturally neutral artefacts or to Soviet ones. This process is seen in the VAZ 
factory as the Italian Fiat 124 was, through a joint process, to become the Soviet 
Zhiguli.
1001 E. Lovelace, The Dragon Can't Dance (London; Longman, 1981) 188.
1002 David Joravsky, Russian Psvcholoav: A Critical Historv. (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989) 
406.
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Participation in the building of the mythical other occurred on several levels 
from the elite to the general population to foreigners. One of the defining features 
of the Thaw was the melding of modern and modernity with an industrial 
superstructure and a relatively recently displaced peasant population. This process 
was pushed by the Party hierarchy who sought to secure their political future as well 
as by sectors of the public who sought to improve their standard of living and to 
maintain their nation’s international status, which had been won in large part 
through the valiant efforts of the general population. As Guroff has written 
‘Marxism [had] added a pro-industrial presumption to the dominant traditional 
Russian ideology based on a single centred, hierarchical society in which legitimacy 
emanated only from the tsar or Party.’ ioo3 Susan Buck-Morss has written that the 
‘Bolshevik experiment, no matter how many specifically Russian cultural traits it 
developed, was vitally attached to the Western modernising project, from which it 
cannot be extracted without causing the project itself to fall to pieces.’ 1004 The 
nature of the Cold War and the end of terror on a massive scale, civil war and direct 
military activity meant that for the first time in Soviet history the government was 
dealing with a stable population base. In addition to the new social contract with the 
masses, a new social contract with a broadly defined elite needed to be established. 
Situated between the general population and the Party leadership were petty 
officials, the intelligentsia and a scientific and industrial elite. While there was a 
great deal of uncertainty under Khrushchev, it seems improbable that there was less 
stability than at any other previous period in Soviet history. Thus, claims that his 
reforms were thwarted by petty official and industrial managers upset at the new 
instability is indicative of a comparatively high level of general social stability. 
Rising expectations from workers and demands that the direct employer (for 
example the factory) supply increasingly better living quarters, consumer durables 
etc and the pressure from the state for increased production left petty officials and 
industrial leaders grappling to address short term needs and unable to seriously 
contemplate long term objectives. It was also not in their best interest to concentrate 
on long-term objectives as their positions were tied to short-term output and not the 
success with which they laid the groundwork for further development.
1003 Guroff, ‘Economic innovation: Observations’ 308.
1004 Buck-Morss, Dream World and Catastrophe 68.
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The intelligentsia’s position was strengthened by their role as the bearers of 
cultural and scientific knowledge, two fields in which the Soviet regime sought to 
impress upon the world the leading status of the Soviet Union. A ‘social cushion’ 
was needed between the power summit and the masses. The intelligentsia was, in 
part, to fill this role.ioos The intelligentsia’s moral, material, and political status 
afforded it the meagre luxury of eventually rejecting the West and consumption. 
Anti-Westemism was an affectation that came to separate educated individuals from 
the uncultured masses. This increasingly privileged position of the intelligentsia 
was furthered by the role afforded to it by the West with the superimposing of the 
concept of liberalisation on the Thaw period. It is an historical inaccuracy to afford 
the intelligentsia a central role in the Thaw period, which was a period of party 
leaders, mass social movement, bureaucratic upheaval and the rise of the 
intelligentsia.
Khrushchev’s policies constituted a rejection of the atavistic excesses of 
Stalinism and marked a new, modem and inherently Western path for the Soviet 
Union. Fundamental to Khrushchev’s policies was the idea of consumption, 
allowing the consumption of material objects to be a projection of both personal and 
collective identities, and an expression of both compliance with and resistance to the 
state. 1006 Consumption as an ideological and political ambition redefined the 
relationship between society and state, society and the enemy (the West), and 
society and the communist future. Khrushchev staked his legitimacy, and that of the 
Party present and future, on a post-industrial definition of material realities of 
everyday life. This definition was to act as a straight jacket for Khrushchev and 
subsequent leaders. As Boris Kagarlitsky has noted, the ‘worse the situation in the 
economy became, the more the ideology of consumerism turned against the system, 
which was incapable of fulfilling its own promises.Too?
If it is accepted that the problem lay in the nature of Khrushchev’s reforms, 
the question arises; was a return to Leninism or Stalinism possible? A fair 
assessment would be that a return to the Terror was possible, events in Hungary,
1005 Moshe Lewin, Stalinism and the S eed s of Soviet Reform (London: Pluto Press, 1991) 
259.
1006 Crowley, ‘Style and Socialism: Modernity and Material Culture in Post-War Eastern 
Europe’ 4.
1007 Kagarlitsky, The Disintegration of the Monolith 18.
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Poland, Prague, the continuation of the gulag system and the repression of 
individuals and groups attest to this, but not probable. As the process of dé­
stalinisation progressed, the prospect of a return decreased. The return to the 
monolithic idea of the Truth, the insistence of its existence having cost so many 
lives, was not possible. Accepting that a return to the Terror was improbable, that 
the concept of the Truth was shattered and that the government lacked the gravitus it 
once had, the government was left to renegotiate its relationship with society in 
general and with the industrial elite and intelligentsia in particular. Compensation 
for the loss of legitimacy that accompanied the loss of the communist Truth was 
sought through external factors (war victor, superpower status, world leader) and 
internal legitimacy (benevolent provider). The Khrushchev and Brezhnev regimes 
were, like other totalitarian regimes, sensitive to social pressure regardless of how 
voiceless and powerless the individual was meant to be. According to Vladimir 
Bukovskii:
These regimes are maintained by fear and the silent complicity of those who 
surround them. Each person should be absolutely powerless before the state, 
completely without rights and generally to blame. In this atmosphere the 
word, even spoken from abroad, comes to have a huge strength, it is not by 
chance that they executed poets among us. At the same time both the powers 
and the people understood perfectly the illegality of the regime, its 
illegitimacy. In this hidden civil war the external world (zagranitsa) becomes 
the highest arbiter. Just as a gangster, who has become wealthy through 
fighting, attempts to be accepted by high society, arrays himself in a dinner- 
jacket and imitates the habits of the profit-making businessman, the Soviet 
regime thirsts to be accepted as an equal in world society. The exclamations 
about being the most just, the happiest, the most progressive, and absolutely 
the most socialist state have long disappeared into the shadows. Tf s no worse 
among us,’ or ‘Do they have it any better?’ -  these are the subtexts of present 
Soviet propaganda. loos
Consumption was needed as evidence that life was getting better, as a source of 
faith, as a replacement for terror, as a means of stability and as a diversion during 
upheaval and change. The adoption of limited finite consumerism was a crucial 
form of internal legitimisation. The focus on improving the material living of Soviet 
citizens, resulted in increased attention being paid to areas such as agriculture, 
housing, consumer goods, and thereby causing ‘much greater consideration of 
scarcity in relation to competing needs’ than was previously done, and placing strain
1008 Vladimir Bukovskii, Pis’ma russkoqo puteshestvennika (New York; Chalidze, 1981} 29.
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on the traditional mechanisms of the central planning system. 1009 The fact that 
consumption could be both stabilising and destabilising was recognised by the 
communist regime, which sought to temper the problematic aspects of consumerism 
by introducing the idea of controlled consumption, otherwise known as austere 
consumerism or goulash socialism.
Moshe Lewin has argued that the appearance of discrepancies between the 
official and non-official values and perceptions that a people use to guide their 
activities and a state uses to govern is inevitable. 1010 However, if discrepancies 
arise within core sectors, for example the economy or if it becomes a general 
condition, the political structure itself is compromised. Within the Soviet Union, the 
discrepancy was not between perceptions between classes or groups but between the 
realisation of the official ideology and its utopian image. That this discord was 
universal can be seen in the consistent nature of the economic image of the West, 
and the nature of the collapse of the Soviet Union. That the Party was no longer 
leading but was in a state of reacting to social changes and needs is evidenced by its 
absorption with commonplace tasks as each implementation of innovations and 
reforms posed the risk of unleashing a process that could exceed the Party’s ability 
to control.
The rise of inquiries, commissions and surveys conducted by the state during 
the 1950s and 1960s is consistent with notion of state sensitivity to social pressure. 
The economic expectations seen in various surveys from this era indicate that the 
rising sense of expectation was disproportional to current and often projected 
capacities. Was this discrepancy a failure of the state to communicate its limitations 
to the citizens? Was it a manifestation of optimism: a genuine sense of having 
achieved the impossible and a faith in continuing with comparable successes? Was 
it indicative of the success of the Soviet propaganda machine? Or was it a demand: 
we the Soviet people believe that there are other citizens with a higher standai’d of 
living and we want it for ourselves? The answer is all of the above.
Given the extensive nature of participation in the creation of the image of the 
mythical other from the intelligentsia, to workers, to Party officials to foreign cold 
warriors, it is perhaps not surprising that the image was built through an infinite
1009 Nove, Political Economy and Soviet Socialism 137.
1010 Lewin, Stalinism and the S eed s of Soviet Reform 337.
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number of sources. Employing an imagery that was used in the Introduction of this
work: the image of the mythical other was built thi’ough a multitude of pebbles
being dropped into a still body of water. The reverberations in the water are the
dispersion of the information and the pattern of the ripples in the sand the image.
The image was to be built through primary and secondary contact of a both Soviet
and Westem nature. Soviet based contact included but was not restricted to: general
media, speeches, conferences, tourism, industrial contact etc. Non-Soviet contact
included but was not restricted to tolerated Western media including films,
reproduced media, tourism, exhibitions etc. Despite numerous sources, the image of
the mythical other was relatively uniform: wealthy, consumer driven, impressive
technology, frivolous/extravagant bordering on nonsensical/silly, desirable if not
achievable, transferable and intertwined with the Soviet future. During the 1950s
and 1960s, this image was adopted by the vast majority of Soviet citizens and the
West for various reasons, some of which have been mentioned above. The child of
the Party official wore his/her Levis jeans as a sign of his/her status within the
system: the dissenter wore them as a sign of protest and non-compliance. The
Westem officials of a national exhibition seemingly casually incorporated them as a
sign of consumer wealth and national mass production capabilities. The economic
nature of the mythical other and its adoption into Soviet culture meant that it was to
play a role in the shaping of the comrade consumer.
A problem lay in the potential diversion of loyalties resulting from
modernisation. Writing about the creation of mass consumer society in the USSR,
William Turpin prophesised that:
were the Soviet economy to develop in such a way as to encourage the citizen 
to become deeply absorbed in the acquisition and enjoyment of consumer 
goods, particularly of the durable variety, one result would very likely be the 
rapid growth of interests and preoccupations that would compete with -  and 
indeed, be detrimental to- the Party’s claims upon the citizen’s time and 
attention. 1011
The ideological ramifications border on the Kafkaesque: a dishwasher would free up 
more time for Party and communist oriented activities, but its presence might 
promote more private time. It may also promote increased private gatherings. This
1011 William N. Turpin, T h e Outlook for the Soviet Consumer,’ Problems of Communism 
no.6 (1960) 30-37, 32.
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is to say nothing of the stress that it would cause to the already inadequate water and 
electrical lines. Consumption takes time and energy.
A study of Soviet policy establishes that consumption was not at odds with 
the official ideology. Consumption was an ill-fitted aspect of the official identity 
and an awkward and often shunned component of the new Soviet man. The price of 
the failure to produce can be seen in the increased dissatisfaction of Soviet society, 
despite improvements in living conditions; in the solidification of the image of the 
West as having the most viable system for providing for high consumption; in the 
acquiescence of the role of the Party in the race to impart the highest standard of 
living; and in the failure of the Communist ideological system to maintain its 
credibility. Aided by petrol-dollars, Brezhnev sought to minimise the instability by 
returning to a historically defined concept of prosperity that would allow for 
significant improvement. However, the dissemination of information about the 
West during the 1950s and 1960s and the contact with the images, if not the reality 
of, Westem goods and technology had become too widespread to allow for the 
removal of the Western standard of living as a yardstick against which to measure 
Soviet material realities. Brezhnev’s success at redefining prosperity from modern 
international to the historical national was moderate, that the Soviet system was to 
outlive Brezhnev is indicative of a compromise having been achieved. The Post- 
War social contract was one that befitted a modern superpower with initial 
concessions due to the war. The challenge was not in arriving at an agreement but 
in fulfilling it.
The mythical other was used to help define expectations by making them 
more concrete and to legitimise expectations and consumption. Expectations 
needed to be made concrete given the nature of Soviet history and understanding of 
the future. The political and ideological need to create a schism between the 
imperialist and Soviet past as well as to distance the Socialist leaders from Stalinism 
resulted in history being problematic and limited largely to the Lenin years. In part 
as a balance to the past and in part an aspect of international post war modernisation, 
the projection into the future was equally truncated allowing for a few decades.
This time constraint not only exasperated the economic aspect of the social contract 
between citizens and the elite, it resulted in the mythical other being weighted 
heavily in the Soviet future and in the nature of the comrade consumer. This highly
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Westernised comrade consumer was propagated by the state and retained as a 
comrade as the regime was seeking to create a new social contract through 
consumption. The mythical other was to have an impact on the comrade consumer 
and on a broader scale on Soviet society and its view of the future.
Coupled with the rise of expectations was the increase in vocalised 
discontent. Dissatisfaction was expressed as letters to editors soared, protests and 
workers’ actions broke out, work apathy intensified, unstable work patterns 
increased (for example, the migration of skilled workers such as tractor drivers from 
the Virgin lands), the second economy grew, and social apathy was felt. Usually a 
driving force in any social change, the youth, specifically the urban youth, were 
absent from Thaw politics, but not from Thaw cultural, social or scientific life.
Clear indications of the limits to political change drove youth into these other areas 
of which two of the dominant trajectories were the West and consumption. As with 
any new trend, there were those within Soviet society who rejected these 
trajectories. The aloofness towards Westerners and in particular towards consumer 
goods was to increase as disillusionment over the Soviet Union’s inability to achieve 
parity increased.
There were distinct political advantages for Khrushchev’s regime to co-opt 
Western material successes. For the individual, the promise of more goods was to 
serve the same motivational role as the potential to earn large sums of money served 
in capitalistic systems. A nation-wide high standard of living would legitimatise the 
Soviet Union’s international position as a superpower in areas other than the 
military and had the prospect of legitimising the regime’s status. However, the 
inherent risk in this approach was increased expectations and discontent. Writing in 
the early 1970s, Paul Hollander theorised that the ‘key to the stability of the Soviet 
system lies in its management of expectations’. 1012 The principle of sacrifice, which 
almost became a ‘psychological instrument of motivation’ prior to and during WWII 
began to lose effectiveness by 1948 and by the mid 1950s had largely ceased to be a 
source of motivation. 1013 One sees the absence of this mentality by the mid 1950s 
in Elena Zubokova’s study of comments made on election ballots. As the comments
1012 Paul Hollander, Soviet and American Society: A Comparison (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1973) 388.
1013 Zubkova, Russia After the War 101.
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on the electoral ballots make clear, people were less interested in politics than in 
their own material problems:
• What kind of faith can the voters have in the government when as long 
ago as 1930 the newspapers promised that people in the Soviet Union 
would soon cease to have to live in basements? This is deception.
Until the present day people continue to take shelter in underground 
lodging in dreadful poverty.
• Everywhere it is said and written that we are prosperous and have 
everything, while in fact we have nothing. It is empty chatter... What 
has become of consumer goods? We have to stand in line all day. Are 
we under blockade? The truth is that abroad they have everything, and 
here at home we have only rubbish. 1014
Particularly problematic was the rise of the perception of consumer desire as a 
‘right’ ; material plenty was an essential measure of the advancement of the Soviet 
socialist system. 1015 In 1978, Vaclav Havel, stated that:
Our system is most frequently characterised as a dictatorship or, more 
precisely, the dictatorship of a bureaucracy over a society. I am afraid that 
the term ‘dictatorship’... tends to obscure rather than clarify the real nature 
of the power in this system...What we have here is simply another form of 
consumer and industrial society... [TJhe post-totalitarian system has been 
built on foundations laid by the historical encounter between dictatorship and 
the consumer society.’ 1016
The Soviet Union was defining itself as a superpower that was 
technologically and economically behind while simultaneously making brilliant 
strides towards a glorious future (i.e. sputnik). Evidence of advance could be found 
in the closing of the standard of living gap between the Soviet Union and the West 
(think butter, milk, radio etc production) in general and between the Soviet Union 
and the United States in particular as the two superpowers. The race was close 
enough that after sputnik the Soviet slogan of catching up and surpassing the West 
was joined by the American slogan of ‘Catch up with the Russians!’ thus 
completing the image of tail chasing.
During the Thaw, cultural and industrial contacts were never subjected to an 
impermeable Ron Curtain. For political reasons, international co-operation and
1014 Zubkova, Russia After the War 162.
1015 Humphrey. ‘Creating a culture of disillusionment: consumption in Moscow, a chronicle 
of changing times’ 55,
1016 Vaclav Havel et al., The Power of the Powerless: Citizens Against the State In 
Central-Eastern Europe (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1985): 37-40.
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contact were represented often as mere snippets of hope within a battle for 
ideological survival. However, the ideology of communism was countered not with 
another ideology, in this regard the West was lacking, but by tangibles. It is highly 
plausible that that the majority of ‘average’ citizens did not know that Pepsi-Cola 
was being produced and sold in the USSR, that the Kopek 40 ice cream used 
American technology, that popcorn was introduced in 1960 (1,000 industrial 
machines were purchased from the USA) after Khrushchev sampled it in America, 
that Rot Front used Swiss machines to produce its chocolates, or that the clothing 
and footwear industry drew heavily on Western technology and fashions. It is 
plausible, but not likely, that the average citizen had never been to an exhibition 
involving Western states/companies, read about the exhibitions, met a Westerner, 
seen a Westem film or read a piece of Western literature. It is implausible, that 
having avoided informed contact with all of the above and with individuals that 
came into contact with the above, that the average citizen did not know about Party 
claims of catching up with and overtaking the West/the USA; of communism being 
achieved by 1980, of the coming of prosperity, of the scientific technical or 
technical material basis of Communism, or of works such as the AVTOVAZ. This 
exposure was a destabilising factor in internal Soviet politics.
A defining characteristic of the Thaw was that it was an era in which the 
limits of possibilities and probabilities were set. Prior to the Thaw, the future of the 
Soviet Union was a fantastical abstraction. During the Thaw an image of the future 
was created that drew heavily upon the reality of the West and combined it with the 
social utopianism of communist ideology. The concrétisation of an idea made it 
more accessible but also allowed progress to be tracked. Thus, failures destabilised 
not only the social contract between the public and the government at that time, but 
also the willingness of the population to perceive the communist future as viable.
As Denis Kozlov has written, the population ‘emerged from the quest without much 
optimism and came to believe in the permanence of problems facing the country and 
the people.’ 1017 From its inception, the Soviet state made both internal historical and 
external contemporary comparisons. During the Thaw, external contemporary 
comparisons dominated. This provided an alternative path to consumption that
1017 Dents Kozlov, T h e Historical Turn In Late Soviet Culture’, Kritlka Vol.2 no.3. (2001): 
577-600, 597-598.
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while not perfect was increasingly perceived as more palatable. In many ways, the 
melting process of the Thaw was to unveil non-communist alternatives.
There has been a wealth of research into the Thaw period form various 
disciplines including but not exclusive to social anthropology, sociology, politics 
and the history of science and technology in particular and history in general. 
Previous research has provided the inspiration and the undeipinnings for ‘Comrade 
Consumer: Economic and Technological Images of the West in the Definition of the 
Soviet Future’ in which images and ideas, that have either been examined in 
isolation or are underdeveloped (communist consumption, the Soviet future and the 
economic and technological West) are triangulated. The penetration of these 
correlated images was found to be ubiquitous, and to have had a significant impact 
on several strata of Soviet society. For every research question answered in this 
study, a new one arises. Potential veins of future research include pursuing similar 
research on a comparative basis with other former Soviet states. Of particular 
interest would be comparisons with the ‘Near West’ countries (for example Hungary 
and East Germany) that were perceived as both Westem and Soviet in nature. 
Through a reading of the archival research, it became evident that another country 
that consistently shifted between West and East was Japan. Japan with its post War 
legacy, rapid modernisation, geographic location and dependency on imported raw 
resources had the potential to be a significant trade partner for the Soviet Union. A 
study into the economic and technological images of Japan and the role that they 
played in the development of Soviet-Japanese trade would be of interest. Perhaps 
the most logical continuation would be to continue with the mythical other and the 
elite in the Soviet Union, asking to what extent did the ‘corruption’ of the elite by 
westem economic and technological images lead the elite to allow or even 
encourage the collapse of communism?
Khrushchev’s legacy, and the legacy of the Thaw, was the establishing of the 
idea of alternatives: of altemative paths for socialism; of altemative leaders and 
leaderships; of altemative social contracts and the solidification of the idea of the 
importance of the individual in respect to the state; and of altemative means of 
achieving ‘all life’s comforts.’ The concept of the alternative and the right to 
alternatives could not have been institutionalised to the extent that it was without the 
use of economic and technological images of the West. The introduction and
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illustration of alternatives through Party disseminated and tolerated information was 
to serve the role of both social and economic pressure valve while destabilising the 
political legitimacy of the Party and communism. The mythical other was a 
composite image of the West based on officially permitted information that was to 
motivate Soviet citizens and to promote agreement on a new social contract. The 
short-term impact of the creation of the comrade consumer and the mythical other 
was a sense of momentum, progress, openness and even optimism. The Soviet 
Union had taken up its place in world culture and politics. It also reinforced 
increased demands for improved standards of living and decreased tolerance for 
Soviet reality. Ultimately, it provided a second path, an alternative future, which 
contained the consumer but not the comrade.
Theory without practise is sterile...Sometimes, as you know, an orchat^d 
blossoms and man rejoices when he looks at the blossoming trees. He expects 
that in the autumn the orchard will yield an abundant crop o f fruit and reward 
his labou?'. But blossom time passes and the man sees that after the blossoms 
have fallen off, no ovary has been formed. So there will be no fruit, and this is 
a great disappointment. The man feels that his high hopes and expectations 
have been deceived. (Khrushchev, 7'^ ' Congress o f the Bulgarian Communist
Party, 03.06.1958)ioi8
1018 Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers 203.
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Appendix A 
ToPiatti Questionnaire Translated
1. Full Name
2. Date of Birth
3. Where and as what have you worked?
4. Were/are you a party member?
5. In your opinion, why did Fiat and VAZ build in Tol’iatti?
6. Was it necessary to have a partnership with Fiat? If yes, why?
7. Did you work with Italian workers in Tol’iatti or did you work in Italy?
8. During the first years of VAZ, what was your opinion of the Zhiguli/Lada?
9. Could you please tell me about your best memory about cars, working in a 
factory?
10. What do you think about the future of VAZ?
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Appendix E
Comparison of Soviet and American Consumer Goods:
USA 1975
USSR 1975
USSR 1965
□ Cars
■  Telephones
□  Televisions
□  Washing Machines
■  Vacum cleaners
□ Refrigerators
20 40 60 80 100
2 Based on table in Matthews, T he Soviet Worker at Home,’ Industrial Labour in the U SSR : 
209-231, 212.
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Appendix F
Vneshniaia torgovlia: Trade Exports and Imports of Foreign Trade Divided
According to Country 3
1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965
Austria
Total 115.8 109.7 100.8 106.3 98.1 102.3
Export 43.5 40.7 40.5 41.1 38 42.5
Import 72.3 69 60.3 65.2 60.1 59.8
Belgium
Total 46.3 60.8 71.3 70 68.3 73.6
Export 26.4 30.3 41.5 44.2 48.4 45.4
Import 19.9 30.5 29.8 25.8 19.9 28.2
UK
Total 270.5 319.5 297.4 310.4 307.6 396.6
Export 173.2 204.1 191.8 193.5 214.7 209.8
Import 97.3 115.4 105.6 116.9 92.9 136.8
Denmark
Total 40.2 25.8 40.2 47.7 51.1 52.9
Export 24.3 21 18.3 18.9 19.3 25
Import 15.9 4.8 21.9 28.8 31.8 27.9
Italy
Total 173.7 203.6 206.9 245.5 209.5 224.5
Import 92.4 117.2 118.2 123 121 133 .
Export 81.3 86.4 88.7 122.5 88.5 91.5
Norway
Total 32.3 30.6 25.8 27.2 33.5 35.3
Export 16.3 16.6 14.3 15 18.4 18.4
Import 10 14 11.5 12.2 15.1 16.9
France
Total 183.3 179.9 215.9 157 157.6 202.2
Export 66.4 71.5 76.9 93.2 95.3 99.3
Import 116.9 108.4 139 63.8 62.3 102.9
Switzerland
Total 12.9 13.6 11.3 18.5 17.2 28.1
Export 3.4 5.6 4.8 8 9.1 15.9
Import 9.5 8 6.5 10.5 8.1 12.2
Sweden
Total 89.6 92.9 116.6 120.4 128.8 98.4
Export 48.1 46.3 47.8 57.9 49.5 50.9
Import 41.5 46.6 68.8 62.5 79.3 47.5
USA
Total 76.1 67.5 40 47.4 164.9 88.7
Export 22.2 21.9 15.7 22.3 18.6 30.5
Import 53.9 45.6 24.3 25.1 146.3 58.2
3 ‘Vn. Torgovli SSSR , O eksporte i importe vazhnelshikh tovarov’, Vneshniaia torgovlia. 
no.8 (1966): 1-16.
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Appendix G 
Profile of Questionnaire Respondents
Gender
M=Male
F=FemaIe
Occnpation 
B=Worker 
0 =  Office 
work
Member of 
the
Communist
Party
Contract 
with Fiat
necessary
Worked
with
Foreigners 
in Togliatii
Worked
abroad
1 M B No answer V
2 F 0 V V V
3 M B V
4 F O V V
5 M B No answer No answer
6 M B V V
7 F 0 V V V
8 F O V
9 M B V V
10 F O V
11 F 0 V V V
12 M B V
13 M B V V V
14 M B V V
15 F B V V
16 M B V V
17 F 0 V
18 F O V
19 M B V V
20 F B V V
21 M O
22 M B V V
23 F B V V
24 M B V
25 F O V
26 F 0 V
27 M B -V
28 M B V V V "V
29 M B -V V
30 M B V
31 M 0 V
32 F 0
33 F O V No answer
34 M B V V V
35 M B V V
36 M B V V
37 M 0 V V
38 M O V
39 M B V V
40 M 0 V V V
percentages M- 62.5% 
F~ 37.5%
B- 60% 
O- 40%
17.5% were
Party
members
92.5% felt 
that Fiat was 
necessary
52.5% 
worked with 
foreigners
12.5% 
worked in 
Italy
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Appendix H 
Song
Turinskoe nebo pohyto  tumanom,
I  kazhetsia nebo ogromnym karmanom. 
Karmanom, v kotorom chut’-chut’ porabotav, 
Popriatalis’ zvezdy - svetit’ neokhota. 
Popriatalis’ zvezdy - svetit’ neokhota.
A V  Tol’iatti vetra. Mnogo raznykh zdbot.
Ot utra do utra liudi stroiat zavod.
A V  Tol’iatti vetra. Mnogo raznykh zabot.
Ot utra do utra liudi stroiat zavod.
Po Tripoli c shumom nesutsia mashiny.
S asfal’tom tseluias’, skvoz’ noch’ voiut shiny. 
Pod sumrachnym nebom molchit Gamalero. 
Zabyv pro Turin, krepko spiat inzheneiy. 
Zabyv pro Turin, krepko spiat inzhenery.
A V Tol’iatti vetra. Mnogo raznykh zabot.
Ot utra do utra liudi stroiat zavod.
A V  Tol’iatti vetra. Mnogo raznykh zabot. 
Ot utra do utra liudi stroiat zavod.
Kogda-nibud’ my soberemsia v ToTiatti,
I  vspomnim San-Karlo, potrogav sediny.
Poka zhe razlukoiu s sem ’iami platim.
Za to, chtob v Tol’iatti my delali mashiny. 
Za to, chtob v Tol’iatti my delali mashiny.
First published in 1967, written by Lev Vainshtein
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